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HISTORY OF
GREECE



BY

T. T. TIMAYENIS.

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

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CONSTANTINE THE GREAT.

A
HISTORY OF GREECE

From the Earliest Times to the Present.

Telemachus
Thomas BY
T. T. TIMAYENIS.

WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

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1883.



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This Work is Respectfully Dedicated

TO

REV. DR. J. H. VINCENT,

PRESIDENT OF THE CHAUTAUQUA LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC CLUB,

AS

A TOKEN OF ADMIRATION

FOR HIS

WELL-DIRECTED EFFORTS

FOR

THE PROMOTION OF POPULAR EDUCATION.

JUN 13 '36

2 V.

PREFACE.

MY purpose in this work, undertaken at the request of my esteemed friend Dr. J. H. Vincent, has been to write a history of Greece based as far as possible on the testimony of authorities contemporary with the events narrated. While I cheerfully acknowledge my obligations to Gibbon and Grote—the most eminent of modern historians—a careful study of the Greek writers has led me to differ from them on many important matters.

The peculiar feature of the present work, therefore, is that it is founded on Hellenic sources. I have not hesitated to follow the Father of History in portraying the heroism and the sacrifices of the Hellenes in their first war for independence, nor, in delineating the character of that epoch, to form my judgment largely from the records he has left us. Nor have I scrupled, in narrating the great civil strife of the nation, to base my assumptions and conclusions on the testimony of the inimitable historian of the Peloponnesian war. If I have misinterpreted the facts or failed to draw legitimate conclusions, it is because I must have misconstrued the meaning sought to be conveyed by my illustrious ancestors. Indeed, I am but too painfully conscious of the brevity and

obscurity of certain passages, not only in Thucydides, but also in the most trustworthy of the other writers of antiquity.

Among the modern authors who have aided and guided me amid the obscurity pervading many epochs of Hellenic history, I desire to make special mention of the important history of Professor Paparegopoulos, whose work has been constantly by my side.

There remains for me the pleasant duty of tendering my warmest thanks to my friend and associate in the New York School of Languages, Professor Henry C. Miller, to whom I am indebted for many valuable suggestions and criticisms.

The difficulties which beset the historian in treating a subject so vast as the fortunes of the Hellenic nation, coupled with the obstacles which a foreigner, however much he may admire the beauty and manliness of English expression, must unavoidably meet in conveying his thoughts in a language not his own, may to a certain extent explain the reasons on account of which the author, after years of earnest labor, has fallen short of the lofty ideal he has aimed at—the graphic representation of Hellenism from its earliest stage to the present.

Such as the work is, he commits it to the judgment of the public, with a reasonable degree of confidence that its deficiencies will be charitably regarded by those who are best qualified to judge.

T. T. TIMAYENIS.

NEW YORK, 1881.

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A HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART FIRST.

THE MYTHOLOGICAL AGE.

CHAPTER I.

LEGENDS OF GODS AND MEN.

THE mythical traditions of the Hellenic nation are invested with a charm and an interest that have never ceased to delight and instruct the student of history. From the earliest times they have been the theme of praise and the subject of investigation.

According to the Hellenic cosmogony, the primeval existing principle of the universe was Chaos, from which arose the broad-chested Earth and that dark, indefinite realm called Tartaros, over which the earth was supposed to be suspended. Erebus (gloom) and Night were the somber children of Chaos; these in turn gave birth to the cheerful elements, Æther and Day. In these simple traditions we recognize the gradual evolution of light and harmony from the previous all-pervading darkness. Among the offspring of Earth were not only the mountains and the sea, but also the starry heavens.

In this way did the Greeks account for the various elements of the physical world. But the most important part

of the Hellenic religion related to the gods properly so called, all of whom were descendants of Uranos and Gê (Heaven and Earth). The first generation of gods, the immediate offspring of Uranos and Gê, were eighteen in number—three Hekatoncheires, three Cyclops, and twelve Titans, six of each sex. The Hekatoncheires were powerful monsters, having each, as their name signifies, a hundred hands. The Cyclops were remarkable for physical strength and manual dexterity; they were beings of fearful aspect, having in the middle of the forehead a single round and glaring eye. At a later period they became the forgers of the thunderbolts wielded by Zeus, the king of the gods.

The names of the six male Titans were Oceanus, Kœos, Hyperion, Krios, Iapetos, and Kronos; and they, together with their sisters and associates the Titanides, were the progenitors of the dynasty of gods who were supposed to govern the world.

Uranos, alarmed at the great strength and increasing power of his children, hurled the Hekatoncheires and the Cyclops into the gloomy depths of Tartaros, and confined the Titans and the Titanides in the caverns of the earth; whereat their mother Gê became enraged, and found means of furnishing Kronos, the youngest and boldest of the Titans, with an iron scythe, with which he inflicted a severe wound on his father Uranos, and made himself and his brother Titans rulers of the universe. But the Cyclops and the Hekatoncheires still remained in Tartaros. Each one of the Titans begat many children, but those of Kronos, by his wife the Titaness Rhea, were the most powerful, especially Pluto, Poseidon, Zeus, Hestia, Demeter, and Hera.

Kronos, fearing lest he should suffer from his children the same wrong which he had inflicted upon his own father, swallowed them as soon as they were born. But on the birth of Zeus, the youngest, Rhea, desirous of saving the child, deceived Kronos by causing him to swallow a stone

wrapped in swaddling-clothes. Zeus, having grown up, craftily induced Kronos to disgorge the other children. Afterward he made an attempt, with the assistance of his brothers, to snatch the kingdom of the world from Kronos and the Titans. A long and frightful combat ensued, in which all the gods and goddesses took part. Zeus released the Hekatoncheires and the Cyclops from Tartaros, and summoned them to his assistance. The former aided him by their surpassing strength and the latter by their invention of thunder. The party of Zeus took their station on Mount Olympus in Thessaly, and the Titans on Mount Othrys. The war lasted ten years. The din of battle resounded throughout the broad earth, and was echoed across the bosom of the sea. Even the lofty sky trembled, and the mountains were shaken to their foundation. Finally Zeus triumphed, and the conquered Titans were hurled into Tartaros, with the exception of Oceanus, who had taken the side of the victors. Thenceforward the scepter of the world remained in the hands of Zeus, who began to be called "the father of gods and men," while his brethren and their numerous progeny occupied important but subordinate positions in the hierarchy of the universe.

Such are the traditions of the Hellenic nation in regard to the origin of the gods. As to the origin of mankind, the account is still less clear. Man is supposed to have been created, or to have sprung up spontaneously on the earth, at a very early period, since we find him already existing in the "age of gold," in which, according to Hesiod, one of the most ancient of the Grecian poets, his state was perfect and happy. In the silver age, which succeeded the golden, the human race had greatly degenerated from their former blissful condition. In the next, or bronze age, this deterioration was still more manifest. It was then that they became addicted to strife, and learned the art of war. The age of heroes followed—an improvement on its predecessor, since

war became tempered with justice and honor. Finally, there was the iron age, that is to say, the present one. But it is supposed by many that this division of ages is an invention of Hesiod himself, for it does not coincide with the genealogies which form the basis of the ancient Hellenic history, and which treat of the descent of the earliest kings of the various Grecian states and communities. The first ancestor was usually represented as the son or immediate descendant of a god, or else as sprung from the earth, and hence called an autochthon. But the principal traditions point to Hellen as the reputed ancestor of the Grecian nation, whence the country received the name of Hellas, and its inhabitants were called Hellenes. He was supposed to be a descendant of the gods, and the following was the genealogy usually assigned him :

The Titan Iapetos begat by Klymene, the daughter of Oceanus, four sons—Atlas, Menœtius, Prometheus, and Epimetheus. Of these, Prometheus was the most daring and intelligent, as well as the wisest. Following the example of his grandfather Oceanus, he took the side of Zeus in the great struggle whereby the latter wrested from the Titans the sovereignty of the world. Soon after he took upon himself the protection of mankind, conferring upon them many benefits, yet also, by unintentionally exciting the enmity of the gods, inflicting upon them many woes. Prometheus stealthily obtained fire from heaven, and, having given it to men, taught them by its aid to practice the useful arts. Zeus, enraged at this, and at various other misdemeanors of Prometheus, devised a plan to punish both him and mankind. Among the many gods and goddesses over whom Zeus held sway were Hephæstus, Hermes, Athene, Aphrodite, and the Charites. Hephæstus, by command of Zeus, formed from earth a most beautiful maiden. Athene, Aphrodite, and the Charites adorned her with various charms, while Hermes imparted to her his cunning and his enchanting eloquence. This

woman was called Pandora, and the messenger of the gods brought her among men in the absence of Prometheus. The latter, who well knew that Zeus was his foe, had told his brother Epimetheus not to accept any presents from the gods. But the beauty of Pandora was irresistible. Epimetheus gladly received her, and allowed her to dwell upon earth among mankind, who thenceforth suffered many hardships on her account. Up to this period all the evils to which mankind are now subject had been inclosed in a certain casket. Pandora opened this casket, and allowed these evils to scatter themselves throughout the world; but just as Hope, which was also in the box, was about to escape, she shut the lid, and Hope "remained imprisoned, and therefore without efficacy, as before, the inviolable lid being replaced before she could escape."

Having thus vented his rage against man, Zeus revenged himself upon Prometheus by chaining him to a rock among the mountains of the Caucasus, and stationing an eagle at his side, which should incessantly torment him by gnawing at his liver. For many years did Prometheus endure this agony, until at last Zeus, wishing to increase the glory of his son Herakles, permitted the latter to kill the eagle and deliver the prisoner.

Now Deukalion, the son of Prometheus, and his wife Pyrrha, a descendant of Epimetheus, were the parents of Hellen, the mythic progenitor of the Hellenic nation.

The greatest impiety prevailed among mankind during the time of Deukalion and Pyrrha; wherefore Zeus resolved to destroy them by a general deluge. Terrible and lasting rains covered all Greece, excepting some of the highest mountain-peaks, on which a few escaped destruction. This deluge is supposed to have occurred in the year 1796 B. C., while King Ogyges reigned in Attica. Deukalion saved himself and Pyrrha by means of a wooden chest which he had constructed by the advice of Prometheus. For nine days

he was tossed about by the waters, and finally disembarked on the summit of Mount Parnassus. Zeus having sent Hermes to ask him if he needed anything, Deukalion begged that he would send him some men, that he might have comrades and followers, and no longer be alone on the earth. Zeus accordingly ordered Deukalion and Pyrrha to pick up stones from the ground and cast them behind their backs. These stones became men and women, and thus was Hellas again peopled. Besides Hellen, Deukalion and Pyrrha had a son Amphiktyon, the reputed founder and protector of a certain religious and political association of the Hellenic tribes, and a daughter Protogeneia, the mother of Aëthlius, who was considered the protector of the games of the Hellenic nation.

Hellen had three sons, Dorus, Xuthus, and Æolus, among whom he divided the whole country. Æolus became king of Thessaly, Xuthus of the Peloponnesus; and the latter, by his marriage with Kreüsa, daughter of Erechtheus, the autochthon hero of Attica, had two sons, Ion and Achæus. Dorus possessed himself of the land opposite the Peloponnesus, on the northern side of the Corinthian Gulf.

The inhabitants of all these parts were called Hellenes from Hellen; but from his sons they received in various parts the different names of Achæans, Æolians, Ionians, and Dorians.

Thus did the Greeks account for the first origin of the Hellenic nation and its four ethnic divisions. It must be observed, however, that these mythical traditions likewise contain a certain allegorical element with more or less distinct moral application. For instance, the moral conveyed by the legend of Prometheus is that no one can contend with impunity against the omnipotent will of God; and by the later poets this legend was expanded into one of the most affecting allegories ever conceived by the imagination of man.

Three centuries after Hesiod, Æschylus, the great dramatic poet of Athens, represented Prometheus not only as having bestowed fire upon man, but as having instructed him in all the arts, thus enlarging the scope of his life, and securing the future fortunes of the race. So that finally the story of Prometheus, who, in return for good deeds and disinterested kindness, suffered harsh imprisonment and torture, becomes a typical representation of the misfortunes and injustice which in this world so often prey upon genius.

But while, according to the myth of Hellen, the sons and descendants of Prometheus ruled over all Greece, each of the Grecian communities had its own traditions concerning the origin of its royal house. Many of these local traditions have no reference whatever to the family of Hellen, and some appear to be of even more ancient date than his genealogy. For instance, Inachus, the first king of Argos, was the son of the Titan Oceanus and the Titaness Tethys. Lelex, the first king of Laconia, and Erechtheus, the first king of Attica, were supposed to have been autochthons ; as was also Pelasgus, the first king of Arkadia, although some traditions represent him to have been the son of Zeus.

These contradictions, which are numerous in the Hellenic myths, resulted from the fact that the mythological traditions were cleared not at once, but by degrees, from the clouds that enveloped them.

In the beginning every tribe had its own separate traditions, so that the ethnic myths of Hellas were originally very numerous. At a later period chroniclers endeavored to link these traditions together and to give them a certain unity ; an attempt which was not altogether successful, since the legends were not complete. Hence the almost endless contradictions, and the consequent difficulty in interpreting the Hellenic traditions. It has already been stated that the first ancestor of each community was regarded as the son or immediate descendant of a god, or else as an autochthon or earth-sprung

being, in which case he was also considered divine. A similar extra-human origin was likewise attributed to the legendary heroes, and to those strangers from other lands, such as Kekrops and Kadmus, who are supposed to have planted the first seeds of civilization on Hellenic soil.

In fact, our forefathers regarded as demigods, rather than as men, not only the chieftains of their race, but even whole tribes of this remote epoch. On this account they attribute to them achievements surpassing human power and nature. Bellerophon, son of Poseidon and of a daughter of Sisyphus, king of Corinth, kills the Chimæra, a fire-spouting monster which had the head of a lion, the tail of a serpent, and the body of a goat. The hero only succeeded in accomplishing this deed by the aid of Poseidon, who gave him Pegasus, a winged horse, also sprung from the gods, mounted upon which he attacked and slew the Chimæra. Perseus, also one of the most distinguished heroes of the mythical epoch, attempts to kill Medusa, one of those numerous monsters so frequently met with in the Hellenic mythology. At first she was famous for her beauty, but afterward, having drawn upon herself the anger of Athene, the latter changed her beautiful locks of hair into serpents, and whoever looked upon them was transformed into stone. Perseus cut off the head of Medusa with the assistance of the three divinities, Pluto, Hermes, and Athene. Who does not know the astonishing deeds of Herakles, the most glorious of mythical heroes, the wonderful achievements of Theseus, king of Attica, and the superhuman strength of Theagenes, a Herakleid, who, among his many deeds of renown, proved himself a conqueror in all the games of Greece, and four hundred times received the victor's garland?

It is evident, therefore, that the world of these remote Hellenic years, created by the fervid poetic imagination of the ancient Hellenes, has nothing in common with the usual life of men. Its inhabitants are not children of mortals, but

descendants and relatives of the immortal gods, not possessing the usual measure of material and moral force allotted to man, but a certain superhuman strength and peculiarity. The Hellenes considered these traditions not only as a part of their religion, but also as belonging to their history, in which, too, they included the lives of the heroes, and the various enterprises undertaken by them. Of these the most famous were the voyage of the Argonauts, the war of the Seven against Thebes, and the war against Troy.

CHAPTER II.

THE VOYAGE OF THE ARGONAUTS.

IN the legend of the Argonauts, the descendants of Æolus, son of Hellen, play the most prominent part. Athamas, one of the sons of Æolus and ruler of Orchomenus in Bœotia, took for a wife the goddess Nephele, by whom he had two children, Phrixus and Helle. Afterward abandoning Nephele, he took another wife, Ino, daughter of Kadmus, who, disliking her two step-children, made several futile attempts on their lives, and contrived to bring about a famine in the land. Athamas sought advice from the oracle at Delphi. Ino, however, by her machinations, caused the oracle to reply that the scarcity would not cease unless Phrixus were sacrificed to Zeus. Athamas, compelled by the people, resolved to carry out this mandate. But the shade of his mother Nephele appeared to Phrixus, bringing a ram with golden fleece, on which he and Helle should escape over the sea. The ram started in the direction of Kolchis, but, as they were crossing what is now called the Dardanelles, Helle fell off and was drowned, in consequence of which the name *Hellespont* was given to that strait. The ram, however,

which among its many gifts had that of speech, encouraged the frightened Phrixus, and finally brought him safe to Kolchis. Æëtes, the king of that land, received him cordially, and gave him his daughter Chalkiope for a wife. Phrixus sacrificed the ram to Zeus in honor of his safety, and hung the golden fleece in the sacred grove of Ares.

Meanwhile, Pelias and Neleus, the twin sons of Poseidon, quarreled for the sovereignty of Iolkos in Thessaly. Pelias finally prevailed, and drove his brother away. But, inquiring of the oracle whether his throne was secure, he was warned to beware of the man who would come to him with but one sandal. Not long after, as Pelias was sacrificing to his father Poseidon, he saw Jason approaching him with only one sandal, having lost the other while crossing a swollen river in Thessaly. Pelias recognized him as the man against whom he had been warned by the oracle, and was still more troubled in mind when he learned that Jason was also an Æolid, being a grandson of Kretheus, a former king of Iolkos. In order to avert the threatened danger, he proposed that Jason should bring the golden fleece from Kolchis, hoping that he would perish in the desperate enterprise. But Jason, encouraged by the oracle, invited the most renowned heroes of Greece to join him in the expedition. Fifty warriors responded to his call, the most renowned of whom were Herakles, Telamon, Peleus, Kastor, Pollux, Laertes, and the musician Orpheus, the sweet sounds of whose lyre were destined frequently to console the heroes in their perils, and to appease the contentions that arose among them.

Argos, the son of Phrixus, aided by the advice and skill of Athene and Hera, constructed the ship in which the heroes were to sail. The name of this ship was the Argo, whence those who took part in the enterprise were called Argonauts. On her prow the Argo carried a piece of wood endowed with the power of speech and divination. This wood had been brought from the oak of Dodona, a town in

Epirus, the seat of a very early and celebrated oracle of Zeus—the oldest, indeed, in Hellas.

The Argonauts proceeded to the Hellespont by way of Lemnos, thence entered the Propontis (Sea of Marmora), and reached that part of the Bithynian coast where lived the aged soothsayer Phineus. Smitten with blindness by Poseidon for having shown Phrixus the way to Kolchis, and tormented by the Harpies, winged monsters that came from the clouds and snatched away or defiled the food placed before him, Phineus hailed with joy the coming of the Argonauts, for he knew by his power of divination that their arrival would bring him deliverance. Nor was he in error, for two of the Grecian heroes, Zetes and Kalais, the winged sons of Boreas, put the Harpies to flight, and would have slain them had not Hermes interceded, promising that they should for ever return to their cavern in their native Krete. It was in gratitude for this kindness that Phineus instructed the Argonauts how to effect a safe passage between the Symplegades, two immense cliffs that moved upon their bases, and crushed whatever attempted to pass between them. He advised them that they should first cause a pigeon to fly through, and that, at the moment the bird got clear, they should courageously attempt the passage. The Argonauts, following his advice, watched the pigeon as with incredible swiftness it flew safely between the cliffs, losing only a few feathers from its tail, and then boldly rowed the Argo forward, clearing the passage, with the loss of the ornaments at their vessel's stern. This was partly owing to the aid of Athene, who, as the cliffs were about to close upon the ship, stopped them for a moment with her strong arms. From that time forward the Symplegades remained stationary, in accordance with the decree of the gods that, if any should succeed in passing safely, the rocks should thenceforth lose their power of motion. Finally, the Argonauts reached Kolchis, where they found Æetes still reigning.

They summoned him to surrender the golden fleece ; but, although they were heroes of divine descent, and had come to recover it by the aid of the gods, he indignantly refused compliance save on the following conditions : The god Hephæstus had given to Æetes two unmanageable bulls that snorted forth fire and had hoofs of brass. To prove his renowned descent and the good will of the gods toward him, Jason must yoke together these frightful bulls and plow a considerable tract of land. This done, he must sow the field with dragons' teeth, when armed men were to spring up in the furrows. After this, he would be permitted to take, if he could, the golden fleece, hanging on an oak in the grove sacred to Ares and watched continually by a monstrous dragon. The wise Idmon, who accompanied the Argonauts in the capacity of a prophet, was the counselor of Jason in all these perilous attempts. The goddesses Hera and Aphrodite came also to his assistance, as did likewise Medea, daughter of Æetes. The latter had conceived a passion for Jason, and prepared him for his dangerous tasks by administering a magic potion which rendered him proof against fire and sword. Athene also helped him, and his success was complete. The Argonauts then set out on their homeward voyage, Jason taking with him Medea, who willingly followed him. On missing his daughter, Æetes started in pursuit. Medea, seeing that her father's vessel was gaining on them, dismembered her young brother Apsyrtus, whom she had taken with her, and cast his limbs into the sea. The delay caused by Æetes stopping to collect the mangled remnants of his child enabled the fugitives to escape. The Argonauts, however, were destined, before reaching Iolkos, to suffer innumerable difficulties, and to be tossed over many unknown seas.

Such is the legend of the voyage of the Argonauts, which, like all other mythical narratives of that epoch, has come down to us in various forms. The greater number of the

Greeks, even in the later historic years, firmly believed in these legends as commemorating the achievements of those heroes of superhuman strength and valor whom they not only esteemed as their ancestors, but also honored almost as highly as they did the gods themselves.

CHAPTER III.

THE SEVEN AGAINST THEBES.

LAÏOS, a descendant of Kadmus and king of Thebes, was warned by an oracle that, if he begat children, he would be murdered by his son. To avert the prediction, he pierced the ankles of the son who had been born to him by his wife Jokasta, and ordered the infant to be exposed on Mount Kithæron. The child, however, was saved by a shepherd and carried to King Polybus of Corinth, who reared it as his own, and, on account of its swollen feet, called it Œdipus. Grown up to manhood, and stung by the reproaches which he heard cast upon his birth, Œdipus consulted the Delphic oracle respecting his parentage, and was warned by it not to return to his native land, as he was there destined to slay his father and to marry his mother. Œdipus, believing Corinth to be his birthplace, instead of returning thither, journeyed toward Bœotia, thus rushing upon the fate which he sought to avoid. While passing along a narrow road, he met Laïos and his retinue. A quarrel having arisen between Œdipus and the royal attendants, the former slew Laïos, his father. Kreon, the brother of Jokasta, then succeeded to the throne of Thebes.

At that time the gods, being enraged against that land, were tormenting it by a frightful monster with the face of a woman, the breast, feet, and tail of a lion, and the wings of a bird. This creature, which was called the Sphinx, propound-

ed a riddle to all who approached her, and, on their failing to solve it, as was always the case, threw them from the high rock on which she dwelt. The riddle was as follows: "What animal is that which in the morning goes on four, at noon on two, and in the evening on three feet?" Œdipus promptly replied that the animal in question was man, who in the morning of life creeps on all-fours, and in old age walks with a staff; whereupon the Sphinx was so vexed that she cast herself from the rock and perished. The prize offered to the man who should succeed in ridding the country of the Sphinx was the throne of Thebes and the hand of Jokasta, the widow of Laios. Œdipus married her and fulfilled the oracle.

These tragical events were destined to lead to a succession of other misfortunes. The gods afterward made known the truth concerning Œdipus. Jokasta hangs herself. Œdipus, unable any longer to bear the light of day, puts out his own eyes, and, expelled from the city by his two sons, Eteokles and Polynikes, pronounces upon them a curse which speedily takes effect. Œdipus was accompanied in his wanderings by his faithful and high-souled daughter Antigone, who resolved to share his adversity. The sons, remaining in Thebes, soon fell into a fierce dispute concerning the succession to the throne, but at last agreed to reign during alternate years, Eteokles, the elder of the two, having the first period of office. When, however, his year had expired, he not only declined to retire in behalf of his brother, but expelled him from the city. Polynikes, brooding revenge, betook himself to Adrastus, king of Argos, who received him hospitably and undertook to aid him in recovering his rights. In company with Tydeus, a fugitive from Ætolia, Polynikes visited many parts of Greece in order to obtain companions-in-arms, and many a hero responded to their summons. The most celebrated of these constituted the confederacy known as the "Seven against Thebes." In this

war nearly all the besiegers were slain, while Polynikes and Eteokles fell by each other's hands.

Thirty years had elapsed since the expedition of the seven, when their sons undertook to avenge their fathers by a second attack on Thebes. This war, called the War of the Epigoni (the offspring), was entered upon with the consent of the gods, and ended with the destruction of the city, which for a long time remained a mere open space, called "Lower Thebes."

The various acts of this terrible tragedy were reproduced on the Athenian stage with all the poetic power of *Æschylus* and *Sophokles*. The drama of the latter poet on this subject is his masterpiece, and has stood the test of the severest criticism. Never was there a tale more affecting than that of *Œdipus*, and never was it told more pathetically than by *Sophokles*.

CHAPTER IV.

THE WAR AGAINST TROY.

THE most renowned and by far the greatest enterprise of the heroic ages was the war against Troy, the theme of the greatest of all epic poems, the *Iliad* of Homer. The north-western corner of Asia Minor, bordering on the Hellespont and on the *Ægean Sea*, was inhabited by the Trojans and the Dardanians. Their country extended eastward to the rivers *Granikus* and *Æsepus*, both of which fall into the *Propontis*, or *Sea of Marmora*. In the interior rose Mount *Ida*, with its lofty, well-wooded summit, and its slopes rich in fountains. The city of Dardania was founded by Dardanus, one of the favorite sons of Zeus, at the time when the Trojans lived at the foot of Mount *Ida*. *Erichthonius*, son of Dardanus, reputed to have been the richest of mortals, was the

father of King Tros, the founder of Troy, who had three children, Ilus, Assarakus, and Ganymedes. Ganymedes, the most beautiful of mortals, was carried away by an eagle to Olympus, where he became the cup-bearer of Zeus. Ilus succeeded his father on the throne of Troy, which from him was also called Ilium, or Ilion. The grandson of Assarakus was Anchises, who became by Aphrodite the father of Æneas, next to Hector the bravest of the Trojans. Laomedon, son of Ilus, then inherited the kingdom. He was the special favorite of the god Poseidon, who constructed a strong wall round the city of Troy. Laomedon was succeeded by Priam, by far the happiest and richest as well as the last king of Troy. His coffers were filled with gold, bronze, and costly garments. He was the father of fifty sons, a noble race, of whom the eldest was Hector. Next to him came Paris, or Alexander, whom Aphrodite endowed with a beautiful face and fine hair. Paris, having crossed the sea, became the guest of the golden-haired Menelaus, son of Atreus, who reigned over Sparta, and whose palace was resplendent with gold and silver. Paris was kindly welcomed by Menelaus, and freely admitted to his hospitality and to the society of his wife, the beautiful Helena, sister of the Dioskuri, Kastor and Pollux. Shortly afterward Menelaus, setting out on a visit to Krete, left his wife under the care of his guest. Then Paris, with the assistance of Aphrodite, readily persuaded Helena to elope with him to Troy, where she could live in Oriental luxury and splendor. Accordingly, deserting her husband and child, and taking with her but one faithful old female slave, she fled with Paris, who also purloined many costly treasures from the palace of Menelaus.

To avenge this insult, and to recover Helena and the stolen treasure, now became the duty of Menelaus and of his brother Agamemnon, who ruled over Mykenæ. The bravest heroes of Hellas joined in the enterprise under the su-

preme command of Agamemnon, son of Atreus. Among them were the powerful Diomedes of Argos, who had already distinguished himself in the war against Thebes, and Sthenelus, son of the famous Kapaneus. From the sandy Pylos came the sweet-speaking Nestor, the aged and chivalrous son of Neleus. From the western sea came Odysseus, or Ulysses, son of Laertes, king of Ithaca, a hero fertile in resources, inventive and ever ready. From Salamis came the mighty and great-hearted Ajax, the son of Telamon. But the most renowned of the Hellenic heroes was the swift-footed, lion-hearted, and godlike Achilles, son of Peleus by Thetis, a nymph of the sea. Achilles, who ruled over the Myrmidons of Thessaly, brought with him fifty ships, each containing fifty men. His father Peleus sent Patroklos, the son of Menœtius, to accompany his son to the war as a friend and companion. The ships and soldiery were ordered to assemble at Aulis, and the fleet was found to consist of 1,186 ships, carrying 135,000 warriors. The Trojans also had many illustrious warriors and numerous powerful allies; among the latter, the Lykians, commanded by Sarpedon, the Mysians, the Paphlagonians, the Mæonians, and the Phrygians. The Thracians, and many others from the opposite shore of the Hellespont, also came to their assistance.

The Greeks on reaching the Trojan coast drew their ships on the shore. Protesilaus, the ruler of Phylake, was the first to disembark on the hostile soil, and he was also the first to fall by the hand of the enemy. The Greeks made three attempts to take the city by assault, but were as many times repulsed. They therefore overran the country and drove away the flocks from Mount Ida, a course which the Trojans were powerless to prevent. For nine years the siege continued, the Greeks holding the Trojans closely hemmed in their city, which, however, they were unable to capture. Meanwhile, Achilles destroyed twelve cities on the seacoast

and eleven in the interior, killing or reducing to slavery the inhabitants. The islands of Tenedos and Lesbos, and the cities of Lyrnessus, Pedasus, and Thebe, fell before his mighty spear. On the division of the spoil after the capture of Thebe, Agamemnon obtained as his share the captive Chryseis, daughter of Chryses, the priest of Apollo. Chryses, having come to the ships of the Greeks with innumerable presents in order to ransom his daughter, was repulsed with contumely by the haughty Agamemnon. Apollo, yielding to the prayer of Chryses, brought on the camp of the Greeks a dreadful pestilence. Agamemnon, to appease the god, gave Chryseis back to her father, but to compensate himself took away from Achilles the fair-cheeked Briseis, who had become the prize of that hero. Achilles submitted to the will of his chief, but, deeply wounded at heart, retired to his ships, refusing to take any further part in the war.

With the above incidents begins the *Iliad* of Homer, whose theme is the "anger of Achilles" and its consequences to both Greeks and Trojans. After the retirement of Achilles the Greeks renewed their attacks against the Trojans, who, no longer fearing the valor of Achilles, issued from their gates and boldly assailed the besiegers. In the action that ensued the Trojans were hard pressed by Diomedes of Argos; but Hekabe, the wife of Priam, hastened with many of the Trojan women to the temple of Athene, and presented to that goddess a magnificent peplum, promising in addition a sacrifice of twelve oxen if she would preserve the Trojans from the valor of the Grecian hero. On the following day Zeus granted a partial victory to the Trojans by casting from Mount Ida into the ranks of the Greeks a thunderbolt, the flame of which, falling before the horses of Diomedes, frightened them, and compelled him to retreat. The Greeks were then obliged to retire to their camp, which, after the departure of Achilles, they had, on the advice of Nestor, intrenched with a ditch and

palisade. The Trojans, instead of returning to the city, encamped outside, and on the following day renewed the battle. At first they were put to flight and pursued up to the gates of the city. But, Agamemnon, Diomedes, and Odysseus having each received a wound, the Trojans rallied against their pursuers and drove them back to their fortified camp. And now the heroes of Troy, commanded by Hector, Paris, Æneas, and Sarpedon, made an assault on this intrenchment. The Greeks strove to repulse them, but the wind blowing from Mount Ida drove the dust into their faces, so that Sarpedon succeeded in forcing that part of the inclosure which was specially defended by the Athenians. The battle then continued within the encampment, and the Trojans steadily made their way toward the ships, until the Greeks, forced to take refuge on the decks of their vessels, there made a last desperate attempt at resistance.

At that critical moment Achilles, yielding to the entreaties of his friend Patroklus, permitted him to lead the Myrmidons to the assistance of the hard-pressed Greeks. Accordingly, Patroklus armed himself in the panoply of Achilles, that the Trojans might mistake him for the hero whose prowess they so greatly feared, and hastened to the scene of action at the head of the Myrmidons. The Greeks, reduced to the last extremity of despair, had decided to set fire to their ships, and already the vessel of Protesilaus was in flames. Just then Patroklus with his warriors fell upon the Trojans, turned the tide of battle, drove the enemy out of the encampment, pursued them up to the gates of Troy, and would have captured the city had not Apollo himself, intervening, thrust him back from the ramparts, broken his spear, and torn the breastplate from his shoulders, so that he soon received a mortal wound from the hand of Hector. With the greatest difficulty Menelaus, assisted by Ajax, recovered the body of Patroklus and brought it to the camp of the Greeks. The death of this hero again turned the tide of bat-

tle, and the Greeks were sorely pressed by Hector and the Trojans. But Achilles, deeply grieved at the fate of Patroklos, resolved to avenge him by slaying Hector, although Thetis, his goddess-mother, had foretold that he would not long survive the Trojan hero. Issuing from his retirement, he led his Myrmidons on to battle, fell upon the Trojans, who were still bivouacking on the plain, and with terrible slaughter drove them back to the walls of Troy. King Priam ordered the gates to be opened in order to admit the weary fugitives, and then to be immediately closed, lest the victorious Achilles should pursue them into the city. Hector alone, disdaining to flee, remained outside the walls, and entered into combat with Achilles. The Trojan fell, and Achilles, still unappeased, bound the lifeless body to his war-chariot and dragged it three times around the walls of Troy. Then the Greeks returned to their ships, singing their pæan or song of victory, while Priam and Hekabe were mourning their irreparable loss. Andromache, the wife of Hector, seated in the interior of the palace, hears the lamentation in the streets, rushes forth to inquire into the cause of it, and reaches the ramparts in time to behold Achilles dragging the corpse of her husband round the walls.

After Achilles had performed the funeral rites of his friend Patroklos, and instituted funeral games in his honor, the aged Priam made his appearance in the Grecian camp, bearing rich presents as a ransom for the body of Hector. Entering the tent of Achilles, he kissed the hands of the hero who had caused the death of his son, and implored him, as he valued the memory of his own father, to allow him to bear away the corpse, that he might bestow upon it the customary rites of burial. Achilles, touched by the gentleness of the supplication, raised the old man from his knees, ordered the body of Hector to be bathed and anointed, and with his own hands placed it on the chariot of Priam. He also granted to the Trojans a truce of eleven days that

they might bury their dead. The Iliad of Homer, to which we are indebted for the foregoing narrative, ends with an account of the funeral rites of Patroklus and Hector, rendered by their respective nations.

Death of Achilles.

After the death of Hector, an army of Amazons, under the command of their queen, the beautiful Penthesileia, daughter of Ares, came to the assistance of the Trojans, and she and Achilles met in single combat. The Grecian hero, anxious to spare the life of his fair antagonist, for a long time acted solely on the defensive, and did not strike a decisive blow until compelled to do so for his own safety. Then Penthesileia fell mortally wounded, and, remembering the fate of Hector's body, implored Achilles to spare hers that disgrace. There was no need of this. Struck with compassion, he raised her tenderly in his arms, and held her there until she breathed her last. The Trojans and Amazons rushed desperately forward to recover her body, but Achilles made a sign to them to halt, and, praising her valor, youth, and beauty, voluntarily yielded it to them; a kindly act, which touched friends and foes alike.

Afterward, Memnon, son of Eos and Tithonus, came to the assistance of the Trojans. He also succumbed to the might of Achilles. But the fatal hour of the latter was soon to arrive. Paris wounded him mortally with an arrow which Apollo guided unerringly to its mark. A deadly combat ensued for the possession of his body; but the Greeks finally prevailed, and carried the fallen hero to their ships. Both gods and men mourned his fate. Thetis, his goddess-mother, with the other Nereids, came from the depths of the sea and wept for him, and their lamentations resounded across the waves. After mourning seventeen days, the Greeks committed his body to the funeral pyre, placed his ashes in a golden urn together with those of Patroklus, and erected a

lofty tomb near the shore, so that it could be seen far out at sea.

Capture and Destruction of Troy.

There came to the ears of the Greeks a prophecy that Troy could not be taken as long as the Palladium (the image of the goddess Pallas Athene) remained in the possession of the Trojans, who kept it carefully guarded in the citadel. In order to preserve it still more effectually from theft, many other images had been constructed so similar to it, that they could scarcely be distinguished from the original. Odysseus, however, disguising himself as a beggar, entered the city for the purpose of purloining the statue. He was recognized by Helena alone, who, longing to return to her native Greece, did not betray him, but on the contrary assisted him to accomplish his object. This dangerous feat performed, Odysseus, acting under the advice of the goddess Athene, proposed to capture the city by means of a stratagem, to which the Greeks readily agreed. Epeius, a celebrated Grecian artist, constructed a wooden horse of enormous size, inside of which a band of warriors was concealed. The Grecian fleet set sail, leaving the horse standing on the beach. The surprise of the Trojans at this sudden retreat was only equaled by their joy. Issuing from the city, they hastened to the deserted camp of the Greeks, and, finding there the wonderfully constructed wooden horse, entered into a warm debate whether they should destroy it or preserve it as a trophy. Among those advocating the former course was one Laokoön, who even ventured to thrust his spear through its side, thereby proving it to be hollow. Nevertheless, the advice of the other party prevailed; especially when the gods, who were bent on the destruction of Troy, caused to come up out of the sea two large serpents, which crushed Laokoön and his two sons in their folds.

The infatuated Trojans resolved to preserve the horse

as a religious trophy, and even to take it into their city and dedicate it to the gods. They were confirmed in this resolution by the testimony of Sinon, a friend of Odysseus, whom the Greeks had left behind them on the shore, and who professed to be a victim of the jealousy and suspicion of his own countrymen, who he declared had intended to sacrifice him on the altar before their precipitate flight had he not been fortunate enough to effect his escape. For these pretended outrages the cunning Sinon feigned the most violent hatred toward the Greeks. Furthermore, he assured the Trojans that the horse was a sacred gift from the gods, and would always insure safety to its possessors.

Thoroughly deceived, the Trojans even destroyed a portion of the wall to admit the prize into the city, since its huge bulk forbade it to be drawn through the gates. That night, while the Trojans were rejoicing and carousing, Sinon kindled a beacon-fire as a sign to the Grecian fleet, which lay concealed behind the island of Tenedos; and at the same time the warriors that were hidden in the wooden horse came forth.

The city, thus attacked both within and without, was entirely destroyed, and most of its heroes and people were either killed or taken captive. The godlike Priam died by the hand of Neoptolemus, and the king's son Deiphobus, who after the death of Paris had become the husband of Helena, was slain by Menelaus and Odysseus, while courageously defending his home. Of the leaders of the Trojans, only Æneas and Antenor escaped by flight. The former, according to ancient tradition, betook himself to Italy, and became the progenitor of the reputed founders of Rome, Romulus and Remus.

Thus, after a siege of ten years, was Troy destroyed. But the conquerors fared no better than the conquered. Nemesis, the goddess of divine retribution, relentlessly persecuted them because, in the haughtiness of their victory,

they had not respected the altars of the captured city. Many perished before they could return to their native country; others, like Odysseus, did not reach their homes until after long and laborious wanderings; some found their relatives estranged on account of their long absence. Agamemnon, on his return, was murdered by his faithless wife Klytæmnestra. Many bitter disputes occurred throughout Greece, producing material changes in its history and internal regulations. The Thessalians, who formerly inhabited Epirus, penetrated thence into the country which from them was afterward called Thessaly. Then followed the Doric invasion, also called "the invasion of the Herakleidæ," because the children of Herakles, who in former ages had been banished from the Peloponnesus, recovered that country with the assistance of the Dorians and the Ætolians, and instituted the Doric governments of Messenia, Sparta, Argos, Corinth, and Epidaurus. Before these invasions the various kingdoms into which the land of Greece had thus far been divided disappeared, and in their stead arose a number of free and autonomous cities, which, although they underwent subsequent transformations, formed the basis of the governments we afterward meet in the history of Greece.

Many nations, also, within and without the Peloponnesus, were compelled by the Thessalians, the Bæotians, and the Dorians to abandon Greece entirely, and to migrate eastward, especially into Asia Minor, where they established numerous colonies. The invasion of the Herakleidæ, the last great event of the mythical ages of Greece, though interwoven with much that is fabulous, must be regarded as an historic event, because the actual state of Hellas, as we find it during the first historic ages, points strongly to this inroad as a previous fact. We shall therefore return to this subject hereafter, but must now give a brief account of society in the heroic age.

CHAPTER V.

SOCIETY IN THE HEROIC AGE.

THE sovereignty was generally hereditary, but this rule was often departed from, because it was indispensable in those turbulent times for a sovereign to be a man of suitable age, as well as of great personal strength. Hence it was that aged fathers sometimes abdicated in favor of their more vigorous sons. Odysseus, for instance, ruled over Ithaca while his father Laertes was still living, and Peleus resigned his scepter to his son Achilles. It is, therefore, probable that the sons, on the other hand, abandoned their hereditary rights whenever they lacked the qualities necessarily required in those who were to rule over a race of heroes.

The nobles resided for the most part in the capital city, which was always built upon an eminence and well fortified. It is true that in the *Odyssey* we often read of solitary villas, but a long sojourn outside of the city was not only unusual, but generally regarded as a banishment.

The mass of the people consisted of the so-called demi-urgi, or handicraftsmen, including not only those who exercised a mechanical trade, such as smiths, shoemakers, armorers, and carpenters, but also physicians, minstrels, heralds, soothsayers, and, in short, all that were not subject to the service of another. There was also a very small class of what might be termed peasant-proprietors. But the greater part of the land was in the possession of the rich, by whom it was mainly devoted to agricultural purposes. Flocks and herds formed the main bulk of a capitalist's wealth, and were the principal medium of exchange. The land was, as a rule, cultivated by slaves, by whom also the flocks were usually guarded, though sometimes poor freemen, the so-called Thetes, or serfs, were engaged in this occupation.

The slaves were either purchased by their owners or taken in war as captives. Many of them were faithful and trustworthy men ; and to this class was confided the care of large herds of oxen, swine, or goats—an occupation of great responsibility, since such a slave must necessarily be trusted, and in some measure be free from the immediate supervision of his master. Odysseus, who resided in the island of Ithaca, possessed flocks and herds of sheep, oxen, and asses, guarded by such men, upon the adjacent continent, just as is the case to this day among the rich of the Ionian Islands. These higher slaves were furnished with assistants, and appear to have stood to their masters in the relation of confidential friends rather than of servants. The faithful devotion of the herdsman Eumæus, and of the shepherd Philœtius, to the family and affairs of Odysseus, is one of the most lovely pictures in ancient epic poetry. This intimate relation between master and slave may be accounted for by the fact that, in the earliest times, when chance and force rendered liberty and property alike insecure, slavery was a misfortune which might fall to the lot of any one. The great and powerful leaders, if successful in an attempted invasion, returned laden with booty, and bringing many slaves in their train ; if unsuccessful, they themselves were liable to the same fate, so that the servant was often the equal of his master in rank and condition. Cruelty to slaves was rare, nor was there a broad distinction between the different classes of society.

The work of the women consisted mainly in spinning and weaving, the garments of both sexes being made in the home circle. The queens themselves were skilled in these arts, which are expressly mentioned by Homer among the virtues of Penelope, the wife of Odysseus, and of Helena, wife of Menelaus.

More unfortunate were the Thetes, who were free but very poor, and were compelled to cultivate the lands of the

rich for a living. They were hired during the harvest, the vintage, and the fruit-gathering seasons, and received in pay their food, shelter, and clothing. With no land of their own to cultivate, cut off from the ties of family and the comforts of home, they were obliged to rely on uncertain and desultory work for subsistence, wandering from the service of one employer to that of another, with frequent periods of forced idleness. Yet, however miserable the condition of the lower classes, the people had some political rights which acted as a restraint on the kings and nobles, and secured in a measure the welfare of the community. After the king had, with the aid of his council, decided on any affair, he was obliged to lay it before the people assembled in the "Agora" or market-place. On such occasions it was considered of the highest importance that the people should be seated, lest they might be led on to tumult or sedition by their impatience at standing. It was by acclamation that they showed their approval or disapproval of the measures submitted to them, and not unfrequently succeeded in changing the plans of the king. From these popular gatherings of the heroic age gradually resulted the famous assemblies before which Perikles and Demosthenes delivered their immortal orations.

In domestic life the authority of the father was respected, and the grown-up son manifested his gratitude to his parents by a faithful filial devotion, and by maintaining them in their old age. Nothing was considered more dreadful than the curse of a father or mother. In Greece we find no traces of the coarseness and cruelty that were the distinguishing features of paternal authority among the early Romans, according to whose laws the father exercised the power of life and death over the members of his family.

In the relations between husband and wife, we discover very little, if any, trace of tyranny on the part of the former. The women of the more respectable classes never ap-

peared in public unaccompanied by a maid-servant. But, during the holidays and public festivals, the young women and the young men often met together and engaged in the dance.

The bride sometimes brought a dowry to the bridegroom ; but generally the latter gave to the father of the bride certain presents, which were called *edna*. This last custom was so current that it was considered highly flattering to a young man to be offered a bride *anaednon*—that is to say, without the obligation of giving dowry to the father. Physical strength, courage, and many other advantages were considered necessary in order to obtain the consent of the father.

We find no trace of polygamy except in the case of the Trojan Priam. The legitimate sons divided the paternal property equally ; the illegitimate received a small portion, but were equally honored, except in rare instances. Not only between brothers, but also between more distant relatives and other members of the same race, existed bonds of noble and lasting friendship. Such were the relations between Herakles and Iolaus, Theseus and Peirithous, Orestes and Pylades, Achilles and Patroklos, Idomeneus and Meriones, Diomedes and Sthenelus.

But the most pleasing characteristic of the heroic society is the noble eagerness with which the stranger seeking hospitality was welcomed, and the lasting bond of friendship that resulted from taking food together, or from exchanging presents—a friendship that was often kept up between the families for several generations. The noble of the Homeric age welcomes the stranger seeking his protection, and asks neither his name nor the object of his journey until the guest has partaken of the food set before him. So sacred a duty was hospitality considered, that we find instances of men devoting their lives and fortunes to the entertainment of strangers, like the noble Axylus, who purposely

built his house by the wayside that all travelers might find a ready welcome.

Even more respected than the guest was the suppliant, to whom the host could not refuse shelter and protection without incurring the displeasure of the gods. No one could deny hospitality to the fugitive, no matter whence he came, who, bearing in his hand an olive-branch, sought refuge at the hearth or household altar. Instances are indeed recorded of persons violating without scruple the most sacred duties, the devotion to one's relatives and fellow countrymen, the hospitality due to the stranger, and the protection that should be extended to suppliants. But such cases are exceptional, and are to be met with in every age and country. In the mythical ages these vices were attributed chiefly to rude savages, as the haughty and cruel Cyclops, who did not belong to the Hellenic race, and inhabited the distant coasts of Sicily. The Greeks considered all such violations of duty as unholy. To understand fully these noble sentiments of the heroic times, the reader must compare and contrast them with the barbarous customs of other primitive nations, who delighted in tattooing their bodies, shedding the blood of strangers, and selling their children into slavery. Finally, the customary sobriety of the heroic times of Greece is really wonderful, in comparison with the excessive indulgence in strong drink that was so universal among the ancient Germanic tribes. The Greeks drank their wine mixed with water, and to call a man a drunkard was the vilest of insults; therefore Achilles, in the height of his anger against Agamemnon, especially stigmatizes him as "heavy with wine." Their festivals were simple and frugal, and music and dancing, which Homer calls the ornaments of a banquet, were the principal diversion.*

* The same temperate habits are characteristic of the Greeks of the present day. Edmond About, the well-known French author, says of them: "They are great drinkers—but drinkers of water."

It is, however, a singular fact that plunder and piracy were considered honorable. Achilles, Odysseus, and Menelaus plunder whenever they can, either by artifice or by force. It was customary in welcoming a stranger to ask him whether his object in traveling was to enrich himself by piracy, just as we might to-day ask of a person whether his object be to enrich himself by mercantile speculation.*

The Greeks of the heroic age had no consciousness of their moral superiority to other races. The word "barbarian," which was afterward applied to all foreign nations, does not appear to have been in general use in that early period, nor to have conveyed the idea of mental or moral inferiority in the nations to whom it was applied. Homer uses the term only when speaking of a foreign language, or of a coarse and uncultivated provincial dialect.

The geographical knowledge of the heroic ages was very limited and unsatisfactory. In the *Odyssey* Homer displays a more extensive acquaintance with the land of Greece than in the *Iliad*, which was composed before the former poem; and it is evident that he must at some period of his life have quitted his native Smyrna, and traveled extensively in Greece proper.

The costly and magnificent works of art with which the splendid apartments of Alkinous, of Menelaus, and of the other nobles were adorned, came from the East, the nations of which were at that early period vastly superior to Greece both in riches and manufactures. The precious

* It must be borne in mind, however, that piracy even among other ancient nations was not unusual. It was practiced by the Romans as late as the fifth century B. C.; for in their second treaty with the Carthaginians it was stipulated that the Romans should not practice piracy anywhere near the Punic settlements on the Spanish coast, nor engage in traffic with the natives of those parts, nor establish any colonies there; from which it may be conjectured that plundering, trafficking, and colonizing were in those times regarded as collateral and equally legitimate occupations.

and elegantly carved breastplate of Agamemnon was a present from the island of Kypros (Cyprus). The very high esteem in which artists were held in Greece shows plainly that they were rare in that land. The arms were of bronze, not of iron, which came into use at a later period, although known as early as the time of Hesiod.

The most difficult operations in warfare were the sieges. Before the Homeric epoch, cities and villages were built, for greater security, upon inaccessible rocks and eminences. Afterward, when industry, the arts, and the social relations received greater development, the cities were extended to the plains below, and the "upper town" was generally abandoned as a place of residence, and simply called the citadel. The cities described in the Homeric poems are to be referred to the transition period, but were none the less strongly fortified; therefore their capture was difficult, engines of attack not having yet been invented. It was necessary either to shut off their supplies by a regular blockade, or to have recourse to deceit; the long siege of Troy, and the final capture of the city by means of the stratagem of the wooden horse, being a case in point.

The notions of the Greeks in regard to the divinity were crude and childlike, and this circumstance, together with their warlike and independent manner of life, somehow led them to a proud consciousness of the worth and dignity of man; insomuch that they did not scruple to attribute to the gods not only the same forms, but also the same thoughts and passions, as to themselves.

The minstrel, sometimes accompanying his words with the lyre, sang at the festivals the achievements of heroes, and more especially the news of the day, if the latter were unknown to his hearers. The profession of a minstrel was especially honored. In the *Odyssey* the poet applies the epithet "divine" to the minstrel Phemius; and there are many other similar passages.

We can not form an accurate idea from the Homeric poems whether or not architecture had reached any great degree of perfection. The poet mentions "resplendent," "beautiful," "sparkling," "high-vaulted" apartments; but the praises that he lavishes on ornaments and decorations seem to refer to their costly material rather than to their graceful shape or proportions. The earliest buildings of which we find a record had their floors paved with stones, as was also the case with the Agora, or market-place. The most ancient of the buildings were the so-called "treasure-houses," some of which have been discovered in Mykenæ, Orchomenus, and Amyklæ. These buildings were conical in shape, and appear to have been used as tombs at first, though they were afterward, as their name indicates, turned into depositories for the treasures of the nobles. The monuments, both in their construction and ornamentation, show some advancement in architecture. Homer mentions various works of sculpture, goblets most exquisitely fashioned, beautiful glasses, highly polished and cunningly wrought throughout. The shield of Achilles, described in the *Iliad*, contained many groups of faces; and the hall of Alkinous was guarded by golden dogs, and lighted by candelabra in the form of statuettes of young men holding torches. Numerous other examples might be adduced to show the degree of excellence which the metallic art, if it may be so termed, had attained during the Homeric period.

Objects of worship in this earlier epoch exhibit an even more exquisite sense of the beautiful than those fashioned in later ages. Pausanias, who traveled in Greece in the second century after Christ, mentions many such images and statues as still existing. The substance first employed by sculptors in the construction of their works was baked earth. In later years metal came to be used, and still later stone and marble.

The names of most of the characters of the Hellenic alpha-

bet, their order, and their shape upon the ancient tombs, establish the truth of the tradition that the Greeks derived their alphabet from Phœnicia. It is not known definitely whether writing was in use during the heroic times. The Homeric poems give no clear evidence of it. In one passage of the *Iliad* it is said that Bellerophon brought to the king of Lykia sealed tablets inscribed with a mystic order that the bearer should be put to death ; but whether these were written letters, hieroglyphic characters, or images, is not certain.

Such was the life of the Hellenic race during the heroic times. Their religious myths show that they were far from attaining to a knowledge of the true significance of the Supreme Being. The measures of government were irregular, but based on the same sound principles which afterward became wonderfully developed into free political constitutions. Manners and customs were rough and uncultivated, but contained the germs of all those virtues which in later years were destined to adorn the characters of men whose memory will be honored as long as mankind shall continue to esteem the beautiful, the brave, and the noble. Science and art were still in their infancy ; but in poetry we have two masterpieces, twin works, bearing the immortal name of Homer,* and sufficient in themselves to glorify and immortalize a nation. The Hellenic race, therefore, not only contained within itself at

* The theory that no such man as Homer existed, and that the works attributed to him are the separate compositions of several poets, afterward ingeniously combined into elaborate poems, has been for centuries the theme of discussion among scholars. We are inclined, however, to believe that the poems were preserved for several generations solely in the memory of the minstrels, and were not committed to writing until the time of Peisistratus. Even at a later period men are reported to have been found at Athens capable of repeating both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* from beginning to end. Similar instances of prodigiously retentive memories occur among other nations, in which long unwritten poems have been handed down from one generation to another.

the earliest known period the seeds of its later growth, but, from the moment its history opens, stands in its peculiarity of development preëminent and unique in the annals of the world. Of these qualities we find an embodiment and representative in Alexander of Macedon alone, whose mind was formed and whose career was determined by the spirit of Hellenic nationality, and who may be said to have begun the performance of great actions in his earliest childhood.

PART SECOND.

THE DAWN OF HISTORY.

THE year 776 B. C., the first year of the first Olympiad, is the point generally assumed as the definite beginning of authentic Greek history.

Let it not be understood that a full and connected narrative can be given from that date onward. Unfortunately, much of the epoch immediately following is involved in obscurity, because the few contemporaneous writers have left but fragmentary records; while the authors of a later period, whose works have come down to us, often mention events for which they do not adduce sufficient evidence. But the fact that some contemporaneous testimony exists is of great advantage to the historian, when we remember the uncertainty that hangs over the heroic ages, in the treatment of which the imaginative works of the epic poets, who are concerned with events of which they were neither witnesses nor contemporaries, are our only guide. In fact, incidents anterior to 776 B. C. appear, as Grote well remarks, not reducible either to history or to chronology; and thus any chronological systems which may be applied to them must be essentially uncertified and illusory.

Assuming the first Olympiad as the proper beginning of the historic ages, let us take a brief survey of the condition of the Hellenic world from that time until about 500 B. C., the date of the Persian wars.

CHAPTER I.

EASTERN PROVINCES.

Thessaly.

THE southern portion of the peninsula extending from the Danube to the promontory of Malea, the southernmost point of the Peloponnesus, was the habitation of the Hellenic race. This southern and smaller section of the great peninsula is divided from the northern and larger by a chain of mountains extending from the Adriatic Sea to the Ægean. These mountains, called in the western part the Keraunian or Akrokeraunian range, acquire, farther east, the well-known name of Olympus.

From a point in this chain of mountains lying about half-way between the two seas there branches out almost at right angles another chain called Pindus, which, descending in a southerly direction, divides Epirus on the west from Thessaly on the east, and emits an offshoot in a direction parallel with Olympus. This offshoot, which bears the name of Othrys, abruptly terminates at the seacoast, where it is met by another range sent forth by Olympus, under the names of Ossa and Pelion, in a southerly direction toward the Ægean. In this manner is formed the almost quadrangular Thessalian valley, the broadest and most fertile of the Hellenic plains, inclosed by the mountain-ranges of Olympus, Pindus, Othrys, Pelion, and Ossa.

The range of Pindus, which continues southwardly, soon sends forth another offshoot, the wild and inaccessible Cæta, which extends eastwardly, and forms with the parallel range of Othrys a long and narrow plain, watered by the river Spercheius. Between the eastern termination of Mount Cæta and the Ægean Sea lies the ever-famous pass of Thermopylæ. Cæta was considered the inner rampart of Greece, just as the equally lofty Akrokeraunian range was regarded as

the outward rampart. Between them the mighty Olympus reared heavenward its snow-capped summit, on which, in the popular imagination, the immortal gods had established their abode as guardians of their favorite land. From the top of Olympus can be distinguished at a great distance a small river, the silvery Peneius. The romantic vale of Tempe, through which the Peneius escapes into the sea between Mounts Pelion and Ossa, is perhaps the most enchanting spot in Greece. Narrow and rock-ribbed, but covered with an ever-luxuriant vegetation, it presents at every season of the year a charming landscape. Here the ivy and yew especially flourish. The banks of the Peneius, into which innumerable rivulets flow, are lined with trees of rich foliage, their intertwined branches forming a dome over the clear waters, and often descending in festoons to the surface. The land of Thessaly was the paradise of ancient Greece, and the central point of its most prominent traditions. On Olympus dwelt the gods; from the precipitous slopes and rugged forests of Pelion the timber was cut for the construction of the Argo, the first ship that sailed toward the unknown countries bordering on the Euxine; and it was in that very neighborhood that the Muses assembled at the marriage-feast of Peleus, and Themis foretold the birth of Achilles and the destruction of Troy.

At the beginning of the historic period the upper and middle sections of the valley of the Peneius, the most fertile portions of the Thessalian plain, were in the possession of the Thessalians proper; the Perrhæbians inhabited the northern part of the country, between the lower Peneius and Olympus; the Magnetes were settled toward the eastern coast, between Ossa and Pelion, and the Achæans in Phthiotis, which extended from Pindus up to the gulf of Pagasæ near Othrys. We find all these tribes mentioned in Homer, except the Thessalians, who are said to have come from Epirus after the Trojan war, to have driven out the Bœotians and the

Dorians, and to have made the Perrhæbians, the Magnetes, and the Achæans their tributaries.

The Thessalians, the most important of these tribes, possessed the middle portions of Thessaly. A small tract of the seacoast along the gulf of Pagasæ was also subject to them, but their principal possessions were in the interior of the land, where flourished many rich and populous cities—Phæræ, Pharsalus, Larissa, and others.

The ruling class in Thessaly was composed of the descendants of the victorious invaders from Epirus, who dwelt in the towns and were proprietors of the greater part of the territory, while the slaves cultivated their land and tended their flocks. The cities were governed oligarchically. The Thessalians were noted for the roughness of their manners, their warlike spirit, and the magnificence of their hospitality, but at the same time for faithlessness and incapacity for concerted political action. Hence their cities were turbulent and badly governed, and the rights of the lower classes very insecure. We do not find here the germs of that spirit of harmony and that regard for equal rights which developed themselves in the more southern cities of Greece. Another important difference was that the Thessalians, when engaged in war, seldom served as hoplites, or regular heavy-armed foot-soldiers; whereas, throughout the rest of Greece, the infantry service was closely connected with the exercise and development of free political institutions. They preferred to serve as cavalry-soldiers; and of their tributary tribes, the Malians alone, who dwelt round about the pass of Thermopylæ, were enrolled as hoplites, while the Perrhæbians, Magnetes, Achæans, and Dolopes fought as light-armed troops, and were particularly skillful with the javelin. But the Thessalians were famous horsemen. The large landed estates of the nobles were celebrated for producing the best horses in Greece, and hence the splendid squadrons of cavalry that formed the main strength of the Thessalian

armies. In such high esteem was the cavalry service held among them, that at the marriage festival it was the custom for the bridegroom to present to the bride an accoutred war-horse.

The slaves of Thessaly were not only husbandmen and shepherds, but likewise composed an important part of the military force. In fact, they are hardly to be regarded as slaves in the proper sense of the term, since they were not allowed to be sold out of the country; they had their own houses, spoke the Greek language, and could acquire property, some of them having been reputed to have become richer than their masters. Therefore their condition materially differed from that of the tillers of the soil in Thebes, Argos, and Athens, where the slaves possessed neither houses nor lands of their own, and had no political rights, no privilege of bearing arms, and no family ties. These latter consequently never became a source of political danger, and did not begin to be turbulent until the decline of Grecian power; while the Thessalian serfs, with so many resources at their disposal, imbued with the consciousness of their Hellenic descent and a feeling of bitterness at their inferior fortune, often caused serious disturbances in the state.

It was sometimes customary to look upon the noblest family of Thessaly as the "hegemon" or leader of the entire country. Until the time of the Persian wars, this post of honor was usually given to the family of the Aleuadæ, but not always; for at one period Prince Kineas of Konion seems to have been sent to Athens as the common hegemon of the Thessalians. This hegemon was often called "Tagus"—a title that was considered of such great importance, that Herodotus designates as "kings" the family of the Aleuadæ and likewise Kineas of Konion.

The frequent animosities existing not only between the princely families of Thessaly, but even among those of lesser note, greatly impaired the power of this rich land. On

this account, we find in late years the Aleuadæ seeking the assistance of the Persians in order to maintain their power. The other Thessalians were indignant at the treason, and, being unable to take up arms in behalf of Greece, the Magnetes, the Achæans, the Dolopes, the Malians, and the remaining tributary nations of Thessaly, took advantage of the Persian invasion to delay the payment of their tributes. Indeed, these nations had never been entirely subdued, for in great measure they transacted their own political affairs.

But the fact that conclusively demonstrates the weakness of the Thessalians, masters as they were of the broadest and most fertile of the Hellenic territories, is that the Perrhæbians, the Magnetes, the Achæans, the Dolopes, and the Malians sat with the same privileges as the Thessalians in the great Amphiktyonic Council of the Greeks. In order fully to understand the importance of this right, the nature of this council must be explained.

The Amphiktyonic Council.

The Hellenic nation, which not only in the historic but even in the mythical ages was divided into numerous independent and self-existing communities, felt the necessity of being bound together by certain ties, which, though they had a religious rather than a political character, nevertheless established a semblance of union among the divided and even hostile sections. These ties were called "amphiktyonic," which term signifies those "inhabiting around"—so that the "Amphiktyonic League" meant nothing more than the union of the cities situated in the vicinity, though, by reason of the ancient Hellenic custom of personifying these traditions, the word was usually derived from Amphiktyon, a brother of Hellen, and the reputed founder of this league. There were, indeed, many Amphiktyonic leagues, one of which was held in the temple of Poseidon at Onchestus in Bœotia; another in Triphylia, in the southern part of Elis;

and a third at Delos. These leagues were also of considerable importance in a commercial point of view, as merchants were in the habit of resorting from various parts to such places of meeting, and engaging in trade and barter, thereby adding another strong link to the unity of the different states.

But the most important of all the Amphiktyonic councils was the one held at Delphi; and whenever general mention of a council under this name is made, the one at Delphi is always understood. In this twelve Hellenic tribes participated—the Thessalians, the Bœotians, the Dorians, the Ionians, the Perrhæbians, the Magnes, the Lokrians, the Cœtæans, the Achæans, the Phokians, the Dolopes, and the Malians—so that, strictly speaking, the greater part of Hellas was here represented; the only remaining nations being the Ætolians, the Akarnanians, the Arkadians, the Eleians, the Triphylians, and the small tribe of the Dryopes. This council met twice a year: in the spring, in the temple of Apollo at Delphi in Phokis, and in the autumn, in the temple of Demeter in the village of Anthele near Thermopylæ.

The antiquity of the Amphiktyonic Council is evident from the fact that each nation had but two votes, irrespective of its power and the number of its representatives. Thus were the smallest and most unimportant tribes on an equality with the Ionians, who could boast of the great city of Athens, and with the Dorians, whose metropolis was the powerful Sparta; from which it may be inferred that this council was established in the prehistoric period, during which both Athens and Sparta, whose eminence is of yet more ancient date, were still small and unimportant cities. Of the duties of the Amphiktyonic Council nothing will give us a better idea than the oath taken by its members. It ran thus: "We will not destroy any Amphiktyonic town, nor cut it off from running water in war or peace; if any

one shall do so, we will march against him and destroy his city. If any one shall plunder the property of the god, or shall be privy thereto, or shall take treacherous counsel against the things in his temple at Delphi, we will punish him with foot, hand, and voice, and by every means in our power."

It thus appears that the main duties of the council were to prevent acts of aggression against its members, and to preserve the rights and dignity of the temple of Apollo at Delphi. The Amphiktyonic Council also presided over the Pythian games. During the Persian wars in the fifth century B. C., when there arose between the Grecian cities other and stronger political ties, this council became useless ; and in the following century, during the decline of Grecian freedom, Philip, king of Macedon, used it as a means of furthering his views. But the council especially flourished during the first historic ages, when it also took cognizance of many important questions.

Oracles.

From the earliest ages the Greeks were accustomed to attribute a religious significance to whatever was rare or exceptional in the phenomena of the physical world. Not only earthquakes, eclipses of the sun and moon, peals of thunder, and violent flashes of lightning, all which things were called "signs from Zeus," but also dreams, sounds in the air, peculiarities in the flight or cries of birds, the various shapes assumed by fire, flame, smoke, or the fumes of frankincense, and the flowing of wine poured out from a goblet, were invested with a sacred character, and considered as harbingers of future events. The interpretation of omens constituted the art of divination, which exercised a decided influence on the public and private life of the people. Especially was it customary for the priests or soothsayers attentively to observe the condition of the victim at different stages of the

sacrifice, and to draw inferences therefrom as to the good or ill will of the god to whom the offering was made. Hence in every undertaking, on the eve of an expedition or of a battle, a victim was offered to the gods, and in its mangled and convulsed entrails was sought some sign or token of the result. Yet it must not be supposed that all the Greeks were blind slaves of superstition. Only the ignorant populace really believed in these divinations. The more intelligent were convinced of their futility, but practiced the ceremony, partly as a matter of form handed down from their forefathers, and partly as a means of producing an impression on the multitude. When Polydamas, in the *Iliad*, wishing to dissuade Hector from engaging in combat with the Greeks, adduced the evidence of a most "terrible oracle," the hero replied, "Our best omen is to fight for our country"; and this was the prevailing motive, not only among the Homeric heroes, but also with the great men of the historic period of Greece.

It was further believed that the gods sometimes vouchsafed to certain favored mortals a knowledge of the future; sometimes granting it as a perpetual gift to particular individuals, or to certain noble houses, with the right of imparting it to their successors—sometimes bestowing it upon some definite place supposed to be sanctified by the perpetual presence of a god. Such a spot was said to be the seat of an "oracle." Many oracles existed in Greece: the most ancient at Dodona, a city of Epirus, where Zeus himself announced his decisions; the most famous and important at Delphi in Phokis, dedicated to Apollo, who was regarded as the interpreter of the will of Zeus, and the dispenser of his prognostic power.

This oracle is to be referred to a period long before the beginning of the historic age. By its influence the Spartans were induced to accept the laws of Lykurgus, and by its direct order Hellenic colonies were established on the distant

coasts of Italy and Sicily as early as the eighth century B. C. The plain of Parnassus, on which the temple was situated, was called Pytho, whence Apollo was surnamed the Pythian, and the priestess that delivered the oracle was called Pythia ; for a like reason the games that were there celebrated in honor of the god were known as the Pythian games. The oracle especially flourished during the first historic ages up to the time of the Persian wars, its popularity resulting partly from its situation in the midst of the Hellenic world, whence it was considered as the middle point of the earth, and partly from the fact that it was one of the annual meeting-places of the Amphiktyonic Council.

The Spartans, who during the sixth century B. C. acquired great influence both within and without Greece, took this oracle under their own protection. Not only Greeks, but also Lydians, Phrygians, and other nations of Asia, as well as Egyptians and Romans, thronged to it, so that this sanctuary finally became not merely of Panhellenic but of universal importance. When in the year 548 B. C. the temple was burned, it was rebuilt, under the auspices of the illustrious Athenian family of the Alkmæonidæ, by contributions received from all parts of Greece, as well as from many foreign cities. The donations reached an aggregate of three hundred silver talents—more than three hundred thousand dollars in our money—a very large sum in proportion to the accumulated wealth of the age. During the most flourishing period of Hellenism, the riches of this temple amounted to ten thousand talents, or more than ten millions of American dollars.

The prophetic power of the god at Delphi was manifested through certain persons, who ascended a tripod in the temple, and breathed a vapor rising from a chasm in the earth. This mystic vapor threw them into a frenzy, during which abnormal condition of mind they possessed a supernatural insight into the past, the present, and the future. The same effect was also produced by drinking the water of a spring

called Kassotis, situated in the innermost part of the temple. In earlier times the oracular responses were delivered by whomsoever happened to ascend the tripod, but at a later period by a maiden especially educated for this purpose. The first priestess who performed these functions was named Phemonoë, and was said to have been a daughter of Apollo himself. In still later years it was deemed more expedient to intrust the office of Pythia to a woman over fifty years of age. Finally, three were chosen. Not only were three days of fasting regarded as a necessary preparation for the divine office, but also a bath in a fountain near the temple, whose waters were supposed to possess the peculiar frenzy-producing power. Afterward the Pythia, having been fumigated by the burning of bay-leaves and barley, in plain attire entered the temple. Then, drinking of the water of the spring, she ascended the sacred tripod, whereupon the strange frenzy seized her, in some cases becoming so violent that its effects proved fatal. Whatever she uttered in this spasmodic state was reported to the worshipers by the priests, who took the liberty of altering or modifying the words as they thought best. Generally the responses were delivered in metrical form, and for their preparation special poets were retained in the service of the god.

The management of the temple was intrusted to five men, chosen for life, one from each of the five tribes into which the noble families of Delphi were divided—the so-called Deukalionidæ. Thus was conducted the famous oracle at Delphi, which exercised so vast an influence over the public affairs of Greece. The reader will perhaps wonder how the oracle sustained its reputation for so many centuries, in view of the fact that its responses must frequently have lacked verification. It is not difficult to explain this. In the first place, many of these oracular answers contained nothing more than a simple piece of advice, as the response once given to the Lacedæmonians, “to let go the suppliant of the Itho-

mæan Zeus"; or as the reply to Solon, "to sacrifice to the heroes of Salamis." Many of the responses proved true by chance, and not a few were so ambiguous that the Pythia would be justified, no matter what the result. For instance, when the Lacedæmonians, toward the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, asked the god "whether it were best to fight?" the Pythia answered, "You will obtain victory if you fight with all your might." On another occasion the oracle told Kallistratus "to return to Athens and obtain what was lawful"; which answer might mean either that he would be acquitted or that he would be condemned, and the latter was the fortune that befell him. Finally, it must be borne in mind that the faith of the worshipers at the shrine of the oracle was so intense that it often survived the shock of repeated disappointments.

First Sacred War.

The temple of Apollo, which was much older than the city of Delphi, was situated on the south side of Mount Parnassus, two thousand feet above the level of the sea, on the site of the present village of Kastri. Near the temple, at an almost equal height, upon a steep eminence of the mountain, lay the Phokian city of Krissa, above which towered the rocks called the Phædriades. The city itself almost overhung the deep chasm through which ran the river Pleistus. The ruins at the spot, called "Agia Tessara-Konta," are considered to be the remnants of this city. On the opposite side of the Pleistus rises Mount Kirphis, which, extending toward the south, penetrates into the Corinthian Gulf. Into this gulf the river empties after flowing through the broad Krissean plain, which stretches away on the west as far as the Lokrian city of Amphissa. Mount Kirphis is least fertile on its eastern slope, nearest to the city and harbor of Kirrha. Of these three cities, Delphi, Krissa, and Kirrha, the first and the third were formerly unimportant, but Krissa seems to have

been great and powerful at an early period. The temple at Delphi was chiefly under its jurisdiction, so that it derived a large revenue from the worshipers who flocked thither. At a later period the harbor of Kirrha underwent considerable increase in size, and drew to itself much commerce, causing thereby a corresponding decrease in the prosperity of the neighboring city. Meanwhile, those managing the affairs of the oracle at Delphi, seeing a city growing up around the temple, conceived the idea of becoming the sole masters of the sanctuary. A clash with the interests of Kirrha was inevitable, and the strife was hastened by unjust acts on the part of the Kirrhæans, especially a heavy tribute imposed by them on those who came to the temple by way of the sea.

Such was the state of affairs in 595 B. C., when the Amphiktyonic Council, on the proposition of the famous Athenian lawgiver Solon, decided to punish the Kirrhæans. A war of ten years' duration resulted (595-585), the so-called "first sacred war," in which the party of the Amphiktyonic Council, through the assistance of the Thessalians, the Sikyonians, and the Athenians, was at last victorious. Kirrha fought bravely until shut off from the sea by the naval force of Kleisthenes, king of Sikyon; even after the city was captured its inhabitants continued the war upon Mount Kirphis. Finally they were subdued; their city was utterly destroyed, or, at the most, continued to exist merely as a landing-place for the worshipers; all the surrounding plain was dedicated to the Delphian god, and curses were pronounced upon any one who should cultivate it. Thus this rich plain, which at the present day is thickly planted with olive-trees, was condemned to remain untilled and to be used only for pasture. This determination was not so ill-advised as might at first appear; for numerous animals were required for sacrifice at the shrine of Delphi, and those who raised them derived great profits from sales to the worshipers. Moreover, the prohibition against the cultivation of the plain prevented the

rise of other great seaports on that coast in the place of the destroyed Kirrha. The subsequent fate of Krissa is not known, but it is certain that Delphi thenceforth remained an independent city.

This war is an event worthy of special note, because now, for the first and perhaps the only time in Hellenic history, a common council of the Greeks, in which the participants held the same rights and an equal voice, undertook a war of such long duration to enforce the fulfillment of their own decision. After this event the most prominent of the Hellenic cities continued to act in common, and became united by another link, the "hegemonia," by virtue of which a confederation of cities acknowledged the leadership and authority of some one of their number more powerful than the rest. Finally, this sacred war led to another result not less memorable, namely, that the victorious allies made use of the plunder they derived from Kirrha in instituting the Pythian games.

Festivals.

The Greeks were wont to enliven their religious festivals with musical, poetical, literary, and, above all, gymnastic contests. Of these festivals the most celebrated were the Olympic, the Pythian, the Isthmian, and the Nemean, to which competitors from all parts of Greece resorted and took part in the games connected with them. The Olympic games were by far the most important; next to them came the Pythian, held in honor of Apollo, and devoted to musical contests only. Originally these latter took place every eight years, but subsequently the period was shortened to four years. The first celebration occurred in 586 B. C., on which occasion very valuable presents were given to the victor; but thereafter the prize consisted merely of a garland of bay-leaves, valued, however, as the highest mark of distinction that could be conferred on a mortal. Even kings and princes eagerly resorted to the games to contend for

this honorary prize; among other royal contestants was Kleisthenes, the wealthy and powerful monarch of Sikyon, who took part in the second Pythian celebration and was proclaimed victor.

The little district of Phokis accordingly, though a state of slight political influence, could boast of three of the most renowned institutions of ancient Greece—the oracle at Delphi, the Pythian games, and, in part at least, the Amphiktyonic Council. On the other hand, Bœotia, though possessing none of these Panhellenic institutions, is a much more important factor in Grecian history.

Bœotia.

Bœotia lay on the northern side of the Corinthian Gulf, between Lokris on the northwest and Attica on the southeast, and contained twelve or thirteen free cities oligarchically governed, the most important of which was Thebes. These cities formed a sort of union, in which the strongest of them exercised the main authority and held the smaller under its dominion. The affairs of the Bœotian union were presided over by a common council called the "Pambœotia," or the united Bœotians, composed of rulers called "Bœotarchi," who were chosen yearly. But the Bœotian union was virtually a plastic instrument in the hands of the Thebans, who, although they never actually deprived the other cities of their liberty, yet controlled them as they chose. Little is known about the internal regulations of these towns. Some meager facts have been handed down to us concerning a very ancient lawgiver of Thebes named Philolaus, a Corinthian by birth, and a member of the aristocratic family of the Bacchiadæ, then ruling over Corinth. He was a friend also of the Corinthian Diokles, who was famous for his personal beauty, and also for his victory in the Olympic games. Diokles, having taken offense at his countrymen, abandoned Corinth for ever, and established himself at Thebes, whither his friend Philolaus followed him, and where both lived and

died together. During his sojourn at Thebes, Philolaus was requested to draw up a code of laws for that city; for it was not an uncommon thing for the citizens of one state to choose some eminent citizen of another as their lawgiver or as referee in their disputes. The legislation of Philolaus was one of the first attempts made in Greece to regulate by strict laws the natural impulses and peculiarities of the heroic times. One law of the Thebans was, that no man should be chosen to rule over the city unless he had retired from every kind of mercantile traffic for ten years—a law enacted from no spirit of hostility to commerce, but probably to prevent affairs of state from becoming subservient to private interests. Another fact worthy of note is, that toward the end of the sixth century B. C. the government of the Thebans had fallen into the hands of a few powerful citizens; at a later period, the Thebans sought to justify themselves for having taken sides against Greece during the Persian invasion, on the ground that the action was not a popular movement on their part, but a course compelled by the decision of their oligarchical government. The wealth of the aristocracy of Thebes consisted largely in horses, and the Thebans are frequently referred to by the poets as excelling in horsemanship and charioteering. The same was the case at Orchomenus and Lebadia, insomuch that it was said of these cities that “the horse ruled there,” that is, that their governments were aristocratic. In this connection Aristotle says: “During the old times, in whatever cities the military force chiefly consisted in cavalry, there the government was that of the few.”

The government and the customs prevalent in Bœotia bore a certain analogy with those of the Thessalian horse-rearing, oligarchical institutions; and an unrestrained and somewhat profligate mode of life characterized both countries. No other branch of the Hellenic race was in such evil repute throughout Greece as the Bœotian, their very

name becoming a synonym for brutishness and ignorance. The great poet Pindar, himself a Theban, has preserved for us that famous adage, "a Bœotian pig," by which the manners of his fellow citizens were stigmatized. They were also accused of being "impudent, insulting, and haughty, quarrelsome and indifferent to foreigners—despisers of every right, paying no respect to justice, and prone to violence." The strangest thing of all is, that to every particular Bœotian city was attributed preëminently some separate form of wickedness: to Oropus, "dishonesty and bad faith"; to Tanagra, "envy"; to Thespiæ, "contentiousness"; to Thebes, "insolence"; to Anthedon, "greediness"; to Koroneia, "curiosity"; to Plataea, "haughtiness"; to Haliartus, "stupidity"; and when the whole catalogue of moral defects seemed to have been exhausted, and none remained to be attributed to Onchestus, that city was accused of being the abode of the "intermittent fever." Nevertheless, one of these cities, and perhaps the most calumniated of all, gave birth to the most lofty and sympathetic lyric poet the world has ever seen. Pindar, who was born at Thebes B. C. 522, not only celebrated in his verses the Panhellenic games and the heroes of Marathon, but amid his songs of victory breathed forth from his poems a mild and gentle melancholy that reminds us of the Christian strains of modern Europe, and is totally at variance with the rudeness popularly attributed to the Bœotians. Again, in Tanagra, another Bœotian city, was born Korinna, the teacher and adviser of Pindar; and though very few of her verses have come down to us, her glory as a poetess is none the less immortal.

Notwithstanding the many points of similarity between the Bœotian and Thessalian oligarchies, the former did not partake of the anarchic and un-Hellenic character of the latter. In the Bœotian governments the lower classes do not appear to have been destitute of certain legal rights. The hoplites of Bœotia were always among the most renowned

of Greece. Thebes produced men of whom Athens herself might justly have been proud—Pelopidas, Gorgidas, Mellon, and, above all, Epaminondas, who may perhaps be considered the greatest statesman and warrior of Greece. Whence, then, that peculiar and steadfast abuse of the Bœotians?

The truth is, that the Bœotians, besides their natural roughness of character, bore the stigma of having sided with the Persians during the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. Other Greeks had done the same; but some, like the Thesalians, were not then considered an essential part of the Hellenic world, so that they drew upon themselves less attention. Moreover, the Bœotians, and especially the Thebans, were often at enmity with the neighboring city of the Athenians, whose plans they thwarted, and thus drew upon themselves the wrath of a people that sometimes made unjust use of its intellectual supremacy in Greece.

Perhaps Demosthenes, when he accused the Thebans of ruthlessness and stupidity, of cruelty and craftiness, should have remembered that no Athenian poet ever praised Athens in more magnificent strains than the Theban Pindar: "O brilliant and violet-crowned city, famous in song, the bulwark of Hellas, glorious, divine Athens!" And the same poet also compliments the Athenians for having laid the groundwork of Hellenic liberty at the battle of Artemisium. Thrasybulus, who at a later period put an end to the rule of the thirty tyrants at Athens, was also of Theban descent. But the gratitude of nations often fades before that of individuals; and the Athenian antipathy toward Thebes was strong, owing to the almost incessant strife between the two cities.

Platæa.

Thebes was always cruelly disposed toward the other cities of the Bœotian union; wherefore the Platæans, about 510 B. C., resolved to secede from that confederacy. Kleomenes, king of Sparta, happened at that time to pass near Platæa

on his return homeward from Athens. The Platæans, therefore, seizing this opportunity, sought the assistance of the Spartans, offering to deliver themselves and their city to them. But Kleomenes, not deeming it advantageous to accept, advised them to apply to the Athenians, who from their proximity could assist them more easily. This advice was prompted by his desire that Athens should be weakened by a war with Thebes.

The Platæans sent an embassy to Athens, and the ambassadors, arriving at that city while a public sacrifice was being performed, took their seats as suppliants at the altar and implored assistance against Thebes. Such a request could not well be refused, and the Athenians promised their protection.

In consequence of this measure, Thebes sent an army against Plataea, and the Athenians were obliged to march to the assistance of their new allies. Both parties accepting the mediation of the Corinthians, it was decided that the Thebans had no right to use violence toward a city wishing to withdraw from the Bœotian union. The Thebans, unwilling to abide by the decision, suddenly attacked the Athenians on their homeward march, but were utterly defeated; and by way of punishment for this faithlessness, the Athenians bestowed upon the Platæans that portion of the territory of Thebes that lay south of the Asopus.

Thus was consummated the alliance of Athens and Plataea, which brought about many important results, but in the end did not suffice to protect Plataea from the terrible vengeance of Thebes.

CHAPTER II.

WESTERN PROVINCES.

ON the western side of the Hellenic peninsula lay Ætolia, Akarnania, and Epirus, whose people took no active part in

Hellenic history until a very late period. The Ætolians, indeed, who were divided into many tribes, achieved some prominence during the heroic age, and also took part in the descent of the Herakleidæ into the Peloponnesus; but during the historic times they relapsed into obscurity, and had no relations with the remaining Greeks prior to the Peloponnesian war. They were remarkable for the coarseness of their customs, and even as late as the end of the fifth century B. C. Thucydides mentions them as not inhabiting cities, but dwelling in unwallèd hamlets; and it was further said that they spoke an unintelligible language, and ate raw meat.

The Akarnanians are not even mentioned by Homer, and remained like the Ætolians aloof from the Greeks until the Peloponnesian war. They were, nevertheless, Greeks by race, and as such were admitted to the Panhellenic games, in which only Greeks had a right to take part.

Epirus was inhabited by several tribes, the most important of which were the Chaonians, Thesprotians, Kassopæans, and Molossians. Herodotus calls the two last-mentioned tribes Greeks, but Thucydides considers them as barbarians. Strabo, a famous geographer who flourished about the beginning of the Christian era, terms the Athamanes, another Epirotic people, "barbarians," while Plato enumerates them among the Hellenic tribes. There is no doubt that Epirus was inhabited by people having the same language, descent, and religion with the remaining inhabitants of Greece. According to Aristotle, the land of Thesprotia, in the neighborhood of Dodona, was the most ancient seat of the Hellenic race, and bore the name of Hellas before any other part of the country. The royal family of the Molossians boasted that they were descended from Achilles and Neoptolemus; and the Thessalians, according to ancient tradition, came from Epirus. But the most evident proof of the Hellenic character of the Epirots is the fact that the oracle of Dodona

was famous both in the time of Homer and in later ages. In this oracle Zeus manifested himself directly, not through the medium of Apollo, as at Delphi. Although the latter oracle afterward overshadowed that at Dodona, yet this continued to be held in honor, not only by the Epirots, but by the Athenians, as late as the fourth century B. C. For these reasons Epirus must be regarded as an Hellenic country, especially since many names of Epirotic cities, as Chimæra, Charadra, and Panormus, were of a decidedly Hellenic character. Even to the present day Epirus has remained one of the prominent altars, so to speak, of Hellenism.

CHAPTER III.

THE PELOPONNESUS.

General Account.

THE extreme southern part of Greece forms a peninsula, connected with the mainland by the narrow isthmus of Corinth, and traversed from north to south by two rugged ranges of mountains radiating from Mount Pindus. In ancient times this peninsula was divided into six important political divisions. Of these the most easterly was Argolis. Bordering on the western coast lay the countries of Elis and Messenia; on the north, along the gulf of Corinth, stretched the land of Achaia; and the districts of Arkadia and Laconia occupied the remainder of the peninsula.

Arkadia, the only one of these divisions that lies wholly inland, is surrounded by a ring of mountains, forming a natural wall separating it from the rest of the Peloponnesus. The principal river of the peninsula, the Alpheius, which descends into the Ionian Sea through the only gap that occurs in the western mountain-range, is one of the most remark-

able in the world, not from its size, but from the fact that, in its windings through the valleys of Arkadia, it sometimes disappears underground and again reappears at the surface farther on. The mountains, being mostly of volcanic formation, have many subterranean chasms, in which the rivers not unfrequently lose themselves and afterward reappear in another place; so that it is not always easy to determine their real source. Such is particularly the case with the Alpheius, and also with the Eurotas, another well-known river of Laconia.

On the eastern side of Arkadia stretches forth the land of Argeia, forming an almost quadrangular peninsula attached to the Peloponnesus. When we enter Argeia by way of the isthmus, we leave on the right, toward the Corinthian Gulf, the small state of Sikyonia, and on the left, toward the Saronic Gulf, the much larger territory of Corinth, the latter extending as far eastward as the boundaries of Megaris, which occupied the broadest and most mountainous part of the isthmus. Sikyonia possessed many inland valleys, and shared with Corinth a large plain of proverbial fertility skirting the sea-coast.

On the northeastern side of the Argolic peninsula was situated Epidauria, possessing a level tract of coast-land, and also some small fertile valleys, one of which was dedicated to the worship of Asklepius, the god of medicine. Opposite Epidauria was the island of Ægina, and farther toward the entrance of the Saronic Gulf the fertile plain of Træzen. Finally, from the head of the Argolic Gulf stretches a plain about five miles in length and two and a half miles in breadth, surrounded on the sides by lofty mountains and only open toward the sea. The western part of this plain, where stood the city of Argos, is much lower and more humid than the eastern part, where Mykenæ and Tiryns flourished in prehistoric times. The small country of Ky-nuria, lying at the entrance of the Argolic Gulf on its west-

ern shore, gave rise to many disputes between Argos and Sparta, and in the most glorious period of ancient Greece belonged to the latter nation, and formed part of Laconia.

Such in brief were the divisions of the Peloponnesus, the inhabitants of which during the historic ages differed materially from those of an earlier time.

The Arkadians, during the heroic times, were the most powerful of all the nations dwelling in this peninsula, and possessed all the eastern and southern portions. But during the early historic times the southwestern and the eastern portions of the Peloponnesus were in the possession of the hardy Dorians, who are nowhere mentioned in the *Iliad*; and, instead of the Epeians, we find in Elis a people said to be descended from the *Ætoli*ans, while the Achæans were crowded up into the northern part of the peninsula, which thenceforth was from them called Achaia; the Arkadians alone occupied their ancient habitations in the middle of the Peloponnesus. How was this change of things brought about? The ancients attribute it to the great event known as the "descent of the Herakleidæ," the date of which Thucydides fixes as eighty years after the capture of Troy. They relate that Herakles and Eurystheus were both descendants of Perseus, the famous king of Tiryns; but after the death of Herakles, Eurystheus drove from their country the children of that hero, and compelled them to seek refuge beyond the Peloponnesus. Hyllus, son of Herakles, made, from Athens as a base of operations, an unsuccessful attempt to recover his paternal domain. After his death, the Herakleids went over to the Dorians, and emigrated with them from Thessaly into Doris. At a later period Temenus, Kresphontes, and Aristodemus, the great-grandchildren of Hyllus, renewed the attempt, and, assisted by the Dorians and the *Ætoli*ans, they were finally successful. They invaded the Peloponnesus, not by way of the isthmus, as their ancestor Hyllus had done, but by transporting their forces directly across

the gulf of Corinth. Their allies, the Ozolian Lokrians, permitted them to make use of one of their harbors, in which they constructed a number of ships, and which thenceforth bore the name of Naupaktus. Thence they crossed over to the opposite coast, and joined battle with the most powerful of the rulers of the peninsula, Tisamenus, son of Orestes and grandson of Agamemnon. Tisamenus was defeated, and the Dorians, having thus become masters of the Peloponnesus, decided upon a new division of the country. The fertile land of Elis was allotted to the Ætolians; Argos became the share of Temenus; Messene fell to Kresphontes; and, since Aristodemus had died in the course of the campaign, Sparta was turned over to his two sons, Eurysthenes and Prokles, whence it became the custom for Sparta to be ruled by two kings, respectively descended from these two brothers. The Achæans, being thus dissevered from the remainder of the peninsula, took refuge in the northern part, on the shore of the Corinthian Gulf, established themselves there, and compelled the Ionians who had hitherto inhabited those parts to emigrate to their relatives the Athenians.

This conquest of the Peloponnesus by the descendants of Herakles, belonging to the mythical period, is not without a certain historic foundation, as is sufficiently indicated by the peculiar condition of affairs in that peninsula when authentic records begin. But the tradition that the Dorians, starting from one point, and in the course of one short campaign, effected a complete conquest of the peninsula, is altogether inadmissible in the face of the well-authenticated fact that, as late as the eighth century B. C., large portions of Messenia and Laconia were still unsubdued by them. The truth seems to be that the conquerors, entering the country at different times and by various routes, gradually worked their way onward, and finally, in the course of a couple of centuries, became masters of the soil. Hence it is that at the dawn of the historic period we find the Dorians the ruling race in

the Peloponnesus, and the real or reputed descendants of Herakles exercising the royal power in all the principal states of that important section of Greece.

Argos—Olympic Games.

Of these states, the most prominent during the earliest historic age were those constituting the Argeian confederacy, whose dominion extended along the entire eastern coast as far as Malea, and embraced all the islands between Kythera and Ægina, and whose bond of union was a sort of Amphiktyonic Council under the auspices of the Argeian Apollo. This confederation especially flourished in the eighth century B. C., when the Messenians called upon it to act as umpire in a dispute between themselves and the Spartans. In the middle and latter part of the same century its power was still further extended by the efforts of Pheidon, king of Argos, who was a lineal descendant of Temenus, and is said to have overstepped the constitutional limits of his power and to have made himself absolute ruler of the state, whence he was called a "tyrant." Pheidon, having increased his authority at home and established the presidency of Argos over this Amphiktyonic Council, attempted to spread his rule over the whole peninsula. He could not obtain possession of Corinth, but he deprived the Eleians of the presidency of the Olympic games, and held it for some time in his own hands.

It is not known exactly when these games, which afterward became the most famous in Greece, first began to be celebrated. They are as hard to trace to their original source as are the rivers of the Peloponnesus, which alternately disappear beneath the mountains and again reappear. Popular tradition referred their origin to Herakles, and, since from the earliest times they were celebrated at Olympia in Pisatis, the inhabitants of that small territory claimed to have been the founders; but the presidency passed over into the hands

of the Ætolians of Elis when the latter became possessors of the neighboring Pisatis. The Olympic games, like the Pythian, were celebrated once every four years, at the first full moon after the summer solstice, but not in the same year as the Pythian, which took place every third Olympic year.

Originally the games consisted simply of foot-races. From the year 776 B. C. the names of the victors were recorded in an official catalogue preserved thenceforth regularly by the Eleians. The first name written therein was that of the Eleian Koræbus. This catalogue became very valuable, not only as the first complete written document of ancient Greece, but also because the later Grecian historians, recognizing the necessity for a common chronological system in place of the numerous and conflicting local calendars in vogue, had recourse to the quadrennial Olympic periods as a universally understood method of reckoning time. In describing any event, they would specify that it took place in the first, second, third, or fourth year of such an Olympiad. But the Olympic games produced other results even more important. Until the seventh Olympiad the victors received their prizes in money, but from that time forward the reward was a wreath or crown of olive, which is one among the many proofs of the natural nobility and lofty soul of the Hellenic people, prizing so highly as they did this mere honorary distinction. These games began to acquire great celebrity from the fourteenth Olympiad onward. Up to that time only one contest took place—the simple foot-race; but then a second was introduced, the so-called “double course”—that is to say, from the beginning to the end of the race-course and back again. In the following Olympiad, 720 B. C., the contests were still further increased, and men thronged to take part in them, not only from Greece, but even from Asia Minor. At the eighteenth celebration wrestling was added, as well as the “pentathlon” (contest of the five exercises—leaping, quoit-throwing, running, wrestling, and hurl-

ing the javelin). At the twenty-third celebration, 688 B. C., boxing was added, and at the twenty-fifth four-horse chariot-races were introduced. This last addition tended to render the games much more brilliant and attractive, for the richest of the Greeks now entered into the contest, and vied with one another in displaying the finest horses and in hiring the most expert charioteers. A victory in the Olympic chariot-races was one of the highest honors that could fall to the lot of a citizen of any Grecian state. Herodotus, in enumerating the merits of an eminent man, sometimes makes special mention of the honorable fact that "he was crowned victor in the four-horse chariot-race." As time advanced, the games were still further multiplied, but as yet were all celebrated in one day.

After the seventy-seventh Olympiad, 472 B. C., immediately following the decisive victory of the Greeks over the Persians, the national enthusiasm was so intensely aroused that it demanded an extension of this great Panhellenic festival, and thenceforward the games lasted four days. Between 540 and 420 was the period of the most distinguished Olympic conquerors. Then flourished Milo, the famous athlete of Kroton, a Greek city in Italy. Milo obtained his first victory at the games while yet a child. On becoming of age he was proclaimed victor in a wrestling-match at Olympia, and he received the victor's crown oftener than any other athlete; for not only did he frequently conquer at Olympia, but also six times at the Pythian, nine times at the Nemean, and ten times at the Isthmian games. Exenetus of Agrigentum, a city of Sicily, also obtained the victor's crown, and on returning to his native country was received by a procession in which there were three hundred white horses. It was about the fifty-ninth Olympiad that statues of the victors began to be erected at Olympia, the number of which was continually increased from year to year, and added greatly to the beauty of the

place. When we consider that Olympia was exceedingly rich in other works of art of all kinds, as magnificent temples, altars and statues of the gods composed of bronze, silver, gold, and ivory, and that it was a most enchanting place in its natural features, we need not be surprised that it came to be considered one of the wonders of the universe, in every way worthy of that gifted race which thronged thither to celebrate the most glorious of its national festivals. Especially was the visitor astounded at the magnificence of the temple of Olympian Zeus, and of the statue of that god contained in it. This statue was wrought of ivory and gold about the eighty-sixth Olympiad by Pheidias the Athenian, the most famous sculptor of ancient times. It was a common saying of the ancients concerning this masterpiece, "Either the god came from heaven for the purpose of showing a statue to Pheidias, or Pheidias ascended in order to see the god"—so sublimely did the artist depict the divine greatness.

About the year 748 B. C. the Argeian tyrant Pheidon attempted to extend the supremacy of the Olympian plain as far as the western section of the Peloponnesus, in pursuit of which object he especially availed himself of the jealousy of the inhabitants of Pisatis toward those of Elis. By the express invitation of the Pisatæ, the king of the Argeians came to Olympia and presided with them over the celebration of the games, on the ground that he himself was a descendant of Herakles. The inhabitants of Elis, thus forcibly deprived of the presidency, refused to inscribe in the catalogue kept by them the name of the victor at this celebration. But this humiliation of the Elians was not of long duration; for the Spartans, who meanwhile, by virtue of their admirably constituted system of government, which had been in operation since the end of the ninth century, had greatly increased their national power, defeated Pheidon, restored to the Eleians the presidency of the games, and

bestowed upon them the sovereignty of both Pisatis and Triphylia.

Notwithstanding this severe check in western Peloponnesus, the power of Pheidon became on the eastern side much more solid and glorious. He was the first of the Greeks that coined copper and silver money, which circulated not only in the Peloponnesus, but throughout nearly all Greece. He was also the first to introduce a regular system of weights and measures, which in honor of him were called Pheidonian. These events clearly indicate the great power and supremacy of the Argolic union during the eighth century B. C., and the cities of this confederacy established many colonies on the southern islands of the Ægean Sea, in the southwest corner of Asia Minor, and elsewhere.

After the time of Pheidon the Argolic confederacy underwent a rapid decline. As early as the end of the seventh century B. C. or the beginning of the sixth, the Spartans deprived it of the greater part of the western coast of the gulf of Argolis; and afterward the Sikyonians and the Æginetans revolted. Notwithstanding these losses, Argos long preserved her right of supremacy over the peninsula of Argolis and in the Peloponnesus; but this authority, unsustained by the necessary power, gradually became weaker and weaker. The Argolic confederation was composed of numerous autonomous or free cities, which, like all the Greek states, were jealous of their independence, and not inclined to surrender a part of their rights to strengthen the link that bound them together. A man of such ability, authority, and energy as Pheidon appears to have been, could, if supported by Argos, the most powerful and important of these cities, have compelled the rest to recognize his supremacy, and to form thus a strong centralized kingdom. But no such man appeared after the time of Pheidon. The royal power was nominally maintained at Argos as late as the period of the Persian wars; but the political authority had

long before that time virtually passed into the hands of the people.

The bond of union between the different cities of the Argolic confederacy was in the course of time entirely loosened. Several of them continued to prosper, especially Sikyon, Ægina, and Argos itself; but, no longer united, they were unable to present an effectual barrier against the encroachments of Sparta, whose political and military system enabled her to subdue some of these cities, to humble others, and by the sixth century B. C. to assume the supremacy over the entire Peloponnesus.

The Spartan Constitution.

The ancients believed that the constitution of Sparta was the work of the famous lawgiver Lykurgus, concerning whom nothing definite is known. Even the period in which he flourished is the subject of dispute, some placing it as early as the beginning of the tenth and others as late as the end of the ninth century B. C. But, since the constitution of Sparta was of such a nature that it could not have been established by the efforts or authority of any one man, the particulars of the career of Lykurgus are of less historic value than might at first be supposed.

From the earliest times we find three separate elements in the government of Sparta: the *gerusia* (senate or council of elders), the popular assembly, and the "royal power," which in Sparta had this peculiarity, that the throne was shared by two kings reigning jointly, the one a descendant of Eurysthenes, the other of Prokles, and both belonging to the race of Herakleids. This double sovereignty, not found anywhere else in ancient Greece, was established with the hope that two kings, each with equal power, by reason of the jealousy which would naturally exist between them, would always be somewhat at variance, and therefore less likely to conspire for the overthrow of the constitution. And,

strange to say, for more than five hundred years no such political crisis occurred in Sparta. Though possessing some advantages, the plan had likewise those drawbacks which are inseparable from a division of the highest authority ; and perhaps Sparta mainly owed her stability to the vast power vested in the ephors, who may be regarded as the representatives of the popular assembly, and who were at first perhaps merely the agents of the kings during their absence in war.

Afterward the ephors constituted a self-existent and all-powerful magistracy. They were five in number, any citizen being eligible to the office, were chosen yearly, and were responsible only to their successors for the manner in which they conducted their office. Their orders were carried out by a body of three hundred cavalry, chosen from among the most energetic citizens. They punished the refractory with fines and imprisonment, expelled from office any magistrate they pleased, and assembled the military force in time of war.

Although the king had the highest command, two ephors always accompanied the army, and on mere suspicion could even arrest him. They also decided matters of private litigation, not in accordance with written laws, of which there were very few in force at Sparta, but in accordance with their own will and judgment. It was only in the most weighty affairs of government that they consulted the popular assembly or the gerusia. Accordingly, the power of the kings was much restricted, though they still preserved important rights. Each was entitled to a vote in the gerusia, and the distinction which they enjoyed was also very great from their being descended from Herakles, the son of Zeus. Accordingly, the kings represented the city in all its relations to the gods ; they were the priests of "Zeus Lacedæmon" and of "Zeus Uranios," and offered the monthly sacrifice by which the gods were rendered propitious to Sparta. They were, indeed, the august protectors of the

social life of the nation, the highest officers of religion, and the living representatives of the divine race of the Herakleidæ, the link that bound the city with the traditions of the heroic period, but nothing more. Their political authority was merely secondary, the ephors virtually holding the highest power.

The authority of the gerusia and of the popular assembly was likewise but little. The gerusia was composed of the two kings and of twenty-eight citizens, each chosen for life and obliged to be at least sixty years of age.

The popular assembly was composed of all the citizens who had passed their thirtieth year, and took part in the common public meals or *syssitia*. The assembly had a voice in all questions of peace and war, as well as in the enactment of the very few laws that were from time to time added to the Spartan constitution ; but its sessions were of rare occurrence and of slight importance. Nothing was proposed in the assembly that had not been previously discussed in the gerusia. The members of the gerusia were indeed chosen by the assembly, but the manner in which they were selected was in itself a sufficient indication of the limited power in the hands of the people. In the first place, as Aristotle says, "the brave, the good, were alone eligible," and of these only such as had passed their sixtieth year. The election was held after this manner : When the assembly was convened, the candidates were shut up in a neighboring building, where they could not see the voters, but could hear their shouts ; for to elect by acclamation was the general custom at Sparta. They were then introduced into the assembly separately, and as each one appeared the shouts of the voters rose or fell in proportion to the popularity of the individual, and the one most boisterously applauded was considered chosen to the position ; the decision of the question being in the hands of certain scribes who were also shut up in a place close by, so that they could hear but not see what was going on.

Now, as the gerusia was composed of very old men, it is evident that it could not form a strong barrier against the political power of the ephors. No citizen could speak in the assembly without first obtaining the permission of the ephors. Hence, debates were unknown, and the propositions of the ephors were either at once accepted or rejected by acclamation. This singularity is easily explained. The Spartans were not fond of discussion, and their peculiar system of education was such as to unfit them for it. Thucydides, speaking of the illustrious Brasidas, remarks with some contempt that, for a Lacedæmonian, he was "not deficient in eloquence." Even in that famous session of the assembly in which the Peloponnesian war was decided on, and in which, owing to the grave importance of the subject, the decision was given by vote instead of by the usual custom of acclamation, no one seems to have spoken except the king Archidamus and the ephor Sthenelaidas, the former of whom advocated the postponement of the war and the latter its immediate declaration.

Such, in brief, was the constitution of Sparta, which was in reality nothing more nor less than a very narrow oligarchy, preserving many traits of the Homeric age, the royalty, the assembly of the old men, and the assembly of the people.

Social Life of Sparta.

From the earliest times we find the inhabitants of Laconia divided into three classes: the Spartans, the Pericæki or "those dwelling around," and the Helots. The Spartans, mainly inhabiting the city of Sparta, composed the standing army of the state, and were alone eligible to the public offices. They had neither time nor inclination to occupy themselves with agriculture, commerce, or industry, but subsisted from the revenues of large estates cultivated for them by the Helots, who received a portion of the produce for their labor. Every Spartan was obliged to submit to the peculiar dis-

cipline of the state, and to take part in the *syssitia* (public dinners) kept up by the contributions of the citizens.

The *Periœki* were inhabitants of the other cities of *Laconia* and not of *Sparta*, which city alone exercised general authority over the affairs of the nation. They also served in the army as *hoplites*, and in some instances were intrusted with the highest commands. In a word, the Spartans were the masters of *Laconia*, and the *Periœki* were their free subjects.

The general appellation of *Helots* was common to the entire slave population of the country, but was especially applied to the farm-laborers. Some *Helots* served as domestics, but they were few in comparison with the much greater number engaged in agriculture. They cultivated the lands of the Spartans, and perhaps also of the *Periœki*, with the understanding that they should receive a share of the proceeds. They could not be sold out of the country, and probably it was not the custom to sell them at all, in which case their condition was superior to that of the *Penestæ* of *Thessaly*, to whom they bear a greater resemblance than to the slaves of any other Grecian state. Like the *Penestæ*, they could acquire property of their own; and it is related that when *Kleomenes III* promised liberty to every *Helot* who would pay five *minæ*, six thousand *Helots* at once came forward with the required sum, and the entire amount thus obtained from them was five hundred talents. Finally, the *Helots*, unlike some other classes of slaves, were allowed to marry. *Laconia* was their native country and Greek their native language, in which respects they formed a decided contrast with the main bulk of the slave population elsewhere, which was generally of foreign birth, or at least of foreign descent. They possessed the consciousness of their Hellenic descent, and an incessant yearning for liberty was one of their most striking characteristics, insomuch that they proved themselves a terrible foe to *Sparta* whenever favorable cir-

cumstances induced them to revolt. According to Plutarch, who quotes Aristotle as his authority, the ephors were accustomed every year, on taking possession of their office, to declare war against the Helots in regular form, and to send out into various parts of the country parties of young Spartans, with instructions to murder the most robust and dangerous of them. A policy so ill-advised could scarcely have been adopted so often or by all the ephors; yet there can be no doubt that thousands of Helots were murdered by infamous means.

What, then, was the power which enabled Sparta to rise to such exalted influence? The answer is to be sought in the peculiar and wonderful Spartan discipline, by virtue of which every citizen was a soldier, educated to the hardships of war, blindly obedient to his commanders, knowing no other pleasure, and indeed having no other occupation, than to fight for his country. To bring about and maintain this state of affairs was the end and aim of all the regulations of the state. From the very hour of his birth, the young Spartan was trained to be a warrior. The new-born infant was at once examined by officers appointed for the purpose. If robust and well formed, it was allowed to live; if weak or sickly, it was at once destroyed, as yielding no promise of developing into a brave and hardy soldier. Until the age of seven the education of the children was intrusted to the parents, who were obliged to bring them up in accordance with public regulations, framed with a special view to prevent the exercise of too great a degree of parental love. From their seventh year they were subjected to a long and arduous course of public discipline, which became more rigid and severe as they advanced toward the age of puberty. To this effect they were placed under the care of a public officer called "paidonomos," or the boy-trainer, who divided them into divisions or squads, each of which was presided over by

a youth of about twenty years of age distinguished for bravery and wisdom.

Instruction in art, science, or philosophy was unknown, and few young Spartans could even read or write ; but they all could run, leap, wrestle, throw the javelin, and use weapons of every sort, with wonderful dexterity. From earliest childhood the young Spartan was inured to hardship and perseverance. His food was scanty, his apparel light, the same in winter as in summer, his bed a bundle of reeds gathered with his own hands from the banks of the Eurotas. Wounds were inflicted upon him by his masters, not always as a punishment, but often for the purpose of hardening him for the life and occupation of a warrior. Even the dance was regarded as a species of military discipline, and so regulated as to excite the emulation of the citizens of every class and age. The chants by which the dance was accompanied were either of a religious or of an heroic character. The Homeric songs were especially esteemed by the Spartans, as were likewise those of the Athenian poet Tyrtæus, who proved by his deeds that he had within himself the fire of that bravery so highly extolled in his poems. On the other hand, the Parian poet Archilochus was expelled from Sparta, and the citizens were forbidden to read his poems, because he had said that it was better to throw away one's shield than to die. All these exercises tended to increase courage and endurance rather than to develop the mind. To the same end the children were taught to accustom themselves to short, pithy answers, and hence the proverbial brevity of Spartan speech. It was sought by these means, not to sharpen the wits of the young men, but rather to accustom them to preserve a tranquil soul, and to think and decide speedily. Above all, they were educated to be modest and obedient, to respect the aged, and to venerate the government. The step and the eye of the young Spartan, as Xenophon remarks, proclaimed his modesty and wisdom. In the presence of his elders he was as modest as

a maiden and as silent as a statue, unless a question was addressed directly to him.

The education of the girls was somewhat analogous. They publicly took part in gymnastic exercises very similar in character to those of the young men, and this discipline was imposed upon them in order to render them capable of bearing children that would be likely to prove efficient soldiers.

The Spartan's period of military service began with his twentieth and ended with his sixtieth year. The armor in which he fought was much like that of other Grecian soldiers, and differed little from the panoply of the heroic times. His superiority in military tactics resulted from his training and experience ; throughout his whole life he was a soldier, while the citizens of other states devoted more attention to agriculture, commerce, navigation, and intellectual pursuits. Compared with him, they were as the militia of to-day are to the regular troops. If, therefore, to all these advantages of drill and military art there is added the spirit with which, by reason of their education and the stringency of their laws, the Spartans were inspired, it can be understood why their armies became unconquerable. Their watchword was "Victory or death !" or, as a Spartan woman is reported to have said to her son, on handing him his shield, "Return either with it or upon it." The coward in battle, or he who sought flight, lost all the rights of citizenship, and was for ever afterward despised.

Aristodemus, one of the three hundred Spartans who, under King Leonidas, fought the Persians at Thermopylæ, and the only one that escaped on that memorable occasion, fell into deep disgrace on his return to Sparta. No one would furnish him with fire or even speak with him, and all pointed scornfully at him with the word "coward" on their lips. Such was the fate in store for the Spartan recreant in battle. If single, he could not find a wife ; if he had daughters, he could not obtain husbands for them. The young

men had no respect for him, and those who turned not their faces away could have struck him without fear of punishment. Is it strange, then, that a Spartan should prefer death to a dishonorable and disgraceful life ?

What made Sparta still more like a military camp rather than an ordinary city was the fact that the citizens did not dine in their own houses, but at public tables, called *syssitia*. This was a duty incumbent on all except the ephors, not even the kings being exempt. Every one that did not take part in these *syssitia* was debarred from political rights. These meals were exceedingly plain and frugal, and yet many Spartans were so poor that they could not make the small contributions required from each in order to keep them up ; from which fact we may with propriety entertain grave doubts in regard to the equal division of property which Lykurgus is said to have introduced into Sparta. Our only extant evidence to that effect is furnished by Plutarch, who professes to have derived his information from earlier authorities. But, on the other hand, the more ancient and trustworthy writers, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Aristotle, make no mention of such a measure, and some of them refer to the great inequality of riches existing at Sparta in their day. Herodotus even mentions by name many rich Spartans, especially Sperthias ; and the victories gained by Spartan citizens in the chariot-races at the Olympic games are in themselves proof that many were rich enough to keep at least four horses of fine breed. An equality of diet certainly prevailed, and citizens of every class were subjected to the same general course of discipline, compelled to wear the same sort of clothing, to take part in the same exercises, to practice the same degree of endurance, and to remain in the same ignorance of the polite arts. To enforce conformity to these rigid and strictly national customs, it was the law that no Spartan should without permission emigrate from his country ; nor were foreigners allowed to remain permanently in Sparta.

In short, the Spartan constitution presents one of the most difficult social and political problems in the history of mankind. It held man a prisoner from his very birth, encompassed him with rigid and inexorable rules, and allowed him no liberty of action either in the choice of a pursuit, in education, diet, or even in the exercise of that holiest and most natural of sentiments, parental love. Narrow and soul-crushing as was the Spartan civil polity in its general aspect, there was, nevertheless, something noble and wonderful in its nature, when we take into consideration the active part performed by the citizens themselves in the enactment of the stringent laws intended to hamper their own liberty.

The Spartan constitution can not properly be judged or criticised in accordance with the political ideas and social conditions of the present age. The general principle is now admitted that every citizen must sacrifice a part of his individual liberty and comfort for the happiness of the community, but that such sacrifice should be the least possible consistent with the common good. In ancient Greece the opposite practice prevailed. The individual was subordinate to the state, and nowhere more so than in Sparta. The citizens of the other Hellenic states, of Athens, for instance, served as soldiers throughout nearly their entire lives, but at the same time had their own personal occupations and intellectual pursuits. Hence it was that Sparta developed the best infantry in Greece, and retained the political and military supremacy for more than four centuries. Athens, on the other hand, attained to the highest pinnacle of glory in literature and the arts; but these very pursuits served in some degree to withdraw the attention of her citizens from military affairs, and, as a consequence, her influence as a power of the first rank scarcely lasted a single century. Nevertheless, the short but brilliant ascendancy of Athens accomplished more for humanity than all the long centuries of rough and unpolished Spartan rule. Let us reflect how faint would be the memory

of the Hellenic name, and how vastly less would have been the benefit to humanity, had Athens never existed ; while without Sparta the star of Hellenism would remain none the less resplendent in the firmament of history.

O. K. Müller, who died in Greece in 1840, a victim to his devotion to Hellenic history, and to whom the Greeks erected a monument at Athens on the site of the ancient Academy, attempted, with a wonderful display of learning, to prove that the laws of Sparta were in early times common to the entire Doric race, and therefore were introduced into the country at the time of the Dorian invasion. Grote has successfully refuted this theory by demonstrating that the laws of Sparta bore no resemblance whatever to those of Corinth, Megara, Epidaurus, Sikyon, Korkyra, or any other Dorian city. In Krete alone we find a system of public meals resembling the *syssitia*, and some other usages that remind us of Sparta, but without trace of the peculiar education and military system so eminently characteristic of the latter nation. Whatever the origin of this very remarkable constitution, the evidence is almost conclusive that it was established toward the end of the ninth century B. C. Shortly afterward the city engaged in a long and arduous struggle for the enlargement of its territory, which was at first confined to the limits of the narrow valley of the Eurotas, but by the first Olympiad had extended itself as far as the city of Helos on the southern coast.

The Messenian Wars.

At what period the remainder of Laconia fell under the Spartan yoke is not known, but not long after the beginning of the Olympic era the Spartans were involved in a serious war with the neighboring Dorian state of Messenia. The events of this war, as reported by Pausanias, a writer who lived nearly a thousand years after it took place, are not regarded as worthy of credit. The only contemporaneous testimony in regard to it is furnished by the few extant poems

of Tyrtaeus, an Athenian by birth, who was an eye-witness of the latter part of the struggle, and by his vigorous and stirring war-songs greatly contributed to the final triumph of the Spartans. From him we learn that there were in reality two wars between Sparta and Messenia; that the first lasted twenty years (743-724 B. C.), and was fought principally about the mountains of Ithome during the reign of the Spartan kings Theopompus and Polydorus. Aristodemus, a descendant of the royal race of Messenia, greatly distinguished himself on the side of his countrymen; but finally the stronghold of Ithome was captured, the entire country subdued, and the Messenians placed in the ranks of the Helots.

The second war was a desperate rebellion of the conquered Messenians, lasting from 685 to 668 B. C., and was even more bloody and terrific than the first. It was principally fought about Mount Eira, and in it the Messenian hero Aristomenes, also of royal blood, immortalized himself. In the course of this rebellion the Spartans were reduced to severe straits, and it is difficult to understand how they succeeded in keeping their subjects under their yoke. Their only allies were the Eleians, while the Argeians, the Pisatæ, and the Triphylians assisted the Messenians. Moreover, by the incessant inroads of the Messenians, a large portion of the Spartan territory remained uncultivated, and a famine resulted. The proprietors of those tracts that had been laid waste demanded a new distribution of the land, and this in turn was the cause of violent internal commotion. In the midst of these dangers, Sparta, in accordance with the advice of the oracle at Delphi, summoned from Athens the poet Tyrtaeus, ostensibly as a leader, but in reality that he might reanimate by his stirring poetry the now drooping courage of the people. At first thought it may appear strange that a lame poet and pedagogue, as Tyrtaeus is said to have been, should have largely contributed to the preservation of a

warlike nation. But the very best political and military systems become paralyzed after long and incessant strain, and, when such is the case, the desponding citizens require to be aroused by words of encouragement. The bravest armies sometimes quail before the prospect of apparently insurmountable hardships, and are reanimated by an enthusiastic proclamation of the commanding officer. And this Tyrtæus accomplished for Sparta. His elegy entitled "Eunomia," of which few fragments have come down to us, had the effect of pacifying the internal dissensions of the country. But the most wonderful poems of Tyrtæus were his war-songs, many of which are still extant, and which inspired the almost despairing Spartans with a renewed enthusiasm that finally led them to success. The Messenians were utterly crushed, and their territory became a part of Laconia.

Arkadia.

After the subjection of their western neighbors, the Spartans, in the beginning of the following century, turned their arms northward, and attempted the conquest of Arkadia. Although this land had never received any colonies from other parts of Greece, its inhabitants did not materially differ from the rest of the Hellenic tribes in language or in general character. In the *Iliad*, the Arkadian form of government is the one prevalent in Greece during the heroic times; but the royal power was overthrown in the seventh century B. C., and, according to tradition, the last king was Aristokrates, the son of Hiketas, who is said to have betrayed the Messenians in their second contest with the Lacedæmonians. From that time forward the rough, mountainous land of Arkadia was divided among a number of autonomous cities, the most famous of which were Tegea and Mantinea.

The bond of union between these several states was perhaps weaker than that of any other Grecian confederacy.

The mountainous character of the country, the poverty and the warlike spirit of its inhabitants, were its real safeguards against foreign conquest. At an early period we find Arcadians serving as mercenaries, both in the armies of other Grecian states and in those of foreign and barbarian nations. Learning was not altogether neglected, for the lawgiver Demonax, who about the middle of the sixth century reformed the constitution of the Hellenic city of Kyrene on the northern coast of Africa, was a native of Mantinea. Tegea, originally much more powerful than Mantinea, saved Arkadia from conquest by inflicting a severe defeat on the Spartans. It is true that, late in the year 560 B. C., the Spartans obtained important advantages over them; but the Tegeans none the less preserved their own freedom and that of the rest of Arkadia. Hence it was that, when the country finally came under the power of Sparta, the Tegeans enjoyed many privileges that did not fall to the lot of the Mantineians, and always occupied an honorable rank in the Spartan armies.

Growth of Spartan Influence.

The inhabitants of Argos, unable to preserve their supremacy over the confederation of Argolis, were deprived by the Lacedæmonians of the greater part of the western shore of the Argolic Gulf, and at the end of the seventh century were again totally defeated by the Spartan king Kleomenes. They continued, however, to claim supremacy in the Peloponnesus. In fact, they still governed a country of considerable extent, and at a later period, during the fifth century, several other cities came under their power. They also assumed the presidency of the Nemean games, celebrated every two years in honor of Zeus. Nevertheless, the Argeians were far from being successful competitors of the Spartans, who by the middle of the sixth century B. C. had made themselves masters of all Laconia and Messenia, and of the greater portion of Ar-

golis. Their dominion now extended from sea to sea, and their influence began to make itself felt beyond the isthmus, insomuch that they were appealed to about that time by the Athenians and the Megarians, to settle a dispute concerning the island of Salamis.

The name of Sparta became known and respected even in distant Asia ; for, about the year 547 B. C., Cræsus, king of Lydia, applied to her for assistance against Cyrus of Persia ; but just as the Spartans were preparing to send him the desired aid, they learned that Cyrus had totally defeated Cræsus and subdued his kingdom.

Three years afterward the Ionian colonies on the coast of Asia Minor also sought the alliance of Sparta against Cyrus. This steady development of power was one of the results of the Spartan constitution, and was destined ere long to vastly enlarge her sphere of action. Up to this period there had existed no regularly organized Peloponnesian alliance under the leadership of Sparta. The first indication of any such alliance does not appear until toward the end of the sixth century. But the influence of Sparta was already manifest throughout the Peloponnesus, except in Arkadia ; and even the latter country was amicably disposed toward her more powerful neighbor. But during the sixth century events occurred that loudly called for the interference of Sparta in other parts of the peninsula.

During the first historic years, the kingly form of government that had prevailed in the Homeric times disappeared from all parts of Greece except Sparta and Epirus. In some states the monarchy was nominally continued, but the duties connected with the position had become of a religious rather than of a political or military character. The prevailing system now became oligarchical, the management of affairs being in the hands of a few nobles or wealthy land-owners. The remaining population of the Hellenic cities, exclusive of the slaves, consisted—first, of the peasantry,

who, possessing no land of their own, cultivated the estates of the rich, and whose condition was merely a grade above that of the slaves ; secondly, of the small proprietors, who cultivated their own lands, and, unable to derive therefrom a comfortable subsistence, sought additional work on the larger estates of the rich, or in the adjacent cities ; thirdly, of the mechanics, merchants, and tradesmen.

All these were freemen, and retained their ancient privilege of being consulted in the general assembly of the people concerning questions of war or peace. As few wars occurred during the first years of the heroic period, and fewer laws were enacted, the real exercise of the political rights of the people was very rare, and in many instances it entirely disappeared in the course of time. This state of affairs continued until the eighth or seventh century, when nearly everywhere, except in Sparta, it was variously modified ; for nowhere else did the oligarchical spirit succeed in fettering the material and intellectual growth of the people. As years wore on, many once wealthy families became poor, on account of the repeated divisions and subdivisions of their landed estates, and yet continued to be numbered among the governing classes. On the other hand, many of the smaller land-owners, and a still greater number of the merchants and manufacturers in the cities, became rich by reason of the development of commerce and the useful arts, and yet remained without any extensive share of political power. As a consequence, the latter class began to manifest a great deal of discontent, of which some ambitious men took advantage, and, by strenuously advocating the rights of the people, succeeded in abolishing the oligarchical governments in many cities, and securing a larger share of power for the people. But this very abolition of the oligarchies gave rise to the establishment of monarchy in a new form. Those who acquired royal power in this way were called "tyrants," which word, in its Greek sense, is merely equivalent to usurper. Some

of these tyrants were guilty of terrible abuses in the governments committed to their charge, while others were just, beneficent, and patriotic in their rule, and were the direct means of securing the military and commercial prosperity of the cities of which they had the control.

Sikyon.

Nothing is known of the history of Sikyon from the time it was captured by the Herakleid Phalkes up to the middle of the seventh century, when the supreme power was usurped by one Orthagoras. In the line of his successors we find mention of Myron, Aristonymus, and Kleisthenes.

Kleisthenes reigned from 600 to 560 B. C., and proved himself the greatest sovereign of this dynasty. He deeply humiliated the oligarchical faction in Sikyon, and by his vigorous foreign policy checked the aspirations of Argos toward political and military supremacy in that part of the Peloponnesus. Argos, although it had long since become a Doric city, still preserved its respect for the heroes of the mythical epoch, and never ceased to strive for the recovery of the preponderating influence it had enjoyed in the heroic age. One of its favorite heroes was the Argeian Adrastus, who had been one of the leaders in the war of the Seven against Thebes. Up to the time of Kleisthenes the memory of Adrastus had been respected at Sikyon as well as at Argos, and had served as a link between the two cities. But Kleisthenes decreed that public honors should no longer be paid to this hero at Sikyon, and even forbade the Homeric poems to be chanted in his dominions, because they praised the Argeians.

This Kleisthenes was certainly brilliant and in many respects noble, but does not seem to have possessed that inborn dignity so becoming to a public man of the first rank. He was, however, proud of his country, and proved himself a great and powerful ruler. His influence in the affairs of Hellas is attested by the deference with which he was treated

by the allies in the sacred war against the Kirrhæans ; and his munificence is manifest from the costly edifices which he erected in Sikyon, from his famous victories at the Pythian and Olympic games, and from the magnificent display at the nuptials of his daughter Agariste.

The circumstances of this marriage, as narrated by Herodotus, present a lively picture of the social condition of Greece during the sixth century B. C. Kleisthenes, desiring to secure the best man in Greece as a husband for his daughter Agariste, caused it to be proclaimed at the Olympic games that all who considered themselves worthy to become a son-in-law of Kleisthenes should present themselves within sixty days at Sikyon. Many distinguished suitors flocked thither from all parts of Greece, and even from the most distant Grecian colonies in Italy and Sicily.

For many days they were royally entertained by Kleisthenes, who narrowly observed them all, studying carefully the manners, character, intelligence, and degree of education of each. Those who had come from Athens pleased him best, on account of their superior refinement and culture ; and of these the one that impressed him the most favorably was Hippokleides, a young man of great wealth, personal beauty, intellectual attainments, and high family connections. At last the day arrived when Kleisthenes was to announce which of the suitors he had chosen.

After sacrificing a hundred oxen to the gods, he invited all the suitors and a large party of Sikyonian nobles to a splendid banquet, at which many of the company drank freely of wine. The conversation happened to turn on the subject of music, and Hippokleides, who was beginning to be intoxicated, called upon the flute-players who were in attendance to strike up a choral tune.

Kleisthenes, who had fully made up his mind to choose Hippokleides as his son-in-law, offered no remonstrance, although his rigid notions of decorum were somewhat of-

fended. But when the young Athenian, excited by both the wine and the music, rose from his seat, capered about the floor, went vigorously through the motions of all sorts of dances, and, not content with this, mounted a table, stood on his head, and performed numerous other silly antics, Kleisthenes, unable to endure his conduct any longer, cried out in great disgust, "Hippokleides, you have danced your wife away!" "Hippokleides don't care," was the unconcerned reply; and these words passed into a proverb throughout Greece, and particularly at Athens, to express sublime indifference of any sort.

As soon as Kleisthenes regained his composure, he thanked the suitors for the eagerness they had displayed, assured them he thought equally well of them all, but added that, since he had only one daughter to bestow, and felt bound to make choice of somebody, he would choose the Athenian Megakles, the son of Alkmæon. He then dismissed the rest of the suitors, after presenting each of them with a silver talent.

The result of this marriage of Agariste with Megakles was the birth of the great Athenian statesman Kleisthenes, so named from his royal grandfather. It is not known whether any one succeeded the elder Kleisthenes in the sovereignty of Sikyon. We find, indeed, some mention of another tyrant, by name Æschines, who is said to have been deprived of his kingdom by the Spartans, but it is not known in what manner he was connected with Kleisthenes. About the year 500 B. C. we again find an aristocratic government prevailing at Sikyon, though not in so decided a form as before.

Corinth.

Events of a similar character took place at Corinth. The descendants of the Herakleid Aletes, who obtained possession of that city, were surnamed the Bacchiadæ from Bacchis, one of his great-grandchildren. This numerous and powerful

clan constituted the entire aristocracy of Corinth. They finally effected the overthrow of the monarchy, and took the whole machinery of government into their own hands. They intermarried only among themselves, and intrusted the supreme power to one of their own number chosen yearly. Meanwhile Corinth prospered greatly, and became one of the richest commercial and maritime cities in Greece. As early as the eighth century she established the famous colonies of Korkyra and Syracuse, the latter of which became in the course of time even more wealthy and powerful than the mother city. Not long afterward (703 B. C.) she constructed the first *triremes* or war-ships. It was Corinth also that freed the sea from the pirates who had been infesting it from the most ancient times; and the first known naval engagement was fought between the Korkyræans and Corinthians in the year 664 B. C.

In the midst of all this prosperity the people rose against the Bacchiadæ, deposed them from power, and connived at the usurpation of Kypselus, who ruled over the city for thirty years from 665 B. C. He extorted an immense amount of money from the fallen oligarchs, of which he lavishly expended a part in offerings to the gods, and laid aside the remainder for safe keeping. The golden-crowned Zeus which adorned the Heræum in Olympia was his gift.

His son Periander, who ruled from 626 to 585, oppressed not only the oligarchs but the people also. Most conflicting reports have come down to us concerning the character of this man. By some he is called a patron of poetry and of music, and one of the seven wise men of Greece; by others he is described as a bloodthirsty tyrant and a heartless husband. Certain it is that during his reign Corinth attained her highest power, and subdued many neighboring cities. At this time occurs the first genuinely historic mention of the Isthmian games, celebrated every two years by the Corinthians on the Isthmus in honor of Posei-

don. The last of the Corinthian tyrants was Psammetichus, the son of Gordius, the successor and relative of Periander ; and this dynasty is said to have been overthrown, as was likewise that of Sikyon, by the Spartans. After this the governmental power passed into the hands of the richest citizens.

Megara.

Megara, which occupied the broadest and most mountainous part of the isthmus that joins the Peloponnesus with the mainland of Greece, was also among the conquests of the Herakleidæ, and at the dawn of the historical period was subject to the Dorians of Corinth. From their dominion it soon freed itself, and it was manifestly an independent state as early as the eighth century. In a war during that period, the famous Megarian general Orsippus, who was victor at the Olympic games in the fifteenth Olympiad, wrested from the Corinthians a very important tract of country. The many colonies which, during the seventh and sixth centuries, were sent out from Megara to Thrace and Asia Minor on the east, and as far as Sicily on the west, clearly indicate that this state was then much more powerful and populous than in the succeeding age, when the Hellenic nation attained the height of its prosperity.

About 620 B. C., Theagenes, a citizen of Megara, having formed for himself a powerful party among the people, overthrew the oligarchical government, and, supported by his faction, usurped the royal power. But ere he had long enjoyed the sovereignty, the deposed oligarchs raised a successful counter-revolution, and Theagenes was obliged to flee. After his expulsion, Megara was for some time tranquil ; but finally the people again rebelled against the aristocracy, many of whom were compelled to leave the country, and severe laws were enacted against those who remained.

The oligarchs afterward partially recovered their influence in the state by allying themselves with some of the

richest individuals of the popular party, and thus gradually formed a new aristocratic class, based not on birth, but on wealth. The condition and fortune of the formerly downtrodden agricultural laborers were now materially improved. This change in the constitution of Megara became somewhat famous through the poet Theognis, whose verses immortalized the strife between the aristocratic and democratic elements. Theognis for a long time was a strong adherent of the old aristocratic party, and a bitter opponent of the populace, which he despises and pitilessly insults throughout his poems. In his eyes every man of humble birth was vicious and a coward, every aristocrat brave and good. But when the democratic faction finally gained the ascendancy, Theognis, with many other adherents of the opposite party, was compelled to flee. He was warmly welcomed in Sicily, in Eubœa, in Sparta, and, in fact, in all places where oligarchical principles of government prevailed. But whithersoever he went he was haunted by an irresistible longing for his native land; and when the exiled oligarchs were at last, through the folly of the people, allowed to return and regain possession of the government, Theognis made haste to go back also. Subdued by misfortune, he became much less violent and fanatical in his political views. This moderation was so far shared by his fellow aristocrats, that they wisely reestablished the government on such a basis as to combine and reconcile in some degree both the popular and the oligarchic interests.

Thus, by the middle of the sixth century B. C., the tyrannical governments of the eastern section of the Peloponnesus had disappeared. In many cases this happened through the intervention of Sparta, which state, being herself eminently oligarchical, was desirous that her neighbors should conform to her policy, and to this end her political intrigues were constantly directed. In this way she contrived to establish for herself a sort of supremacy over

the weaker oligarchical cities. In fact, about 524 B. C., we find her even attempting to overthrow Polykrates, the tyrant of Samos, and sending to that distant island a military force transported on Corinthian vessels, as she had no navy of her own. Polykrates, however, after a brave resistance, drove the Spartans away.

About the end of the sixth century we also find her interfering in the affairs of Athens, with a view to overthrow the sons of the usurper Peisistratus. Her success in this latter enterprise proved in the end disadvantageous to her own interests—a consequence which she had then, of course, no means of foreseeing. The Athenians, relieved from the presence of their domestic oppressors, proceeded forthwith to organize their political system on new principles, the vigorous and energetic development of which soon wrought a complete change in the current of Hellenic affairs, and generated a spirit of antagonism to Sparta much more formidable than she had as yet anywhere encountered.

CHAPTER IV.

ATTICA.

General Account.

ATTICA forms in the southeastern section of Greece a triangular peninsula, across the solid base of which rise the mountains of Parnes and Kithæron, separating the country from Bœotia on the north, while the apex of the triangle is formed by the rocky promontory of Sunium in the south. The land is bounded on the southwest by the Saronic Gulf and on the east by the Ægean Sea.

Attica is small in extent, barren and ill-watered, the two

principal rivers of the country—the celebrated Kephissus and Ilissus—being often entirely dry. Nevertheless, this small corner of the earth has advantages peculiar to itself: a delightful transparency of atmosphere, a radiantly smiling sky, and landscapes of such enchanting beauty that we can not wonder that here were produced the highest and noblest masterpieces of art.

During the historic period the city of Athens, which lay on a commanding height near the western coast of Attica, was considered the metropolis of the Ionian tribes, just as Sparta was the most important city of the Doric branch of the Hellenic race. But while, according to tradition, Sparta was occupied by the Dorian conquerors from the north at the time of the descent of the Herakleidæ, it was the boast of the Athenians that they were veritable autochthons, and that the population of Attica had never been alloyed by the intrusion of a foreign element.

The kingly form of government, so universal in Hellas during the Homeric age, was in course of time abolished at Athens. After the death of Kodrus, the last of the Athenian kings, the government of that city was vested in the hands of a supreme officer called the *archon* (ruler), who for a long period was chosen for life, and invariably from among the immediate descendants of Kodrus. The only real difference between the kings and the succeeding archons was, that the latter were held responsible to the citizens for the manner in which they exercised their office. The last archon for life was Alkmæon, and from that period (753 B. C.) the term of office was limited to ten years.

After a series of seven such archons, the term of office was divided between nine chosen annually. From the year 714 all the members of the Athenian nobility became eligible to this office, which had heretofore been confined to the posterity of Kodrus. Thus was the change at Athens gradually made from the royal government of the heroic times

to the oligarchical system afterward prevalent throughout Greece.

The Athenians were anciently divided, as were usually the Ionian communities, into four political and social classes—the hoplites, the artisans, the farmers, and the goatherds. Some authorities record a somewhat different division, namely, noblemen, farmers, and manufacturers.

The noblemen constituted the richest and most powerful class, and resided either in the city itself or in its immediate vicinity. They alone had the right of voting, and they alone were eligible to the office of archon. Whoever had filled that high position was entitled after his term of office had expired to a seat for the rest of his life in the court of the Areopagus, which was in consequence an essentially aristocratic institution.

But about the beginning of the seventh century B. C. the exclusive political privileges of the nobility began to be curtailed. Hence, B. C. 624, one Drako was intrusted with the task of revising and reducing to writing the laws of Athens, in order to put a check to the growing insubordination of the inferior classes. Drako did not alter the constitution, but simply codified and published the already existing laws which were falling into disuse, at the same time making some necessary changes. The general belief that he made death the punishment for all misdemeanors is not correct; he decreed the infliction of fines for certain offenses, and under his regulations the death-penalty was of rarer occurrence than it had previously been. To the Greeks of the succeeding centuries, animated by a milder spirit in their criminal legislation, the laws of Drako seemed unnecessarily harsh, and they were popularly said to have been written, not with ink, but with blood. Yet the laws in force before Drako's time made no distinction between the various degrees of murder, whether committed by accident, in anger, in self-defense, or in revenge, but prescribed the penalty of death or banish-

ment for all ; whereas Drako first laid down specific and different punishments.

His laws did not, however, remove the causes of discontent nor end the danger of revolution. In the year 612 B. C. Kylon, an Athenian patrician, attempted to usurp the supreme power at Athens. The conspiracy failed, Kylon was forced to flee, and many of his adherents were slain. Nevertheless, this occurrence became a source of lasting trouble to the state.

Megakles, a member of the great and powerful family of the Alkmæonidæ, was at that time *archon eponymos*, or chief of the archons then officiating. The friends of Kylon accused him and the rest of the Alkmæonidæ of having violated the sanctuaries of the gods, by putting to death some of Kylon's followers who had taken refuge at the altar in the Acropolis. The Alkmæonidæ refused to undergo a trial for this alleged offense, and the city was in consequence violently disturbed by contending factions of a religious as well as of a political character. Just at this crisis Solon appeared on the scene as the savior of his country.

Solon. good administrator.

This great man was born about 639 B. C., and belonged to the noblest family of Athens. He was a lineal descendant both of Kodrus and of Neleus, and therefore derived his origin not only from the ancient royal line of Athens, but also from that race which professed to trace its pedigree back to the god Poseidon. But his father, Exekestides, having greatly diminished his estate through imprudent generosity, Solon was obliged in early manhood to devote himself to commerce, and in that pursuit visited many parts of Greece and Asia. In the course of these travels he obtained not merely riches, but also an amount and variety of knowledge that could never have been acquired at home. Education in Greece, and especially at Athens, was then mainly confined

to the two branches known as "gymnastics" and "music." By the former was understood the important art of strengthening the body and preserving the health by judicious diet and exercise. Running, leaping, wrestling, throwing the discus, and practicing in all sorts of arms and armor, were among the daily athletic occupations of the Grecian youth—imposed upon them as requirements more or less obligatory, with a view to rendering them active, persevering, and formidable in the field of battle.

By music much more must be understood than is implied in the modern acceptation of the term. In its Greek sense it included the art of dancing, as well as that of poetry, which up to the time of Solon was the only branch of literature that had yet been developed. The sciences likewise came within the meaning of the word, as indeed did everything in any way pertaining to the worship of the Muses.

The only strictly intellectual department of study not considered within the pale of "music" was that which the Greeks were wont to term "philosophy." But as this had not yet attained the same perfection at Athens as in the Ionian cities of Asia Minor, it was to these latter that Solon was chiefly indebted for his proficiency therein. He returned from his travels with an amount of wisdom and experience that secured to him an influential standing among his fellow citizens, and enabled him in after years to become a great benefactor to the state.

In the few fragments of his poems that have come down to us, we find a spirit of moderation decidedly at variance with the intense political fanaticism of Theognis, and most unusual in the age in which he lived. Indeed, he seemed to possess within himself the rudiments of those political virtues for which the democracy of Athens became at a later period so honorably distinguished. In his threefold character as a poet, a warrior, and a lawgiver, he may be regarded as the

first of those great and brilliant men who conferred immortal glory upon Athens.

Solon was forty years old when he entered on his political career. Megara, then a powerful state, had carried on war successfully against Athens, and had deprived the latter city of the small but important island of Salamis. The Athenians, weary of their unavailing efforts to retrieve their loss, passed a law that no one, under penalty of death, should by speech or writing propose that the city should assert its claim to that island. Solon, indignant at this ignominious policy, observing that a great part of the youth desirous of war were restrained only by fear of the law, composed a beautiful and inspiring poem on the subject, and, feigning himself to be insane, rushed into the market-place with a cap on his head, ascended the *bema*, or herald's stone, and sang the elegy, which begins—

“Hear and attend; from Salamis I came
To show your error.”

He showed clearly the disgrace of abandoning the island to the Megarians, and cried out that, if his fellow citizens did not feel this shame, he would prefer to be called a barbarian rather than an Athenian. The citizens at once repealed the law, recommenced the war, and bestowed the command on Solon, who, at the head of a force of five hundred Athenian volunteers, made an assault on the island and captured it. The people of Megara continued the war and strove to recover the place; but at length both sides agreed to refer the matter to the Lacedæmonians, by whose decision the island was adjudged to Athens.

The fame of Solon was further increased by his success in negotiating succor for the temple at Delphi against the insolent and injurious behavior of the Kirrhæans; and his influence at Athens had become very great at the time of the breaking out of the dispute between the Alkmæonidæ

and the other noble families—a crisis that threatened serious danger to the state. In addition to this, Attica was at that time torn asunder by the incessant quarrels of three political factions : 1. The *Pedieis*, comprising the wealthier citizens, and so called because they mainly inhabited the *pedion*, or vast level plain around Athens and Eleusis ; 2. The *Paralii*, or dwellers on the seacoast, who chiefly derived their livelihood from commerce, and formed a sort of middle class between the *Pedieis* and the following ; 3. The peasantry, called *Diakrii*, from the mountainous district of *Diakria*, in which for the most part they lived.

The immediate cause of the violent civil broils between these three parties is not known with certainty, though its origin was no doubt owing to the wretched and abject condition to which the poorer classes had been reduced. According to the barbarous laws then in force, not only in Attica but throughout all Greece and Asia, the creditor could seize upon the person of his delinquent debtor, and even of his wife, daughters, and minor sons, and sell them as slaves. As a consequence, many of the poorer citizens had been reduced to slavery ; some of them had been sold into foreign lands, and others had fled from Attica to escape that cruel fate. Such small proprietors as still retained their possessions were compelled to pay their creditors five sixths of their hard-earned revenues, and to eke out for themselves a miserable existence on the remainder, so that their material condition was even lower than that of the *Penestæ* of Thessaly or the *Helots* of Laconia.

The poor, thus deprived of political rights and personal security, were dissatisfied and turbulent, when the strife between the *Alkmæonidæ* and the other noblemen added a new element of confusion to the already distracted commonwealth. At the same time epidemic diseases broke out through the country, and a host of imagined evils added their terrors to the reality. The superstitious fears of the

populace were excited to the verge of madness. Solon clearly saw that the state was in need of a radical reform, and that, if this were not speedily introduced by lawful means, the natural march of events would enforce it at the price of a terrible political convulsion. In his endeavors to accomplish the desired end, he first persuaded the Alkmæonidæ to submit to a fair trial before a special tribunal of three hundred judges chosen from among the nobility. They were found guilty and banished from the country (597 B. C.).

In accordance with a response from the oracle at Delphi, he then caused to be summoned from Krete the famous philosopher Epimenides, who was revered throughout all Greece as a pious man, beloved of the gods, and skilled in all matters relating to religious inspiration and the sacred mysteries. Epimenides, having arrived at Athens, tranquillized the spirits of the citizens by conducting many religious festivals and performing expiatory lustrations. By his influence, in 594 B. C. Solon was chosen *archon eponymos*, or chief magistrate, and at the same time endowed with extraordinary powers as arbitrator or lawgiver. Had Solon been so inclined, he might have availed himself of the enormous authority thus conferred on him to set himself up as king, as Kleisthenes of Sikyon, Periander of Corinth, and Polykrates of Samos had done in their respective cities. No one would have opposed the attempt. The multitude in its despair was eager to sustain whosoever would promise to free them from the oppressive tyranny of the few; and so strange to the Hellenic mind was as yet the theory of complete political equality, that even citizens of the middle class were disposed to intrust the government of the state to the hands of one wise and just man, as the only practical way of escaping from the disadvantages of oligarchical rule. Some, moreover, assert that he had received this oracle from Apollo:

“Seize, seize the helm, the ruling vessel guide;
With aiding patriots stem the raging tide.”

Many of his friends even urged him to assume the scepter, alleging that, wielding the supreme power, he could the more easily effect the intended reformation. Solon, however, turned a deaf ear to such advice. Though declining to act as a usurper, he conducted the administration with great spirit and energy.

The first of his public acts was the *seisachtheia*, or "disburdening ordinance," intended to ameliorate the miserable condition of the poorer classes. The provisions of this ordinance were as follows : Mortgages held on real estate were canceled ; all contracts pledging the person of a debtor as security for money lent were declared void ; all who had become slaves by reason of their undischarged debts were made free, and those who had been sold into foreign lands were bought back at the public expense. Besides these regulations, Solon ordained that the legal value of the *mina* should be raised from seventy-three drachmæ to a hundred, so that those who had large sums to pay to their creditors were relieved of a portion of the burden, while the latter lost nothing by the change.

Perhaps to some this "disburdening ordinance" of Solon will seem unjust and ill-advised, on the ground of its arbitrary abrogation of previous contracts ; but most of those contracts were made with men possessed of no property, and with the acknowledged purpose of reducing them and their families to slavery, and hence were unworthy of the protection of the law. The state was also threatened with a terrible civil outbreak, which was to be averted at any sacrifice. This *seisachtheia* was the greatest and most important of the laws of Solon, for upon it as a basis rested the future liberty and development of Athens. By it he removed the heavy encumbrances from the soil of Attica, which was on the point of being monopolized by a few unscrupulous speculators, and at the same time emancipated from slavery many persons who formerly had been free and honorable citizens. To

guard against future attempts of the rich to acquire undue influence in the state, Solon decided to lessen their power still further, and to bestow upon the rest of the people a larger share than they had before possessed. With this end in view, he divided all the citizens of Attica into four classes. The first was composed of those who could show a yearly revenue of five hundred or more measures in wet or dry goods, whence they were called *Pentakosiomedimni*. The second class consisted of those who could afford to keep a horse, or whose lands produced three hundred measures; these formed a sort of equestrian order, called *Hippeis*, and were obliged to serve as cavalry in the wars. The third class, who had but two hundred measures, were called *Zeugitæ*, formed the heavy-armed infantry, and were bound to serve, each with his full panoply. All those whose revenues amounted to less than two hundred measures were included in the fourth class under the name of *Thetes*.

All the highest public officers and the members of the Areopagus were chosen from the first class. Those belonging to the second and third classes were eligible to the *boule* or assembly of four hundred, and to some minor offices. Those forming the fourth class could obtain no political office, and had only a right to appear and give their vote in the general assembly of the people. This seemed at first but a slight privilege, but afterward it proved of great importance; for most causes came at last to be decided by this assembly, as matters under the cognizance of the magistrates could be appealed to the people. Desirous yet further to strengthen the common people, he empowered any man to enter an action for one that was injured. If a person was assaulted or suffered damage or violence, another, who was able or willing to do so, might prosecute the offender. Thus the lawgiver wisely accustomed the citizens as members of one body to feel and to resent another's injuries. When asked what city was the best modeled, Solon is said to have answered, "That where

those who are not injured are no less ready to prosecute and to punish offenders than those who are."

The public taxes were regulated according to the amount of property, and citizens of the fourth class were entirely exempt. With a view to encouraging manufactures rather than agriculture, the laws of Solon prohibited the exportation of any of the productions of Attica, except olive-oil. The same motive must have influenced the lawgiver in decreeing that a son should not be compelled to support his father in old age in case the latter had not taught him a trade. He ordered, moreover, that no dowries should be given; the bride was to bring with her only three suits of clothes and some household stuff of small value; for he did not choose that marriages should be made with mercenary or venal views.

Another of Solon's regulations was, that a citizen dying without legitimate descendants could dispose of his property by will, whereas formerly the law was that it should revert to the state. The legal right of making a posthumous disposition of one's property is an evidence of a considerable degree of civilization; hence it was unknown among the ancient Germans, Hindoos, and other primitive nations. The most peculiar and surprising of his other laws is that which declares the man infamous who stands neutral in times of civil sedition. In communities so small as those of ancient Greece, the number of actors in the political field was limited; if the greater portion of the citizens remained aloof from contests of political excitement, and took part neither with the government nor with the opposition, the tendency would be to throw the balance of power into the hands of a few crafty politicians, or to facilitate the usurpation of some unscrupulous adventurer. By this regulation Solon placed a check on the possible influence that might be acquired by demagogues.

Such were the main features of the constitution of Solon.

His laws evince great experience and remarkable insight into the social, political, and commercial questions of the day. The constitution which he established was of an order much higher than any yet adopted in the Hellenic states, and of all the ancient governmental systems approaches nearest to the enlightened political spirit of modern times. To the lofty genius of Solon is probably due the analogous system regulating the payment of the national assessment in accordance with the rank of the citizen. This form of taxation, which appears just and equitable, is only partially adopted by modern governments, and is nowhere mentioned in the Roman constitution. The constitution of Solon did not, indeed, remain in force more than a century; for, after the battle of Salamis, 480 B. C., all the citizens were declared eligible to all the offices without distinction of property. But had it not been for the successful efforts of Solon in shielding the main body of the people from impending slavery, and in imparting a new impulse to commerce and manufactures, Athens never would have been able to attain her after-greatness. The "disburdening ordinance" ordained that in future no citizen could become a slave. He succeeded in opening new channels of industry and of revenue, and in bringing to the country new capital, in consequence of which the people of Attica became wealthy and prosperous, and were enabled to enter on a course of material and moral advancement almost unparalleled in history.

But the great work of Solon was destined to undergo many trials before producing its good fruits. The new constitution did not entirely please any one of the opposing factions, because it did not exclusively embody its principles. Solon, however, had no other object in view than to promote the prosperity and happiness of the citizens at large, irrespective of party. Those who had fault to find—and, as time wore on, this class greatly increased in number—frequently came to Solon, asking the meaning of this or that law, com-

plaining of some and commending others, or advising him to make certain additions or retrenchments. Sensible that he could not well excuse himself from complying with their desires, and aware that, if he remained in Athens, he would be compelled to attempt endless changes, he determined to escape at once the difficulty of his position and their cavils and exceptions. Under pretense of traffic, he set sail for another country, having obtained leave of the Athenians for ten years' absence. By that time he hoped the advantages of the new constitution would be recognized by all. His first voyage was to Egypt, thence to Kypros (Cyprus). His celebrated interview with King Cræsus of Lydia unfortunately must be regarded as fictitious, on account of insuperable chronological difficulties ; for Solon is not only known to have returned to Athens B. C. 560, but also to have died there before the earliest date at which an interview could possibly have taken place. On his return Solon found that the Athenians were much divided among themselves. His laws had indeed been inviolably observed, but the three parties which he had striven to reconcile by the new constitution were as much at variance as ever, each under a special leader.

The most dangerous of these leaders was Peisistratus, the son of Hippokrates. His party was composed of the poorest farmers, with whom the most impecunious inhabitants of the city were allied. These men, by reason of their ignorance and poverty, were prone to revolution, and could easily be influenced by a cunning and ambitious chief. Such a one was Peisistratus, who counterfeited so dexterously the good qualities which nature had denied him, that he gained more credit than their real possessor, and stood foremost in public esteem in point of moderation and equity, in zeal for the existing government, and aversion to everything that savored of change.

By means of these arts he imposed upon the people, and finally accomplished his purpose. Solon well understood in

what direction the state was drifting, and, though now enfeebled by old age, attempted to avert the inevitable misfortune, and to oppose himself to the inordinate ambition of Peisistratus. He was unsuccessful, for the passions of the populace heeded not the voice of wisdom and moderation. Peisistratus, although called the leader of the Diakrii, had friends in the other two parties also ; and in the year 560 B. C., when he overcame the opposition of his enemies and usurped the supreme power, a majority of the boule was found ready to act in his interest.

Availing himself of these favoring circumstances, Peisistratus one day wounded himself, caused himself to be conveyed to the agora or market-place, and endeavored to inflame the minds of the people by telling them that his enemies had attempted to assassinate him on account of his patriotism ; whereupon the multitude loudly expressed their indignation, and in a general assembly of the people it was decided that a body-guard of fifty clubmen should be assigned to Peisistratus. By the aid of this force, he soon afterward made himself master of the Acropolis, and assumed the supreme direction of the affairs of state.

During the first year of the tyranny of Peisistratus, Solon died at Athens. The brave old man had endeavored by all means to prevent the citizens from authorizing Peisistratus to form his body-guard of clubmen, assuring them that by such a proceeding they would be sure to lose their liberty ; and when he saw that his prophecy was on the point of fulfillment, he entered the agora and attempted to stir up the citizens to a forcible resistance against this violation of the laws. Then it was that he spoke those memorable words : ("It would have been easier to repress the advance of tyranny and to prevent its establishment ; but now that it is established, it would be more glorious to uproot it.") But they heeded him not. Then in despair he returned to his home, and placed his weapons at the

street-door with these words : ("I have done all in my power to defend my country and its laws.") This was his last public effort. Hearing the Athenians lamenting their sufferings, he told them, with the just bitterness of truth, not to blame the gods, since they themselves, through their lethargy, had brought about their own servitude. When again many advised him to flee, as others had done, from the probable revenge of the tyrant, and asked him to whom or to what he trusted for safety, he replied, "To old age." In fact, Peisistratus proved himself a mild ruler, nor did he trouble the last moments of the life of his determined opponent ; so that Solon died in peace, distressed at the non-realization of his hope, but with the expectation of a better future, which the just God would surely grant to the benefactors of humanity.

Peisistratus and his Successors.

Before Peisistratus had long exercised the power he had usurped, the three parties uniting forced him to flee from Athens (559 B. C.). About five years afterward he formed an alliance with Megakles, the powerful chief of the Paralii, whose daughter he had married, and, returning to Athens, recovered the supreme direction of affairs. But he was soon again driven from the city by the combined efforts of Megakles, who became dissatisfied with him, and Lykurgus, the leader of the Pedieis. (Then it was that he resolved to seek no further alliances with the other factions, but to recover the sovereignty of Athens by force.) He spent eleven years in the city of Eretria in Eubœa, preparing for the great event. Though his property in Attica had been confiscated, he was not without resources, as he possessed large tracts of land on the river Strymon in Thrace. Aid was sent him besides from Thebes and Argos, and by Lygdamis, the tyrant of Naxos ; so that in the year 541 B. C. he marched against the Athenians, defeated them in a decisive battle, and took possession of the city. In order to

secure the prize he had taken so much trouble to gain, and which he had heretofore found it so difficult to keep, he seized the children of the nobles and of the most influential citizens and sent them as hostages to his ally Lygdamis of Naxos. The laws of Solon were preserved, but all public offices were bestowed upon the followers of Peisistratus. The poorer citizens, whose cause he had formerly espoused, did not secure political rights by the change, but one material benefit fell to their share. To many of the peasantry Peisistratus gave seeds, cattle, and the necessary implements for agriculture. Others he furnished with work, and in this way adorned Athens with costly and useful buildings. At that time was begun the great temple of the Olympian Zeus, the ruins of which are still admired. This immense edifice, which was much larger than the Parthenon, was not completed until the time of the Emperor Hadrian, several centuries after the palmy days of Greece were over.

Under Peisistratus was also erected among others the public fountain called "Kallirrhoe," the "beautifully flowing." The expense of these buildings was provided for by a tax of one tenth on the proceeds of agriculture. Peisistratus also instituted the festival called the "greater Panathenæa," celebrated every third Olympic year. This great public holiday must be carefully distinguished from the "lesser Panathenæa," which already existed and continued to be celebrated annually.

Peisistratus showed himself a generous patron of literature. The statement that he was the first that caused a general collection to be made of the then scattered Homeric poems must be regarded as an exaggeration. It is much more probable that he took pains to complete the collections of these poems already existing. He was certainly the first to form at Athens a public library, the use of which was permitted to all the citizens. Athens acquired great fame during his reign. It was at this period that Miltiades, son

of Kypselus and uncle of that Miltiades who in later years routed the Persians at Marathon, conquered Sigeum, a city of the Troas, and also the Thracian Chersonese, the peninsula on the European side of the Hellespont. Hence there is reason to conclude that Peisistratus was in many respects really worthy of the power he had unlawfully usurped.

He had so greatly strengthened his authority that after his death, which occurred B. C. 527, his three sons, Hippias, Hipparchus, and Thessalus, without difficulty succeeded to his position. Of these brothers, Hippias was by far the ablest as a politician. Hipparchus was rather literary in his tastes, but also somewhat addicted to pleasure and dissipation, while Thessalus was especially distinguished for his courage and ability as a warrior. The sons at first imitated the generous and patriotic policy of their father, and, although supporting their power by bands of foreign mercenaries, they preserved the form and in some degree even the spirit of the constitution of Solon. They were the protectors of arts and letters, and collected about themselves the most distinguished poets of that epoch. They also diminished by one half the taxes on agriculture, but shortly afterward were guilty of several violent and unlawful acts. Among these was the murder of Kimon, the brother of Miltiades who had conquered the Thracian Chersonese, and the father of Miltiades the hero of Marathon. They also made an unwise attempt to increase their revenues by debasing the silver coin of the country.

The dissatisfaction arising from these causes was increased by the grievous insult offered by Hipparchus, B. C. 514, to the sister of the Athenian citizen Harmodius, who at once decided in common with his friend Aristogeiton to assassinate the tyrants. The plot was only partially successful. Hipparchus alone was slain; and Hippias, not content with the death of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, became more cruel and unjust than before, and endeavored by force to secure his position. Anticipating his own inevit-

able downfall, he amassed great treasures, often by the most oppressive means, and provided a refuge for himself in case of emergency by giving his daughter in marriage to *Æantides*, the son of *Hippokles*, tyrant of *Lampsakus*, who was the friend of *Darius*, king of *Persia*.

It was, indeed, most natural that by such a state of affairs the exiled *Alkmæonidæ* should be benefited. At first supposing that the citizens themselves would expel the tyrants, they advanced into *Attica*, and occupied the district near *Mount Parnes*, to await the course of events. Having, however, been dislodged and driven from *Attica* by *Hippias*, they became convinced that they had need of external allies.

Perhaps it may appear strange that the *Athenians* allowed themselves to be outraged by the *Peisistratidæ* in this manner, instead of rising against them and driving them from the country. But it not unfrequently happens that those nations most worthy of liberty become so entangled in the web of tyranny that they can not unaided recover their independence; and in the present case the *Alkmæonidæ* had no other choice than to seek aid from abroad. Their natural allies were the *Spartans*, who had always shown themselves opposed to a monarchical form of government; but on this occasion they were indisposed to act. The *Alkmæonidæ*, however, of whom *Kleisthenes*, the son of *Megakles*, was the most prominent, were men of many devices. Though exiles, they were possessed of such immense riches that in the year 548, the temple at *Delphi* having been burned, they undertook its reconstruction on a much more magnificent scale than before. Consequently, they stood high in favor with those who had charge of the *Delphic oracle*, which by its repeated exhortations finally persuaded the *Spartans* to assist the *Alkmæonidæ* to expel the *Peisistratidæ* from *Athens*.

The first expedition that left *Sparta* for this purpose consisted of but a small number of troops, and was easily de-

feated, the more so because the Peisistratidæ had received from the Thessalians an auxiliary corps of one thousand horsemen. But another Spartan army, headed by King Kleomenes himself, immediately took the field, routed the Thessalians, and compelled Hippias and his supporters to retire to Sigeum (510 B. C.).

Thus ended the tyranny which had continued for thirty years from the last usurpation of Peisistratus, and fifty years from his first assumption of the supreme power. Kleomenes at once withdrew with his army, believing that, by the return of the Alkmæonidæ and the other exiled noblemen, the government of Athens would now be conducted on an aristocratic basis. But therein he was in error, for the minds of the Athenians were now ripe for the enjoyment of the blessings of a free constitution. For thirty years they had been debarred from the full exercise of their rights, and now they proceeded to make good use of their liberty by taking measures to render it steadfast and lasting.

The Constitution of Kleisthenes.

The citizens Kleisthenes and Isagoras placed themselves at the head of two political parties, each basing its existence on certain abstract principles of government, and each equally anxious to guard against the reëstablishment of monarchy in any form. One of these parties was chiefly composed of nobles, under the guidance of Isagoras. It claimed that the only safeguard against usurpation was a return to the ancient aristocratic principles of the state. The opposite party, to which the Alkmæonidæ joined themselves, and in which Kleisthenes was the most influential man, maintained that the desired end could be attained through the constitution of Solon by a few simple emendations. Kleisthenes, therefore, having explained to the people their true interests and the causes of their former calamity, proved victorious in the election that followed, and was proclaimed archon eponymos, 510 B. C.

Applying himself at once to the work of reformation, he dissolved the four Ionic tribes into which the population of Attica had thus far been divided, and established in their stead ten new classes, in which were included many who had been debarred from the rights of citizenship under the former arrangement. He still further augmented the number of citizens by enrolling in the communities many wealthy foreigners who had become permanent residents of Athens, and at the same time increased the number of the members of the boule, or general council, to five hundred, fifty being chosen from each community. He also conferred upon the people the right of civil procedure in almost all cases.

The results of these changes soon declared themselves. On the one hand, the nobles, or Eupatridæ, thus weakened in power by being distributed through so many new communities, were no longer able to wield the same solid influence at the election as formerly; on the other, through the increase necessitated in the number of public offices, and through the extension of political privileges above described, the people began to take a much more eager and active part in the administration of affairs. In every other respect the constitution of Solon was preserved intact and established on a secure basis, since all the citizens were now more or less interested in maintaining it.

During the time of Kleisthenes, and principally by his influence, was introduced the singular custom of ostracism, which has given rise to much careless misstatement on the part of some modern historians, and by reason of which much unmerited blame has been bestowed upon the Athenians. By means of the ostracism it was possible for any distinguished man of Athens, without previous accusation, trial, or defense, to be exiled for ten years. This measure was very seldom resorted to, and there were many legal restrictions whereby its abuse was carefully guarded against. Both the boule and the assembly of the people were consulted, and

it was their privilege to decide whether the power and influence of any one citizen had become so extensive as to be a source of danger to the state. In this preliminary discussion no particular name was mentioned; the question was simply put to the council and to the assembly. If the decision of these bodies was that the condition of public affairs required a vote of ostracism, a day was appointed on which all citizens desiring to vote were summoned to the agora. In the center an inclosure was erected, having ten entrances, one for the citizens of each community, and ten receptacles in which the votes were to be deposited. Every citizen then provided himself with a shell or potsherd (*ostrakon*, whence the name), on which he wrote the name of the man who, according to his judgment, ought to be banished for the well-being of the state, and deposited it in the receptacle assigned to his community. At the close of the day the votes were counted, and if it was found that the name of any citizen was written on as many as six thousand of the shells, he was ostracized or banished for the period of ten years. If less than six thousand votes were given against any one citizen, no further proceedings were taken. Ten days were allowed to the banished man for settling up his private affairs, after which he was obliged to depart from Attica. He was allowed to retain his property, and was not considered to rest under any taint or disgrace.

By this strange custom of ostracism some of the most eminent and illustrious men of Athens were driven from the country, and on this account the Athenians have been accused of ingratitude toward their greatest benefactors. But we must bear in mind that since the Hellenic republics were of small extent, and the privileges of citizenship were conferred upon a limited number of the inhabitants, it was sometimes easy for an influential and ambitious citizen to bring about a revolution and to set himself up as a monarch. Solon endeavored to prevent this evil by imposing on every one the duty of enlisting in one party or the other when-

ever a revolution appeared imminent, believing that the bulk of the citizens would be drawn up on the better side, and would strive to preserve the republic from violent or unlawful change. But the usurpation of Peisistratus showed that this law was not sufficient to meet the emergency. Hence Kleisthenes, to guard against future contingencies, instituted ostracism, which, notwithstanding its apparent injustice, had the merit of preventing the evil against which it was directed. That it was sometimes unjustly applied can not be denied ; but those who, in consequence thereof, accuse the Athenians of ingratitude, neglect to view the subject from the standpoint of the times. When called upon to cite an instance of the injustice of ostracism, they are sure to mention the case of Aristides, forgetting that Aristides himself was thoroughly convinced of its necessity, and that on one occasion he remarked that there would be no safety for Athens until either Themistokles or himself should be cast into the barathron.* And, indeed, what human law is there that is not sometimes abused ? So that, when we take into account the great danger to which the commonwealth was exposed by the ambition of some of its prominent citizens, and the consequent necessity of the ostracism, we ought rather to admire the moderation of the Athenians than to accuse them of injustice or ingratitude.

All the modifications made by Kleisthenes in the constitution of Solon had for their object the preservation of the state in its republican form, and the prevention of any usurpation of the royal power. His policy was, therefore, mainly directed against the aristocrats. And hence it was that Isagoras and his party, becoming alarmed at the decline of their influence, invoked the aid of Kleomenes, king of Sparta, who, also displeased at the course affairs had taken at Athens, eagerly returned thither with his army, expelled from the city Kleisthenes and seven hundred families that were among

* A yawning cleft behind the Acropolis, into which criminals were thrown.

the most faithful of his adherents, and attempted to deliver the government into the hands of Isagoras and three hundred of his chosen friends.

But the fifty years that had passed since Peisistratus had cowed the people of Athens into submission with his small body-guard had wrought a great change. The administration of the sons of Peisistratus had made the very name of tyranny hateful. The new boule of five hundred refused to obey Kleomenes when he ordered it to disband. The citizens rose *en masse*. Kleomenes and Isagoras were obliged to take refuge in the Acropolis with their troops, where, after having been closely besieged for two days, they came to terms. Kleomenes and his Lacedæmonians were allowed to return to Sparta, but the followers of Isagoras were captured and put to death, as traitors who had called in the aid of a foreign foe. Kleisthenes and the seven hundred exiled families returned, and the new constitution was established on a firm and lasting basis. Its provisions were strongly democratic in their tendency. Many of the ancient political landmarks had been torn away by the redistribution into the ten new communities. The power of the Eupatridæ, or nobles, was greatly curtailed, and that of the people augmented in a corresponding degree. The multiplication of the offices also tended to popularize the government. This state of affairs was a source of alarm to the Lacedæmonians, who were aware that a democratic Athens would be a dangerous neighbor, while, on the other hand, she would be weak, and easily kept in dependence on Sparta, if in the grasp of a tyrant.

On this account Kleomenes, even after his return to Sparta, persisted in carrying out his plan of establishing a monarch at Athens. With this end in view, Sparta, B. C. 506, assembled for the first time, as far as we know, the collective forces of her Peloponnesian allies. Kleomenes likewise communicated with some Hellenic nations beyond the

Peloponnesus—among others, with the Chalkidians and the Bœotians, the latter of whom eagerly embraced this opportunity of punishing the Athenians for having assisted the Platæans in their revolt against the Bœotian confederacy. It was the expectation of Kleomenes that Athens, thus attacked on all sides, would be compelled to surrender. But, strangely enough, he had collected his forces and advanced as far as Eleusis before he informed the allies of the real object of the expedition, whereupon their dissatisfaction at once asserted itself.

The Corinthians immediately turned back; others soon followed their example, so that it became necessary to abandon the enterprise. The Athenians, unexpectedly delivered from pressing danger, turned their arms against the Bœotians and the Chalkidians. Invading Bœotia with the army they had assembled at Eleusis to oppose the Peloponnesian allies, they totally defeated the forces of the Thebans, and then, crossing into Eubœa, captured the city of Chalkis. Many prisoners were taken and conveyed to Athens, where they were ransomed for two minæ per man.

After these signal victories they were once more at liberty to devote their entire attention to the war they had long been carrying on with the neighboring Dorian state of Ægina, then the strongest naval power in Greece. This struggle between Athens and Ægina lasted twenty years, and was only brought to a close by the Persian invasion; but it was subsequently renewed, and ended in the conquest of Ægina by her more fortunate rival.

After the humiliating failure of the expedition against Athens, Kleomenes and the Spartans directed their intrigues toward the reëstablishment of Hippias on the throne of his father. The ex-tyrant was summoned to Sparta, whither all the allied states were at the same time requested to send representatives (505 B. C.). But in the result of this conference they were again doomed to disappointment. The

other Peloponnesian cities had not yet become obedient tools of the Lacedæmonians. Sosikles, the representative of the Corinthians, vehemently opposed the proposition to force Hippias on the Athenians, and the other allies coincided with his opinion. Accordingly, Hippias retired in disgust, not only from Sparta, but even from Greece, and sought a more efficient ally in the person of Darius, king of Persia, thereby becoming one of the immediate causes of the terrible wars that followed a few years later. Darius received Hippias under his protection, and manifested a willingness to espouse his cause, but took no active measures to that end until the Athenians directly drew upon themselves his ill will by their endeavors to aid the Hellenic cities of Asia Minor in their revolt against Persia.

CHAPTER V.

THE HELLENIC COLONIES.

THE Greek race was not confined to the limits of Hellas proper, but had at a very remote period spread itself to the adjacent islands, and thence to the continent of Asia. The peninsula extending southward from the range of Olympus was, indeed, the great home and hearth of Hellenic nationality, the abode of its gods, and the focus of its social and religious life. But the daring enterprise of the children of Hellas had at an early period allured them from their narrow limits, and prompted them to found colonies on nearly all the Mediterranean coasts.

Between Greece and Asia Minor lies the Ægean Sea, the islands of which were from time immemorial so thoroughly Hellenic, that the Greeks were wont to call it "Our Sea." Of these islands, the largest and at the same time the nearest to the Grecian coast is Eubœa, which may be regarded

as a continuation of the mountain-chains of Pelion and Othrys. The principal cities of Eubœa were Chalkis and Eretria, both during the earlier ages among the most powerful in Greece. They carried on a more extensive commerce than Athens herself, as is manifest from the numerous colonies they established even on the far-distant coasts of Italy and Sicily, and also from the fact that their coinage, of which the Euboïc talent formed the basis, was current in every part of Greece.

To the group of islands clustered around the sacred isle of Delos the ancient Greeks gave the name of Kyklades (Cyclades). Of these the most powerful was Naxos; but Delos itself, although the smallest, was by far the most important, by reason of the great festival of Apollo periodically held there, in which all the Ionian cities took part. This celebration was conducted with the greatest pomp and splendor, and is described at some length in the Homeric hymn to Apollo. The multitude of vessels that thronged to this island at the season of the festival, the profuse expenditure that attended the celebration, and the magnificent ceremonies accompanying the athletic and musical contests, all bear witness to the wealth of the Ionian cities at that period. But after the conquest of those cities by Crœsus, king of Lydia, the splendor of the festival at Delos underwent a decline.

The most noted of the islands lying toward Asia Minor were Lesbos, Chios, Samos, and Rhodes, all occupied by Greeks from the remotest known times. The same is true of the adjacent continental coast, which at the dawn of the historic period was studded with colonies of the three great branches of the Hellenic race. Farthest north lay the Æolic colonies, originally twelve in number. The most important of these was Smyrna, which, situated at a great distance from the rest, at an early period identified its interests with those of the neighboring Ionian cities. The islands of Lesbos and Tenedos were also colonized by the Æolians, who founded

many other cities in the Troas, along the Hellespont, and on the coast of Thrace. Lesbos contained six cities, of which the most famous was Mytilene, the birthplace of Pittakus, one of the seven wise men of Greece, of the lyric poet Alkæus, and of the ever-famous Sappho. For a long time this city was subject to violent dissensions and civil strife. Usurpers repeatedly arose and grasped at the supreme power, until at last the citizens intrusted the direction of their affairs to Pittakus, investing him with absolute authority for a period of ten years (587 B. C.). Pittakus, who was already distinguished in war, then made himself doubly renowned by the wisdom and moderation with which he discharged his important trust, and by his disinterested patriotism in voluntarily laying aside his absolute power after the ten years had elapsed. Of the subsequent internal history of Mytilene little is known.

The Ionian colonies, which lay to the south of the Æolic, likewise consisted of twelve cities. Enumerated from south to north, they stand—Miletus, Myus, Priene, Samos, Ephesus, Kolophon, Lebedus, Teos, Erythræ, Chios, Klazomenæ, Phokæa. These communities were united by a common bond of worship, the center of which was a temple dedicated to Poseidon at Priene. This confederacy was rather religious than political, so that each Ionian city flourished by its individual energy rather than by reason of the bond of union. Miletus was the most celebrated and powerful of them all. Her immense commerce was carried on with the nations dwelling around the Euxine, as well as with her colonies, some of which were planted in Scythia, and others on the banks of the Borysthenes (Dnieper). This city, with its four harbors and its powerful navy, was for a time the greatest commercial center in the Hellenic world. In the main portion of the Mediterranean Sea her power and influence were second to those of Carthage alone; but along the western shores her commerce was less extensive than that

of her sister city Phokæa, whose colonies lined the coasts of France, Spain, Italy, and the adjacent islands.

To the south of the Ionian lay the Doric colonies, originally forming a confederacy of six cities united by the common worship of the Triopian Apollo. The communities sharing in this worship were the continental cities of Halikarnassus and Knidus, the city of Kos on the island of the same name, and three cities on the island of Rhodes. But there were many other Doric settlements not members of this religious confederacy.

—All these colonies, especially the Ionian, applied themselves not only to commerce, but also to literature and the arts, in which, by reason of their closer contact with Asiatic civilization, they attained at an early period even greater celebrity than the cities of Greece itself. Here arose the earliest epic and lyric poets—Homer of Smyrna, Alkæus, Sappho, and Lesches of Mytilene, the Samian Asius, Peisander of Rhodes, and the Parian Archilochus. Here, too, flourished the first writers in prose—Kadmus and Hekataeus the Milesians, precursors of Herodotus and the real “fathers of history,” and Pherekydes of Syros, the teacher of Pythagoras.

The higher philosophy, if it did not originate in these parts, at least received here its earliest developments. Thales the Milesian was the founder of the Ionic school; the Italic school owed its origin to Pythagoras, and the Eleatic to Xenophanes of Kolophon. Here, too, were produced the first great works of architecture and sculpture, the precursors of those still more glorious monuments of succeeding ages. Glaukus of Chios is said to have invented the art of soldering metals; and Rhækus of Samos and his son Theodorus are reputed as the first who cast statues in bronze and iron. The temple of Artemis at Ephesus, and that of Hera in the island of Samos, were the two most ancient in all Hellas, the construction of both having been

begun about the same time—the former shortly before 600 B. C. by Theodorus, and the latter by Rhœkus. They were therefore earlier in date than the first great buildings erected at Athens by Peisistratus.

For many years these Hellenic colonies in Asia Minor preserved their independence. But, no general bond of union existing between them, as soon as a neighboring nation rose to imperial power they one by one fell beneath its yoke. Such a nation was Lydia, the kings of which, even before the time of Crœsus, showed a hostile disposition ; but it was not until the reign of that monarch (559–546 B. C.) that they were reduced to subjection. In vain did Thales of Miletus, who was not merely a philosopher and man of science, but also a practical inquirer into political and social problems, urge the Ionian cities to form a federal council and make provision for the common defense. His advice was unheeded, and not only the Ionian, but likewise the Doric and Æolic colonies of Asia Minor fell victims to the ambition of Crœsus.

The dominion of this monarch was of short duration ; for about the same time rose Cyrus, the founder of the Persian empire, who rapidly extended his sway over all central and western Asia. Crœsus, alarmed at the overshadowing power of Persia, sought aid from the Lacedæmonians, who were about to send troops to his assistance when the tidings came to Greece that Crœsus and his kingdom were already in the possession of Cyrus. But Persia proved for the Greek colonies a more implacable foe than even Lydia. The Spartans were not disposed to render their Hellenic brethren the same aid that they had so readily promised to Crœsus ; and the Asiatic Greeks, abandoned to their fate, all succumbed to the power of Cyrus, with the exception of the Teans and a large portion of the Phokæans. The former, preferring exile to Persian servitude, sailed away to Thrace, and there founded the city of Abdera ; while the

latter, actuated by the same motive, emigrated to the far west and founded Massalia, which still exists under the name of Marseilles. Cyrus subdued not only the Greeks of the Asiatic continent, but also the adjacent islands, excepting Samos, which during this same century attained a striking prominence under the auspices of the tyrant Polykrates, and remained independent of Persia until the time of King Darius.

Much farther south than the other colonies lay the island of Krete, belonging rather to the Mediterranean than to the *Ægean*. Homer, who makes no mention of the Dorians in any part of Greece proper, speaks of them in the *Odyssey* in connection with this island. Dorian colonies appear to have been sent thither from Thessaly in the prehistoric period, as well as from the Peloponnesus after the Herakleid conquest. It is also certain that there existed strong points of resemblance between the laws of Sparta and those of Krete. The popular assemblies gave their decisions by acclamation, and affairs of state were mainly in the hands of ten annually chosen archons, who bore some analogy to the ephors of Sparta. The Kretan cities had also senates similar to the Spartan *gerusia*, each composed of thirty members, chosen for life from among those who had held the office of archon, subject to no higher authority, and forming their decisions in accordance with custom and precedent instead of written laws. Furthermore, we find in Krete the institution of public meals, which were there called *andreia*. Like the Spartans, the citizens of the various Kretan states were wont to pass their time in martial and athletic exercises, leaving the ordinary pursuits of life to the peasantry and the slaves. On the other hand, we find no trace of a military system similar to that of Sparta. The various cities of the island were continually at war with one another, and at the same time greatly subject to civil strife, whereby they were effectually prevented from attaining any prominence in Hellenic history.

Nor did the great island of Kyprus, in which the earlier Phœnician occupants were afterward partially displaced by Grecian colonists, contribute much to the general prosperity of the Hellenic nation. About the middle of the sixth century B. C. it was subdued by the Egyptians, and about fifty years later it fell under the yoke of Persia.

The colony of Kyrene, on the coast of that district of northern Africa now called Tripolis, reflected much more glory on the Hellenic name. Founded in the seventh century B. C. by emigrants from the little island of Thera, themselves descendants of the Dorians of Sparta, this city rapidly increased in power, subdued the neighboring Libyans, and even defeated the forces of Apries, king of Egypt. The main cause of her power was the immense trade carried on by land with Upper Egypt, Nubia, and the eastern countries of central Africa, and her maritime commerce with Greece, Asia Minor, and Carthage.

All the above colonies were founded in the prehistoric period; but much more important in their bearing on Hellenic history were the colonies afterward planted on the coasts lying to the west of Greece. The first Grecian state founded on those western shores was Cumæ, situated on the neck of the peninsula which terminates in Cape Misenum, about 1050 B. C. For upward of three centuries Cumæ and its offshoots clustered around the bay of Naples were the sole western representatives of Hellenism, and the center whence the first seeds of higher civilization became diffused among the natives of Italy. But in the second half of the eighth century B. C. the Greeks suddenly began to flock in swarms to the coasts of Sicily and southern Italy.

In 734 B. C. the Corinthians, having colonized Korkyra as a convenient way-station to the west, founded Syracuse, which became the greatest and most powerful of all the numerous Grecian cities of the west. Korkyra rapidly increased in size and wealth, and united with Corinth in forming many

other colonies on the Sicilian coast. Shortly afterward no less vigor was manifested in the colonization of the southern coast of Italy. Here arose the important cities Rhegium, Sybaris, and Kroton.

In 683 settlers from the Lokrians founded Epizephyrian Lokri (thus called from the neighborhood of Cape Zephyrium), the native city of the lawgiver Zaleukus, who flourished about 664 B. C., and whose written code of laws was the most ancient in Greece, preceding by forty years that of the Athenian Drako.

The colonization of Sicily and of southern Italy was a sudden and spasmodic movement of the Hellenic nation, lasting scarcely fifty years (736-683 B. C.). That we may correctly understand this striking historical phenomenon, we must take into consideration the peculiar political and social condition of Greece at that epoch. Almost every Hellenic city was the scene of violent strife between the oligarchic and democratic factions, in consequence of which many citizens were prompted to emigrate to foreign parts in order to seek a better or a quieter fortune. The first Messenian war had just been brought to a close, and a large part of the conquered Messenians became voluntary exiles. Soon after civil dissensions in Sparta herself caused the departure of many Laconians, who emigrated to Italy and became the founders of Tarentum. Finally, it was about this time that the Greeks in general, following the example of the Corinthians, began to construct those large ships called triremes, by the aid of which they were able to undertake longer and more difficult voyages.

The natives of southern Italy, and in the main those of Sicily also, appear to have belonged to the Pelasgic branch of the Indo-European race. As a rule, the Greeks, not content with founding colonies, did their utmost to Hellenize the natives of the surrounding territory, introducing among them the language, religion, social customs, and political constitu-

tions of Greece. This is the peculiar characteristic of the Grecian system of colonization. The bold, energetic, and ever-moving spirit which at the present day distinguishes the so-called Anglo-Saxon race, was in an equal degree peculiar to the ancient Greeks. The Romans, indeed, founded in different parts of their empire fully as many colonies as their Grecian predecessors had done; but the Roman colonies were due to the efforts of the government rather than to the spontaneous enterprise of the people, while the Grecian, more especially those established before the time of Alexander the Great, were mostly independent of state influence, and therein bore a strong resemblance to the English colonies of modern times.

The great movement of Hellenic colonization may be divided into two distinct epochs, the first of which is the one we are now considering. It commenced in the age immediately preceding the historic period, and continued until the sixth century B. C., at which time the Grecian world began the great work of expanding and perfecting its political and intellectual life. Afterward, about the end of the fourth century B. C., another extensive movement of colonization began under Alexander and his successors—a movement mainly directed eastward, and by land rather than by sea. Its result was the successful Hellenization of Egypt and of all western Asia, from the Caspian Sea to the deserts of Arabia, and from the Mediterranean almost to the Indus. In both these movements of colonization the Greek showed himself superior to the Anglo-Saxon, in that he civilized and assimilated the native races, instead of exterminating or driving them out. The Hellenization of Sicily and southern Italy was so complete that it survived the long centuries of Roman sway; nor could any subsequent conqueror, whether Lombard, Norman, or Saracen, eradicate its vestiges, which indeed continue down to the present day. The reader must not infer, however, that the Hellenic colonists established

their own language in these countries to the exclusion of the original tongues, or imposed on the natives their own customs and national character without being influenced by them in turn. Such counter-influence must have been considerable ; for most of the Grecian emigrants were men, who upon their arrival on the new coasts married native women. In this way the colonists and the natives coalesced and produced a mixed race, in which Hellenic characteristics predominated.

The colonies increased so rapidly in population and commerce that they began at an early period to excel the cities of Greece in size, wealth, and power, whence southern Italy soon received the name of "Great Greece" (*Magna Græcia*). The two most distinguished of these Græco-Italian cities were Sybaris and Kroton. Sybaris could bring into the field an array of three hundred thousand men, and the wealth and luxury of her citizens became so proverbial that the term Sybarite has remained in use to the present day as synonymous with "luxurious" or "voluptuous."

Kroton was famous for the great number of her citizens who proved victorious in the Olympic games, and also for the celebrated school of philosophy founded there by Pythagoras of Samos. This philosopher attempted to infuse his own political theories into the government of the state, by establishing a secret philosophical society, the members of which were selected from among the wisest and best citizens. Shortly after Pythagoras had reduced this system to good working order, a war broke out between Kroton and Sybaris (510 B. C.), in which the Sybarites were conquered and their city was utterly destroyed. A few years afterward there was a revolt in Kroton against the increasing power and influence of the Pythagorean society, some of the members of which were slain and others banished (504 B. C.). Seven years later Pythagoras died in Metapontum, at the venerable age of ninety. The political societies he had

founded in the various cities of Italy were dissolved, and the Pythagoreans became thenceforth a mere philosophical sect.

The fall of Sybaris exercised a marked influence on the future of all Hellas. One of the strongest bulwarks of Greek civilization in Italy being thus swept away, the native tribes of the central part of that peninsula were emboldened to advance southward. Cumæ and the other cities about the bay of Naples became subject to their sway, and the Hellenic dominion was thenceforth confined to the extreme southern coast. About the same period began the decline of the Ionian cities of Asia Minor, which likewise had formerly been more wealthy and prosperous than those of Greece itself. When we consider their remarkable development on the one hand, and that of the Italian and Sicilian colonies on the other, we may with propriety affirm that up to the close of the sixth century B. C. the wings of the Hellenic world were more powerful than the center. About that period a change took place in these relations. The cities of Asia Minor were brought under the yoke of Persia; those of Italy were seriously weakened by wars with one another, and by the encroachments of the tribes of the interior; while at the same time Athens and Sparta so rapidly developed their power that the center regained its normal weight. The Sicilian colonies were the only ones that continued to flourish during the fifth century. It was not, in fact, until then that the commerce and power of Syracuse, the most eminent of them all, were developed on a grand scale, through the efforts of her energetic sovereign Gelon, who usurped the throne in 484 B. C.

The coasts of Macedonia and Thrace also, and even the shores of the Euxine or Black Sea, were studded with Grecian cities. The natives of Macedonia were semi-Hellenic in character, somewhat resembling in language and customs the less civilized tribes of Epirus. Of the numerous purely Grecian colonies on their coast, the oldest was Methone, founded by the Eretrians about the same time that the Co-

rinthians established themselves in Korkyra. The foundation of Abdera on the Thracian coast, by fugitive Teans from Asia Minor, has already been alluded to. The Chians and Lesbians also established colonies there, it is not known with certainty at what period. The neighboring islands of Thasos and Samothrace, which had at a remote period been in possession of the Phœnicians, also became Hellenized. The former consists almost entirely of a single mountain partially covered with forests, whence the Parian poet Archilochus humorously likened it to an ass with a load of wood on its back. The barrenness of its soil was amply compensated for by the richness of its gold-mines, which about the beginning of the fifth century were so productive as to pay all the expenses of the government, and to leave an annual surplus of from two to three hundred talents. On the Thracian Chersonese the Milesians founded the city of Kardia; and on the northern shore of the Propontis, or Sea of Marmora, were Perinthus and the Megarian colonies Chalkedon, Selymbria, and Byzantium, the last occupying the site of the present Constantinople. Of the many colonies that bordered the Euxine, the most important were Sinope, Trapezus, Olbia, and Tanais.

Such was the condition of the Hellenic nation during the early portion of the historic period. The spontaneous and almost unrestrained natural impulses of the heroic ages, under the influence of written laws and advancing civilization, had become crystallized into definite social and political institutions, and the unrefined virtues of former years were now regulated by the graces of cultivated thought and speech. At the same time the wonderful instinct of expansion, that had formed for itself a vent in the establishment of colonies throughout the vast basin of the Mediterranean, had the effect not of weakening, but rather of strengthening, the bonds of the Hellenic race. For that race, which now comprised about twenty millions of people, although scattered

from Olympus to Kyrene, and from Marseilles to Asia Minor, although divided into many independent states of every possible political complexion, from the narrow oligarchy of Sparta to the liberal democracy of Athens, was nevertheless united by strong moral and social ties, far outweighing in political importance the lack of political consolidation. Herodotus reckons these ties as fourfold—namely, those of common blood, of common language, of common institutions, and of common worship.

CHAPTER VI.

LITERATURE—SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS BONDS.

THE Greek language was divided into numerous dialects, which the later grammarians classified into four main groups, the Ionic, the Doric, the Æolic, and the Attic. The Greek tongue was seldom made the medium of prose composition until about the end of the period we are now considering, but continued to produce wonderful heroic poems, though the ancient epic style underwent a gradual decline after the close of the heroic epoch. The new forms that were developed were the iambic, the gnomic, and especially the lyric, in all of which many inimitable pieces were produced. In the following, or fifth century B. C., poetic art attained its highest perfection in the tragic and comic drama. At the beginning of that century flourished the best of the lyric poets, Pindar and Simonides, and the great tragic poet Æschylus. To the preceding periods belong the poets Archilochus, Kallinus, Tyrtæus, Alkman, Arion, Stesichorus, Alkæus, Sappho, Solon, Theognis, and Anakreon—all, in whatever dialect they wrote, admired and loved equally at Athens and Sparta, at Kroton and Miletus, at Kyrene and Trapezus, and thus serving as living links in the great chain

that bound together the scattered branches of the Hellenic race.

The contempt for everything not Hellenic, which was soon to find for itself a vent in the opprobrious epithet "barbarian," had not yet become prevalent, and in fact did not distinctly assert itself until after the establishment of the Persian empire. In the sixth century B. C. this term was used in a much milder sense than during and after the Persian wars, and the relations between the Greeks and the contiguous races were more familiar, and based on a feeling of moral equality which afterward disappeared. Amasis, king of Egypt, although he made war upon and subdued the Grecian cities on the island of Kyprus, liberally contributed to the reërection of the temple at Delphi, took for a wife a Grecian woman of Kyrene, and presented many statues to various Hellenic cities. Alyattes, the predecessor of Cræsus on the throne of Lydia, erected at Miletus two temples in honor of Athene, in place of the one that had been burned during his attack on that city.

The kingly generosity of Cræsus was eulogized by Pindar. The partiality manifested by that sumptuous monarch for Hellenic art and culture in every form, together with his lavish hospitality and the rich presents he was wont to bestow, attracted to his court many of the most distinguished men of Greece—among them Æsop, the celebrated fabulist; Alkmæon, who commanded the Athenians in the first sacred war; Miltiades, son of Kypselus, who led the first Athenian colony to the Thracian Chersonese; and, although there are strong chronological difficulties against the probability of Solon's reputed visit to the court of Lydia, the very fact that the legends bring the name of this wise and learned man into connection with Cræsus sufficiently attests the intimate relations then subsisting between the Greeks and the more civilized of the foreign nations around them. From the Olympic festival and from the so-called religious mysteries

foreigners were indeed excluded from the very first ; but it was not until a later period that they were shut off from all the Panhellenic games.

The strongest moral and social links that united the widely scattered branches of the great Hellenic race were the Olympian, the Pythian, the Nemean, and the Isthmian games, together with the Delphic oracle. To this shrine continually resorted vast throngs of worshipers and inquirers from all parts of Hellas, while the celebrations of the games were so regulated as to make the intercourse between the different Hellenic states almost incessant. Not only were all those who conquered in these games held in the highest esteem in every Hellenic land, but all who came to witness them sacrificed to the same gods on the same altars, looked upon the same contests, and by their offerings contributed to the enrichment and adornment of the same sacred spot. Kings, nobles, and private citizens were subjected to the same rules, submitted to the same penalty when they violated them, engaged in the same contests, and obtained the same reward when they came forth victorious. Not only did the multitude gather to behold the athletic sports, but poets, philosophers, and historians thronged thither in order to submit their compositions to the judgment of all the assembled Greeks. When the victors returned crowned with the customary garlands of bay, their native city received them with pomp and parade, the poets wrote odes in their honor, and the historians commemorated their achievements as if they were of national importance.

When, therefore, we take into consideration the movement from the farthest corner of Hellas to the center, and thence back again, we can not fail to recognize the fact that the lack of political union between the various states was amply compensated for by these social and religious bonds. But the cohesive power of the Grecian race was destined soon to be put to a terrible test by the formidable Persian invasions.

PART THIRD.

THE PERSIAN WARS.

CHAPTER I.

PERSIA.

Establishment of the Empire.

ONE of the most striking points of difference between Asia and Europe lies in the manner in which the political communities of the respective continents have originated and grown. In Europe they have always been formed from small beginnings, and have increased little by little, developing their energy gradually, and lengthening their existence through many generations and even centuries. In Asia, however, great empires have quickly sprung up and as speedily decayed. Such was essentially the fortune of the Persian empire, which, beginning with the small district of Persia proper (the ancient Persis), was expanded into a mighty dominion by the efforts of Cyrus the Great, about the middle of the sixth century B. C. Within thirty years from the commencement of the conquests of this chieftain, his empire embraced the western half of Asia and the lower valley of the Nile. Within thirty years more it had entered upon its decline, and within two centuries from its first formation it had entirely disappeared.

The district of Persis, the nucleus of this great political system, was a small province lying northeast of the upper

extremity of the Persian Gulf. Its inhabitants belonged to the Zendic or Iranic branch of the Indo-European division of the Caucasian race, as did likewise those of the neighboring district of Media, and in general all the Asiatic tribes dwelling between the river Oxus on the north and the Persian Gulf on the south, and between the river Indus on the east and the Zagrus Mountains on the west. Most of these nations professed the religion of Zoroaster, and spoke different dialects of the Zendic tongue, or languages closely allied thereto.

Persis was a rough and mountainous country, and the Persians were an athletic race, of simple habits, divided into eleven tribes, of which seven were agricultural and four nomadic. Of all these tribes, the most powerful was that of the Pasargadæ, to which belonged Cyrus, who made this little nation the ruler of all western Asia. His first exploit was to excite his countrymen to rebellion against the Medes, to whom they were subject. The contest that ensued is said to have been long and desperate; but the insurgent Persians finally overcame Astyages, the Median king, who was connected by marriage with the royal family of Lydia. The Medes, however, although conquered, remained ever afterward closely associated with the Persians, and were regarded as the second nation in importance in the empire. So intimate, indeed, were their relations, and so closely allied were they in language and national character, that the Greeks were accustomed to use the terms Medes and Persians as synonymous and interchangeable.

After the defeat and overthrow of Astyages, his relative Cræsus proposed to take vengeance on his conqueror Cyrus. But the latter quickly marched into Asia Minor with a large army, and, before beginning his campaign against Cræsus, sought to secure the Grecian cities of that section as allies. Deeming Lydia the stronger power of the two, they declined his offers. The result showed that they were in error. After

a bloody but indecisive battle fought near Pteria, a city of Kappadokia, to the east of the river Halys (546 B. C.), Cræsus retreated to his capital city Sardis, and applied to the Lacedæmonians for assistance. But the rapid movements of the Persian conqueror set at naught this alliance even before it was consummated. Cyrus at once pushed on to Sardis, and the Lydian empire was for ever at an end. The Grecian cities of Asia Minor, with the exception of Miletus, were then, after a brave resistance, subdued by Cyrus; and the islands of Chios and Lesbos also thought it best to recognize his supremacy. Cyrus subsequently made himself master of Babylon, Phœnicia, and all Syria, and (529 B. C.) died in the course of an expedition against the Scythians.

Cambyzes, his son and successor, during a reign of seven years and five months, subdued Egypt and the Hellenic colony of Kyrene in Africa. Upon his death Smerdis, a Mede, usurped the throne and attempted to restore the ancient supremacy of his own countrymen. But after a reign of seven months he was assassinated by a party of Persian noblemen, who placed upon the throne one of their own number, Darius, son of Hystaspes, who was also a member of the famous family of the Achæmenidæ.

This prince proved himself the most liberal and energetic sovereign that ever occupied the throne of Persia. In his foreign wars, indeed, he was not invariably successful, and the conquests effected by him were of small importance in comparison with those of Cyrus. The greatest monument of his genius was his masterly organization of the immense conquests of his predecessors into a compact whole. When he ascended the throne the public affairs were in great confusion, and the empire bade fair to fall to pieces in consequence of its own weight. Darius systematized the administration by dividing the entire domain into twenty satrapies or provinces, on each of which was imposed a specific annual tax and a specific contribution of produce for the mainte-

nance of the court ; and over each of these satrapies he placed as ruler a noble Persian, who was called a satrap. This governmental system would no doubt have had the effect of imparting a lasting element of stability to the empire, had the immediate successors of Darius been men of the same energy and exalted character. As it was, it merely retarded the decline of the Persian power for the space of about two generations. Every satrap was in reality a king within the limits of his province, permitted to govern it as he liked, as long as he punctually remitted the royal taxes and contributed his contingent of troops to the general army. In this way was the sovereign of Persia enabled to realize his proud title as "the great king," or supreme lord over many tributary monarchs.

During the reign of Darius, Samos also was subdued by the Persians. About ten years after the capture of Sardis by Cyrus, the usurper Polykrates obtained the sovereignty of that island, and extended his dominion over several of the neighboring isles, and also over some cities on the Asiatic continent. He constructed a fleet of one hundred penteconters, or ships of fifty oars each, and maintained an army of one thousand men—mercenary bowmen—with which force he aspired to the conquest of all Ionia and of all the isles in the Ægean Sea. During his reign Samos was the foremost naval power of Greece ; and to him were due the famous architectural monuments of that island—the aqueduct, brought through a lofty mountain, the works about the harbor, and the great temple of Hera. But, while at the height of his power, Polykrates was murdered by a Persian satrap of the adjacent continent, and his dominions were soon afterward added to the empire of Darius.

The Scythian Expedition.

Darius, having resolved to undertake an expedition against the Scythians, with a force of seven hundred thou-

sand men crossed (515 B. C.) from Asia into Europe by means of a bridge built for him over the Bosphorus by the Samian architect Mandrokles. Thence he marched northward through Thrace, subduing the native tribes on his way, and finally arrived on the banks of the great river Ister (Danube). He had ordered to precede him a naval force of six hundred ships, chiefly manned by Asiatic Greeks, who had been instructed to prepare for him a bridge of boats across that river, then supposed to be the largest in the world. Darius, having led his forces over this bridge, gave orders that it should be destroyed, and that the mariners in the fleet should follow his army into Scythia, leaving on board the ships merely a sufficient force to guard them. Before the Greeks had time to carry out these commands, Koës, the Mytilenean commander, represented to Darius that the expedition might result in failure, in which case wisdom demanded that the means of retreating across the river should be preserved; wherefore Darius retracted his former commands, and left behind a large force of Greeks as a garrison at the bridge. At the same time he bound sixty knots in a long leathern thong, and delivered it to the Grecian commanders in charge of the bridge and fleet, with instructions to untie one of the knots every day during his absence, and after the loosening of the sixtieth knot to break up the bridge and sail homeward. This event is worthy of note, not only as an example of the simple and primitive customs of the age in reckoning the lapse of time, but also as a proof that the intention of Darius was not to return by way of the Danube unless compelled to do so. His original design seems to have been to penetrate into the heart of Scythia in a northeasterly direction, subduing the tribes as he advanced, and to return to Asia by some route to the east of the Euxine; and it was evidently his expectation that sixty days would decide whether he would be able to accomplish this, or would be obliged to retrace his steps.

Well was it for him, however, that he listened to the advice and adopted the suggestion of Koës the Mytilenean; for his expedition against the Scythians utterly failed. He appears to have penetrated as far as the river Don, and perhaps to the Volga, but never succeeded in forcing the Scythians to a general engagement. Fleeing before him in every direction, they hovered around the flanks and rear of his army, and harassed him by incessant skirmishes. Finding himself beset with countless dangers, without the hope of accomplishing anything, he was at last forced to return to the Danube, and narrowly escaped perishing with his whole army in the trackless wilderness. The sixty days had by this time elapsed, and the Greeks at the bridge were in doubt whether they should carry out to the letter the commands of Darius, or wait a little longer for his return. Just at this juncture a party of Scythian cavalry made their appearance on the opposite bank, and, announcing that Darius had suffered a defeat far in the interior of the country, advised the Greeks to destroy the bridge and leave him to his fate, thereby securing the freedom of themselves and of their native cities from the Persian yoke. At first the Greeks were inclined to entertain favorably this proposition, and Miltiades, the ruler of the Thracian Chersonese, stoutly advocated it. But Histæus, sovereign of Miletus, vehemently opposed it, on the ground that the death of the great king and the destruction of his army would be of no advantage whatever to the Grecian rulers of the subject cities of Asia Minor, since they held their positions by the favor of Darius himself, and would surely be deposed from power if the people should recover their liberty; therefore the ruin of Darius would be their ruin, and the safety of Darius their safety. Inasmuch as the greater number of the commanders at the bridge were sovereigns of Græco-Asiatic cities, and owed their elevation to the favor of King Darius, the opinion of Histæus naturally prevailed against that of Miltiades.

It was decided to preserve the bridge ; and thus was the army of Darius enabled shortly afterward to effect its escape across the Danube after its long and disastrous campaign in Scythia. A few years afterward, this same Miltiades was destined to inflict a fearful blow on the power of Darius in the great action at Marathon, while on the other hand Histiaëus was to become the prime cause of the great Ionian rebellion, which, in turn, was the precursor of the Persian invasion of Greece.

The Ionian Revolution.

Darius had left on the European side of the Hellespont a considerable army, under the command of Megabazus, to complete the conquest of Thrace. The native tribes of that country were soon reduced to subjection, as were likewise most of the Hellenic cities of the coast, from the Hellespont as far west as the river Strymon. Darius, desiring to reward Koës for the good counsel he had given him in regard to preserving the bridge over the Danube, appointed him sovereign over his native city Mytilene. At the same time, having learned of the good service that Histiaëus had done him by restraining the Greeks from destroying the bridge, he sent for that commander, and bade him name whatever reward he wished in return for his fidelity. Histiaëus requested the sovereignty of Myrkinus, a city of Thrace, near the lower Strymon—a request which was at once granted.

Darius tarried for some time at Sardis to arrange the affairs of the western portion of his empire. While there, learning that Histiaëus was engaged in surrounding Myrkinus with a strong wall, he repented of having made him ruler of that distant frontier city, and summoned him back to Sardis. Soon afterward Darius made his half-brother Artaphernes satrap of all Asia Minor, and returned to Susa, taking Histiaëus with him as a friend and counselor, and intrusting the

government of the city of Miletus to Aristagoras, the nephew and son-in-law of Histæus.

Such was the condition of affairs when, B. C. 505, Hippias, the ex-tyrant of Athens, despairing of recovering his throne by the assistance of the Spartans, went to Sardis and sought the protection of Artaphernes, who manifested a willingness to assist him. But circumstances intervened that delayed the scheme, and finally rendered its realization impossible.

Of the islands called Kyklades, which were still independent of the Persians, Naxos was the most powerful, being rich and populous, and possessing a large fleet as well as a land force of eight thousand hoplites. The tyrant Lygdamis, the former ruler of this island, had been expelled by the Lacedæmonians, who restored the oligarchical form of government. But the people rose against the oligarchs, and the latter fled from the island, taking refuge with Aristagoras, the ruler of Miletus, who eagerly sought to aid them in recovering their power. With this end in view, he applied to Artaphernes, and succeeded in convincing that satrap that it would be an easy matter to subdue not only Naxos, but all the Kyklades. With the consent of Darius, a fleet of two hundred ships was collected and placed under the command of Megabates, a nephew both of Artaphernes and of Darius. The expedition had been prepared with the greatest possible secrecy, so that the people of Naxos were still unsuspecting of danger. But while the armament was on its way thither, a dispute arose between Megabates and Aristagoras; and the former, being greatly incensed against the latter, endeavored to effect his ruin by causing the failure of the enterprise. To this end he sent a secret message to Naxos, informing the people of their danger. They at once put themselves into a condition of defense, and the fleet returned to Asia after vainly blockading the island for the space of four months.

This failure was a source of sore perplexity to Aristagoras, who had been so rash as to make himself responsible for the cost of the expedition. Not only was he now unable to make good the loss, but he had also converted into enemies two influential members of the royal family of Persia—the admiral Megabates, with whom he had had a serious quarrel, and the satrap Artaphernes, who suspected him of deceit and treachery. In this dilemma he saw no other means of securing safety than to revolt from the Persians. By a singular coincidence, his father-in-law Histæus had already conceived the same idea, though from other motives. Histæus, although royally entertained at Susa as an intimate friend of the great king, had become weary of the irksome splendor of the Persian capital, and longed to return to his native Ionia. He resolved, therefore, to foment a revolt among the Hellenic cities on the coast, in the hope that Darius would send him thither to bring the rebels to submission. He contrived to send a private message to his son-in-law Aristagoras, urging him to induce Miletus and the other cities to revolt. Aristagoras immediately assembled the principal citizens and communicated to them his plans, which they all eagerly approved, with the exception of Hekataeus the historian, who had the good sense to see that all Ionia could accomplish nothing against the enormous power of the Persian empire. His opinion was hardly listened to, and revolt was determined upon. The opportunity was as favorable as any they could reasonably expect to obtain. The fleet which had been fitted out for the expedition against Naxos had not yet been disbanded, but still remained moored in the harbor of Myus; its commander and crews, being all Grecian subjects of Persia, were persuaded to join in the rebellion, and hence the insurgents became at once masters of the sea. The spirit of revolt spread from city to city, and ere long all the Greeks in Asia Minor, from the Hellespont to Kyprus, were in open insurrection against Persia (500 B. C.).

Well knowing that his countrymen could do nothing without the aid of a powerful ally, Aristagoras made haste to cross over to Hellas in order to form an alliance with Sparta; but neither by persuasion nor by bribery could he prevail upon Kleomenes, the more influential of the two kings then reigning, to lend him a willing ear. He therefore repaired to Athens, which was now regarded as the second Hellenic state in power and influence. Here he was more successful, partly because the Athenians were conscious of a certain degree of friendship between themselves and the Ionians, and partly because they knew that Hippias was seeking assistance from the Persians, and that the latter were strongly disposed to grant it. Hence it was that the Athenians at once voted to send to the aid of the insurgents a fleet of twenty war-vessels. Herodotus, in his narrative of these events, quaintly remarks that Aristagoras, unable to deceive one Lacedæmonian (Kleomenes), found nevertheless no difficulty in deceiving thirty thousand Athenians; implying thereby that it is easier to lead astray a whole people than a single monarch. This may be true, but it is a truth that does not apply to the present case; for, although it was no doubt a blunder to begin the Ionian revolt, and although it ended in failure, yet, the revolution having once been started, it was clearly the interest not only of Athens, but also of Sparta and of all Greece, to hasten to the assistance of the insurgents. If the European Greeks had then made, for the sake of their countrymen in Asia, one half of the heroic efforts they were not long afterward compelled to put forth for their own safety, the nation would have been spared many misfortunes. Greece could have then accomplished under favorable circumstances all that she achieved twenty years later under the pressure of extraordinary difficulties. As it was, Athens and Eretria were the only states of European Greece that saw fit to aid the insurgents, the latter city contributing five ships to the flo-

tilla, in return for the assistance she had formerly received from Miletus in her war against the Chalkidians.

This small and inadequate force sailed across the Ægean and joined itself to the Ionian fleet. The allies proceeded into the interior and captured Sardis, compelling the satrap to take refuge in the citadel, where they held him besieged. But the city having taken fire and burned to the ground, the Greeks thought it best to withdraw to the seacoast. They were followed by a Persian army that had come to the assistance of Artaphernes, and overtaken near Ephesus. An action ensued, in which the Persians were victorious, and some of the most noted of the Grecian commanders fell—among others Eualkides, the general of the Eretrians. Then the mistake of the Athenians in sending so small a fleet to the succor of the Ionians became manifest. The Athenian admiral, convinced of his inability to accomplish anything of importance with so meager a force, sailed back to Athens, and the Ionians received no further aid from that city. Nevertheless they still maintained the contest, and King Darius found it a difficult task to subdue them. The Ionian fleet routed the Phœnicians in a great naval battle near the coast of Kyprus; but by land the Greeks of that island, although they fought bravely, were beaten by the Persians and reduced to subjection, while the Persian army in Asia Minor captured many of the insurgent cities about the Hellespont and the Propontis. But the Karians obstinately kept up the struggle; Miletus was still defiant and unsubdued; the Ionians were by sea superior to the Persians; so that the cause of the revolutionists could not yet be pronounced desperate. But just at this critical time Aristagoras, who throughout the whole contest had evinced a total lack of ability as a commander, abandoned his countrymen in the midst of danger, went to Thrace with a party of his associates, and soon afterward perished there at the hands of the inhabitants.

A worse fate was in store for Histæus. On receiving the first tidings of the revolt, Darius at once suspected the truth, and accused Histæus of having brought about the defection. The latter ingeniously contrived to allay the great King's suspicions, and promised to quell the insurrection and to deliver up Aristagoras into his hands, provided he would allow him to leave Susa and go down to the scene of action. Darius consented, and Histæus proceeded to Sardis. Finding that Artaphernes suspected his complicity in the revolt, he felt himself no longer safe, and managed to escape to the seacoast. Here he was captured by the Chians, who held him a prisoner on the ground that he was an enemy of the Ionians ; but he convinced them of the contrary, and persuaded them to furnish him with the means of crossing over to Miletus. The Milesians, however, refused to allow him to enter the city. He then repaired to Lesbos, from the inhabitants of which island he obtained a squadron of eight triremes, with which, instead of sailing to the aid of the Ionians, he proceeded to the Hellespont, and seized and plundered the vessels that came out from the Euxine. Finally, he was captured by the Persians and put to death by Artaphernes, who ordered his body to be impaled at Sardis and his head to be sent to King Darius at Susa. The latter, who still entertained a feeling of gratitude toward Histæus for the service he had rendered him at the bridge over the Danube, was far from rejoicing at his death, and ordered his funeral to be conducted with honor and magnificence.

Artaphernes now concentrated against Miletus all the forces at his disposal, and closely besieged the city. The Ionian fleet, consisting of no less than three hundred and fifty-three ships, still held the sea ; and although the Persians had brought into the *Ægean* a fleet of six hundred Phœnician vessels, the cause of the Ionians was by no means hopeless ; they had shown themselves more than a match for the

Phœnician mariners in the late naval battles off the coast of Kyprus. The bravery of the Ionians was not inferior to that of the peninsular Greeks, and of their love of country they had in many instances given proof. But they lacked unity of action, and suffered their cause to be ruined through mutual jealousy and distrust. The naval contingent of each city had its own separate commander, but the entire fleet seems to have been under no general direction. Of these commanders, the most able and energetic was Dionysius of Phokæa; and had he been invested with the supreme control, there is strong probability that the Ionians would have been victorious, notwithstanding the great odds against them. But, unfortunately for the Greeks, Dionysius had only three ships under his command; for Phokæa had now sadly degenerated from her former wealthy and prosperous condition. The influence of Dionysius was overbalanced by that of the other commanders, who, although inferior in knowledge and ability, thought themselves entitled to disregard his advice by reason of the greater number of their ships. Hence they were unable to agree upon a united and energetic course of action. The whole fleet fell into a state of demoralization, until at last the Samians, the Lesbians, and some others, despairing of the Ionian cause, sailed homeward and made the best terms they could with the Persians. The remainder, attacked by the enemy in overwhelming force, offered a resistance worthy of the Grecian name. The Chians especially fought with such desperate bravery that of their hundred ships very few were saved. Dionysius, seeing that all was lost, did not return with his ships to Phokæa, but sailed away to the coast of Phœnicia, after ravaging which he proceeded to Sicily and there entered upon a career as a corsair, capturing and plundering many Carthaginian vessels, but carefully sparing those of the Greeks.

The Persians were now at liberty to turn their entire fleet, as well as their land forces, against the doomed city

of Miletus, which was soon obliged to succumb to their repeated assaults. The revenge of the conquerors was frightful. The temples were plundered and burned, the citizens slaughtered in the streets by hundreds. The women and children were carried as captives to Susa, to await the pleasure of Darius, who, less cruelly disposed than his generals, assigned them as a dwelling-place the city of Ampe, not far from the mouth of the Tigris.

Thus, in the sixth year from its commencement, ended the Ionian insurrection (494 B. C.)—a movement ill-judged in its origin, disastrous to those engaged in it, and portentous in its consequences to all Hellas.

CHAPTER II.

FIRST PERSIAN INVASION.

It was already evident that the Ionian insurrection must lead to the invasion of Greece by the Persians. No one knew this better than the Athenians, to whom the fall of Miletus caused much distress and uneasiness. The tragic poet Phrynichus portrayed upon the Athenian stage the misfortunes of the conquered Ionians in one of his best and most powerful dramas, whereby the feelings of the populace were excited to such a pitch that a fine of one thousand drachmæ was imposed on the poet for having reminded his countrymen of their woes, and the representation of the drama was thenceforth prohibited. The Athenians looked upon the misfortune of Miletus as their own. And how could they have done otherwise? The rumor had reached their ears that King Darius, on learning that the Athenians had sent aid to the Ionians, had angrily inquired, "Who are the Athenians?" Then he had placed an arrow in his bow and shot it high up in the air, calling upon the supreme god of the Per-

sians to aid him to take revenge on the Athenians. It was also reported that he had ordered one of his attendants to take his station near him whenever he sat down to dinner, and repeat three times during the meal, "Master, forget not the Athenians." The Athenians also knew that their former sovereign Hippias would take care to remind Darius of their existence. They could not, therefore, fail to foresee that a great danger threatened their city.

Nor were they in error ; for no sooner had the Ionian revolt been suppressed, than Darius dispatched a large land and naval force, under command of his son-in-law Mardonius, against Greece, and more particularly against Athens and Eretria. Mardonius crossed the Hellespont, and proceeded with his army through Thrace and Macedonia toward the Grecian frontier. Meanwhile the fleet worked its way along the coasts of the same countries ; but while doubling the dangerous promontory of Mount Athos, it was overtaken by a terrific tempest and utterly wrecked. Three hundred vessels were dashed to pieces on the rocks, and twenty thousand mariners drowned. At the same time Mardonius suffered a defeat at the hands of a warlike Thracian tribe, which surprised his army by a night attack ; and although he rallied his troops and reduced the tribe in question to subjection, he thought it best, on account of this double disaster, to return to Asia with his remaining forces, when he fell under the displeasure of Darius and was deprived of his command.

This failure had the effect of inspiring the great king with a still fiercer determination to revenge himself on the Athenians. Orders were issued to all the subject cities on the coast of the *Ægean* Sea to prepare ships of war and transport-vessels, and heralds were sent to the different cities of Greece to demand earth and water—the usual symbols of submission.

The internal affairs of Greece were in such a condition at the time of the arrival of these heralds, that united action

was impossible. The war waged by Athens against Thebes and Ægina, begun B. C. 506, had not yet ceased. The Thebans and the Æginetans, deeming any nation hostile to the Athenians their own friend and protector, eagerly acceded to the demands of Darius. This example, together with the lack of a definite political union, as well as the consternation that had been caused by the complete overthrow of the Ionians, prompted many other Grecian states to recognize the authority of the king of Persia. But there were other states that were far from sharing this consternation. The herald who had been dispatched to Athens to demand earth and water was thrown into the *barathron*, a deep chasm in the rear of the Acropolis, into which it was customary to throw criminals condemned to death. The one that came to Sparta was cast by the indignant citizens headlong into a well, and ordered to take therefrom as much earth and water as he wanted, and to carry it to the great king as best he could. As the person of a herald had always been regarded by the Greeks as sacred and inviolable from the earliest times, these violent proceedings on the part of the Athenians and Spartans are especially worthy of notice. The latter can not be said to have been actuated by a feeling of insulted Hellenic pride, for the consciousness of a common Hellenism had not yet been developed in Sparta, and even in later times we never find it strong there. But the Spartans had now for over a century been conscious of their supremacy in Greece ; so that, although indifferent in regard to the well-being of the other cities, they were incensed at the summons of submission from a foreign monarch. It was not a spirit of Hellenism, but rather of wounded Spartan vanity, that prompted them to this violation of the rights of heralds.

In Athens, we already see vestiges of that noble and generous Hellenism that was destined soon to expand into a spirit of genuine national and social patriotism. The alliance between the various Peloponnesian states under the command

of Sparta was still unstable and precarious. But as soon as Greece began to be threatened by invasion, the Athenians made overtures to the Spartans in the name of the common cause, acknowledging their supremacy, and laying before them their complaints against the Æginetans for accepting the terms of Darius with the view of securing him as an ally in their intended invasion of Attica, thereby betraying their Grecian brethren to the barbarian foe. The Athenians did their utmost to urge the Spartans to send their king Kleomenes to Ægina to punish the people of that island for their un-Hellenic conduct. This act of the Athenians was entirely new in Grecian history. For the first time we find a Hellenic city maintaining that there is such a thing as a "common cause," and that for a Grecian state to submit to the demands of a foreign monarch is treason against the interests of Hellas. For the first time, moreover, we see a city beyond the isthmus voluntarily acknowledging the supremacy of Sparta, and thereby sacrificing its own local and sectional feeling on the altar of Hellenic union. In Sparta, also, the jealousy previously existing between her two kings now ceased. Both sovereigns began to exert themselves in the public cause; and the Spartan armies, marching against Ægina, compelled that wavering state to give hostages to the Athenians, and to renounce her intention of forming an alliance with the Persians.

Meanwhile, Darius had prepared six hundred ships of war and a vast number of transport-vessels to effect the invasion of Greece. This fleet—a large portion of which was furnished by the Greeks of Asia Minor, who were now once more under the yoke of Persia—was collected at Samos in the spring of 490 B. C. Hippias accompanied the expedition, expecting to be restored to the throne of Athens. The generals in command were Datis and Artaphernes—the former a Mede of rank and experience, the latter a nephew of Darius. Their instructions were to subdue and to impose tribute upon all the Hellenic states that had not offered earth and water,

and especially to wreak vengeance on Eretria and Athens, whose inhabitants they were to bring to Persia as slaves. The commanders of the invading force never for a moment doubted that they would be able to execute these orders to the letter, and that before the end of the year numberless captives would be conducted in mournful procession along the high-road leading to Susa.

In order to avoid another shipwreck on the dangerous shores of Mount Athos, the fleet sailed directly across the *Ægean* Sea from Samos to Eubœa. On the way the invaders subdued the intervening islands, especially Naxos, the inhabitants of which had ten years before bravely repulsed the Persian forces. The remaining islands, aware of the futility of resistance, quietly submitted to the enemy, who exacted from each of them hostages as a pledge of fidelity, and a number of recruits in proportion to the population. In accordance with the strict orders of Darius, an exception was made in favor of the sacred island of Delos, on which Datis landed and performed a magnificent sacrifice.

The Persians, having safely accomplished their voyage across the *Ægean*, came to the coast of Eubœa, where they first captured the city of Karystus, and thence advanced to Eretria. Meanwhile the Eretrians had appealed to the Athenians for aid, and the latter had sent to their assistance a force of four thousand men. But this detachment, unable to render the Eretrians any efficient service on account of the prevalence of violent factions among the citizens, some of whom were even conspiring to betray the city to the invaders, returned to Athens. The Eretrians, notwithstanding the traitors in their midst, made a brave resistance, but in a few days were obliged to surrender. Their country was laid waste, their city plundered, their temples burned, and the surviving inhabitants reduced to slavery.

Datis, having thus executed the orders of Darius in regard to Eretria, now turned his thoughts toward Athens. After

a short repose in Eubœa, the Persians sailed to the coast of Attica, and by the advice of Hippias landed on the plain of Marathon. Forty-seven years had elapsed since Peisistratus, the father of Hippias, had landed at the same spot with a much smaller army, triumphantly forced his way to Athens, and compelled the citizens to accept him as their ruler. But Hippias was soon to learn that the Athenians were now a different people from those over whom his father had reigned. The constitution of Solon, for the preservation of which the Athenians had gloriously fought against the Spartans, Thebans, Chalkidians, and Æginetans, was beginning to show its good results. Political power was no longer exclusively in the hands of a few noble houses. The people were not to be awed into submission by the aristocratic pretensions of the Eupatridæ. The privileges of citizenship had been extended to so great a number that the populace had now no reason to fear that their liberties would be infringed upon by the nobles. Thus all classes had a living interest in defending their country against a foreign foe.

We may perhaps derive a fair inference in regard to the spirit and moral strength of the Athenian people at this period from an inspection of the characters of the four men who then seemed to exert the most marked influence over their fellow citizens. These were Miltiades, Xanthippus, Aristides, and Themistokles. Miltiades, already mentioned in connection with the Scythian expedition of Darius, had returned to Athens after a long sojourn in the Thracian Chersonese, whither he had been sent by the tyrant Hippias about 517 B. C., as the successor of his uncle Miltiades. He stood in high repute for his courage and daring. No one knew more accurately the merits and defects of the Persian military organization, in which he had held an important post. As he had in former years drawn upon himself the enmity of Darius by advocating the destruction of the bridge across the Danube, it was natural that he should now become

a zealous defender of Athens. His whole previous career had, however, tended in a great degree to unfit him for Athenian political life. He had left his native city when still under the control of the Peisistratidæ, and had not familiarized himself with the radical changes that had been brought about by the expulsion of the tyrants and the subsequent political reforms of Kleisthenes. Having spent the greater portion of his life as a military commander on a foreign coast, where he had exercised almost regal authority, he was unaccustomed to opposition, had never been led to restrain the ardor of his impetuous nature, and did not altogether comprehend his duty and responsibility as a citizen of a free state. His education as a soldier led him to regard the state, not as a community by whose suffrages the highest office was bestowed upon the most able citizen, on condition that he should discharge it in strict accordance with law and hold himself responsible to his fellow citizens, but rather as a military camp that owed a blind obedience to the man who was most capable of defending it from disaster. In brief, Miltiades, though in many respects different in character from the late usurper, belonged to the domineering school of the Peisistratidæ rather than to that class of conscientious citizens represented by Solon. But, notwithstanding his imperious and un-Athenian nature, he was chosen one of the ten generals of the city at the very time that Datis was leading his forces against it. His election to this important post furnishes a striking proof of the wisdom and patriotic spirit of his fellow citizens, who, although the character of the man was distasteful to them, hesitated not at this critical period to avail themselves of his extraordinary abilities.

Xanthippus was a man of different type. He had received his political training under his friend and relative Kleisthenes, and therefore could scarcely help developing a character widely at variance with that of Miltiades. Although he can hardly be said to have possessed the military genius of the

latter, Xanthippus at a later period honorably commanded the naval forces of his country in the famous battle at Mykale, drove the Persians from the Thracian Chersonese, captured Sestos, and laid the foundations of Athenian supremacy on the seas ; for which services, as well as for his conscientious adherence to the constitution of the state, he was held in high esteem throughout his whole life.

Themistokles and Aristeides, though perhaps not much younger in years than the two former, had not been so long on the arena of political action. As statesmen, they were new and striking productions of the constitution of Kleisthenes. Unlike Miltiades, they claimed neither gods nor heroes among their progenitors ; unlike Xanthippus, they were not connected either by blood or by marriage with the noblest families of the city. Being of middle rank and moderate property, both were fair representatives of the new order of affairs that prevailed in the state through the political reforms of Kleisthenes. Both had made their way to distinction by means of their talents and energy, and yet no two statesmen in all history present characters so fundamentally different.

Themistokles was a man of the rarest genius and of exalted ambition. At the battle of Marathon he won his first laurels, and his subsequent career was destined to be eminently glorious, and conducive to the honor and safety of his country. But in the attainment of this end he sometimes resorted to means the most unscrupulous and reprehensible.

Aristeides, with less genius and foresight, was equally brave and patriotic, but more cautious and conservative, exhibiting a decided contrast to the fiery and progressive spirit of Themistokles. His ambition, less intense and less daring than that of his great rival, was always kept conscientiously within the bounds of the constitution. He contented himself with faithfully discharging his duty as a citizen, and honestly fulfilling the requirements of whatever offices were bestowed

upon him by the votes of his fellow citizens. Themistokles, when elected to office, too often sought to make the position a medium of personal aggrandizement, and was rarely known to refuse a bribe if sufficient in amount. Aristides, on the other hand, never wavered in his integrity, whence he was popularly called "Aristides the Just." In the course of his career he was many times chosen archon, often occupied the judge's bench, and was finally appointed commander of the naval forces, in which capacity he was invested with almost discretionary power to impose tribute upon the allies. manifold as were the opportunities thus afforded of enriching himself, no man could ever accuse Aristides of having committed an injustice or stained his hands with bribes. By the genius of Themistokles not only Athens but all Greece may be said to have been saved at Salamis. No such brilliant exploit can be found in the record of Aristides, yet the latter always retained a firmer hold on the affections of his fellow citizens than the former was able to do with all his dazzling qualities; so highly did the Athenians esteem justice and integrity in the character of their public men.

Widely divergent in character and political instincts as were these four Athenian leaders at the time of the Persian invasion, they were all alike actuated by a noble and generous determination to preserve their country from the threatening danger.

Great was the consternation at Athens when tidings reached the city that so formidable a host of invaders was disembarking on the plain of Marathon. As frequently happens on such occasions, imaginary dangers conspired to render the reality more appalling. The minds of the people were agitated by rumors of treason; but the prevailing spirit was one of unconquerable bravery and resolution. With their own small army they could scarcely hope to offer effectual resistance to the enormous forces of their foe. Their only assurance of safety seemed to lie in aid from the other states

of Greece. This they could not expect from their nearest neighbors, Ægina and Thebes, both still embittered at the recent defeats they had sustained at the hands of the Athenians. All eyes were therefore anxiously turned toward Sparta, and thither was dispatched in all haste the courier Pheidippides, who, performing the journey of one hundred and fifty miles, on foot, in the incredibly short space of forty-eight hours, made an earnest appeal to the Lacedæmonians, reminding them of the sad fate that had lately overtaken Eretria, and imploring them not to suffer Athens, the most ancient among the cities of Hellas, to be likewise enslaved by barbarians. The magistrates expressed their willingness to grant the desired aid, but declined to do so immediately, on the plea that it was now the ninth day of the moon, when, in accordance with a time-honored custom, all the citizens of Sparta were required to be at home, in this month at least, to celebrate the festival of the Karneian Apollo. They promised, however, to send assistance to the Athenians as soon as the festival should be over.

The lukewarm behavior of the Spartans has been justified by some historians on the ground that it was in accordance with their religious principles ; but this same custom, which the Spartans alleged as an excuse for their delay, was violated on other occasions when it happened to be to their interest so to do. Had Athens fallen into the hands of the invaders, nothing could have saved Sparta herself and the entire land of Greece from the yoke of Persia. We are not to infer that the Spartans offered this custom as a pretext in order altogether to avoid sending the desired assistance ; for they did indeed send an army in all haste to Attica four days later. Probably at first they did not thoroughly appreciate the magnitude of the danger, their own city not being immediately threatened ; but it must be acknowledged that they displayed a total lack of the Panhellenic sentiment that had prompted the Athenians to send succor to Miletus and Eretria.

The unsatisfactory answer brought back to Athens by Pheidippides on the fifth day from his departure greatly troubled the minds of the citizens, who could not help suspecting that their jealous rival city intended to leave them to their fate. Yet it caused no change in the plans of resistance. Nine thousand hoplites had already been dispatched to the plain of Marathon to oppose the advance of the invaders by land, while the remainder of the forces were kept in the city in order to be prepared for an attack by sea ; for it might be the intention of the Persian commanders, after landing a large force at Marathon, to proceed with the fleet to the very harbor of Athens.

These nine thousand citizens—nine hundred being from each of the ten Attic communities—were accompanied by their slaves, who served as attendants, and many of whom no doubt took part in the ensuing battle as light-armed troops. This little force was under the command of ten generals, one from each community, each of whom was to hold in turn the post of commander-in-chief for the space of one day, and then to hand over this authority to the next in order. Arriving on the field, they pitched their camp in a favorable place about a mile distant from the spot where the Persians had disembarked, and in such a position that the latter could not advance toward Athens without first giving battle. The ten generals then held a council of war, in which Miltiades advocated the policy of boldly attacking the enemy instead of remaining on the defensive, alleging that the courage, high spirit, and admirable self-confidence of the little army rendered an offensive policy perfectly justifiable, and that too long a delay might furnish an opportunity to the secret partisans of Hippias, of whom there were not a few still left in Athens, to effect an understanding with the enemy and to betray the city. Four of the other generals agreed with Miltiades, but the remaining five deemed it unwise to risk the fortune and existence of

Athens on the chance of a single battle, especially since there was good ground for expecting the speedy arrival of reënforcements from Sparta. The commanders being thus equally divided in opinion, the decision of the matter rested with the polemarch, or the third in rank of the nine annual archons, who by virtue of his office was entitled to a vote in the council of the regularly elected generals. Fortunately for the Hellenic cause, the polemarch was Kallimachus, a man of daring and prompt action. Convinced by the arguments of Miltiades, Kallimachus gave the casting vote in favor of an aggressive movement. This decision reached, Aristides, who was also one of the ten generals, and had a right to the supreme command on the day of his turn, voluntarily came forward and resigned that right in favor of Miltiades, whom he acknowledged to be a more able and experienced general than himself. His example was immediately followed by the rest, and Miltiades became sole commander of the whole force. Nevertheless he did not seek an encounter with the enemy until the day on which he would have held command according to the previous arrangement, which happened to be the tenth day after their departure from Athens. The delay was probably owing to his desire to fall upon the Persians at an unguarded moment, or perhaps unavoidable on account of preliminary manœuvres.

In the mean time, although the promised aid from Sparta had not arrived, an event occurred that raised the spirits of the Athenians to a high pitch of enthusiasm, and convinced them that they were not entirely abandoned. They were joined by one thousand hoplites from the little city of Plataea, which twenty years previously had been freed by the Athenians from the Bœotians. This little band formed the entire military force of the Plataeans, who made use of this opportunity of showing their gratitude toward Athens for past services. When we consider that Athens was the main object of the vengeance of Darius, and that Plataea was not

immediately threatened by the invaders, it must be acknowledged that this eagerness of the Plateæans to assist their former benefactors is a noble instance of national gratitude, and an example of disinterestedness and self-devotion rare in the history of Greece.

After the arrival of this reënforcement the whole Hellenic force at Marathon amounted to ten thousand hoplites. Of the magnitude of the Persian army we have no trustworthy accounts, but the lowest estimate places it at one hundred and fifty thousand men, of whom ten thousand were cavalry, while some authorities swell the number to six hundred thousand.

CHAPTER III.

BATTLE OF MARATHON.

THE plain of Marathon lies about seven hours' march to the northeast of Athens, and forms an irregular crescent six miles long and two miles broad in its middle and widest part. It is bounded on one side by the sea, on the other by a semicircular rampart of mountains. The uninterrupted flatness of the plain is at the present day scarcely relieved by a single tree. Formerly the northern portion consisted of an extensive marsh, which was still to be seen until a recent period, when it was drained by the proprietor of the tract; toward the southern extremity lies another marsh of smaller dimensions; whence the size of the plain for strategical purposes was really much less than the dimensions above given. The surrounding mountain bulwark is perforated by four passes, the most southerly of which leads toward Athens and forms the only outlet of the plain in that direction. In ancient times this pass was too narrow for vehicles, and was available only for men and beasts of burden. It was not until a few years ago that a carriage-road

was constructed, over which visitors can drive in four hours from Athens to Marathon.

Such was the ground on which was about to be fought one of the most memorable battles in all history. For nine days had the two hostile armies been encamped on opposite sides of the plain, each closely watching the other. The Greeks occupied an elevated ledge of ground on the slopes of Mounts Pentelikus and Hymettus near the southwestern extremity of the plain, whence they had a clear view over the whole field; while the Persians remained down by the seacoast, having the swamp in their rear and their ships close on their left flank. The former, in addition to the natural strength of their position, had thrown up a line of intrenchments as a double guard against an attack from their numerous foes; while the latter, assuming that the mere handful of Greeks before them must remain strictly on the defensive, took no pains to fortify themselves, and had not the remotest suspicion of the coming disaster.

On the morning of the tenth day after their departure from Athens, which appears to have been the 12th of September, 490 B. C., Miltiades drew up his army in order of battle. The Persians still occupied their former position, with their best and bravest troops stationed in the center. These consisted of Persians proper and of Sakæ, a warlike subject nation from the steppes of central Asia. Among the Greeks the post of honor was the right wing, which on the present occasion was commanded by Kallimachus, while on the left were stationed the thousand Platæans under their leader Aëimnestus.

Notwithstanding the great numerical inferiority of the Hellenic force, Miltiades thought it indispensable to spread out his lines until they should show a front equal in length to that of the Persian army, in order to avoid the danger of being surrounded or outflanked by the superior numbers of the latter. At the same time he did not neglect to

strengthen his wings as much as possible, to accomplish which he was obliged to weaken his center proportionally. As has already been said, the Grecian force consisted of ten thousand hoplites, besides a large number of attendant slaves, who seem to have rendered important service as irregular light-armed combatants; but there were neither archers nor cavalry. On the other hand, the hostile army was well supplied with expert archers. It is stated by ancient writers that the Persian commanders had taken special pains to transport to Greece a squadron of ten thousand cavalry, and that they had selected Marathon as the place of disembarkation in the expectation of finding it a favorable spot for bringing into play that important branch of the service. And yet we find no mention of cavalry in any well-authenticated description of the battle. The best solution of this difficulty seems to lie in the ingenious supposition of a German historian, that the Persians had decided to abandon the project of approaching Athens by way of Marathon, and, not supposing that the Greeks would dare to attack them, had already reëmbarked their cavalry preparatory to setting sail directly for the city. This hypothesis best accords with all the otherwise inexplicable known facts of the case—the absence of cavalry in the action, the delay of Miltiades in making the attack, the short duration of the engagement, and the ease and rapidity with which the Persians retreated aboard their ships after their defeat.

A sacrifice having been offered to the god of war, and the omens having been found propitious, Miltiades gave the order to advance. Issuing from their intrenchments, and descending the gentle slope toward the spot where the Persians were drawn up, the Greeks raised a loud war-cry and gradually quickened their pace to a run. Their object in thus hastening to a close encounter was to avoid the skillful Persian archers, who could, of course, best operate from a

distance ; but their courageous impatience to strike a decisive blow for their own and their country's safety materially added to their speed. The Persians were greatly astonished when they saw this little band rushing against them with such a headlong dash, and thought that the Greeks must have been seized with madness. In vain, however, did the Persian bowmen shower their arrows against the approaching hoplites, from whose thick shields and helmets the shafts glanced harmlessly off. In a few minutes the Grecian troops hurled themselves against the Persian front. The crash was terrible. The arms of the Athenians were heavier and more destructive than those of the foe ; but the courage of the latter was scarcely inferior, and their immense numbers gave them an overwhelming advantage. The Athenian center, which had been weakened for the purpose of strengthening the wings, soon began to waver before the solid columns of the Persians and Sakæ ; and, although the firm and persevering Aristides was posted there, as well as the dashing and ambitious Themistokles, that section of the little army was finally compelled to give way, and the victorious enemy, heedless of what was taking place on the wings, began to follow in hot pursuit. Meanwhile both the Grecian wings had succeeded in breaking the array of foemen opposed to them, and had scattered them in flight. At this juncture Miltiades, who had foreseen and provided for the possible repulse of his center, hastily recalled his wings from pursuit, and ordered them to make a combined attack on the rear of the exultant and unsuspecting Persians. This manœuvre decided the day. The Athenian center, encouraged by this efficient aid, at once rallied and again presented an unbroken line to the foe, who, thus attacked in front and rear, were soon put to flight. Many were driven into the swamp and there slain ; others escaped to the shore, whither the previously routed Persian divisions had preceded them, and were now, in great confusion, embarking on their ships.

The victorious Greeks, pressing rapidly forward, did their best not only to prevent their foe from embarking, but even to capture or burn those vessels still moored to the shore. But the Persian archers stationed on the decks kept up an incessant discharge of arrows, under cover of which the greater number of the defeated troops managed to embark. Nevertheless, the Greeks captured seven vessels. And here the struggle was even more desperate and bloody than it had been in the main action. It was no longer a battle, but a fierce, irregular skirmish, replete with striking instances of individual heroism. Some waded out into the water, and, in defiance of the arrows, darts, and missiles showered on them from the decks above, strove to fire the ships by hurling blazing torches. Greek and Persian grappled together in the water in a desperate death-struggle. Here fell the polemarch Kallimachus, and Stesilaus, one of the ten generals. Here perished Kynægeirus, brother of the poet Æschylus, in a daring attempt to capture one of the vessels. He had placed his hand on the prow, and was about to climb on board, when one of the crew severed his wrist with an axe, and he fell back into the sea. The contest did not cease until the last Persian vessel had put off from the shore, and the Athenians had the satisfaction of beholding the hostile fleet standing seaward under full sail. The Greeks were left in undisputed possession of the field of battle, the camp and accoutrements of the enemy, and an immense amount of treasure which had been abandoned in the precipitate flight. Six thousand four hundred Persian dead remained on the plain, while the entire Grecian loss was one hundred and ninety-two.

It was now about noon. The Grecian army, filled with enthusiasm by its almost unexpected achievement, joyfully beheld the departure of the Persian fleet, and the mountains round about were echoing back their shouts of victory. But, in the midst of the general gladness, the scouts that had been

stationed on the summit of one of the neighboring mountains dispatched a messenger down to the plain with the tidings that the ships of the defeated foe, instead of shaping their course for the open sea, were bearing down toward Cape Sunium, with the evident intention of doubling that promontory and attacking Athens. There was no time to be lost. Miltiades, leaving on the field of battle a detachment under the command of Aristides to keep guard over the prisoners and spoil, led the remainder of the troops by a forced march to the city, where they arrived at nightfall and encamped at Kynosarges, on the banks of the Ilissus.

The citizens had already learned the glorious result of the engagement at Marathon; for, as soon as the battle was over, a soldier had set out at full speed to carry the news to his countrymen, and, although still encumbered with his heavy armor, had run so swiftly as to accomplish the journey in four hours. As the people anxiously crowded around him to learn what tidings he had brought, he staggered and fell from sheer exhaustion, exclaiming with his dying voice, "Rejoice! victory is ours!"

It may well be imagined that Miltiades and his comrades found their fellow citizens in a joyful mood, which was somewhat dampened by the further news that the Persian fleet might be expected at any moment to make its appearance off the harbor. It did indeed arrive during the night, and the Persian commanders had made preparations to disembark their forces the next day, fully expecting to capture an undefended and helpless city. But when the morning dawned they were astonished and disconcerted to behold the Grecian army—the same army which had inflicted so signal a defeat upon them at Marathon the day before—drawn up on the shore ready to dispute their landing. After a careful consultation, they decided to return at once to Asia.

Thus was Athens saved from the threatened danger, and

the Persian fleet sailed homeward with no other booty than that which had been obtained from the plunder of Naxos, and with no other prisoners than those from Eretria. These latter met with a much more lenient fate than usually fell to the lot of prisoners of war. King Darius, instead of reducing them to slavery, assigned them a dwelling-place not far from his capital city Susa. What became of the ex-tyrant Hippias is not known with certainty. According to some ancient writers, he fell in the battle at Marathon; others say that he died from sorrow at the failure of the Persian expedition. However that may be, he left several sons, who continued to reside at the Persian court and to urge the great king to undertake another invasion of Hellas, in the confident hope of recovering for themselves their father's former position as ruler of Athens.

On the evening of the day of the final departure of the Persian fleet, a Lacedæmonian army of two thousand men arrived for the purpose of assisting the Athenians. Although this force seems pitifully small when we consider that Sparta was the most powerful city in Greece—for Athens had sent double that number of troops to the aid of Eretria—it must in justice to the Spartans be added that they showed a praiseworthy eagerness to arrive in time to take part in the battle. Leaving home on the day following the full moon, they had marched with such rapidity as to accomplish the whole journey in less than three days. On learning what had taken place, they expressed their regret at being too late for the action, praised the Athenians for their gallant achievements, and returned to Sparta.

This battle of Marathon was most important in its consequences, both immediate and remote. Had the Persians conquered on that day, Athens must have fallen under the yoke of a crushing foreign despotism, and the star of Hellenic civilization would have been extinguished ere it had fairly dawned upon the world. Well was it for posterity

that such a misfortune was averted ; that humanity was not forced to forego the brilliant example and the solid benefits of the subsequent development of Hellenic science, philosophy, literature, and art.

After the danger was past, the delighted Athenians lost no time in returning thanks to the gods for their deliverance. Before the battle Miltiades had made a vow that in case the Greeks were victorious as many goats should be sacrificed to Artemis as foemen should have fallen in the fight. But as no less than six thousand four hundred Persians were left dead on the field, it was decided by a vote of the people that, instead of performing so immense a sacrifice at once, five hundred goats should be sacrificed annually, and that this custom should be kept up as an everlasting memorial of Marathon. Of the many costly treasures that the enemy had abandoned in their precipitate flight, a tenth part was dedicated to Athene, Apollo, and Artemis ; and so valuable were these spoils that from the portion assigned to Athene, the guardian goddess of Athens, the sculptor Pheidias in after years constructed the great statue of Athene Promachos that stood upon the Acropolis.

After duly honoring the gods, the Athenians proceeded to pay a fitting tribute of respect to their fellow citizens who had fallen on the field of battle. To this day can be distinguished in the southern part of the plain of Marathon the tumulus or mound of earth that was heaped up over the carefully collected remains of the hundred and ninety-two slain Athenians. In ancient times this tumulus was adorned with ten splendid marble columns, on which were inscribed the names of the departed heroes. These columns were still standing, and the names upon them were still legible, in the time of Pausanias, nearly six hundred years after their erection. Another tomb was erected over the remains of the slaves who had laid down their lives in the Hellenic cause on that memorable day. In addition to these

tombs, there was placed on the battle-field a triumphal monument, the inscription* on which was composed by Simonides of Keos, who may with propriety be called the poet of Marathon. Not far from this monument was another memorial column, also of white marble, in honor of Miltiades, to whose wisdom and energy the Greeks were mainly indebted for their great victory. This was a mark of distinction never accorded to any other Greek, either before or since his day. Moreover, it was decreed that his portrait should be hung up in the Prytaneium or town-hall, and that his statue, molded in bronze, should be dedicated to Apollo in the temple at Delphi.

Such marks of esteem on the part of his fellow citizens should have satisfied the most ambitious of men. Far better would it have been for Miltiades if, like his comrades Kallimachus and Stesilaus, he had fallen upon the field of Marathon after the victory; for his subsequent career was most unfortunate. Miltiades, whose family had been in former days strong adherents of the Peisistratidæ, and who had himself been indebted to Hippias for his appointment as governor of the Thracian Chersonese, had never sympathized with the republican constitution of Athens, and heartily disapproved of the popular reforms introduced by Kleisthenes. His naturally proud and somewhat overbearing disposition had been confirmed and strengthened by his many years of command in the Chersonese, where indeed he had exercised an absolute and almost irresponsible authority. After the victory at Marathon his heart was more than ever swelled with pride, and his self-confidence knew no bounds. Taking advantage of the enthusiasm manifested for him by his fellow citizens, he proposed to them that they should grant him the command of a squadron of seventy well-manned ships, promising to perform with them an exploit that would

* Ἑλλήνων προμαχοῦντες Ἀθηναῖοι Μαραθῶνι,
χρυσοφόρων Μήδων ἐστόρεσαν δύναμιν.

enrich Athens with an abundance of spoil, and render her more illustrious than ever before. Although this singular proposition was nothing less than a demand for a large share of discretionary and almost dictatorial power, and decidedly unrepugnant in its nature, such was the respect and esteem of the Athenians for the man who had obtained for them the Marathonian victory that they granted his request, supposing that he intended to make a descent on some portion of the coast of Asia in retaliation for the late Persian expedition against Greece.

Miltiades, who had kept the object of his enterprise secret from his countrymen, sailed at once to the Grecian island of Paros, laid siege to its capital city, and demanded of the inhabitants the sum of one hundred talents, threatening to lay waste the island with fire and sword if it were not paid. He did this under the pretext that the Parians had taken the side of the Persians and contributed a trireme to the fleet of Darius ; but his real motive was to revenge himself on the Parian Lysagoras, who had in former years, while he was holding his command in Thrace, traduced him to the Persian general Hydarnes. The Parians at first promised to pay the money as soon as they could get it together ; and having thus obtained a short delay, they made good use of the time by putting the wall of their city into a condition for defense. Then they sent him a message of refusal. Miltiades held the city closely besieged for twenty-six days, but was unable to capture it. Finally, having received a severe wound in the thigh, he gave up the attempt and returned to Athens.

Miltiades, notwithstanding his great and deserved popularity with the Athenian people, had many enemies among the more prominent citizens ; some of whom were jealous of his fame, while others had taken offense at his haughty and overbearing manner. Especially hostile to him were the noble family of the Alkmæonidæ, who felt that their pres-

tige was cast into the shade by the lately acquired influence of the victor ; and now, when the latter returned from Paros without the promised spoil and with the disgrace of defeat attached to his name, they eagerly seized the opportunity of abasing him.

Xanthippus, father of the great Perikles, then the most prominent member of this powerful family, brought an accusation against him on the ground that he had deceived the Athenians, and to settle a private quarrel had drawn them, without their knowledge or consent, into an unjust and inglorious enterprise. The trial that ensued presented a tragical scene. The wound in his thigh had become so painful and so dangerous that the accused was obliged to be carried on a couch into the presence of the assembled judges. His friends did what they could toward securing his acquittal ; but as it could not be denied that he had brought disgrace upon the city by his ill-judged undertaking, they were forced to rest his defense on the glory of his past achievements, his capture of Lemnos, his success in making the name of Athens respected among the barbarians of Thrace, and above all his inestimable services in repulsing the overwhelming force of invaders on the field of Marathon. Although these considerations had due weight, the judges, after careful deliberation, decided that they must pronounce him guilty. The offense which he had committed was of such a remarkable and extraordinary character that no definite provision had been made by the law for its punishment. Xanthippus, carried away by the spirit of personal enmity, demanded that the hero of Marathon, the savior of his country, should be condemned to death ; but the judges thought it sufficient to impose upon him a fine of fifty talents, which would probably be enough to cover the cost of the expedition.

Later historians, such as Cornelius Nepos, Diodorus, and Plutarch, say that after the passing of this sentence Miltiades, unable to pay the fine, was cast into prison and there

died from the effects of his wound. But there is reason to believe that this is a mere fable, invented to portray in still deeper colors the lamentable fate of the benefactor of Athens. Herodotus does not mention this imprisonment. It was customary in ancient Athens to allow to those who were condemned to pay a fine a limited period of time to enable them to raise the money before compulsory measures were taken ; and that any exception was made in the case of Miltiades is, to say the least, highly improbable. The truth seems to be that he died a few days after the close of his trial by reason of his wound having gangrened. The fine was afterward paid by his son Kimon.

However much we may pity Miltiades and sympathize with him in his misfortune, we can not with justice accuse the Athenians of ingratitude toward their benefactor, as some writers, both ancient and modern, have thoughtlessly done. No people in all history knew better than they how to honor the citizen worthy of honor, and how to punish where punishment was deserved. Great services may palliate a subsequent wrong, they can not justify it ; and in passing judgment upon the political actions of the Athenians, we must bear in mind that their position was a peculiar one. Too great power or influence in the hands of one citizen was liable to result in serious danger to the state ; and had Miltiades been acquitted in consideration of his former services, others would have been encouraged by the assurance of impunity to act in the same arrogant and reckless manner, and to seek their own aggrandizement at the expense of the liberties of the people.

CHAPTER IV.

SECOND PERSIAN INVASION.

Preparations of Darius and Xerxes.

KING DARIUS was far from satisfied with the issue of his great expedition against Greece. Eretria had indeed been captured and destroyed ; but his principal foe still survived, with increased influence and glory. The prestige of the Persian arms must be restored and Athens humbled at any cost. That there might be no chance of failure this time, Darius began his preparations on a far more extensive scale than before. The best troops in the empire were summoned, and the vast resources of Persia strained to their utmost. For three years all western Asia resounded with the preparations for war ; but just as the requisite arrangements had been completed, the attention of the king was diverted by a rebellion in the province of Egypt. This event would have caused but slight delay in the intended expedition against Greece, had not Darius sickened and died after a prosperous (although not uniformly successful) reign of thirty-six years.

His son Xerxes, who succeeded him on the throne, was much inferior in energy, and cherished no particular animosity against the Athenians. Consequently, he manifested no haste in carrying into execution his father's designs. The rebellion in Egypt was still unsubdued, and the new king was anxious to reduce that province once more to subjection ; a task that kept him busy for upward of a year, after which he was at leisure to proceed against Greece. He seemed to have as little desire to do so as before, and in this lukewarmness was encouraged by the cautious counsels of his wise and experienced uncle Artabanus. On the other hand, Mardonius, aggrieved by his former defeat in Thrace and the shipwreck of his fleet off Mount Athos, was eager for an opportunity

to redeem his character as a general, and continually urged the young king to carry out his father's intentions. The sons of Hippias used their influence to the same effect, as did likewise many other Grecian exiles who had sought refuge in Persia, and who bore their countrymen no good will for having banished them. Xerxes finally yielded to their persuasions, and resolved to undertake the contest. Not content with the preparations made by Darius, he ordered that large additional bodies of horse and foot should be assembled, that more ships should be added to the already enormous fleet, and that vast stores of munitions of war should be accumulated. In all this, Xerxes was actuated not merely by a determination to accomplish the conquest of Greece, but also, and perhaps in a still greater degree, by motives of personal vanity. He resolved that his army should be the largest and most splendid ever assembled under the banners of any one sovereign, and that its march to Greece should be not so much a campaign as a grand triumphal procession, of which he himself should be the central and most conspicuous figure.

Four years more were spent in incessant preparation, and at last, in the autumn of 481 B. C., the various divisions of the immense army were ordered to rendezvous at Sardis, whither Xerxes himself repaired, in order to accompany the expedition on its march. The fleet, which consisted of twelve hundred and seven war-galleys and wellnigh double that number of transport-vessels, was scattered along the coasts of Ionia, the Hellespont, and Thrace. It was not the intention of Xerxes to proceed directly across the *Ægean*, as Datis and Artaphernes had done, but to cross the Hellespont with his land forces, and to march through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, while the fleet accompanied him by sailing along the shore. He also showed a wise foresight in sending forward along the line of this projected route immense stores of provisions, and stationing them under a strong guard, at convenient distances, almost up to the confines of Greece.

Two memorable works were constructed by the order of Xerxes to facilitate his progress : a bridge across the Hellespont, whereby were avoided the trouble and delay involved in transporting his immense army over that strait in boats ; and a canal through the neck of land that connected Mount Athos with the continent, enabling his fleet to avoid the danger of doubling that rocky promontory, so fatal to Mardonius. The bridge extended from the neighborhood of, Abydos, on the Asiatic coast, to a point between Sestos and Madytus on the European side. Herodotus estimates the width of the strait in this place at seven stadia, or somewhat more than four thousand feet ; a more accurate modern measurement places it at just one English mile. This work was at first intrusted to Egyptian and Phœnician engineers, who constructed the bridge of small vessels stationed in a continuous line from one shore to the other, and fastened together by strong cable-ropes of flax and papyrus. Had the Hellespont been an ordinary river, instead of an arm of the sea subject to violent marine storms, this structure would no doubt have answered its purpose ; but the builders, deceived by the usually placid appearance of the water, had not provided for the possible contingency of a high wind and a rough sea. No sooner had they triumphantly announced to Xerxes that the bridge was finished, and that he might lead his army across it, than there arose a furious tempest which shattered it to pieces ; whereat Xerxes was so wroth that he ordered the engineers to be beheaded, the Hellespont to be scourged with three hundred lashes, and a pair of fetters to be cast into it. Another set of engineers, probably Ionian Greeks, who were better acquainted with the nature of the Hellespont, undertook the work, and brought it to a successful completion. In fact, they constructed two bridges, one for the passage of the army, and the other for the baggage-wagons and beasts of burden. Both were composed of long lines of large ships, anchored abreast of one another,

with their prows pointing toward the *Ægean*, and secured by cables stretching from shore to shore.

The difficult and laborious task of cutting a canal through the isthmus connecting Mount Athos with the mainland occupied a large force of men for three years. Some writers deny that Xerxes could have accomplished these two great works, and treat as mere fables the accounts handed down in regard to them ; but not only are both the bridge and the canal distinctly attested by Herodotus and Thucydides, two of the most conscientious and accurate historians of ancient times, but traces of the latter can be clearly distinguished at the present day.

The March—Enumeration.

All had been completed by the time Xerxes arrived at Sardis late in the autumn of the year 481. Heralds were sent at once to the cities of Greece, excepting Athens and Sparta, to demand earth and water. The army remained encamped at or near Sardis during the winter, and early in the following spring began its march in the direction of the Hellespont in two grand divisions. Between these space enough was left for Xerxes himself, with his body-guard and his extensive retinue of courtiers ; and indeed the attendants of the king were numerous enough to form an army by themselves. The vanguard of his private escort consisted of a thousand cavalry and a thousand spearmen, all of pure Persian blood. After them came ten superbly decorated steeds, of the sacred Nisæan breed, from the famous plain of Media. Then followed the consecrated chariot of the supreme god of the Persians, drawn by eight white horses. Upon this chariot no mortal was allowed to sit, not even the king himself, the charioteer walking by its side. This pageant, of course, had a religious significance, and was intended to propitiate the gods, and to call down their blessings on the great expedition. Then followed the splendid chariot of

Xerxes, likewise drawn by Nisæan horses, and escorted by a brilliant cavalcade of Persian nobles. Immediately behind came a troop of ten thousand cavalry, and the same number of infantry, all picked men of unmixed Persian race. The ten thousand infantry were called "the Immortals," because their number was always kept complete. Such was the royal cortége, after which, at a distance of two stadia, followed the other half of the main army.

In this order the Persians departed from Sardis, marched through the province of Mysia, and, coming to the place where once had stood the famous city of Troy, encamped on the banks of the little river Skamander, so often mentioned in the Homeric poems, the waters of which proved insufficient for that immense host of men and beasts. Xerxes, after having sacrificed a thousand oxen to Athene, and honored in various other ways the memory of the heroes of Troy, proceeded to Abydos. Desiring to survey his forces before crossing over to the European shore, he here caused a marble throne to be erected on the summit of a high hill, whence he could obtain a good view of the mighty host before him. The next day at dawn the army began to cross the bridges into Europe; and so vast was the host that seven days and seven nights were required to complete the passage. Halting at a plain on the seacoast, near the mouth of the river Hebrus, whither the fleet had also repaired in accordance with previous orders, Xerxes prepared to make an enumeration of his entire armament.

Never, before or since, in the history of humanity, has there been gathered together an army so immense in number, composed of so many different and far-distant nations, under the command of one general, and with one object in view. The land force was composed of warriors of forty-six different subject nations of Persia, each clad in its own national costume, and marching under its own leaders; while eight different nationalities entered into the composition of

the naval forces. Each of these carried its own customary arms, which widely differed in kind and efficiency. The Sagarthii, for instance, a nomadic Persian tribe, serving as horsemen, were armed with the dagger and the lance, with both of which weapons they were equally skillful; while the Ethiopians from the upper Nile, with bodies painted half red, half white, were clothed in the skins of lions and hyenas, and, in addition to their spears, carried long bows with arrows of reed tipped with sharp stones.

The manner in which Xerxes numbered his army was peculiar. Ten thousand men having been gathered together in as small a space as possible, an inclosure was erected around them, after which they were ordered to march out of it, and another ten thousand marched in. This process was repeated until all the land forces had passed through the inclosure, which was found to have been filled and emptied 170 times, from which it was concluded that the number of men in the army amounted to 1,700,000, exclusive of 80,000 cavalry, 20,000 Arabian camel-drivers, and a large number of Libyan charioteers. But this enumeration comprised the land army alone. The fleet was composed of 1,207 war-vessels and 3,000 transport-ships. Each war-galley contained 200 sailors and 30 warriors, and each of the other ships carried at least 80 men. Therefore, when the total is taken, we find that the whole force may be computed at 2,817,610 men. Not content with these stupendous numbers, Xerxes levied extensive contributions both of men and ships on the various tribes and cities of Thrace, as he passed along from Doriskus toward Thessaly. In this manner he augmented his force by 300,000 infantry and no less than 300 ships, with an aggregate crew of 24,000; so that, by the time he reached the Grecian frontier, his entire armament amounted to 2,641,610 men. To these must be added, according to the testimony of Herodotus, an equal number of servants, camp-followers, cooks, etc., whereby the already

enormous host becomes swelled beyond 5,000,000. These figures are seriously given by Herodotus, who evidently believed that the army of Xerxes was even larger, on the ground that the number of attendants in reality greatly exceeded that of the fighting-men. But the estimate can not be accepted, because so enormous a multitude, while on the march, could not possibly have obtained sufficient food to enable them to subsist. Without doubt, however, this was by far the largest army ever collected. Such is the unanimous testimony of all our authorities, and the conclusion is enforced by the vast extent of the Persian empire, and the many years spent in energetic preparation for the expedition.

Before the departure of the army from Doriskus, Xerxes embarked on a Sidonian ship, on the deck of which a golden tent had been spread, and reviewed the fleet as it sailed past him. Then, having divided the army into three parts, he caused them to march by as many different routes through Thrace and Macedonia, as far as the range of Olympus, while the fleet skirted the coast in the same direction. On this march the Persians not only met with no opposition, but even obtained reënforcements from the tribes of Thrace, as well as from the Hellenic cities lying along the route, each of which was compelled to sustain the army for one day, and to provide for the entertainment of the royal court. The loss sustained by these cities was not confined solely to the food consumed by the troops, but included the gold and silver utensils that were placed on the table of the king, and invariably stolen by his subordinates. Not a few cities were ruined in consequence. The Thracians expended on this occasion the sum of four hundred talents. Megakreon of Abdera advised his fellow citizens to assemble in their temples and thank the gods that Xerxes was wont to take but one meal a day; for, had he also breakfasted, the Abderites would have been compelled either to abandon their city, or to drag out a miserable existence in abject poverty.

Condition of Affairs in Hellas.

While this torrent of invasion is about to swoop down on the land of Hellas, threatening to overwhelm in its apparently irresistible course the whole Hellenic nation, let us direct our glance south of the mountain-chain of Olympus, which the Persians have already reached, and observe what preparations have been made to meet it.

Of the condition of affairs in Greece immediately after the battle of Marathon and the retreat of the armament of Darius, our knowledge is limited and indefinite. Kleomenes of Sparta was no longer among the living. The Æginetans, who had been compelled by him to cease their hostilities against Athens, and to give hostages to the Athenians as a pledge of peace, took advantage of his death to persuade the Spartans to demand from Athens the restoration of those hostages. The Athenians declining to comply with this demand, the Æginetans began hostilities afresh. This war, though greatly to be deprecated as an exhausting and fratricidal contest between two flourishing Grecian states, ultimately produced one good result for Greece, in that it compelled the Athenians to increase their naval force, and thus, by making Athens a leading maritime power, paved the way for the victory at Salamis, and indirectly saved Greece from becoming a satrapy of Persia.

At Athens the principal actors in the political field were Aristides and Themistokles, the former of whom was chosen chief archon for the year succeeding the battle of Marathon, 489 B. C., and was now more highly honored than ever, on account of his personal and official integrity, his faithfulness in the performance of public duty, and his services in the field. Nevertheless; he was not without personal enemies, for the very uprightness of his conduct as a public man could not fail to give offense to those whose dishonest schemes were thereby thwarted. Such men naturally ranged them-

selves on the side of Themistokles in the great political strife that arose between the rival statesmen. The cause of this enmity lay not solely in the personal ambition of the respective leaders, but also, and in a still greater degree, in their antagonistic views concerning the true method of developing the power and resources of the state.

Themistokles believed it absolutely essential to the safety and well-being of Athens that her citizens should devote their energies to building up a substantial naval force, and made use of every opportunity to urge upon them this policy. On the other hand, the more conservative Aristeides deprecated such a course, and maintained that it was the manifest interest of the commonwealth to bend its efforts toward becoming powerful on land in preference to seeking the dominion of the sea. The event proved that Aristeides was wrong. He was one of those who thought that the battle of Marathon had for ever settled the conflict between Greeks and Persians, while the unerring eye of Themistokles discerned a far greater struggle in the future. He foresaw that Greece would be exposed to another barbarian invasion, more dangerous than the one she had escaped, and that the only way of meeting it with any hope of success was to prepare a powerful fleet. In this branch of service the Persians were weakest ; and it had been demonstrated in the Ionian insurrection that a Grecian fleet was more than a match for double its number of Persian war-vessels. The genius of Themistokles foresaw to a certain extent the needs of the future ; but the less astute, less comprehensive, and less daring mind of Aristeides refused to accept the calculations of his rival. He considered them founded more on fancy than on facts, and insisted all the more strongly on his own policy, alleging that the equipment and maintenance of a large sea force would inevitably produce in the customs and habits of the Athenians a change at variance with their former mode of life and the natural law of their development. This strife between Themistokles and

Aristeides lasted more than four years, and finally became so violent that Aristeides is reported to have remarked one day, "The affairs of the Athenians can never prosper until they throw either me or Themistokles into the barathron." Their rivalry at last waxed so hot that it became necessary to proceed to a vote of ostracism, by means of which each of them hoped to effect the banishment of the other. The sentence of ostracism fell on Aristeides, and Themistokles, relieved from opposition, began energetically to carry out his plans.

By this time the din of the Persian preparations had reached the ears of the Athenians, and the wisdom of the policy on which Themistokles had so long strenuously insisted was now fully vindicated in the minds of his countrymen. The time was manifestly short. Owing to the delays of Xerxes, several years elapsed before the storm finally burst upon Athens ; but time was not the only required element in the building of a navy. There was in the public treasury of Athens a large amount of money, the proceeds of the silver-mines of Laurium, which were the property of the state. The revenue arising from these mines had always been divided among the citizens. Themistokles now persuaded the Athenians to renounce their right to such a division, and caused them to apply the money to the development of their naval force, to construct as many war-ships as possible, and to transfer the navy-yard from Phalerum to the much safer and more defensible Peiræus. In this way he provided for the construction of two hundred triremes.

Such was the state of affairs when, in 481 B. C., the heralds of Xerxes arrived in Greece to demand from the various cities earth and water. As has already been stated, no heralds were sent either to Sparta or to Athens. These two cities, regarding the war as directed specially against them, hastened to consult the oracle at Delphi, and at the same time summoned a Panhellenic council at the isthmus of Corinth, for the purpose of agreeing on some general plan

of resistance to the coming invasion. This council first directed its endeavors toward putting an end to the broils still subsisting between various Hellenic cities, and especially to the bloody war raging between Athens and Ægina. The latter state promptly accepted the terms of reconciliation thus proposed, and thereby freed herself from all further suspicion of favoring the Medes. Messengers were also sent to those Grecian cities that were supposed to be inclined to take sides with the enemy, or to be indifferent to the issue of the contest ; especially to Argos and Korkyra, and to the Greeks of Krete and Sicily.

Spies were at once dispatched to Sardis to observe and report upon the preparations and the probable plans of the Persians. These spies were detected, and were on the point of being put to death, when Xerxes ordered their release, believing that if they returned to Greece and reported how vast was the Persian armament, their countrymen would become aware of the futility of resistance. But to resist, the Greeks were fully determined ; and yet the prevailing terror throughout the land was great, as is evinced by the response of the Delphic oracle to the Athenians. When the Athenians sent to Delphi for advice, scarcely had the messengers taken their seats inside the temple when the priestess, suddenly inspired by the divine frenzy, abruptly addressed them :

“O unhappy ones, why sit you here ? Leave your homes, and the lofty crags crowned by your city, and flee to the ends of the earth ! Everything is already lost ; for Ares is coming in his Scythian chariot to work your ruin. Nor will *you alone* be the sufferers. Many walls will be leveled with the ground, and many shrines of the gods will be overwhelmed with fire. Away ! and sink your souls in sorrow at the misfortunes in store !”

The messengers withdrew from the temple in astonishment and confusion. Not daring to return to Athens with

such an answer, they soon reëntered as suppliants, bearing olive-branches in their hands, and declared that they would not leave the sanctuary until the god should vouchsafe them a more propitious reply ; whereupon the priestess again addressed them as follows :

“Athene can not appease the Olympian Zeus, though she prays to him with many words and much wisdom. This only can I assure you : When the foe shall have taken all that the land of Kekrops holds within it, Zeus grants to the prayers of Athene that the **WOODEN WALLS** shall be your safeguard. Await not the tramp of man and horse, but turn your backs to the foe and retire. Some other day you shall meet them in battle. O divine Salamis ! thou too shalt destroy the children of women, either at the seed-time or at the harvest.”

This second reply, though less discouraging than the first, was much more difficult to interpret. When it was brought to Athens the citizens were sorely puzzled, especially by the phrase “wooden walls,” on which evidently hinged the correct interpretation of the whole. The opinion finally prevailed that the words in question had reference to the fleet. But the general impression was that there could be no hope of safety, even on board their ships, unless they should abandon their country for ever, and seek another home on some distant coast ; for the concluding words of the prophecy seemed to indicate that, if they risked a naval battle off their own shores, they would suffer defeat and destruction at Salamis. Had the Athenians acted in accordance with this impression and abandoned their country, Xerxes would have been successful, and Greece would have become a Persian province. But, just at this critical moment, Themistokles came forward and suggested to his despairing countrymen that if the god had wished to convey the idea that the Greeks were to suffer a calamity at Salamis, he would not have applied to that island the term divine ; and that the latter part

of the prediction therefore referred to the enemies of Greece who were doomed to perish there. This view found favor in the eyes of the people, who determined to embark on their ships and boldly give battle to the barbarians.

About the same time representatives from all those states that had decided not to submit to Xerxes assembled at the isthmus of Corinth to provide for the common defense. As soon as they came together, there seemed to be danger of dispute concerning the precedence, since it was necessary that some single state should be acknowledged as the hegemon or presiding leader of the confederacy. No one could deny that Sparta was the most powerful by land ; but, on the other hand, while she could only show a naval force of fifteen war-vessels, Athens possessed a larger fleet than all the other states combined. It was therefore at first proposed that Sparta should have the leadership on land and Athens on the sea ; but when the Athenians saw that such an arrangement would be displeasing not only to Sparta, but to many others among the allies, they gave a signal proof of their Panhellenic patriotism by withdrawing their claims. This generous self-sacrifice was all the more memorable when contrasted with the lack of zeal displayed by some of the other states in the common cause. Argos refused to contribute any aid whatever, on the ground that her ancient dignity as the first of Grecian states forbade her to participate in any Panhellenic movement save as lord and leader of the rest. The Kretans likewise sent in a refusal, alleging that they had received a prohibitory response from the Delphic oracle. The Korkyræans promised aid, but neglected to furnish any ; and Gelon, the powerful monarch of Syracuse, haughtily declined to contribute any assistance whatever, unless he were appointed commander-in-chief of all the allied forces.

Although the great Thessalian family of the Aleuadæ threw their influence into the Persian scale, the greater portion of the Thessalian people showed a disposition to resist

the invaders ; wherefore a force of ten thousand hoplites was sent to their assistance, under the command of the Spartan Euænetus and the Athenian Themistokles, which in conjunction with the Thessalian cavalry took up a position in the vale of Tempe, between the ranges of Olympus and Ossa, the only available pass leading from Macedonia into Thessaly. But, having observed that the fleet of Xerxes could easily disembark an army in their rear, and at the same time learning that there was another pass farther to the west, leading through the craggy range of Olympus, they abandoned Tempe as an untenable position. The hoplites returned to the isthmus ; and the Thessalians, unable to defend themselves alone, recognized the authority of Xerxes, to whom they proved of great service in the course of the war.

By the time the great king had reached Macedonia, the heralds whom he had sent to Greece returned to meet him, bringing earth and water from all the states on the north of Kithæron except Thespiæ and Plataea. Notwithstanding this defection, the states that still remained steadfast did not lose courage. It was at once decided that another stand should be made against the invaders, both by land and by sea, the pass of Thermopylæ and the straits of Artemisium being selected as the most suitable points of defense. The latter (so named from a temple of Artemis that crowned the northernmost headland of Eubœa) was at the northern entrance of the long and narrow channel called the Euripus, flowing between that island and the mainland. Through this channel lay the nearest and safest route by sea from the Macedonian coast to Attica.

Thermopylæ, or the " Hot Gates " (so called from certain warm springs at or near the spot), was the name given to the narrow entrance from Thessaly into Lokris, the only road by which an invading army could conveniently penetrate into southern Greece. It consisted of two passes about half a mile apart, with a wider space intervening, and was formed

by the precipitous approach of Mount Ceta to the impassable morasses that lined the Ægean coast. At both passes the space between the rugged slope of Mount Ceta and the edge of the morass was so narrow as barely to leave room for a single wagon-track ; and across the pass on the Thessalian side were the remnants of a wall that had in former times been constructed by the Phokians for the purpose of defending themselves against their aggressive Thessalian neighbors.* This wall the Greeks at once set about repairing, with a view to making a desperate stand at Thermopylæ, which was a much more defensible position than Tempe, since the presence of the Grecian fleet at the straits of Artemisium would effectually prevent the Persians from landing a force in the rear of the defenders.

CHAPTER V.

THERMOPYLÆ AND ARTEMISIUM.

The Hellenic Forces.

It was now about the end of June, and Xerxes in his progress through Macedonia had reached the head of the Thermaic Gulf, where stands the modern city of Salonica. The allied fleet, under command of the Spartan admiral Eurybiades, proceeded to Artemisium ; while King Leonidas, the younger brother and successor of the late Kleomenes, led to Thermopylæ a small force, which, far from representing the full strength of the allied Grecian states, seems sur-

* The physical features of Thermopylæ are at the present day very different from what they were in the time of Xerxes, by reason of the change in the coast-line, caused by the accumulation of soil brought down by the Spercheius and other adjacent rivers.

prisingly meager. It consisted of 300 Spartans, 500 hoplites from Tegea, 500 from Mantinea, 120 from the Arkadian Orchomenus, 1,000 from other cities of Arkadia, 400 Corinthians, 200 Phliasians, and 80 Mykenæans. Such was the slender array with which Leonidas left the Peloponnesus to oppose the enormous host of Xerxes. But as he marched through Bœotia, Phokis, and Lokris, he was joined by 1,000 Phokians, 700 Thespians, 500 Thebans, and the entire available force of the Opuntian Lokrians. The two last-mentioned states had already offered earth and water to the heralds of Xerxes; but, partly encouraged and partly overawed by the approach of Leonidas, they contributed their contingent to the defending army, now amounting to about 6,000 hoplites, and a somewhat larger number of light-armed soldiers, if we assume each hoplite to have been accompanied by one attendant, and each Spartan by several, as was the prevailing custom. In considering the component parts of this little army, we can not but wonder at the smallness of the Spartan contingent. But it must be remembered that this was merely an advanced guard, and that after the close of the Olympian and Karneian festivals, both of which were nigh at hand, the entire Spartan force expected to hasten to the scene of action.

Arriving at Thermopylæ, the Greeks took up their position in the pass, but learned that there was a footpath leading across the mountains through a craggy ravine, a short distance to the southwest of Thermopylæ, by means of which the enemy might throw a force into their rear. A council of war was held, in which the Peloponnesian commanders expressed themselves in favor of falling back to the isthmus of Corinth; but when Leonidas saw with what indignation the Phokians and Lokrians opposed this proposition, he decided to remain, and took the precaution of posting the Phokian troops at a favorable spot near the summit of the mountain-ridge, for the purpose of guarding the pathway.

At the same time he sent back messengers to the various Grecian cities, with earnest appeals for reënforcements.

The naval force that had assembled at the straits of Artemisium consisted of 271 triremes, of which 147 were from Athens, manned by Athenians, Chalkidians, and Platæans, 40 from Corinth, 20 from Megara, 18 from Ægina, and 12 from Sikyon; while the Lacedæmonians furnished 10, the Epidaurians 8, the Eretrians 7, the Træzenians 5, the Styreans of Eubœa 2, and the little island of Keos 2. Besides these, there were nine penteconters, or vessels of fifty oars each, furnished in part by the Keans and in part by the Opuntian Lokrians. The crew of this fleet comprised about 60,000 men, of whom 25,000 were Athenians. Themistokles commanded the Athenian and Adeimantus the Corinthian contingent, but the supreme command was vested in the Spartan Eurybiades, on account of the persistent refusal of the allies to serve under an Athenian admiral.

Preliminary Movements.

Shortly after their arrival at Artemisium, three ships were sent forward to watch the movements of the Persian fleet as it came working its way southward along the Thesalian coast. The Persians also had sent in advance ten of their swiftest vessels, to observe the position of the Greeks; and these two detachments unexpectedly hove in sight of each other near the island of Skiathus. The Grecian commanders, thinking that the whole Persian fleet was close upon them, put their vessels about and attempted to escape, the Persians giving chase. One of the Grecian ships, an Athenian, ran ashore near the mouth of the river Peneius, and was destroyed, the crew escaping by land. The other two, an Æginetan and a Træzenian, were captured by the enemy after a desperate resistance.

That night the Grecian scouts that had been stationed on the heights of Skiathus endeavored, by means of fire-signals,

to convey the intelligence of what had taken place to their countrymen at Artemisium; the effect of which was to throw the Grecian commanders into such a panic, that they withdrew with their fleet farther into the Euripus, and halted opposite Chalkis, where the channel was much narrower and therefore more defensible. By this movement, however, they left the way open to the Persians for disembarking an army in the rear of the defenders of Thermopylæ. This position would therefore have become untenable had not a terrible hurricane overtaken the Persian fleet off the craggy coast of Magnesia. The storm lasted three days, causing the destruction of four hundred war-vessels, and a much greater number of transport-ships. The Greeks at Chalkis, informed of this disaster by their lookouts on the mountains of Eubœa, immediately recovered courage and returned to Artemisium. Immediately after their arrival there, fifteen Persian vessels, which had strayed from the rest, mistaking the Grecian fleet for a portion of their own, unsuspectingly approached and were captured.

The Battle of Thermopylæ.

Meanwhile Xerxes had pitched his camp not far from Thermopylæ, and remained there four whole days without taking any measures to dislodge the defenders from their position. His intense anxiety in regard to the fate of his fleet was doubtless the cause of this inaction. So soon as he was assured that the greater number of his vessels had escaped the hurricane, he began the assault by sending forward a large detachment of Medes, with orders to take the Greeks alive and bring them into his presence. They bravely advanced to the attack, but soon found themselves over-matched in a hand-to-hand fight, their short spears, wicker shields, and light tunics proving of little avail against the long pikes and heavy defensive armor of the hoplites. Nevertheless, they fought valiantly and fell in great numbers,

others continually advancing to take the place of the slain. In this manner the contest was kept up throughout the whole day, until at last Xerxes, convinced of the inability of the Medes either to force the pass or to capture its defenders, recalled them, and ordered the 10,000 "Immortals" to undertake the task. Led by their commander Hydarnes, they pressed forward to the fray, and fought as valorously as the Medes had done before them, but with no better success. Multitudes were slain, while of the Greeks very few had thus far fallen. Xerxes, who witnessed the struggle from a distant eminence, is said to have thrice leaped from his throne in terror at the repeated repulses thus suffered by the flower of his army.

At last the "Immortals" too were obliged to retire from the contest, which was renewed the next day by fresh Persian troops. The main hope of the invaders now was that the Greeks, being so few in number, would finally become exhausted by incessant fighting and fatigue; but as a pass so narrow could readily be defended by a very small band, Leonidas had taken the precaution to divide his force into a number of detachments, which took part in the contest by turns, and thereby preserved their energies fresh. Hence the efforts of the Persians during the second day of the battle were as futile as they had been the day before.

Just before nightfall Ephialtes, a Malian, and certain others familiar with the country, hoping for a rich reward, conveyed to Xerxes information of the pathway leading across the mountain. The great king, overjoyed at being thus delivered from his perplexity, forthwith dispatched Hydarnes and the 10,000 "Immortals" by that route, that they might fall upon the rear of the Greeks at Thermopylæ, and thus hem them in. Ephialtes guided them along the ravine, through which the stream of the Asopus descends from its mountain source, and thence up the steep declivity of Mount Ceta, at the summit of which they arrived at day-

break and found themselves face to face with the party of Phokians, 1,000 in number, on guard there. Both parties were equally surprised at the encounter. Hydarnes in alarm inquired of Ephialtes whether these men also were Lacedæmonians, and, being informed of the contrary, boldly led his forces on to the attack. The Phokians fought bravely, but, overpowered by numbers, at length fell back to a more advantageous position near the crest of the mountain, where they prepared to sell their lives as dearly as possible, fully expecting that the Persians would renew the attack.

Then became manifest the grave error the Grecian allies had committed in not sending their entire force to Thermopylæ; for had the pass and the mountain pathway both been guarded by sufficient numbers, the Persians must inevitably have been baffled in their efforts to penetrate farther into Greece. As it was, Hydarnes, without losing time in the pursuit of the Phokians, led his forces down the mountain on the other side, and before noon reached the plains below. The Greeks had received information of the danger that threatened them, and Leonidas, hastily calling a council of war, ordered the allies to return home in all haste, and to reserve their strength for the future defense of Hellas, since there was now no advantage to be gained by tarrying longer at Thermopylæ. At the same time he expressed his own determination to remain where he was, with his three hundred Spartans, and to court death at the hands of the foe. This resolution was based on an oracular response which the Spartans had received at the beginning of the war from Delphi, to the effect that either Sparta or one of her kings must fall in the struggle. All the allies obeyed the injunction of Leonidas save the Thespians and the Thebans, the former of whom voluntarily decided to remain and share the fate of the Spartans, while the latter were detained by Leonidas as hostages, since the loyalty of Thebes to the Hellenic cause was regarded as doubtful.

After the allies had taken their departure, Leonidas, who had hitherto kept within the wall and contented himself with repulsing the enemy's assaults, led his forces from the pass, and fell with the energy of despair upon the advancing columns of the Persians. The slaughter was terrible. The barbarians fell by hundreds, many of them slain outright, and many more trampled to death by their own comrades, who were driven forward to the fight under the lash of their officers (for such seems to have been the Persian custom); others were driven into the sea by the impetuous charges of the Greeks, who fought with furious valor until their spears were shattered, and then continued the contest with their swords. Leonidas at last fell, and with him many other Spartans, while among the great multitude of Persians that were slain were two half-brothers of Xerxes. Then ensued a desperate struggle between the Persians and the Greeks for the possession of the body of Leonidas, which the latter finally bore away with them into the pass.

About this time the Persians under Hydarnes, who had found their way across the mountain, came marching into the defile at the other extremity, and the Thebans who had been detained by Leonidas as hostages embraced this opportunity of surrendering. Their lives were spared, but by command of Xerxes their bodies were afterward branded with marks as royal slaves. The remnant of the Greeks retired to a small hillock, closed their ranks, and, attacked on both sides, continued to fight desperately until they were overwhelmed with missiles and slain to a man.

Thus perished the three hundred Spartans and the seven hundred Thespians, the immortal heroes of Thermopylæ—an instance of self-devotion that has been the admiration of all succeeding ages. Next to King Leonidas, the Spartan Dienekes acquired the greatest honor in the fight. Before the beginning of the action some one remarked in his presence that the numbers of the Persians were so vast that the sun

would be darkened by the multitude of their arrows. "All the better," replied the intrepid Dienekes; "we shall fight in the shade."

The names of the three hundred Spartans were for many centuries preserved on a memorial column in their native city. Of the entire band there was but one that returned alive to Sparta. His name was Aristodemus. Shortly before the battle, he and a comrade, Eurytus, having been taken sick, were ordered by Leonidas to leave the camp and retire to Alpeni until they should recover. Eurytus, as soon as he learned that the battle had begun, rose from his couch, put on his armor, bade his attendant Helot to assist him to the field of action, and, plunging into the midst of the fight, was slain. Aristodemus remained at Alpeni until he recovered, and then returned to Sparta only to find himself an object of scorn. He afterward atoned for his conduct by his desperate valor and heroic death at the battle of Plataea. The traitor Ephialtes, who had guided the Persians across the mountains, was universally execrated; a price was set upon his head by the Amphiktyonic Council, and some time afterward he was slain in a personal quarrel.

Battle of Artemisium.

Meanwhile many of the commanders in the Hellenic fleet at Artemisium, on learning that the greater part of the Persian naval force had escaped the effects of the storm, had again become somewhat discouraged, and began to entertain serious thoughts of withdrawing from their present position and returning to the isthmus of Corinth. Themistokles stoutly opposed this project, and resolved at all events to retain the Athenian vessels at Artemisium. Hence he wrote to Athens for a reënfacement, which arrived two days later, and swelled the Athenian contingent to wellnigh two hundred ships. When the inhabitants of Eubœa heard that there was a probability of the fleet leaving their waters, they

sent messengers to Eurybiades, beseeching him to tarry a few days longer, to allow them time to remove their children and slaves to some safe place. Finding him unwilling to listen to them, they went to Themistokles and secretly presented him with the sum of thirty talents, in consideration of which he promised that he would manage to detain the fleet at Artemisium until it should have fought at least one battle in defense of Eubœa. Of this sum Themistokles gave five talents to Eurybiades and three to Adeimantus, the Corinthian admiral, both of whom, thinking that the money came either from the private purse of Themistokles or else from the Athenian treasury, received it gladly and consented to remain where they were.

The hostile fleet having arrived at the promontory of Aphetæ, about seven miles above Artemisium, the Persian admiral, Megabates, fearing that the Greeks would endeavor to escape at his approach, dispatched a squadron of two hundred vessels with orders to sail around the island of Eubœa on the outside and close up the other end of the Euripus, while he advanced directly against them with the remainder of his force. The Greeks, having received information of this scheme from a deserter, resolved at once to sail boldly out against the Persians, and test their strength in an open engagement.

When the Persians saw the Greeks bearing down upon them with their meager fleet, they thought them insane, and felt confident of an easy victory. But, just as they were about to come to action, the Greeks at a given signal dexterously arranged their vessels in the form of a compact semicircle by bringing their sterns close together, and presenting their prows to the foe, whose evident intention it was to surround them. At a second signal the Grecian rowers exerted their full strength, so that every vessel made a sudden dash forward and vigorously attacked the Persians, who found it no easy matter to capture or to destroy the fleet which

they had but lately so despised. In the action the Greeks captured thirty of the enemy's vessels, and at the approach of night both parties retired to their former positions—the Greeks to Artemisium and the Persians to Aphetæ.

These events took place on the first day of the battle at Thermopylæ. In the course of the following night the two hundred Persian vessels that had been dispatched to sail around Eubœa, in order to cut off the retreat of the Grecian fleet, were overtaken by a storm and completely wrecked ; and the next morning a reënforcement of fifty-three triremes arrived at Artemisium from Athens, in response to the appeal which Themistokles had sent thither a day or two before. These two circumstances so encouraged the Greeks that they at once sailed out against the foe, sunk a number of Kilikian vessels, and on the approach of darkness returned to Artemisium.

On the following day, which was the third of the action at Thermopylæ, the Persian commanders, fearing that Xerxes would be displeased with them for allowing so small a number of hostile vessels to baffle them, set sail from Aphetæ and bore down upon the Greeks with their fleet arranged in the form of a crescent. The latter remained in position and awaited the attack. The engagement lasted for the remainder of the day, and ceased at nightfall without decisive result. On the side of the invaders the Egyptians bore the chief brunt of the battle, and captured five Grecian ships ; while among the allies the Athenians distinguished themselves above all the rest. Special praise for bravery was awarded to Kleinias, a wealthy citizen, who commanded a trireme which he had fitted out at his own expense.

After the combatants had retired to their respective positions, a small Athenian galley, which had been stationed off the coast near Thermopylæ, came back to Artemisium with the tidings that Leonidas and his comrades were all slain, and that the pass was in the possession of Xerxes. The

Grecian commanders, aware that they could accomplish nothing by remaining longer at the straits, therefore drew back through the Euripus to the coast of Attica, rounded the promontory of Sunium, and cast anchor off the island of Salamis. Before leaving Eubœa, Themistokles, for the purpose of enticing the Ionian Greeks to desert from the fleet of Xerxes, caused to be engraved on the rocks along that coast, at different places, the words: "Men of Ionia, why do you assist the barbarians to enslave Greece? Join us if you can; or, if you can not, stand aloof from the contest, and afford our foes as little help as possible." These inscriptions, engraved in such conspicuous places, could not fail to attract the notice of the mariners of the hostile fleet as they sailed along. The object of Themistokles was not merely to foment disaffection among the Ionian followers of Xerxes, but likewise to draw upon them the suspicions of the great king, either of which contingencies would seriously mar their usefulness in the Persian armada.

The next day at sunrise the invaders, informed of the departure of the Greeks, sailed down to the straits, and took their stand at Histiaæa, a small city of northern Eubœa. While there, a message came from King Xerxes that all who so desired were at liberty to quit their posts and come over to Thermopylæ, to behold with their own eyes the fate of the rash men who had dared to oppose his armies. Vast multitudes availed themselves of this permission, and the remainder of that day was devoted to an inspection of the field of battle, on which were heaped the corpses not only of the Spartans and Thespians, but also of a number of Helots, who had taken part in the action as attendants on their Spartan masters, so that the entire number of slain on the side of the Greeks was about four thousand. The Persian mariners viewed these bodies with mingled interest and awe, supposing them all to be either Spartans or Thespians; while of the invaders only about a thousand appeared to have

fallen, Xerxes having ordered the remainder of the slain, fully twenty thousand in number, to be hastily buried in order to conceal his actual loss. Few, however, were deceived by this device.

After these battles, Xerxes advanced southward at the head of his land forces, while his fleet continued its course along the coast in the wake of the retiring Grecian ships.

CHAPTER VI.

SALAMIS.

Abandonment of Athens.

ON receiving news of the disaster at Thermopylæ, the Spartans awoke from their lethargy, and sent forth all the forces they could muster, under the command of King Kleombrotus, the brother of Leonidas. But it was now too late to make a stand in Bœotia, as they had promised the Athenians they would do; so they halted at the isthmus of Corinth, and began hastily to fortify that neck of land in order to secure the defense of the Peloponnesus—a course which left the territories of Attica and Megara open to the advancing barbarians.

When the Grecian fleet reached Attica in its retreat from Artemisium, the Athenian ships cast anchor in front of their own harbor, while the remainder of the allies, following them more slowly, took their station near the isle of Salamis. Eurybiades was with difficulty persuaded to remain there a few days in order to give the Athenians time to move their families from the doomed city, in the streets of which no word of complaint was uttered in that trying hour. No murmur arose against Themistokles, although he had prom-

ised his fellow citizens that the Peloponnesian forces should make a stand for the defense of the Attic frontier ; still less was there a whisper breathed in favor of peace or surrender. The women and children were hastily transported to places of safety—some to Ægina, others to Salamis, but the greater number to Trœzen in the Peloponnesus.

At the same time an assembly of the people was convened, in which it was decreed that all those citizens who had been banished on political grounds should be recalled from exile. It was the especial object of this enactment to effect the restoration of the great and good Aristides, ostracized a few years before. Themistokles warmly favored the return of his old antagonist to their common country. All private enmity was laid aside in the face of the coming danger, insomuch that even Xanthippus, the accuser of Miltiades, and Kimon, the son of that renowned general, were seen walking arm in arm toward the Acropolis, to dedicate a bridle to Athene, the tutelar goddess of the city, as a token that not cavalry, but mariners, were now needed for the protection of the state.

Advance of the Persians.

A few days after the action at Thermopylæ King Xerxes began his march southward. As he advanced, the entire land of Bœotia and all the adjacent territories submitted to him, with the exception of Phokis, which the invaders laid waste with fire and sword. Most of the inhabitants, however, escaped by taking refuge among the crags of Mount Parnassus, or going still farther into the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians. One division of the Persian army was sent against Delphi for the purpose of seizing upon the costly treasures in the temple there ; but as the invaders approached the shrine, immense fragments of rock came rolling down the precipices of Mount Parnassus, crushing great numbers of the advancing troops beneath their weight. A violent thunderstorm that arose at the same time impressed the Greeks

with the belief that Apollo himself had miraculously intervened to protect his sacred precincts. The panic-stricken Persians fled in great confusion, and the Delphians and Phokians who had taken refuge on Mount Parnassus, issuing from their hiding-places, pursued them with great slaughter back into Bœotia.

Meanwhile the main body of the Persian army, advancing into Attica, overran the whole country, and occupied the city of Athens, which they found deserted, save by a small band of citizens who, instead of retiring to Salamis with the rest, had taken refuge in the temple of Athene on the Acropolis, and had fortified themselves there with a palisade of planks, thinking that they had thus interpreted the true meaning of the WOODEN WALLS referred to in the oracular response. Here they were vigorously besieged, and, notwithstanding their brave resistance, were soon captured and massacred, after which the temple was plundered and burned to the ground.

Well might King Xerxes now regard the object of his great expedition as almost accomplished. Only four months had elapsed since his departure from Sardis, and all Greece from Mount Olympus to the isthmus of Corinth was occupied by his armies, the Peloponnesus alone remaining unsubdued. The sea was also his from the Hellespont to Salamis. Moreover, he was in undisputed possession of the haughty city which had so long defied his royal house, assisted the insurgent Ionians, and defeated his father's forces at Marathon. Immediately after the capture of the Acropolis, he dispatched a messenger to Susa to carry the news of his achievements to his uncle Artabanus, whom he had left vicegerent of Persia during his absence. The Peisistratidæ, supposing they had at last gained that for which Hippias had during the greater part of his life vainly striven, mounted to the Acropolis and offered a sacrifice in honor of the restoration of their dynasty.

It was, however, much too soon for the Persians to sing their songs of triumph. Although Athens apparently lay prostrate at their feet, Sparta, which had offended their sovereign in an almost equal degree, had thus far escaped vengeance. To force the isthmus of Corinth bade fair to prove a harder and a bloodier task than Thermopylæ; and the mountainous and easily defensible Peloponnesus would be a more difficult country to overrun than the open land of Bœotia. Not only was a desperate struggle probable in that direction, but the Athenians themselves were still unsubdued. Xerxes had captured the mere empty shell of a living nation. Moored off the isle of Salamis lay the real Athens, resolutely prepared for the approaching struggle. Moreover, if the final conquest were delayed much longer, the invading army could not fail to be greatly embarrassed for means of subsistence. The immense stores of provisions they had brought with them were wellnigh exhausted; that portion of Greece of which they were in possession had been rendered desolate, and the winter season was approaching. Besides, the royal fleet was by no means so powerful as when it had started for the Hellespont. Two violent storms had materially diminished its numbers, and the conflict at Artemisium had, to say the least, borne witness to the superiority of the Grecian mariners over those of the great king. On the other hand, the naval force of the Greeks was now larger than before; for not only had the ships that were damaged in the battles at Artemisium been repaired, but a number of additional vessels from various cities had joined the armament at Salamis, so that the entire Grecian fleet now consisted of 350 ships, of which 200 belonged to the Athenians.

Debates at Salamis.

As soon as the Athenians had completed the removal of their families from the city, the commanders of the allies at Salamis held a council to consider the question where they

should give battle to the Persian fleet, which was now almost hourly expected to make its appearance. The Peloponnesian captains were of the opinion that it was no longer advisable to come to an engagement anywhere on the Attic coast, and that the most feasible plan would be to withdraw to some point nearer the isthmus, and there to make their final stand. They argued that, if beaten at Salamis, they would be entirely at the mercy of the foe ; while, on the other hand, if beaten at the isthmus, they could easily join in the land service. This measure was stoutly opposed by the Athenian, the Megarian, the Æginetan, and, in a word, all the non-Peloponnesian commanders, and no one spoke against it more vehemently than Themistokles. In the midst of the discussion the news arrived that the Persian army had entered Athens, and almost at the same moment the flames of the burning Acropolis began to light up the distant sky. Thereupon some of the commanders, seized with a sudden panic, left the council and hastened to prepare their vessels for departure ; and Eurybiades, seeing that the majority was in favor of retiring to the isthmus, gave his decision accordingly.

Themistokles, determined to leave no means untried to bring the admiral over to his views, visited him on board his galley that night, and represented that to abandon their position at Salamis would be equivalent to abandoning the Grecian cause ; that if they should retire to the isthmus, there would be a strong probability of the fleet breaking up entirely, and of each contingent returning to its own city, in which case it would be an easy matter for the Persians to conquer the whole country piece by piece.

By dint of such reasoning he induced Eurybiades to reconsider his decision, and forthwith to summon another council of the commanders. As soon as they were assembled, and before the admiral had time to announce for what purpose he had again called them together, Themistokles, in his impa-

tience to impress upon them his opinions, began to harangue them. Adeimantus, commander of the Corinthian contingent, and one of the strongest advocates of the plan of leaving Salamis, sarcastically observed, "Themistokles, those who start too soon at the games are scourged." "True," replied the great Athenian, courteously accepting the rebuke; "but those who tarry too long do not win the crown."

Eurybiades then stated that, since there had arisen in his mind some doubt whether the decision at which they had arrived that afternoon was really a wise one, he had called this second council to invite a further and more exhaustive discussion of the subject. Themistokles then resumed his discourse, and, addressing himself directly to Eurybiades, argued with great force that Salamis was a far better base of operations than the isthmus, because at the latter place they would be at the disadvantage of fighting in the open sea, where their comparatively small force could be more easily surrounded by the enemy's vessels, while at Salamis they would have the advantage of the narrow strait between that island and the Attic coast; that the Peloponnesus could be as well defended at Salamis as at the isthmus; and that to withdraw from their present position would be merely to postpone the decisive contest for a few days, and in the mean time to inflict further woes upon Hellas by leaving Megara and Ægina at the mercy of the invaders, and by abandoning the Athenian women and children, many of whom had been transported to Salamis for safety.

After Themistokles had thus spoken, Adeimantus the Corinthian, observing with chagrin that his words had made an impression, began to upbraid him as a man without a country—alluding to the fact that Athens was in the hands of the foe—and to deny that he had any right to speak in the council. At this Themistokles, waxing indignant, broke out in a torrent of reproaches against Adeimantus and the Corinthians, maintaining that the Athenians, although their

houses were burned and their temples leveled with the ground, had still a country ; in proof whereof he adduced the two hundred Athenian ships, all fully manned for battle, and constituting more than half the allied fleet. Then turning once more to Eurybiades, he addressed him even more warmly and earnestly than before, saying : " If you remain and fight bravely here, all will be well. If not, you will bring Greece to ruin ; for the whole fortune of the war depends on our ships. Be persuaded by my words, or otherwise we will take our families on board and sail away to Italy, where certain oracular prophecies declare that we are destined some day to found a colony. And then, when you no longer have us as allies, you will call to mind what I now say."

At this threat the Peloponnesian commanders began to be alarmed, and Eurybiades was induced to reverse his former decision ; for it was evident that without the Athenians the allied fleet would be no match for the enemy. It was therefore decided not to retire to the isthmus, but to remain and give battle at Salamis. Accordingly, the various commanders at once began to prepare for the fight. Shortly after dawn the immense fleet of the invaders hove in sight, making its way toward Phalerum, the harbor of Athens, and fairly hiding the neighboring coasts with its innumerable sails ; and at the same time Xerxes was seen marching his land forces down to the shore. At the sight of these prodigious armaments many of the Greeks were dismayed, and the Peloponnesians in particular were seriously alarmed, not so much on their own account as for their countrymen, who were prepared to defend the isthmus against the Persian army. They did not, however, venture to set at defiance the authority of Eurybiades, but vented their discontent by half-suppressed murmurs, until the feeling became so strongly pronounced that another council of war was held, at which the discussion waxed hot, and was pro-

longed far into the night. The Athenians, the Megarians, and the Æginetans were still in favor of remaining at Salamis ; but the Peloponnesians insisted on retiring to the isthmus.

Stratagem of Themistokles.

When Themistokles saw that the vote would be carried against him, he quietly withdrew from the council, and, calling to himself one of the most faithful of his household slaves, Sikinnus, a Persian by extraction and the tutor of his sons, ordered him to cross over to the mainland with all possible speed and secrecy, and inform King Xerxes that the Grecian fleet was about to desert Salamis in order to effect its escape to the coast of the Peloponnesus, and that Themistokles the Athenian commander, being secretly a well-wisher to the Persian cause, strongly advised him to prevent their flight by surrounding the island with his vessels, and compelling immediate battle.

This stratagem of Themistokles was thoroughly characteristic of the man, who, firmly convinced that the only chance of safety for all Greece lay in risking an engagement at Salamis, thus had recourse to a desperate and dangerous expedient in order to bring it about. Although the result of the battle was favorable to the Greeks and vindicated Themistokles as the savior of Greece, he was perfectly aware at the time that, had the fortune of war declared in favor of the Persians, this very device would have stamped him as a traitor.

Xerxes received the message of Themistokles with gladness, and forthwith ordered two hundred of his ships to sail around Salamis on the outside, and to block up the other end of the strait, thus imprisoning the Grecian fleet in the narrow channel between the island and the mainland. This movement was carried out with the greatest possible secrecy, and under cover of night, while the Grecian commanders were still assembled in council, and while the crews were

resting securely on board their vessels, the Peloponnesians fully expecting to receive orders to weigh anchor for the isthmus before dawn.

One of the first to observe the movement on the part of the enemy was Aristеides, who had not yet availed himself of the permission to return that had been extended to all the Athenian exiles. From the heights of the isle of *Ægina* he perceived about nightfall certain manœuvres on the part of the Persian fleet that led him to suspect what was about to take place. Hastily embarking in a small boat, he crossed over to Salamis at the risk of his life, barely escaping capture at the hands of the foe, through whose advancing vessels he threaded his way under cover of the darkness. Arriving safely at Salamis, he proceeded to the place where the council was being held, and sent in a message to his former rival Themistokles, to the effect that he desired to confer with him. When the Athenian commander came forth, Aristеides thus addressed him: "Our rivalry, O Themistokles, ought at all times, and especially at the present crisis, to be a struggle which of us shall be of the greater advantage to our common country. I have heard much of the desire of the Peloponnesians to depart from this place; but, however much the Corinthians, or Eurybiades himself, may wish to do so, it is now too late; for we are inclosed on all sides by the enemy! Go back, therefore, into the council, and make this thing known to the commanders."

Themistokles, greatly pleased to learn that his stratagem had been successful, told Aristеides what he had done, and requested the latter to go in and report to the council that they were surrounded by the foe—fearing that, if he should do so himself, he would not be believed. Accordingly, Aristеides entered the assembly and addressed the commanders, telling them that he had just arrived from *Ægina*, that they were hemmed in on all sides by the vessels of Xerxes, through which he had barely succeeded in stealing his way,

and that it now behooved them to bring their discussions to an end and prepare for battle. Having thus spoken, he withdrew from the council. The greater number of the officers would not believe the tidings, and it was not until a Tenian trireme deserted from the Persians, and brought full intelligence of what had taken place, that they saw fit to break up the council, and devote all their energies to preparation for the coming conflict.

The Battle of Salamis.

By dawn of day the Grecian fleet, fully prepared for action, was drawn up within the bay at the head of which lay the little city of Salamis (the modern village of Ampe-lakia) ; while the naval force of the Persians was extended in a long line from a point on the opposite coast of Attica to the promontory of Kynosura, which forms the eastern extremity of the island of Salamis. Eurybiades commanded the right wing of the Greeks—which was usually considered as the post of honor—with the contingents of Sparta, Corinth, Ægina, and Megara ; opposite, composing the left wing of the hostile armament, were stationed the Ionian and Karian subjects of Persia. In the Grecian center were drawn up the vessels of the smaller allied cities ; arrayed against them were the Pamphylians, the Lykians, the Kilikians, and the Kyprians. On the left wing were the Athenians ; and opposed to them were the Phœnicians and the Egyptians.

As to the size of the Persian fleet in this engagement, we are informed by Herodotus that both the land and naval forces of Xerxes, notwithstanding the severe losses he had sustained, were now, owing to the large reënforcements which he had received, fully equal to what they had been when he first set out from Asia. The number of Persian ships that took part in the action at Salamis is variously stated by different ancient authorities, none putting it lower than 1,000, and some as high as 1,300. Of the number of

the Grecian ships the most trustworthy estimates range from 300 to 350, the weight of authority being in favor of the smaller figure. The superiority of the Persian fleet was therefore enormous. Three hundred Grecian vessels, carrying a combined crew of some 70,000 men, were about to engage in conflict with over 1,000 Persian ships, with crews amounting to fully 250,000 men, to say nothing of the immense Persian land force drawn up on the shore in the rear of their fleet, while the Grecian mariners had no such land force to sustain them. The main body of the Grecian army still remained at the isthmus, while the entire fighting population of Attica was on board the fleet, save a mere handful of hoplites on the isle of Salamis under the command of Aristides.

For some time after sunrise the hostile armaments remained motionless, each side waiting for the other to advance and begin the contest—the Persians hoping to draw the Greeks out into the wider space at the entrance of the channel, and the Greeks wishing to entice the Persians into the narrow bay within which they had taken their stand. At last, Eurybiades gave the signal for the assault; the Greeks raised the pæan or war-song, and propelled their vessels forward. Before they had advanced far from the shore, the Persians, shouting loudly, rushed forward with equal fierceness to meet them; whereupon most of the Greeks, as if by a concerted movement, began to back water with their oars, in order to carry out their former scheme of drawing the Persians into the narrow harbor. In this they were partly successful; but as their vessels neared the bay, an Athenian galley commanded by Ameinias, a brother of the poet Æschylus, and also of Kynægeirus, who had met with such an heroic death at Marathon, began the attack in good earnest by darting forth from the Grecian line and engaging with one of the Phœnician ships. The two vessels became entangled, and a hand-to-hand conflict took place between

the crews. The other Athenian vessels pressed forward to the assistance of Ameinias. At the same time an Æginetan vessel on the right wing advanced beyond the line and began the engagement in that quarter; while Demokritus, the commander of the Naxian contingent, forced the contest in the center, and the action at once became general.

For some hours the combat was indecisive. The Persians fought much more bravely than at Artemisium; and their Ionian subjects, disregarding the advice Themistokles had endeavored to give them by means of his inscriptions on the rocks, caused much damage to the right wing of the Greeks. The Samians particularly distinguished themselves on the Persian side in this part of the action; and the Æginetans, with all their bravery and nautical skill, found it a hard task to cope with them. The truth of the matter was, that every man in the invading host was constrained to do his utmost, feeling that the eye of Xerxes was upon him; for the great king had seated himself on a throne at a convenient spot on the slope of Mount Ægaleos, on the Attic mainland, whence he could view everything that took place in the strait below.

Finally, the fortune of war began to declare itself in favor of the Greeks; and this was mainly owing to the exertions of Themistokles on the right wing. Causing the best of his ships to cluster around his own galley, the Athenian admiral made a bold dash against the superior force of Phœnician vessels that were endeavoring to surround him, and broke their lines, compelling some of the disabled ones to retreat shoreward and others to take refuge behind the Persian center, which, already hard pressed by the Grecian ships in front, was now thrown into some degree of confusion by this sudden retreat of the Phœnicians. But the Kyprian and Kilikian mariners who formed the main bulk of the hostile center, inspired with renewed courage by the exhortations of their commanders, bravely met the assault of

the Athenians, as the latter, following the example of the daring Themistokles, hurled themselves against their flank. The battle raged with much fury until at last the death of Syenesis, the admiral of the Kilikians, became the signal for a hopeless panic on the part of all those under his command. Then the Persian center also gave way ; so that, of all the hostile armament, the Ionians and the Karians alone still stood their ground, obstinately fighting against the Ægineans and other Dorians on the Grecian right. Everywhere else the ships of the Persians were retreating in desperate haste, some toward the Attic coast, others toward the open sea in the direction of Peiræus, clashing against one another in almost inextricable confusion.

The Athenians, elated by their double success in breaking both the right wing and the center of the invading armada, turned their prows toward the now exposed flank of the Ionians. Themistokles ordered his trireme to be steered directly at the vessel of Ariabignes, brother of Xerxes and admiral of the Ionians and Karians ; but the vessel of Ameinias the Athenian, who had so honorably distinguished himself at the beginning of the action, shot ahead of that of Themistokles and bore down upon the ship of the Persian admiral, which was very tall and bulky, and from the deck of which the Persian archers incessantly shot a shower of arrows, as if from the ramparts of a castle. As the two vessels came together, Ariabignes ordered his men to board the Athenian trireme and capture her by a hand-to-hand fight, and was himself the first to leap down upon her deck. A desperate struggle ensued, in which Ameinias and his followers repulsed the boarders. Ariabignes, in the midst of the tumult, fell into the sea between the two ships and was drowned. Shortly afterward his vessel, which had been greatly injured by the collision, sank. As his body lay floating in the water, among innumerable other corpses, it was recognized by Artemisia, queen of Halikarnassus, who hap-

pened to be sailing past in her war-galley, and was rescued by her and sent ashore to Xerxes.

Not only did this Artemisia command five triremes in the Persian service, but such was her wisdom that she acted as one of the counselors of the great king. The Athenians, indignant that a woman should presume to bear arms against them, had offered a reward of ten thousand drachmæ to whomsoever should take her alive. She had, however, taken part in the thickest of the battle and performed many astonishing feats of valor with the ships under her command; and now, when after the fall of Ariabignes the rout of the Persians became general, and she found her galley closely pursued by an Athenian trireme and on the point of being overtaken, she again manifested her characteristic energy and decision of character by turning suddenly aside and running down and sinking one of the Persian vessels that happened to be near. The commander of the Athenian trireme, supposing her ship to be an Ionian that had deserted from the Persian side, desisted from the pursuit, and Artemisia by means of this unscrupulous stratagem effected her escape. King Xerxes, who from his lofty station had beheld this transaction in the distance, thought that the vessel she had sunk was one of the enemy, and is said to have exclaimed with vexation, "My men have behaved like women, and my women like men!"

In the midst of the confusion of the retreat, Aristeides, who still remained on the island of Salamis in charge of the few Athenian hoplites that had been stationed there, performed a signal service to the Grecian cause, by crossing over to the neighboring isle of Psyttaleia at the head of this band, and engaging in combat with the Persian troops occupying it, all of whom were slain after a desperate conflict.

Meanwhile the defeated naval force of the Persians did not escape without suffering much more damage at the hands of the victors. While the Athenians caused great havoc

among the ships that remained in the strait seeking to take refuge along the Attic coast, the Dorian allies, especially the Æginetans, took their stand at the mouth of the channel and intercepted many of those that attempted to sail away in the direction of Phalerum. By nightfall the victory of the Greeks was complete ; and a bright full moon lighted up the whole expanse of the strait of Salamis, now thickly strewn with corpses, wrecks, and floating fragments. The Greeks had lost forty ships. Of the Persian vessels, two hundred had been sunk, and many more captured with all their crews.

Nevertheless, the danger was not yet over. The Persian fleet, notwithstanding its losses and its apparently disastrous defeat, was still much larger than that of the Greeks, while the land forces of Xerxes were as strong as ever. It was evident that many a blow was yet to be struck, ere the soil of Hellas would be free from the barbarian invader.

CHAPTER VII.

RESULTS OF THE BATTLE.

Retreat of Xerxes.

THE cowardice of Xerxes was destined to accomplish what the daring and dexterity of the Greeks had begun. Immediately after the battle great fear fell upon him lest the Hellenic forces should sail at once to the Hellespont, break down his bridges, and cut off his retreat into Asia. In order, however, to keep up an appearance of courage and determination, he began the construction of a vast mole or dike which should unite the mainland with the island of Salamis, and serve as a passageway for his army. At the same time he collected and repaired his scattered and dam-

aged vessels, as if intent on another naval battle. But Mardonius, the brother-in-law of the great king, and the chief instigator of the invasion, suspecting that Xerxes had already resolved to return to Persia, endeavored to strengthen him in that purpose by promising that he would himself effect the conquest of Hellas, provided three hundred thousand of the best troops were left under his command. Xerxes, gladly hearkening to this proposal, bade Mardonius choose whatever forces he desired, and determined to return to Asia with the remainder. Moreover, that very night he issued orders to the captains of the vessels composing his fleet that they should forthwith sail away to the Hellespont, and keep guard over the bridges there until his arrival.

The next day the Greeks, supposing that the Persian fleet was still at Phalerum, put themselves into a condition of defense, expecting an attack at any moment. But when they learned that the Persian ships had all departed, they left at Salamis a detachment under the command of Aristeides to keep guard over the booty, and promptly set off in pursuit. Proceeding as far as the island of Andros, they halted and held a council of war. Themistokles and the rest of the Athenians were strongly in favor of following up the chase with all possible speed, so as to arrive at the Hellespont before the Persians and destroy the bridges. Eurybiades and the Peloponnesians opposed this, on the ground that it would not be wise to reduce the great king to despair by imprisoning him and his army in Europe. Themistokles, perceiving that he would not be able to carry the point, changed his plan, and had recourse to an expedient not less hazardous than that whereby he had compelled his countrymen to engage the enemy at Salamis. Summoning into his presence his slave Sikinnus, who had so faithfully carried out his instructions on the former occasion, he bade him go again to Xerxes and deliver to him the following message: "The Greeks since their victory at Salamis have formed a resolution,

O king, to sail to the Hellespont and destroy the bridges. Themistokles the Athenian, who has always been the king's friend, hastens to give this information, and advises the king to return to Asia at once, while Themistokles endeavors, under various pretenses of delay, to hinder the Greeks from pursuing him, and to dissuade them from their purpose."

Here again did Themistokles commit one of those acts which, by their "double meaning," cast a blot upon the incomparable splendor of his genius. Why did he do this? If he thought that Xerxes was really desirous to depart, the sending of such a message was unnecessary. If, on the other hand, the king were otherwise disposed, such a message would rather encourage him to remain. Herodotus is no doubt right in asserting that Themistokles acted thus in a spirit of far-sighted policy—a view of the case that will be rendered more plausible by subsequent events.

A few days after the battle of Salamis the Persian army withdrew from Attica, and ere long King Xerxes departed from Greece, taking with him all his forces with the exception of the three hundred thousand chosen warriors whom he left in Bœotia under the command of Mardonius. He could perhaps boast of having accomplished a portion of his purpose in invading Hellas; for he had captured and destroyed the haughty city that had been the first to defy his father's vengeance, and as trophies of his success he carried away from Athens various works of art, among others a beautiful statue of Aphrodite and the bronze images of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. Notwithstanding this material success, the fact that the sons of Hippias returned with him to Persia proclaimed in eloquent tones that the Athenians were still unsubdued.

Mardonius was himself permitted to select the troops that were to remain and assist him in the conquest of Greece. He accordingly made careful choice from among the Medes, Persians, Baktrians, Sakæ, and the other most warlike and

valiant tributary nations of Persia. But as it was now about the end of September, and therefore too late in the season to begin another active campaign, it was decided that sixty thousand of this force should be sent, under the command of Artabazus, to escort King Xerxes as far as the Hellespont, and that they should return to Bœotia in time to engage in the campaign of the ensuing spring.

The retreat of the king through Thessaly, Macedonia, and Thrace was long and disastrous. Forty-five days elapsed after his departure from Attica before he reached the Hellespont. As no stores of provisions had been prepared for this sudden emergency, his immense host suffered terrible hardships during the march. Xerxes, finding them unable to make the journey as expeditiously as he desired, pressed forward with a small retinue and hastened to the Hellespont; but on arriving there, and finding that his bridge of boats had been broken up by a violent storm, he was obliged to cross over to Asia in a small fishing-boat. Under such humiliating and inglorious circumstances did the great king, the ruler of half the continent of Asia, return from the expedition he had so pompously undertaken eight months before.

Siege of Andros.

Meanwhile the Grecian fleet, after advancing as far as Andros, instead of following up the retreating Persians, proceeded to take vengeance on those Ægean islands that had furnished aid to the invaders. Their first step in this direction was to demand a contribution of money from the inhabitants of Andros. On the refusal of the latter to pay, they attempted to force them. It was then that Themistokles again displayed his incorrigible spirit of avarice. While the allied fleet was engaged in the siege of Andros, he sent private messengers of his own around to the neighboring islands, threatening them with the vengeance of the allies unless they should appease him by gifts of money. In this

way he collected for his own use vast sums from Paros, Karystus, and other islands ; while the remaining commanders, discouraged by the stubborn resistance of Andros, raised the siege and returned to Salamis with empty hands, but not without stopping on their way thither to plunder the island of Karystus, whose previous bribe to Themistokles did not save them from this misfortune.

Honors conferred on the Victors.

Although both the Thespians and the Helots had bravely borne their part in the fight at Thermopylæ, it was not to be denied that that heroic action was mainly due to the self-devotion of the three hundred Spartans and of their king Leonidas. As a memorial of their heroism, this inscription was set up : "O stranger, inform the Lacedæmonians that here we are lying in obedience to their laws." Moreover, on a prominent part of the battle-ground there was erected a marble lion in honor of Leonidas.

A large portion of the spoils taken at Salamis was set aside as an offering to the shrine at Delphi, and from the proceeds was constructed a colossal statue twelve cubits in height, holding in its hand the prow of a vessel. Besides this, the Æginetans offered on their own account a bronze mast surmounted by three golden stars. After the distribution of the remainder of the booty, the entire Grecian fleet accompanied the Athenians to the isthmus of Corinth, in order to dedicate in the temple of Poseidon at that place one of the three Phœnician vessels first captured, and also to award the proper honors to those states and individuals that had most distinguished themselves in the late action by their wisdom, bravery, or skill.

Among the various cities, Ægina bore away the palm for bravery, and next to her came Athens. But as to the prize of wisdom and dexterity no decision was arrived at, and the result of the vote was peculiar ; for each commander in cast-

ing his vote inscribed his own name in the first place, and that of Themistokles in the second. Yet not only was the first prize withheld from the great Athenian statesman, but even the second was denied him. This singular and somewhat ludicrous incident will serve to illustrate one of the chief defects of the Hellenic character—the petty jealousy subsisting between the different states, and likewise between prominent individuals, to such a degree that every commander seriously considered himself as the savior of Greece, and was reluctant to recognize the superiority of another's services, however manifest to an unprejudiced mind.

It must not, however, be supposed that these very men were incapable of honoring their national benefactors. Had they been altogether swayed by so ignoble a spirit of envy, they could never have attained such an exalted pitch of greatness and glory. Such instances as the above were of rare occurrence, and the spirit that prompted them did not remain long in the ascendant. The sentiment of justice was sure to prevail in the end. Notwithstanding the slight at the isthmus, Themistokles was none the less honored throughout all Greece as the man who had most distinguished himself for wise counsel and strategy. Shortly after, on the occasion of his visit to Sparta, he was the recipient of higher honors than had ever been bestowed upon a stranger by the citizens of that proud state; for the Lacedæmonians gave him the prize of wisdom, even as they had already given to Eurybiades the prize of valor, awarding to each of them a crown of olive. They likewise presented to Themistokles the handsomest chariot in the city, and on his return to Athens dispatched three hundred young Spartan nobles to attend him to the frontier. At the next celebration of the Olympian games, as soon as Themistokles appeared in the ring, the attention of the spectators was withdrawn from the champions and directed for the remainder of the day upon the great Athenian, whom they pointed out to strangers

with the utmost admiration and applause. This mark of honor and respect was extremely gratifying to him, and he afterward acknowledged to his friends that on that day his labors in behalf of Greece had been amply rewarded.

Greek and Persian Movements.

After the departure of the invaders from Attic soil, the Athenians returned from Salamis, and reoccupied the remnants of their unfortunate city. The Persians under Mardonius remained encamped in Bœotia, and made no movement to advance southward. There was therefore a lull in the contest until the ensuing spring, 479 B. C. ; and indeed it was not until the month of July that Mardonius saw fit to assume the aggressive. His motive for this delay was, perhaps, the continued absence of Artabazus, who, after escorting the king to the Hellespont, tarried for some time in Macedonia in order to subdue certain cities that had revolted from the Persian dominion.

In the mean time, the Grecian fleet, which was now reduced to one hundred and ten vessels, and had been placed under the command of the Spartan king Leotychides, had advanced as far as Delos, but did not proceed farther, although urged to do so by the Chians, Samians, and other Ionian subjects of Persia that were anxious to throw off the yoke.

Xanthippus and Aristides now appear once more on the scene as the prominent chosen leaders of the Athenians, to the exclusion of Themistokles, whose rejection at this important crisis has been attributed by some historians to the envy of his fellow citizens, who had, perhaps, also taken umbrage at the honors he had obtained at the hands of the Spartans. But, if the Athenians were really actuated by such unworthy sentiments, the feeling was not of long duration, for soon afterward we again find Themistokles taking a prominent part in the counsels of his countrymen. He was,

in fact, accustomed to say that the Athenians paid him no honor save when a storm arose, and that then they sheltered themselves under him as under a plane-tree, which in fair weather they would rob of its leaves and branches. But the real cause of the defeat of Themistokles in the elections of 479 B. C. was the prostitution of his great influence to corrupt purposes. The Athenians had at last acquired a knowledge of his bribery at Artemisium, and his secret and unjust exactions from the islands during the siege of Andros ; and they wished to teach him, as ten years before they had taught Miltiades, the salutary lesson that not even the savior of his country could with impunity inflict disgrace upon her.

Before advancing from his secure position on the borders of Thessaly, Mardonius strove by all possible means to conciliate the Athenians. With this end in view, he sent to them Alexander, king of Macedonia, promising to rebuild their city and establish them firmly over the rest of Hellas, provided they would form with him an equal and independent alliance.

When the news reached the Spartans, they were in great fear lest the Athenians should agree to the alliance. They knew that the latter were in dire distress on account of the destruction of their city, the laying waste of their country, and the impossibility of cultivating their fields during the current year on account of the total lack of seed. Moreover, the Athenians had good reason to be angry with the Peloponnesians for not sending their forces to the defense of Bœotia during the previous year. The Spartans, therefore, hastily dispatched heralds to dissuade them from entering into an alliance with the invaders, promising to furnish support for their families during the present distress.

The Spartans little understood the magnanimous spirit of the Athenians. The latter delayed answering the proposals of Mardonius until the arrival of the heralds from Sparta, in order that the reply might be delivered in their presence.

Then the following solemn and dignified, yet resolute, answer was given to Alexander :

"Tell Mardonius that, as long as yonder sun shall continue in his present path; the Athenians will never contract alliance with Xerxes : we will encounter him in our own defense, putting our trust in the aid of those gods and heroes to whom he has shown no reverence, and whose houses and statues he has burned."

Then, turning to the Spartans, they bade them say to their countrymen at home that they were grateful for their offer of sustenance, but that they would endeavor to provide for themselves, and begged them to send the Peloponnesian army as soon as possible into Bœotia, that it might protect Attica against the attack of Mardonius.

The Spartans, instead of fulfilling their promise, turned their attention to the celebration of the Hyakinthian festival, while Mardonius advanced as far as Attica with the allies from eastern Hellas, including the Phokians, who had remained neutral during the invasion of Xerxes. The Athenians were not able alone to meet this overwhelming force, and were a second time compelled to abandon their city and fly for refuge to Salamis with their wives and children.

Mardonius sent to them again, repeating his former proposition. The late faithlessness of the Spartans had justly excited the anger of the Athenians, and no one would now have blamed them had they given heed to Mardonius. Yet all the members of the senate, with the single exception of Lykidas, unhesitatingly rejected the proposals. So ominous did the Athenians deem it that one of their archons should suggest the propriety of yielding to Mardonius, that in the excess of their patriotism both senators and people combined to stone Lykidas to death ; while the Athenian women in Salamis, hearing what had occurred, "went of their own accord to the house of Lykidas, and stoned to death his wife and children."

At the same time they sent to Sparta to remonstrate against the treachery and indifference of that state, and to demand that the army be immediately forwarded, if not into Bœotia, already occupied by the Persians, at least into the Thriasium, the plain of Attica.

The ephors received the message coldly, and replied that they would consider the matter. For ten successive days they delayed their answer, all the while celebrating the Hyakinthia and hurrying up the fortifications of the isthmus. The ambassadors then became impatient, and declared that on the following day they would hold their last meeting, and would then take their departure. The ephors, not desiring to drive the Athenians to desperation, arranged everything with such amazing dispatch as to show how admirably the machinery of their government operated. On the next day the ambassadors, coming to the ephors, said: "Ye Lacedæmonians, remain here, celebrating the Hyakinthia, and desert us, your allies. The Athenians, unjustly treated by you and in want of assistance, will now make the best possible terms with Mardonius, and will act with him in every expedition."

After the ambassadors had ended, the ephors assured them on oath that the army had already started. Five thousand Spartans, each accompanied by seven Helots, had the previous night set out toward the isthmus. Forty thousand men had been ordered to march, and had marched in such silence that the ambassadors, although staying in the same city, had not even a suspicion of the event. In addition, five thousand Pericæi, each accompanied by a light-armed Helot, had also departed toward the isthmus. Other Peloponnesian cities followed this example, and a large army was thus collected under the Spartan Pausanias.

The Argeians hastened to announce to Mardonius the advance of the Spartans. He consequently retreated to Bœotia, a country in every way more favorable to his pur-

poses ; but, before his departure from Attica, he completed the work of destruction begun in the preceding summer. He led his forces up the banks of the Asopus, and encamped in the form of a square, each side of which had an extent of ten furlongs, defended by wooden walls and towers.

This position was highly advantageous for his cavalry. Near him was the walled city of Thebes ; provisions were abundant, and the Bœotians ready allies ; from the north he feared no enemy, and the Hellenic army, being without cavalry, could not expect success. Many of the Persians, however, were disheartened by the departure of the king, and, placing no reliance on their Greek allies, had no confidence in the favorable issue of the combat. The Phokians were especially mistrusted. Mardonius ordered them to form in a separate detachment on the plain, and surrounded them with a large body of horse. A sudden and simultaneous impression ran through the Phokians that he was about to charge their ranks. But Harmokydes, the Phokian chief, was not dismayed at this turn of affairs. He urged his men to die honorably, and to teach their ignoble opponents that they had plotted as barbarians against Grecian heroes. The attacking horsemen rushed upon the Hellenic ranks with drawn bows, but the Greeks met them with solid phalanx and a firm countenance. All at once the Persians, either terrified at their formidable array, or wishing simply to try the strength of that small body, fell back, and Mardonius, sending a messenger, said : "Take courage, ye Phokians ; you have proved yourselves brave men. Show yourselves as ready in the coming war, and you shall be greatly rewarded both by the king and by myself." This circumstance was but one of many that tended to foster a feeling of distrust throughout the Persian army, little calculated to increase its courage and efficiency.

CHAPTER VIII.

EXPULSION OF THE PERSIANS.

The Battle of Plataea.

THE Hellenic army arrived late at Eleusis, because the Lacedæmonians were obliged to await the arrival of the Peloponnesian and other confederates. The total force of hoplites was 38,700 men, of whom 8,000 were Athenians. There was no cavalry, and but few bowmen. But if we add those who were called light-armed, some of whom were provided with javelins or swords, but none with any defensive armor, the grand total was not less than 110,000 men. Of these light-armed there were, as computed by Herodotus, 35,000 in attendance on the 5,000 Spartan citizens, and 34,500 in attendance on the other hoplites, together with 1,800 Thespians, who were properly hoplites, yet so badly armed as not to be reckoned in the ranks.

Pausanias, seeing the Persians drawn up near the Asopus, did not at first dare to descend into the plain, but encamped on the mountain declivity near Erythræ. Mardonius committed the mistake of attacking the Greeks there with his cavalry. The plain was undulating, and ill suited for a cavalry engagement. The Megarian contingent, which happened to be more exposed than the rest, were hard pressed, but they soon rallied when a force of three hundred Athenians came to their assistance. For some time the struggle was sharp and indecisive, but the Persians finally were driven back with loss. In this engagement, Masistius, the Persian commander, "a man renowned for bravery, lofty in stature, clad in conspicuous armor, and mounted on a Nisæan horse with golden trappings," was slain while charging at the head of his troops. His death produced deep sorrow among the Persians. His body, after a desperate strug-

gle, was captured by the Greeks, and the corpse, still clad in its golden panoply, was borne through their ranks as a brilliant trophy, amid the enthusiastic plaudits of the soldiers.

Pausanias, trusting in the zeal of his army, descended from his position, and was thus separated from the enemy only by low hillocks. Shortly after he marched toward the west, and encamped in the Platæan territory near the south bank of the Asopus. Mardonius, apprised of this change of position, wheeled his army also toward the west, and drew up opposite the Greeks, with the river between them. By advice of the Thebans, he posted the Medes and Persians, the flower of his army, opposite the Lacedæmonians, and his Greek allies, numbering about fifty thousand, on the right, opposite the Athenians; while the Baktrians, Indians, Sakæ, and the other Asiatics occupied the center.

Just as the two armies stood ready to rush against each other, a strange event occurred. Both the Greeks and the Persians had sought the advice of their respective soothsayers, and had received like responses. The sacrifices foretold propitious results for both sides, should they continue in their defensive position; but unpropitious, should they engage in battle by crossing the Asopus. So the combat was delayed, each waiting to be attacked. This delay almost proved calamitous to the Greeks, because in their new position they could obtain water only with great difficulty, since they were driven from the Asopus by the darts and missiles of the enemy. Hence, the entire army was forced to go for water to the fountain Gargaphia, at the extreme right of the position, near the Lacedæmonian hoplites. Mardonius had also seized five hundred of their cattle. Affairs were in so bad a condition that the wealthiest of the Athenians were contemplating the overthrow of the democracy, and the establishment of an oligarchy under Persian dominion. But the arm of Aristides, at once strong and gentle, averted this calamity.

Fortunately, Mardonius became impatient, and on the tenth day decided that he would no longer delay. Making a forced interpretation of the oracles, he early the next morning ordered the army to the attack. The Greeks were informed of this by Alexander, king of Macedonia. Pausanias now requested the Athenians to change places with the Lacedæmonians in the line. "We Lacedæmonians," said he, "now stand opposed to the Persians and Medes, against whom we have never yet contended, while ye Athenians have fought and conquered them at Marathon. March ye then over to the right wing, and take our places, while we take yours upon the left against the Bœotians and Thessalians, with whose arms and manner of attack we are familiar." The Athenians accepted this proposal, which savored so little of the traditional Spartan valor. Grote well remarks that no other incident similar to this will be found throughout the whole course of Lacedæmonian history. To evade encountering the strongest troops of the enemy, and for this purpose to yield their privileged post on the right wing, was a step well calculated to lower them in the eyes of Hellas, and could hardly have failed to produce that effect if their intention had been realized. As soon as Mardonius heard of this change, he effected a corresponding one in his own line, so as to place the native Persians once more over against the Lacedæmonians. Pausanias, therefore, again returned to his former position.

Mardonius, although encouraged by this incident, did not venture an attack, but confined himself to harassing the Greeks with his cavalry, against which the latter could make no adequate defense. They compelled the Greeks to abandon their only spring; so that Pausanias, seeing his camp entirely cut off from water, and besides suffering from lack of food, perceived that it would be impossible to remain and await the general battle. He, therefore, after an exciting conference with his generals, resolved to retreat to a

place called the Island,* distant about ten furlongs almost directly west, and seemingly north of the town of Plataea, which was itself about twenty furlongs distant. Here they could obtain water in safety, and also have their front less exposed to the missiles of the Persians.

This plan was wisely formed, but during its execution disorders occurred which came near causing the utter destruction of the Greeks. Night coming on, the Corinthians, Megarians, etc., moved first; but instead of going to the Island, they marched directly to the town of Plataea, near which they encamped. When Pausanias became aware of the departure of the center, he supposed it to be toward the Island, and * he ordered the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans to repair to the same place. All the commanders appeared eager to obey, but Amompharetus, a Spartan officer, obstinately refused to retreat. He had not been present at the council, and now with surprise heard the news for the first time. He declared that "he for one would never so far disgrace Sparta as to run away from the foreigner." In vain did Pausanias and the generals endeavor to persuade the refractory officer; in vain did they threaten to abandon him alone to meet the Persians. Amompharetus replied that he did not care; and when it was remarked that the order which he would not obey was made by a vote of all the officers, he grasped a rock with both hands, and, casting it at the feet of Pausanias, cried, "*This is my pebble, where-with I give my vote not to run away from the strangers!*" The general was in a dilemma; night was fast passing; the center of the army had departed. At last Pausanias, seeing that the day was beginning to dawn, resolved to leave the officer and his division to their fate, and gave the signal for retreat.

On reaching the river Molois, he stopped to give Amom-

* The spot selected, improperly called an island, was a piece of ground situated between two branches of the river Ceroë.

pharetus time for repentance ; and the latter, seeing himself really abandoned, finally decided to follow. The Athenians had long since departed toward the Island, in a line parallel with the march of Pausanias, but by a more level road. It was now evident that the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians would have no time to draw themselves up on the same spot before being attacked. The center had also marched elsewhere. The Hellenic army was in a precarious situation ; and if the Persians had taken advantage of it, defeat would have been almost certain.

Mardonius, on learning that the Greeks had retreated by night, evinced a rash boldness and contempt for his opponents. Summoning some of the Greeks to his camp—"Are these," he said, "your famous Spartans, who changed their place just now in the line rather than fight the Persians, and have here shown by a barefaced flight what they are really worth ?" At the same time he ordered his army to the pursuit, and, thinking that victory was now assured, pressed forward in great disorder.

Pausanias was still on the march when he was attacked, first by the cavalry of the Persians, and later by the whole army. He immediately dispatched a horseman to the Athenians for assistance. The latter, however, were unable to give aid, because they were themselves soon to be engaged by the Thebans. Thus the Lacedæmonians and the Tegeans, numbering in all fifty-three thousand, were compelled to encounter alone the overwhelming force of the barbarians.

As soon as the Medes and the Sakæ, who were in advance of the other Persians, came within bow-shot, they stuck into the ground their long, pointed wicker shields or *gerrha*, and formed a compact breastwork, from behind which they discharged a shower of arrows against the Greeks. Their bows were of the largest kind, and drawn with no less skill than power. Pausanias, though his army was hard pressed, attempted first of all the performance of an unavoidable duty,

the sacrifice belonging to the gods. For some time the auspices were unfavorable, so that he did not venture to give orders for close combat, although this was earnestly desired by the Greeks, who, having no archers, were better fitted for a hand-to-hand encounter. Their agony, therefore, was prolonged, and many were slain or wounded in the ranks. The brave Kallikrates, the handsomest and strongest man in the army, fell mortally wounded, saying that he did not hesitate to die for Hellas, but regretted that he could not accomplish a deed worthy of his ambition. At last Pausanias, wearied with this painful delay, raised his eyes toward the Heræum of the Plataeans, which was in sight, and invoked Here to show herself more propitious to her own people. As soon as this prayer was offered, the sacrifices were accepted.

While he was still praying, the Tegeans had anticipated the result, and, as soon as Pausanias gave the word, rushed against the enemy, followed by the Lacedæmonians. The breastwork was quickly overthrown by the Hellenic charge; but the Persians still fought with marvelous courage, although their ranks were broken and they had only their short spears, while the Greeks fought in line of battle, advancing with measured step and armed with long spears. Many of the Persians captured the spears of the Lacedæmonians, broke them in pieces, and clustering together endeavored to break down the wall of the Hellenic phalanx. Mardonius himself, at the head of his body-guard of one thousand picked men, and conspicuous by his white charger, was among the foremost in battle, and severely pressed the Greeks. But finally Mardonius fell, most of his body-guard were killed, and the rest of the army, disheartened, recrossed the Asopus to their fortified camp.

In the mean while the Athenians on the left wing were engaged in a hot contest with the Thebans, who fought bravely; but, after losing three hundred of their men, they also were put to flight. The Theban cavalry, however, held

their ground, and enabled the flying infantry to retreat with safety to their city. The rest of the Greeks who had allied themselves with the Medes, as soon as they saw the flight of the Bœotians, followed their example without risking battle. Artabazus, who was jealous of Mardonius, had at first ordered the forty thousand troops under his command to emulate the headlong impetuosity of the general-in-chief. Arriving at the scene of action, and seeing that the Persians were about to be defeated, instead of endeavoring to assist them, he marched straight through Phokis, Thessaly, and Macedonia to Byzantium, whence he crossed into Asia.

Of the Greeks engaged in this battle, the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans were on the right, and the Athenians on the left. The other Greeks, stationed in the center, had separated and gone to Plataea, as already related. There they received tidings of the victory, and, rushing forward in disorder, were attacked by the Theban cavalry, which still covered the flight of the Bœotians, and lost six hundred men.

This slight reverse of the Greeks did not mitigate the general defeat of the Persians. The Lacedæmonians, following in pursuit, arrived at the fortified camp, whither the Persians had fled, and, rushing upon it in company with the Athenians and the central Hellenic divisions, soon became its masters. Once within the wall, "the Greeks slaughtered without mercy as without limit"; so that, if we are to credit Herodotus, out of the 300,000 of Mardonius, excepting the 40,000 with Artabazus, hardly 3,000 men escaped. This statement is certainly an exaggeration, and is without doubt as inaccurate as that which places the loss of the Greeks at 91 Spartans, 16 Tegeans, and 52 Athenians. Plutarch supposes that about 1,360 Greeks fell in this battle. Be this as it may, the defeat of the Persians was complete. The victory, however, can not be attributed to the military genius of Pausanias, who certainly showed neither the capacity of Miltiades at Marathon, nor that of Themistokles at Salamis.

Neither was it due to the discipline and obedience of the Hellenic troops. The Lacedæmonians, the Tegeans, and the Athenians did indeed show remarkable bravery ; but success resulted mainly from the mad precipitancy of Mardonius, as well as the ignoble retreat of Artabazus, and from the inferior armament of the Persians.

It was impossible for the king of Persia soon to prepare another such expedition. The liberty of Hellas was secured, and the Greeks, forgetting their dangers, gave themselves up to feelings of joy and thanksgiving. They first buried their dead, and then distributed their booty, which occupied ten days. Pausanias treated with respect the body of Mardonius, and indignantly repelled the barbaric proposition of a certain Æginetan, to inflict upon the Persian dead the ignominious treatment offered to Leonidas, whose corpse had been beheaded and impaled by Xerxes.

The booty was rich and heterogeneous. There were gold and silver in Persian coin, utensils, and ornaments, costly carpets, garments, arms, horses, and camels. Even the sumptuous tent of Xerxes, which on his retreat he had left with Mardonius, was taken. Pausanias ordered the Helots to collect all this booty into one spot, but they concealed a large portion of it, which, in ignorance of its value, they were persuaded by the Æginetans to sell as brass.

The treasure accumulated for distribution was immense. A tithe of all was set apart to the god at Delphi, and from it was made a tripod standing upon a three-headed serpent. Pausanias, who was already becoming dazed by the excess of his glory, inscribed on the tripod a stanza in which he attributed to himself all the honor of the achievement. It ran thus :

“Pausanias, Spartan victor o’er the Mede,
To Phœbus this memorial decreed.”

The ephors, however, ordered the inscription to be erased, and

in its stead to be engraved at the foot of the tripod * the names of all the cities which had contributed to the rout of the barbarian.

Besides the tithe offered to Apollo, a good share of the booty was given to the Olympian Zeus and to the Isthmian Poseidon. A tenth of the remainder was offered to Pausanias as the commander-in-chief of the whole army, and the rest was divided among the participants in proportion to their number.

Siege of Thebes.

The time had come for the allies again to direct their attention to the city of Thebes, which was the most efficient ally of Mardonius. They accordingly demanded from that city the surrender of her prominent citizens who had joined themselves to the Medes. The Thebans refused the demand, upon which the allies laid siege to the city, and began

* By some strange chance this memorial has come down to us, in a state of partial mutilation; and its varied fortunes depict the history of the nation itself, one of the glorious achievements of which it was destined to immortalize. When, in the fourth century, Constantine the Great built the city named after him, destined to become the capital of Hellenic Christianity, he brought from Hellas, among other things, this memorial, and had it placed in his vast race-course. It was even then mutilated, because the Phokians had long before stolen the golden tripod, and only the three-headed serpentine base was transported to Constantinople. In this condition the column was preserved until the fifteenth century, when the devastator of Constantinople, Mohammed II, either to display his dexterity, or to avenge the memory of the conqueror whose work he had come to renew, cut off with his sword one of the three heads of the serpent. In the year 1700 the two other heads were stolen, and the column itself was afterward partly buried. In 1856 it was excavated by some English officers, and then had a height of about fifteen feet. Even in this condition it is a priceless relic of Hellenic nationality, standing where it has stood for so many years, and where the Greeks of to-day can still read on the coils of the serpent the names of the heroes of their first war of independence. The letters of these names are of a finger's length, so that there are two or three names on each line. The Lacedæmonians are first recorded, after them the Athenians, and then the Corinthians and others.

to devastate the surrounding country. An offer of indemnity in money having been declined, the Thebans were obliged to accept the conditions imposed upon them and to surrender the citizens called for. Pausanias carried the prisoners to Corinth, and executed them without trial, fearing that, if he should submit their case to a tribunal, they might, through their wealth, contrive to escape conviction.

Honors awarded to the Victors.

Herodotus does not mention whether any positive vote was taken among the Greeks respecting the prize of valor at the battle of Plataea. It appears that the Athenians were unwilling to allow the Spartans the honor of the day, and, at the suggestion of Aristides, the palm was granted to the Plataeans. Although the popular judgment of Hellas would have placed the Lacedæmonians before the Plataeans, since they had overcome the best troops of the enemy and slain the general, yet the Plataeans were esteemed very highly as the owners of the soil upon which the great battle for the liberty of Hellas had been fought. Besides their portion of the booty, there was granted to them an extra reward of eighty talents. In the market-place of their city a thanksgiving panegyric was performed in honor of Zeus Eleutherius. To the Plataeans was also allotted the right to hold an annual religious celebration in honor of the Greeks who had fallen in their land. Pausanias and the allies swore to become for ever responsible for the liberty of the Plataeans and the security of their state.

It was also decided that the common alliance against the Persians should continue, and that, to this end, an Hellenic force of ten thousand hoplites, one thousand horse, and one hundred triremes should be maintained. The town of Plataea was fixed upon as the annual place of meeting for delegates from all the confederate states.

Thus triumphantly did the Greeks celebrate their vic-

tory. Their joy would have been still greater had they known that, on the very day Mardonius fell at Platæa and the Persians were routed, the naval forces of the Greeks had totally defeated the enemy at Mykale.

Battle of Mykale.

The Hellenic fleet of one hundred and ten triremes had remained idle at Delos, under the command of the Spartan king Leotychides, although it was the earnest desire of the Ionians that they should advance as far as Asia Minor. Finally, in the beginning of September, Leotychides consented to sail to Samos, where he knew the Persian fleet was collected. The latter, on hearing of the approach of the Hellenic fleet, at once retreated to the promontory of Mykale, near Miletus. Here they were under the protection of a land force of 60,000 men, commanded by Tigranes—the main reliance of Xerxes for the defense of Ionia. They drew up their ships on the shore, fortified themselves by a hastily constructed wall, and for further security disarmed the Samians serving in their army, and stationed the Milesians in the rear to guard the various mountain-roads leading to the heights of Mykale.

The Greeks followed the retreating enemy, and determined to offer opposition to this united land and naval force. They numbered not more than 25,000, while the Persians could bring 120,000 into action, and were besides in an intrenched position. The Greeks began the attack, and rushed impetuously upon the enemy. The Persians adopted here the same plan of warfare as at Platæa; but their breast-work, though bravely defended, was finally broken, and the Greeks forced an entrance into the fortified camp upon the very heels of the retreating foe. A desperate hand-to-hand encounter ensued; Greek and Persian leaped upon the bodies of the fallen, and obstinately contested their ground, until the latter finally gave way. The defeat was completed by

the sedition of the Ionians. The Persian army was scattered, their ships were burned, and a large number of the native Persians, together with their general Tigranes, perished in this disastrous battle. The loss of the Greeks was also considerable. A large number of men were slain, including many of the Sikyonians, and their commander Perilaus. This victory was almost wholly due to the valor of the Athenians. The Lacedæmonians contributed the least of all to it.*

The remnant of the Persian army escaped to Sardis, where Xerxes had waited on his return from Hellas, and where he was still seeking forgetfulness in dissipation. He had neither fleet nor army for the defense of Ionia. Hence the commanders of the victorious Hellenic fleet recognized as allies the Chians, Samians, Lesbians, and the other islanders who had formerly been under Persian rule. As to the cities on the mainland they could make no decision. The Peloponnesians hesitated to guarantee the liberty of these cities, because they foresaw that they would be necessitated to maintain a land force against the Persians. They therefore proposed to transport the inhabitants to European Hellas, and to establish them on the coasts of those states which had made common cause with the Medes. The Athenians opposed this, since it was altogether foreign to Hellenic customs. The despots of Asia, both ancient and modern, Persian and Turk, have never understood or appreciated a love for native land, and have often attempted similar wholesale transportations. The proposition was not accepted by the Athenians, but at the same time the extent to which they would undertake the protection of their countrymen in Asia was not finally decided.

* This battle was fought almost at the precise spot where, in August, 1824, the Hellenic fleet, under command of George Sachtoures, routed, in three successive engagements, another barbarian army, and prevented a numerous Turkish fleet from landing at Samos.

Capture of Sestos.

The Hellenic fleet afterward sailed toward the Hellespont, with the intention of destroying the bridges of Xerxes, since, so difficult and meager was the communication, the Greeks had not heard that those bridges had been swept away ten months before. Upon reaching Abydos and becoming aware of the fact, Leotychides and the Peloponnesians at once returned home ; but Xanthippus, with the Athenian squadron, resolved to remain and dislodge the Persians from the Thracian Chersonese. This had been formerly peopled by Athenians, but, between the years 493 and 480 B. C., no citizen of that state was allowed to remain there. Naturally the victorious Athenians now sought to recover their dominion over the peninsula, and were the more anxious, since the country not only produced an abundance of corn, but was the key to an extensive commerce. On this account they decided, even without the assistance of the Peloponnesians, to besiege Sestos, its most strongly fortified city.

The Greek inhabitants of the Chersonese eagerly assisted the Athenians in expelling the Persians ; and, as the latter had not sufficiently provisioned their fortifications, they were finally obliged to surrender. After the capture of Sestos, the victors returned home toward the end of 479, not forgetting to take, among other things, the colossal cables used in the construction of the bridges of Xerxes, which they placed as a trophy on the Acropolis.

CHAPTER IX.

CONTEMPORANEOUS WAR IN SICILY—CONCLUSION.

WHILE the eastern Greeks were thus successfully repelling the invasion of Xerxes, their countrymen in Sicily were

engaged in another war of a character little less momentous. The Greeks held the eastern coast of the island, the greater part of the southern, and a portion of the northern, dominating the native element and forcing it to retreat inland toward the west.

The cities Gela and Agrigentum, on the south side of the island, were the most prominent of the Hellenic colonies until the beginning of the fifth century; but Syracuse, after it fell into the hands of Gelon, about 485 B. C., surpassed the others. In all these cities the oligarchical form of government originally prevailed; but after the fifth century tyrants or despots ruled, under whom these cities were peculiarly flourishing. Thus, while the states of Hellas proper reached the highest degree of power and glory under aristocratic or democratic rule, the Sicilian cities attained the acme of their fame under despotic constitutions.

The most ancient tyrant of Sicily, notorious for his cruelty, was Phalaris, who held dominion from about 570 to 554 B. C. About 500 we find many tyrants in Sicily, prominent among whom were Panætius in Leontini and Kleander in Gela. Kleander levied a powerful mercenary force, largely among the native Sicilian tribes, and overpowered many of the previously independent Hellenic cities of the island. He was, however, after a reign of seven years, slain by one of his fellow citizens, and was succeeded by his brother Hippokrates, who extended his dominion over nearly half of the island. The officer most famed for courage and wisdom in the mercenary army was Gelon, who, when Hippokrates was in turn murdered (about 491), seized the sovereignty, which he still further aggrandized.

Gelon attempted to drive away the Carthaginians and Egestæans from the island, and hostilities were already begun when, in the autumn of 481, the Greeks sent to him from the isthmus of Corinth for aid against Xerxes. Gelon promised to send 20,000 hoplites, 200 triremes, 2,000 cavalry,

2,000 archers, 2,000 slingers, and 2,000 light-armed horse, and to assume the maintenance of the entire Hellenic force throughout the war, on condition that he should be proclaimed its general and hegemon. His offer was rejected with indignant scorn, and the Athenian envoy declared that the Athenians, the oldest nation in Hellas, would never submit to be dictated to by a Syracusan. But even had he been desirous of sending assistance, he could not have done so. About the spring of 480 B. C., when Xerxes sailed down the Hellespont, the Carthaginians, at the instigation of many dissatisfied Greeks in Sicily, and very probably by the connivance of the Persians themselves, sent a mighty fleet of 8,000 ships of war, under Hamilcar, followed by a still greater number of transport-vessels, which, on reaching Panormus, landed 300,000 men and laid siege to Himera. Gelon soon came up at the head of 50,000 infantry and 5,000 horse. The battle was obstinate and bloody, lasting from sunrise until late in the afternoon. Hamilcar fell, and the Carthaginians suffered a total defeat. The opponents of Gelon were compelled to recognize his supremacy. The Carthaginians sued for peace, and at the request of Gelon's wife it was granted, on condition that the Carthaginians should pay two thousand talents to defray the costs of the war, and of erecting two temples wherein the terms of the treaty were to be permanently recorded.

Conclusion.

Here ends the narrative of the great battles which the Hellenic nation fought in the beginning of the fifth century B. C., both in Hellas proper and in Sicily. The most important of these wars, both as regards the fortunes of the nation and the interests of humanity, were certainly those in Hellas. If Hellenism had been subdued in Sicily, while it prevailed in the mother-country, only a few branches of the Hellenic tree would have been cut off and withered ; but the trunk,

vigorous and unharmed, would still have produced all its glorious fruits.

When we consider the vast forces which Xerxes led against Hellas ; the unity of will which moved that great army ; the surpassing bravery which his men displayed ; the many Greeks who were largely interested in the success of his expedition ; the considerable number who took no part in battle for their native land ; and, finally, the frequent indifference and dissensions among the few who had combined to fight the barbarians—when we consider all these adverse circumstances, we are justified in repeating the question, How did the Greeks finally conquer ?

The chief cause of their success was the credulous rashness, the imbecility, and the cowardice of Xerxes, which became as ruinous as his will was omnipotent. Had such a man as Cyrus engaged in the work, we can not believe that its issue would have been the same. It is true that in 479 B. C. the command was intrusted to Mardonius, but he himself committed numerous mistakes, and had the disadvantage of not being sustained by a naval force.

Another cause was the marked lack of energy, the indifference, and the distaste for war which the Persians manifested. After the defeat at Salamis their army, although still intact, showed itself eager to acquiesce in the desire of Xerxes to depart. At Plataea also most of the army fled as soon as Mardonius fell. On the other hand, so great was the determination and spirit of the Greeks, and particularly of the Athenians, that after the misfortune at Thermopylae and the repeated capture of Athens, and after the alluring propositions of Mardonius, they showed an independence and tenacity of purpose which alone would have sufficed to overpower the enemy.

Again, both in armament and manner of fighting, the Persians were much inferior to the Greeks, who early understood that better arms and superior drill were advantages

which no mere bravery, be it never so desperate, could successfully withstand.

But to understand still more clearly these great results, we must take into account the genius, independence, perseverance, and Panhellenic patriotism of the Athenians, without whom, as Herodotus justly remarks, the Greeks would not have escaped the rule of the Mede.

Again, this war would not have earned such luster in history had not the Athenians in consequence of it attained that enlarged supremacy under which were produced those political, intellectual, and artistic masterpieces upon which Hellenic civilization prides itself. The wars with the Medes were admired and eulogized for having shown the excellence of the Hellenic mind. But could this excellence ever have been completely manifested within the narrow bounds of Attica? Could the productions of Pheidias have been created without the booty of Kimon and the tribute of the allies? Could the inimitable historical masterpiece of Thucydides ever have originated without the supremacy which Athens achieved, resulting in that fearful combination of forces which bears the name of the Peloponnesian war?

Unfortunately, we shall no longer have the guidance of the accurate Herodotus, who may be regarded as contemporaneous with the great wars. He was born at Halikarnassus between the first and second Persian wars (490-480 B. C.). At an early age he traveled through Hellas, Macedonia, Thrace, Syria, Egypt, and other lands. On his return he settled at Samos, and there commenced his history. In 444 he went to southern Italy, with many Athenians, who built, in the place of the destroyed Sybaris, a new city named Thurii, in which the historian appears to have spent the remainder of his life.

Herodotus is the creator of true historic art. Preceding writers related past events of mythical character, or gathered dry chronological and genealogical annals; but Herod-

otus first breathed into these dry bones the breath of life—first understood that history is the artistic arrangement of events, and the description of their actors. Hence he is justly called the Father of History.

The prevailing idea in his writings is the antithesis of Hellenic and Oriental life. It is true that Herodotus has neither the philosophical judgment nor the practical political experience and depth of Thucydides; yet the former wrote about the middle of the fifth century, Thucydides toward its end; and, short though this intervening period may be, yet at its close the Hellenic mind had wonderfully matured.

Again, Thucydides was in advance of his age, while Herodotus faithfully delineated his own epoch. For this reason, his work is perhaps the more precious. In Thucydides we admire the genius of the historian, in Herodotus the truth and vividness of description. Herodotus gives credence to many myths, just as the majority of the Greeks believed in them; yet he never willingly falsifies, and sometimes he intimates his doubts by the prefatory phrase "They say" or "I have heard." His history ends at the recovery of the Thracian Chersonese by the Athenians.

The want of his high authority is the more marked, since in the succeeding glorious epoch we have no other contemporaneous writer. The minute descriptions of Thucydides begin with the Peloponnesian war; and during the years preceding the organization of the hegemony of the Athenians, we have only brief narratives by Plutarch, Diodorus, and other writers of the "lesser Hellenism," who had no correct ideas of the historic art. But, having the guidance of the divine dramatist of the Peloponnesian war over the stormy sea of this historic time, and assisted by other minor historians, we shall now proceed to relate the rise of the Athenian supremacy.

PART FOURTH.

ATHENIAN SUPREMACY.

CHAPTER I.

FORTIFICATION OF ATHENS.

AFTER the battle of Plataea, the Athenians found a desolate home waiting for them. "Their country was laid waste ; their city burned or destroyed, so that there remained but a few houses standing, wherein the Persian officers had taken up their quarters ; and their fortifications were for the most part razed or overthrown."

As soon as they had supplied their immediate needs, they commenced the rebuilding of their fortifications. But here they met with unexpected obstacles. The allies, and more especially the Spartans, who had been witnesses of their daring, naturally looked upon the strengthening of the city as the beginning of other and greater plans for power. They therefore opposed the work, alleging that, in case of another invasion by the Persians, it would not be advantageous to Hellas that other fortified cities should exist beyond the Peloponnesus, because if captured by the enemy they might become dangerous retreats, as in the case of Thebes.

The Athenians well understood the latent significance of this objection ; yet they deemed it best not to rouse opposi-

tion, fearing lest the allies might attempt to enforce their views. But a statesman like Themistokles was not likely to be imposed upon by this opposition. By his advice the Athenians answered that they would themselves send ambassadors to Sparta to discuss the matter there. They accordingly appointed Themistokles, Aristides, and Abironichus ; but by previous concert they sent Themistokles first, meanwhile fortifying the city with all haste—men, women, and children lending their assistance.

On reaching Sparta, Themistokles did not present himself to the ephors, but pretended to be awaiting his fellow ambassadors. He solemnly assured them that these would come very soon, and was indeed at a loss to account for their delay. News, however, was constantly arriving that the wall was rapidly advancing. Themistokles indignantly denied the reports, and to gain still further time proposed that they should send messengers to learn the truth, while at the same time he secretly notified the Athenians to detain the messengers until the safe return of himself and his colleagues, which he feared might be denied them when his trick came to be divulged. At last Aristides and Abironichus came, and announced that the work had advanced so far as easily to resist an attack. Themistokles, at once laying aside the mask, said to the ephors that the city of Athens was already fortified, that the Athenians needed no advice, and that when not long ago they had abandoned their country and put out to sea, they had not consulted with the Spartans. The latter, seeing that they could make no opposition, kept silent, but never forgave Themistokles. Their indignation was not without cause, since the fortification of Athens was the foundation of all its subsequent greatness.

The second great work which the Athenians undertook was the strengthening of the Peiræus and of Munychia. The Athenians had begun this work before the Persian wars, and had transferred thither their ship-yard from Pha-

lerum. The results of their labor, however, had been destroyed by the Persians, and now Themistokles planned to render these harbors in every respect worthy of the great fortunes which he felt the city of Athens was destined to achieve. The walls surrounding the Peiræus and Munychia had a circumference of sixty stadia, and were to be of such height and thickness that they would be impregnable. The height was never completed, because half of the estimate was deemed sufficient. The thickness was such that two carts could pass each other; probably, therefore, not less than fourteen or fifteen feet. On the inside there was neither rubble nor mortar, but the whole was built of square stones clamped on the outside with iron and lead.

This colossal wall was considered insurmountable, and the Peiræus became not only a fortified ship-yard, but also a secure place for purposes of trade. Many foreigners established themselves there, including the so-called Metics or resident foreigners, who by their commerce and industry contributed largely to the finished civilization of the country.

CHAPTER II.

NAVAL SUPREMACY OF THE ATHENIANS.

Treachery of Pausanias.

WHILE the Athenians were carrying forward these great works, they also took part in the expedition which set sail for Asia (478 B. C.) under the Spartan Pausanias; and while all Peloponnesus furnished only twenty ships, they alone sent thirty under Aristides and Kimon. The fleet under Pausanias, to which some Ionian and insular ships were added, first sailed to Kyprus and rescued most of its Hellenic cities

from Persian dominion. Next they turned to the Thracian Bosphorus, and recovered Byzantium, the key of commerce between the Euxine and Hellas.

The capture of Byzantium proved "the signal for an unexpected change in the relations of the various Hellenic cities." Pausanias, who since the battle of Platæa had been carried away by his inordinate vanity, and who had in fact through this achievement gained a renown unparalleled in Hellenic annals, was no longer willing to be subject to the strict laws of his country, and decided to become its ruler and despot. Therefore, after the capture of Byzantium, he sent to Xerxes some of the most eminent captives, and a letter which, according to Thucydides, read as follows :

"Pausanias, the Spartan commander, wishing to oblige thee, sends these men back, after taking them in war. I am desirous, if it please thee, to marry thy daughter and make Sparta and the rest of Hellas subject to thee. With thy assistance I think that I am able to do this. If my proposition be acceptable, send a trustworthy man down to the sea, through whom in future we will confer."

Xerxes was surprised and gratified with the proposition, and sent Artabazus, the sub-general of Mardonius, with the following reply :

"Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias : As to the men whom thou hast saved from Byzantium and sent over the sea to me, the record of this kindness is for ever registered in our palace ; and thy propositions now received are acceptable to me. Let neither night nor day stop thee in accomplishing that which thou promisest, nor let thyself be hindered by lack of gold or silver or numbers of men, if thou standest in need of them ; but in conjunction with Artabazus, the good man whom I have now sent, fear not to advance both my interests and thy own as shall be most advantageous to both."

Happily for Hellas, Pausanias had not the ability to

carry out his promises. When he received the letter from Xerxes, his insane hopes knew no bounds, and he immediately began to live like a satrap, and to oppress the allies ; so that, although the above correspondence was then unknown, the Spartans, suspecting his designs, deemed best to recall him. They exonerated him from the accusation of treachery, but appointed in his place another general.

The allies, however, were unwilling to submit to the new commander. In fact, as soon as Pausanias had departed, they recognized as their chiefs Aristides and Kimon, whose wisdom and moderation were well calculated to overcome the arrogance and tyranny of Sparta. Consequently, the new Spartan general, being in no condition to use compulsory means, was obliged to return home.

The Spartans, although their pride was wounded, did not attempt to recover their power. They were without a suitable force, and besides were not disposed to undertake a foreign war, fearing lest their generals should become enriched and plot against the government. The designs of Pausanias were now evident, and the example of their king Leotychides showed them the depraving and pernicious effect of such military power, "remote as well as unchecked." The king, marching into Thessaly to punish the Aleuadæ, who had allied themselves to Xerxes and Mardonius, about the same time that Pausanias embarked for Asia, accepted a bribe, on the discovery of which he was banished. Sparta therefore applied herself henceforth to home government, and the rest of the Peloponnesian states followed her example.

The Ionic Alliance.

The Athenians, with the islanders and other Greeks on the *Ægean*, continued the war against the Persians. The Ionic allies acted as the chief movers in the enterprise. The sympathies of the Ionian Greeks clung to Athens, for they stood in obvious need of protection against the attacks

of Persia, and had no further kindness to expect from Sparta or the Peloponnesians.

The Athenians also showed their usual versatility in the organization of this new alliance. They highly esteemed the genius of Themistokles, yet they were aware of his faults, especially of his inordinate greed of gain. They therefore placed the fleet under the command of Aristeides. He at once instituted a congress of the cities, which, assembling periodically for deliberative purposes in the sacred island of Delos, was to carry on the affairs of the alliance, under the presidency of the Athenians.

We are entirely ignorant concerning the exact number of the allied cities, but it was no doubt large. This is conjectured, not only from the annual contribution, which from the first amounted yearly to four hundred and sixty talents (about five hundred and fifty thousand American dollars), but also from the important and various interests in which all the nautical cities shared.

The chief objects of the alliance were the suppression of piracy, the maintenance of the free route between the Euxine and the *Ægean*, and the freedom of all islands and coasts from Persian rule.

The Persians, although they suffered frequent reverses, were strong, not merely from their own resources, possessing as they still did many fortified places, but also through the aid of internal parties in many Hellenic states — traitors within, as well as exiles without.

CHAPTER III.

DEATH OF PAUSANIAS, THEMISTOKLES, AND ARISTEIDES.

Pausanias.

As soon as Pausanias was freed from the accusation of favoring the Medes, he returned as a private citizen to Byzantium, and resumed his negotiations with Artabazus. Driven thence by the Athenians, he retired to Kolonæ in the Troad, where he continued the execution of his nefarious schemes, by dispatching emissaries to distribute Persian gold among various cities of Hellas. The ephors, on hearing of this, recalled him to Sparta, threatening that, in case of disobedience, they would consider him an enemy.

Pausanias, seeing that by not complying he would be unable to accomplish his designs, returned. On his arrival at Sparta he was sentenced to death, but through the intervention of his friends he was rescued. Notwithstanding his recent peril, he still audaciously persisted both in his intrigues at home and his correspondence abroad with Artabazus. He opened negotiations with the Helots, instigating them to revolt by the promise of political liberty.

The ephors discovered the plot, and also seized his last letters to Artabazus. But such was the magnitude of the crime, especially in a Spartan Herakleid and a victorious general, that the ephors wished to receive more evidence; and it was only after hearing Pausanias himself hold treasonable conversation with his servants that they resolved to arrest him. They met him in the public street, not far from the temple of Athene Chalkiækus, or the Brazen House. As they came near, either their menacing looks or a significant nod from one of them revealed to the noted criminal their purpose, and he sought refuge in the temple of Athene. The ephors took off the roof of the building, barri-

caded the doors, and thus doomed him to the slow death of starvation.

Themistokles.

Such was the lamentable end, about 465 B. C., of that Greek who had reached the summit of glory, not deservedly, but because he belonged to the royal race of Sparta. But not less lamentable is the fact that he dragged to his destruction another, who certainly was worthy of a better fate. For some time after the battle of Plataea the Athenians continued to honor Themistokles, who in return was unremitting in furthering the interests of his country. But soon after his star also began to wane.

It has been stated that he had received no appointment in the great alliance of the Athenians. On account of his avarice, it was thought best to place a man of the greatest possible probity over the affairs of the allies, and the attention of all was turned to Aristeides. He was held in high esteem, as well for wisdom and uprightness as for his policy in instituting certain changes in the constitution of Kleisthenes, by which the Thetæ (those having a yearly income of less than two hundred drachmæ), instead of merely being admitted to the assembly, could hold other political offices.

So long as the city was protected by infantry, the exclusion of the Thetæ might have been just. The hoplites or the richest of the citizens composed this force. They were those who risked their lives in behalf of their country. The poor "Psilæ," or light-armed, were of little importance. Thus those incurring the greater responsibilities might justly demand the greater rights. But after the city became a naval power, the Thetæ rendered services more important than those of the upper classes—at Artemisium restraining, and at Salamis defeating, the enemy.

The hoplites contributed little to this. On what ground could they retain their former position, and the conquerors

of Salamis remain excluded from the government which they themselves had preserved? Furthermore, the influence of the rich had been sustained heretofore by the revenue accruing from agriculture; but during the repeated devastations of Attica this source of income was greatly diminished, and thus the equality of property was naturally calculated to bring about an equality of privileges.

Aristeides comprehended this necessity, because his mind had that peculiarity corresponding to the myopic state of the eyes. He could not see far into the future, but had remarkable discernment in things close at hand. He became so dear to the Athenians that the fame of Themistokles, often tarnished by his unprincipled thirst of money, began to grow obscured. New men were daily becoming prominent, far more violent in their antipathy to Themistokles than Aristeides himself. Of these the chief was Kimon, son of Miltiades, who was destined soon to dazzle Hellas by his achievements.

The prominent political theme was now the management of the allies, and the Athenians did not deem Themistokles capable of being intrusted with this office. The latter, however, was not the man to bear in silence such humiliation. He often reminded the people of his former services, reproached them for their ingratitude, and derided the newly elected officers for their lack of experience. He also built near his house a private shrine to Artemis, as a standing memorial that he, now almost despised and forgotten, had been the chief instrument in saving his country. Was he in communication with Pausanias at the time? No definite proof then existed, but it is certain that he loved money, and that the Persians had sent a large sum by Pausanias into Hellas. The Spartans also, who hated Themistokles, strengthened the suspicion at Athens. Therefore his political enemies easily availed themselves of the vague rumors to accuse him of treason. He was formally acquitted of the

charge, both for want of proof and on account of the obligations of the people to him. Themistokles himself strenuously denied the accusation, not without emphatic appeals to his illustrious services.

The trial, however, greatly increased the antagonism between Themistokles and the new political faction. The city was thrown into such a state of disturbance, that it was again found necessary to apply the law of ostracism, and the people voted the banishment of Themistokles. He went to reside at Argos, but continued traveling for about six years through the Peloponnesus. We may easily conjecture what were his sentiments during that time. It was impossible for him to forget that he, though now an exile, once held in his hand the future of Hellas. Deprived at last of all his power and glory, he no longer hesitated to join in the treacherous plans of Pausanias.

For a long time the plot remained hidden ; but after the death of Pausanias the documents were seized, the intrigue of Themistokles became manifest, and the Lacedæmonians accused him of high treason at Athens. Themistokles, expecting arrest, fled to Korkyra. The inhabitants of that island, though under obligations to him, could not venture to protect him, but transported him to the mainland opposite. Still followed by his pursuers, he fled to Admetus, king of the Molossians in Epirus. Driven thence, he sought refuge at Pydna in the Thermaic Gulf, and from that place, after many vicissitudes, he crossed to Ephesus.

At Athens he was proclaimed a traitor, and his property was confiscated ; but his friends secreted a considerable sum and sent it over to him in Asia, together with the money which he had left at Argos. With all this deduction, the property which he possessed of a character not susceptible of concealment, and which was therefore actually seized, amounted in value to about one hundred talents, or six hundred thousand drachmæ ; from which, and from the fact

that he commenced his career with only three talents, may be estimated the magnitude of his official peculations.

Themistokles went to Susa, where Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes, was ruling. He addressed a haughty letter to him, the memory of which was destined to be recalled, when in 1815 Napoleon I, compelled to seek refuge with his bitterest enemy, in a letter to the king of England compared himself to the famous exile of Athens. The letter of Themistokles is preserved to us by Thucydides :

"I, Themistokles, am come to thee, having done to thy house more mischief than any other Greek, as long as I was compelled in my own defense to resist the attack of thy father ; but having done him yet greater good, when I could do so with safety to myself, and when his retreat was endangered. Reward is yet owing to me for my past service. I am now here, driven away by the Greeks in consequence of my friendship for thee, but able still to serve thee with great effect. But I wish to wait a year, and then to explain my views before thee in person."

King Artaxerxes admired the address of the man, and granted him the time sought, within which Themistokles learned the Persian tongue and customs to such an extent that he was enabled to confer directly with the king. He became an influential man at the court, as none of the Greeks had hitherto been, being aided in this by the hope which he held out to King Artaxerxes of making Hellas subject to Persia—an enterprise which Themistokles, doubtless, never seriously contemplated.

Artaxerxes was so favorably impressed with his guest, that he gave him a Persian wife, ample presents, and the rule of Magnesia on the Mæander, not far from the coast of Ionia. To use an Eastern expression, Magnesia, which brought him fifty talents a year, was allotted for "bread," Lampsakus for "wine," and Myus for "provisions in general."

It must not be wondered at that Themistokles endeared himself so much to Artaxerxes ; for, says Thucydides, "Themistokles was one who most eminently displayed his natural talents, and was in this respect more worthy of admiration than any other man." Themistokles brought his family from Athens to Magnesia. He died at the age of sixty-five (about 449 B. C.), and a splendid sepulchral monument was erected in his honor by the Magnesians in their own market-place. His last known descendant was the Themistokles who, five hundred or more years later, was the fellow student and friend of Plutarch at Athens, and who still derived some income from Magnesia.

The common sentiment of Hellas could not for a long time accept the idea that he had really intended to betray his country. The thought that the bones of the savior of Hellenic liberty were lying far from his native land, in a province belonging to Asiatic despots, was unbearable. Therefore it was believed in the time of Thucydides that Themistokles died by poisoning himself, because he did not wish to execute his promises to Artaxerxes, and that his bones were secretly brought to Athens as he had requested, and were buried at the Peiræus near the walls and ship-yards which he himself had constructed. At the present time his remains are said to be resting on the right as you enter the harbor.

Aristeides.

Aristeides died three or four years after the ostracism of Themistokles, about 468—according to some at Athens, according to others in an action near the Euxine. He died extremely poor, not possessing even means sufficient for his burial. His grateful city erected to his memory a monument, set apart a sum of money for his two daughters, and made costly presents to his son Lysimachus. All his descendants, however, were poor, and the city for more than one hundred and fifty years provided for their maintenance.

CHAPTER IV.

KIMON AND PERIKLES.

THE Athenians had now reached that happy political, moral, and social position in which nations are never in want of able men, and in which new political athletes succeed those departing, more numerous and better fitted for the requirements of the age.

Among these new men Kimon and Perikles took the first rank. Kimon, son of the celebrated Miltiades, the hero of Marathon, belonged to one of the most esteemed families of Athens. By his marriage also with Isodike, a relative of Kleisthenes, he joined himself to the Alkmæonidæ, the most illustrious family of Athens.

Perikles was the son of Xanthippus, who commanded the Athenians at Mykale, and of Agariste, sister of Megakles, the grandfather of Isodike. Thus both belonged to the first families of the city, and were related by marriage. But this was the only bond between them. Like the two rivers of Bœotia, Ceroë and Asopus—both flowing from Kithæron side by side, then turning, the one to the west and emptying into the Corinthian Gulf, the other to the east and flowing into the Eubœan Sea—so Kimon and Perikles, each descended from an illustrious race and to some extent related to the other, entered upon divergent careers, one distinguishing himself especially in war and the other in civic affairs. The former showed himself conservative, the latter most radical.

Kimon lost his father at an early age. Possessing an excitable nature and an ample fortune, he gave over to pleasure and dissipation the early years of his manhood, during which years occurred the battles of Marathon and Salamis. Yet within his breast slumbered courage and

ambition, waiting only some powerful stimulus to spring to action and glorify an ignoble and aimless life. In the stirring scenes of the year 480 B. C. we find Kimon among the foremost at Salamis. Led by the good and noble Aristeides, who understood the genius of the young man, he was rapidly promoted to the highest offices, and soon succeeded his patron in his arduous command of the allied fleet.

Kimon, even after his most illustrious victories, and after being extolled in poetry as the best of the Panhellenes, was still a slave to the passions of his youth. It is said that, in the midst of sumptuous banquets, he delighted to relate the numerous thrilling incidents of his glorious military career. And, although he always kept free from bribery, he was generous to a fault in rewarding his fellow combatants. His private possessions, increased by lawful booty procured by his expeditions, were employed in public decorations, as well as in alleviating the wants of the poorer citizens. He threw open his fields to all the inhabitants of his deme, and was attended in public by well-dressed slaves, who tendered their warm tunics in exchange for the threadbare garments of those who seemed in want.

Comparing him with the eminent men of Athens who preceded him, he shows the nature of Miltiades and of Xanthippus, rather than of Themistokles and Aristeides. He was, however, more loyal than the former, and more truly a general than the commander at Mykale.

Perikles commenced his political career long after Kimon, and continued in public service for forty years (467-428). In taste, in talent, and in character, Perikles was the very opposite of Kimon—moderate in his passions, reverential in his language, careful of his money, brave, but not eager for war.

The comic poets—whose vocation at that time in Athens corresponded to a certain extent with that of the newspaper writers of to-day, condemning what was worthy of blame,

but often unjustly attacking the honorable and the good—accused Perikles, among other things, of being dissipated. It is certain, however, that he lived temperately, although he loved passionately the famed Aspasia of Miletus, after separating by mutual agreement from his lawful wife. He avoided the symposia, the conventional visits of friends, and every sort of intimacy, to such an extent that it is said of him that he never dined with any of his associates. It is said that he went to the marriage ceremony of his cousin Eurypolemus, but remained only until the conclusion of the *spondæ*.

He was the greatest orator of his time, both in eloquence and power of argument; yet he addressed the popular assembly only on the most serious occasions, acting in most cases through his friends and followers. He employed the language of common life, the vernacular idiom of Attica, even more than Thucydides; but his accurate discrimination of meanings gave his words a subtlety and pregnancy which was a main ingredient in the nervous energy of his life. Although there was more of reasoning than of imagination in his speeches, he had no difficulty in giving a vivid and impressive coloring to his language by the use of striking metaphors and comparisons; and, as the prose of the day was altogether unformed, he could not help expressing himself poetically. Many of these figurative expressions and apothegms in the speeches of Perikles have been preserved by Aristotle and others; as when he said of the Samians that "they were like little children who cried when they took food"; or when, at the funeral of a number of young persons who had fallen in battle, he used the beautiful figure that "the year had lost its spring." *

Possessed of such a nature, and being thoughtful, cold, and distant, most of all to his relatives, he is said also to have received from early youth the most finished education

* Muller and Donaldson's "History of the Literature of Ancient Greece."

possible at that time. He was taught music, science, and rhetoric by the most capable teachers of the day. He was the friend and pupil of the famous philosopher Anaxagoras, whom the men of that day called "Mind," partly on account of his wisdom and his experience in physiology, and partly because he taught that the highest force in nature is not Chance or Necessity, but Mind. By this intercourse with Anaxagoras, Perikles rid himself of many prevalent superstitions. He formed his home life amid a circle of select and distinguished friends, such as Protagoras and Zeno, over which the beautiful and Muse-crowned Aspasia presided. Compared with the distinguished Athenians of earlier days, he partakes not so much of the character of Miltiades or Xanthippus as of Aristides and Themistokles ; but he possessed incomparably more genius than the former, and more integrity than the latter.

One would suppose at first view, therefore, that Kimon was a demagogue and Perikles rather a conservative and aristocrat. But this was not the case. Plutarch, speaking of the external appearance of Perikles, says that his body was without blemish, but his head disproportionately long ; for which reason artists always represent him wearing a helmet, to hide the shape of the cranium. So the thoughtfulness of the man covered as a helmet the plans of his mind, destined finally to draw to him the confidence and sympathy of rich and poor, more surely than all the loud and open-hearted familiarity of Kimon.

By means of the amendment of Aristides, all citizens acquired the right of being chosen to office ; but it is evident that the poorer classes, occupied as they were with their own labors, could not well exercise their new privilege. Thus affairs continued in the same general condition as before. Perikles maintained that the city would reach its acme of moral, intellectual, and material force only when all its citizens, rich and poor, should have as their only true

occupation the management of public affairs. He therefore commenced by magnificent and costly public works, and regular outlay of money from the national treasury, to furnish the poor with such means as would enable them to exercise their political rights.

Kimón was of another opinion. He contended that the city, by granting to all equal rights, had done its full duty; that the present business of every citizen was to secure influence by his own well-directed industry, and thus profit each by his own acquirements.

Hence a bitter political animosity resulted, during which the people took sides with Perikles. But, however great the name of Perikles may be, and however closely linked with the glory of Athens, it must be conceded that in this question Kimón's views were the more correct. It is never the duty of the public treasury to feed the citizens. Whenever the people's money has been used for such a purpose, the government has fostered indolence and poverty, destroyed all virtues that energy and diligence produce, dulled the conviction that the future of every man depends upon his own energy, and finally surrendered the government to the mercy of demagogues and tyrants.

It must not be understood that Perikles was influenced by the ignoble passions of a demagogue. Far from it! His constitution was fatal to Athenian interests solely because he thought that he could replace the material success and self-reliance resulting from the industry of citizens by gifts from the public treasury. This, and this only, corrupted the people of Athens. So long as Perikles managed affairs, the city certainly remained at the height of its glory and power. But the various pernicious results of the new political organization instituted by him sprang up immediately after his death, because the fortunes of the city passed into the hands of base and unprincipled citizens.

This moral change began to show itself even during his

life. For Thucydides, in his wonderful encomium, intimates that the constitution, instead of being democratic, became monarchical, and the people, instead of controlling the leading man, as they did in the case of Miltiades and Themistokles, were in fact swayed by him. This was perhaps a benefit as long as Perikles was at the helm ; but when men like Kleon, Hyperbolus, Theramenes, and Kritias occupied the place, it was far otherwise. A government can flourish only when it is not unrestrictedly managed by its officers, but when the people examine into their conduct, and are ever ready and strong to restrain excess. Athens had entered a glorious career during the first half of the fifth century, and perhaps would have continued for a long time in this path had the voice of Kimon been heard. But the people eagerly embraced the innovations ; Kimon was engaged in foreign wars ; and thus Perikles could without serious obstacles secure the accomplishment of his purposes.

CHAPTER V.

RAPID EXPANSION OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.

Domination over the Allied States.

It has been mentioned that the supremacy of the allied Hellenic fleet passed from Sparta to Athens (477 B. C.), and that Sparta and the Peloponnesians withdrew from the war against the Persians. This epoch is one of the most critical in the Hellenic history. Up to the wars with the Medes the nation was divided into various independent states. Sparta controlled most of the Peloponnesus, but the first practical evidence of her predominating power appeared about the end of the sixth century, and after that time her authority

proved itself weak. Finally, during the wars with the Medes, all the Hellenic cities that had undertaken the struggle for independence placed themselves under command of Sparta, not from ambitious efforts on her own part to acquire it, but, as Grote well remarks, from the converging tendencies of Hellenic feeling which required some such presiding state, and from the commanding military power, rigid discipline, and ancient undisturbed constitution, which attracted that feeling toward Sparta. But Sparta was lamentably deficient in comprehensive policy, and in business tact and flexibility of dealing; and the larger the union became, the more her deficiency became manifest. Hence this union lasted only three years, 480-477.

The nation, however, did not again return to its former condition of separate and independent states. It now became divided into two great parts, over one of which Athens presided, depending chiefly upon her navy, and over the other Sparta, relying upon her infantry. For at least thirty years Athens alone, assisted by her energetic democracy, made marked increase in power and wealth. Sparta during this period either remained neutral or endeavored to throw obstacles in the way of the success of Athens, which, however, did not impede her triumphant march. The hands of Sparta were fettered by the treacherous plans of Pausanias, as well as by a great revolt of the Helots. During the years now under consideration, Sparta therefore remained unnoticed, while Athens presided over the Hellenic world, and effected by the great extent of her sway that political, military, intellectual, and practical progress for which the Hellenic name is famous.

It has been stated that the first aggregate assessment of tribute paid by the allies in 477 amounted to four hundred and sixty talents. This was increased at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war (forty-six years after the first formation of the confederacy) to six hundred talents. We

know also that for a few years all members of the alliance maintained their independence ; that during this time affairs were managed by the common assembly at Delos ; that the city of Athens had simply the presidency, but that this presidency in later years became a despotism ; that most of the allied cities lost their autonomy, the common assembly ceasing to convene ; that the treasury was removed from Delos to Athens ; and that this latter city became absolute mistress of most of the states over which formerly she had merely presided. This change was naturally destined to occur.

The execution of the various obligations imposed on the cities by order of the assembly was generally allotted to the Athenians. From the first they undertook the collection of the tribute, and also took care that each city should regularly furnish the prescribed quota of money, ships, and men. But, as neither was ready at the time called for, the Athenians were compelled to enforce the tribute. This was the prime cause of their interference in the internal affairs of the allied cities. In course of time many cities sought permission not to furnish ships and crews, but in their stead to contribute a proportionate amount of money. The Athenians eagerly accepted the exchange, and supplied with their own ships and crews what was wanting. It is evident that their ascendancy must have correspondingly increased, and naturally the cities which furnished only money could not be regarded as having equal rights and an equal vote with themselves.

Perhaps the tributary cities still sent ambassadors to Delos ; but on the voting, the ambassadors of Athens could say to them, what Amompharetus once said to Pausanias, that there is "vote and vote," and that the rock which his athletic hands cast before the feet of the general had more weight than all the little pebbles cast by the other generals.

Finally, several cities, either from their own free will

or incited by Sparta, desired to withdraw from this alliance, furnishing neither money, ships, nor crews. Athens, acting seemingly on the recommendation of the assembly, began to reduce these cities to submission, and thus rendered them subjects instead of allies. Since the votes of the subject cities were lost in the assembly, being given to the city of Athens, the latter treated nearly all her former allies as dependents, and their contribution as her own revenue.

Capture of Eion and Skyros.

The first object of the alliance was of course the expulsion of the Persians from Hellenic soil ; and as soon as the Athenians took command of the fleet they captured the important post of Eion on the Strymon, after a desperate resistance by its Persian governor Boges. For this first achievement of Kimon the people showed their gratitude by inscribing his name on the Hermæ* (rectangular columns of stone which stood in various public thoroughfares and before the houses of the city).

Not long afterward Kimon attacked the Dolopes and Pelasgi in the island of Skyros (about 470 B. C.), who, having robbed certain Thessalian traders, had been sentenced by the Amphiktyonic synod to make recompense. Availing himself of this opportunity, he conquered the island, which had a fine harbor and was adjacent to Lemnos, expelled the inhabitants, and peopled it with Athenian settlers.

On his return to Athens, he was received with honor befitting the great city which so well knew how to combine intellectual and political life. Just at that time a dramatic contest was going on between the already aged Æschylus and the young Sophokles. The spectators being divided as to the merits of the disputants, the archon Aphepsion chose no judges, but, seeing Kimon with his fellow generals en-

* 'Ηγεμόνεσσι δὲ μισθὸν Ἀθηναῖοι τὰδ' ἔδωκαν'
 Αὐτ' εὐεργεσίας καὶ μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν.

ter the theatre and perform the customary libations, had them sworn to decide the contest. Sophokles was declared the victor. Æschylus took his defeat to heart, and departed to Sicily, where he died (at Gela) in 456 B. C.

About three years or more after this incident the first breach of union in the confederacy of Delos took place, in the revolution of Naxos, the largest of the *Kyklades*; which, however, was soon reduced to submission. The alliance, meanwhile, did not neglect its main object; and though the historians mention only the recovery of Eion from the Persians, it is quite probable that other successes were gained against the barbarians.

Double Battle on the Eurymedon.

About 466 B. C. the allies undertook a great expedition to the southwestern and southern coasts of Asia Minor. Kimon, at the head of two hundred Athenian and one hundred allied triremes, drove the garrisons of the enemy from several Hellenic settlements, both in Karia and Lykia, and captured the well-known commercial city Phaselis.

In the mean time the Persians had collected a powerful land and naval force near the mouth of the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia. Their fleet was chiefly Phœnician, and amounted to two hundred triremes; but a reënforcement of eighty Phœnician ships was daily expected, and previous to their arrival the Persian generals did not wish to engage in battle. Kimon forced an engagement, put the enemy's vessels to flight, and drove them to the shore so quickly, and with so little loss to himself, that he was able immediately afterward to land his own troops and give battle to the Persian infantry on the coast. The contest on land was long and obstinate, but finally Kimon routed the enemy, captured many prisoners, and either took or destroyed the entire fleet.

Having accomplished this victory, he sailed to Kyprus to seize the approaching force of Phœnician vessels. By good

fortune he met them before they had received tidings of the disaster at the Eurymedon, and destroyed them all, though most of the crews succeeded in escaping to the coast of Cyprus.

This threefold victory of Kimon on the same day, and by the same fleet, was regarded as the most glorious of the heroic achievements of Hellas against the Persians, and was extolled as such in the inscription * on the commemorative offering to Apollo which was set up out of the tithe of the spoils.

Capture of Thasos.

The increasing glory and power of the Athenians was more and more a stimulus to their enterprise and ambition. After taking possession of Eion, they attempted to capture the rich gold-mines in that region. This brought them into hot dispute with the Greeks of the opposite island of Thasos, who for a long time had possessed a large tract of that land, with many tributary cities on the mainland of Thrace. The Athenians at once laid siege to Thasos, and, after a blockade of two years (464 and 463), compelled her to raze her fortifications, to surrender her thirty-three triremes, to release her possessions and mines on the opposite continent, and to pay an immediate and heavy fine, and thereafter a yearly tribute.

The capture of Thasos is linked with another event which deserves particular notice, as indicating the beginning of a new and serious conflict. While the Thasians were in a state of siege, they secretly sought the assistance of the Lacedæ-

* 'Εξ οὗ τ' Εὐρώπην Ἀσίας δίχα πόντος ἔνειμεν,
καὶ πόλις θνητῶν θούρος Ἀρης ἐφέπει,
οὐδενὶ πω κάλλιον ἐπιχθονίων γένητ' ἀνδρῶν
ἔργον ἐν ἡπείρῃ καὶ κατὰ πόντον ὁμοῦ.
Οἶδε γὰρ ἐν γαίῃ Μήδων πολλοὺς ὑλέσαντες
Φοινίκων ἑκατὸν ναῦς ἔλδον ἐν πελάγει
ἀνδρῶν πληθούσας μέγα δ' ἔστανεν Ἀσίς ὑπ' αἰτῶν
πληγεῖσ' ἀμφοτέραις χερσὶ, κράτει πολέμου.

monians, who promised to invade Attica for the purpose of diverting the attention of the Athenians. They were not able to carry out their promise, but their assent shows clearly that they were not indifferent to the increasing power of that city.

Revolt of the Helots.

Of the incidents which occurred in Hellas during the fifteen years following the battle of Plataea we have scarcely any information. The decree of the assembly at Corinth, levying on the Greeks who had espoused the cause of the Medes a fine of one tenth of their property, does not appear to have been enforced. But Thebes lost for many years her supremacy over the rest of Bœotia; and the Theban government, for its un-Hellenic spirit during the invasion of Xerxes, was in discredit even in the estimation of the Thebans themselves.

Sparta was occupied with matters of minor importance, when suddenly in 464 B. C.—the year preceding the surrender of Thasos to the Athenians—a terrible earthquake destroyed an important part of the city, and killed many citizens. The Helots, seizing their opportunity, rushed to arms, and, with the assistance of some of the inhabitants of the adjacent districts, threatened to complete the destruction of the city. They were repelled by the young and brave king Archidamus, but were not subdued. Seizing Ithome, the ancient citadel of their Messenian forefathers, they continued hostilities with such vehemence and persistence that the Lacedæmonians were forced to seek assistance from their allies.

When the matter was submitted to the assembly of the people at Athens, the rivalry between Kimon and Perikles was at its height. Perikles would have deterred the citizens from strengthening their most formidable opponent, but Kimon energetically sustained the Spartan request, on the ground that it was unjust that the city which, next to Athens, had contributed most toward the preservation of Hellenic liberty, should be abandoned in her need. Kimon was not an orator,

but, like any man of strong passions and steadfast convictions, would occasionally rise to heights of eloquence. His many glorious achievements also gave him powerful influence at Athens, and it was decided that he should hasten to the assistance of Sparta with four thousand men.

The means of laying siege to places strongly fortified were so crude, that not even with the aid of the Athenians were they able to effect the capture of Ithome. Disputes arose between the latter and the Spartans, who finally came to suspect these "Ionic strangers whom they had introduced into the interior of Laconia," as not unlikely to make terms with the besieged. They therefore dismissed them, on the pretext that they no longer needed their help, while they retained all the rest of the allies and continued the war as before.

Ostracism of Kimon.

This dismissal was deemed a premeditated insult to Athens, and tended to weaken the party of Kimon and to strengthen that of Perikles. The adherents of the latter availed themselves of the change in public sentiment, and attempted various innovations in home and foreign relations, by which a mortal wound was inflicted at once upon the opposite party and upon Sparta. By reason of the daily increasing animosity of the two factions, it was deemed necessary to resort again to the expedient of ostracism; and as the populace was constantly becoming more attached to Perikles, the latter obtained the six thousand votes necessary to banish his formidable antagonist. At the same time, at the instigation of Perikles, the Athenians officially annulled their alliance with the Lacedæmonians, and sought an opportunity even to ally themselves with land enemies of Lacedæmon.

New Alliances.

Argos, which had now recovered from her defeat of thirty years before, gladly accepted the proposal of an Athenian

alliance. The Thessalians also, incensed at Sparta on account of the invasion of Leotychides, readily entered into the new league, which was a defensive alliance against Lacedæmon. Finally, Megara, between which city and Corinth there were constant disputes concerning the boundary line, despairing of protection from the Lacedæmonians, broke its treaty with them and joined the Athenians. Thus the supremacy of Athens, which had long since become unquestioned on the sea, was now extended over a great part of the mainland of Hellas ; while the Lacedæmonians, continuing the siege of Ithome, were unable to check the growth of their redoubtable enemy.

Though the Lacedæmonians were thus fettered, the Corinthians in 460 B. C. decided, in company with their allies the Epidaurians and the Æginetans, to engage in war with Athens. The Corinthians saw themselves hemmed in by powerful enemies—on the south by the Argeians, on the north by the Megarians and the Athenians. The Æginetans, whose city Perikles called the eyesore of the Peiræus, uneasy at the increasing naval force of the Athenians, were only seeking an excuse to anticipate the threatened danger. These cities would not have dared to make an attack upon the powerful ruler of Hellas, had they not known that the forces of their antagonist were engaged in various distant expeditions.

The Athenians in 460 had energetically followed up the war against the Persians, and had sent two hundred triremes to Kyprus, to the coast of Phœnicia, and even to Memphis in Egypt, for the assistance of Inaros, who had revolted from Artaxerxes. The Persian king dispatched Megabazus to Sparta with a large sum of money, to persuade the Lacedæmonians and the other Peloponnesians to enter Attica, that the Athenians might be forced to retire from Egypt. Megabazus, deeming the Lacedæmonians powerless to do so, returned to Asia. The Corinthians, the Æginetans, and the

Epidaurians, however, hoped to find Athens destitute of defenders. In this they were disappointed.

After several minor engagements by land and sea, a great naval battle was fought off Ægina, and the allies suffered a crushing defeat. The Athenians took seventy of their ships, landed a large force upon the island, and besieged the city both by land and by sea. The Corinthians and Epidaurians sent to the assistance of the besieged Æginetans three hundred hoplites, and attempted to attack the Megarians. But the Athenians raised a temporary army, composed chiefly of the two extremes of military age, and repulsed their opponents with such loss that those who escaped returned in a demoralized condition to their respective homes.

CHAPTER VI.

THE LONG WALLS.

Battles of Tanagra and Ænophyta.

By the advice of Perikles the Athenians now undertook a colossal work—the complete fortification of their city. Much had already been done in this direction during the administration of Themistokles ; but the defenses back of the Peiræus could have been captured without great difficulty by a strong land force, and the Athenians could not hope to contend successfully in the open field with the united armies of the Peloponnesians. The Peiræus was indeed wellnigh impregnable, since the Athenians had control of the sea, and their enemies could not besiege it. But even the capture of the citadel alone would be an irreparable loss, because here lived their most influential families ; here were their most costly shrines ; here were erected their most magnificent

trophies. On this account Perikles often expressed his sorrow that Attica was not an island ; and in that famous speech delivered just before the Peloponnesian war, after having compared the forces of the Peloponnesians with those of the Athenians, he added, "If we had been islanders, what state would have been more impregnable?" Therefore he considered how this physical defect might be counterbalanced, and the capital be made as impregnable as the harbors. To this end he constructed the so-called Long Walls—one of forty stadia (about four and a half English miles), joining Athens with the Peiræus, and another of thirty-five stadia (nearly four English miles), uniting Athens with Phalerum. These walls had also the advantage of rendering secure a considerable piece of land lying between the city and the sea, within which the inhabitants of the rest of Attica could take refuge during an invasion. Compared with the warlike achievements of Kimon, this work of Perikles reveals a marked difference in the character of the two men. Kimon sought to secure the supremacy of Athens by offensive means ; Perikles, by defensive.

When the Lacedæmonians were informed of this new enterprise, they awoke from their lethargy. Though they had not yet subdued the Helots in Ithome, yet they deemed it indispensable to take some step toward maintaining their influence out of the Peloponnesus. With an army of fifteen hundred troops and ten thousand allied forces, about 456 B. C., they set out from the Peloponnesus, under command of the regent Nikomedes. The expedition was made under pretext of assisting the inhabitants of the small territory of Doris, whom the Phokians had recently attacked. The latter retreated at once before so large a force, and the army of the Peloponnesians endeavored to present some effective opposition to the aggrandizement of the Athenians.

It has been observed that Thebes had lost its ancient supremacy over Bœotia. The Spartans now occupied them-

selves in strengthening and rebuilding the fortifications of Thebes, making the rest of Bœotia submissive, and intrusting the government to the oligarchs. Thebes, recovering thus her ancient power, was destined to become the bulwark against further conquests by the Athenians on land. Besides, some of the aristocrats at Athens were ill disposed toward the innovations of Perikles, and were inclined to seek the assistance even of Sparta for the coercion of their opponents. They therefore hastened to open secret communications with the Peloponnesians in Bœotia, inviting them to penetrate into Attica, destroy the long walls, and also subvert the democracy.

The danger of Athens was great, as there was a suspicion that the ostracized Kimon and his remaining friends in the city might make terms with the conspirators and the Peloponnesians. The generals of the Athenians, deeming it indispensable to anticipate any possible movements of this sort, hastily collected an army, and, joined by a few of the allies, set out toward Tanagra. As soon as they were beyond the limits of Attica, an event occurred which displayed the noble and patriotic sentiments of Kimon. That exile, who had so often commanded and led to victory, asked as a favor to be permitted to fight as a common soldier in the ranks of his tribe, the Ēneis. But so strong was the belief that he was an accomplice in the conspiracy known to be in progress, that his political enemies refused his request. In departing he urged his friends to show by their deeds how groundless was the suspicion entertained against him. A fierce battle was fought, and the friends of Kimon bore themselves with such valor that one hundred of them fell side by side in their ranks. The Athenians, however, were defeated, mainly through the faithlessness of the Thessalian horsemen, who at the very crisis of the combat deserted to the enemy.

Far from being dispirited by this defeat, they even drew from it new strength. Acknowledging the magnanimity

and bravery of Kimon, they hastened to annul his decree of ostracism. Perikles himself submitted the proposal, thus demonstrating that in those glorious years a private grudge or a political difference always yielded to the best interests of the community. The Athenians, greatly encouraged by this reconciliation, penetrated again into Bœotia, under command of Myronides, sixty-two days after the battle at Tanagra. Grote remarks that the extreme precision of this date—being the only case in the summary of events between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars in which Thucydides is thus precise—marks the strength of the impression made upon the memory of the Athenians.

The Peloponnesians had already departed, and the forces of the Thebans and Bœotians which came to meet them were completely routed at Œenophyta. Thus the Athenians became masters both of Thebes and the remaining Bœotian cities. They reversed all the arrangements recently made by Sparta, and established everywhere democratic constitutions. Phokis and Lokris were simultaneously enrolled as their allies.

Death of Kimon—The Kimonian Treaty.

These successes were followed in the year 455 by the completion of the long walls and the subjugation of Ægina. This island was compelled to destroy her walls, surrender her ships to the Athenians, and submit to the payment of a yearly tribute.

Not long after, the admiral Tolmides sailed around the Peloponnesus, burned the Lacedæmonian ports of Methone and Gythium, captured Chalkis, a Corinthian possession, and Naupaktus, belonging to the Ozolian Lokrians, and forced into the Athenian alliance not only Zakynthus and Kephallenia, but certain other cities of Achaia.

Occasionally mishaps interrupted this continuous line of triumphs. In 454 B. C. Perikles, who was seldom fortu-

nate in military matters, was unable either to subdue Akarnania or to conquer the rebellious Thessalians. About the same time the Athenians, after a series of hostilities lasting six years against the great king in Egypt (460-455), suffered a complete disaster, lost one of the finest fleets which they had ever equipped, and saw that country again under the dominion of the Persians.

Soon after, Kimon—the favorite son of victory—avenged this misfortune. Sailing with two hundred ships against Kyprus, he besieged Kitium, and at the same time dispatched sixty triremes again to Egypt, where a certain native ruler was still fighting against the Persians. During the siege of Kitium Kimon died, either of disease or of a wound. But so great was the spirit of ambition, obedience, and high-mindedness with which he had inspired the army under his command, that even after his death, when, sailing from Kyprus, they fell in with the Phœnician and Kilikian fleet near Salamis, they offered battle. Here they were victorious, pursued the fugitives to the island, and again routed them. After this, the generals of the Athenians recalled the ships from Egypt and sailed home.

The Athenians and their allies now ceased all hostilities against the Persians. A treaty of peace was also concluded between the contending parties. By this treaty, Artaxerxes promised that he would leave the Greeks inhabiting the coast of Asia Minor free, undisturbed, and untaxed, that he would not send troops within a given distance from the shore, and that he would not send any ships of war west of Phaselis—according to some, farther west than the three islets called “the Chelidonian”—or within the Kyanean rocks at the confluence of the Thracian Bosphorus with the Euxine. In return, the Athenians surrendered Kyprus and Egypt to Artaxerxes.

To such a depth of humiliation the great king of Persia had descended, who thirty years before had dispatched her-

alds to Hellas demanding earth and water from all the cities. It is true that many ancient and modern commentators have doubted the existence of any such treaty. The strongest of their arguments is, that Thucydides does not mention it; and among the more recent writers who quote it there is a lack of agreement as to its conditions. But, if Thucydides records no such treaty, he also mentions nothing to disprove its existence. On the contrary, it is conjectured from his narrative that after the above victories hostilities between the Athenians and Persians ceased; and, up to the time when the Athenians were defeated at Syracuse, at which time the Persians again interfered in Hellenic affairs (412 B. C.), the Persian satraps in Asia Minor levied no tribute whatever upon the Ionian Greeks, nor did Persian vessels appear on the Ægean Sea. If, therefore, it may be doubted whether any actual treaty was made, it can not be questioned that affairs were in the condition said to have been provided for by the treaty. Neither is there any doubt that this triumphant result was almost wholly due to the heroic achievements of Kimon; and, although he died before the last victory in Kyprus, which preceded the declaration of peace, history has still named it the "Kimonian treaty."

CHAPTER VII.

CULMINATION OF THE ATHENIAN SUPREMACY.

Changes at Athens under Perikles.

THE Athenians had now not only compelled the Persians to recognize the independence of the Hellenic cities, but, actuated by one will enthroned at Athens, had also succeeded in establishing a great government. Sparta, although she had

(about 455 B. C.) subdued the Helots in Ithome, attempted nothing against her all-powerful and prosperous antagonist. On the contrary, in 450 she entered into an official alliance with her. This was the epoch in which the supremacy of the Athenians reached its Olympian height of glory.

A glance at the internal regulations of the city of Athens will give us a clear insight into this existing condition of affairs. We shall find the authority of Perikles all-powerful, although he had many co-workers. The foremost of these was Ephialtes, son of Sophonides, who during the first year of Perikles' power acquired great influence as the representative of the democratic party—an influence greater even than that of Perikles himself. Ephialtes was murdered by the oligarchs, and Perikles remained the sole popular leader at Athens. It was probably he who introduced the choice by lot, instead of the raising of hands, in electing archons, and indeed all other public officers except the generals. The archons and the Areopagus were also deprived of every judicial function which they formerly had, except that of imposing certain petty fines. The judicial authority was granted to the numerous tribunals called "Heliastai" (from the Greek *ἑλίσσεται*, to gather), which were composed as follows: Six thousand citizens were annually chosen by lot, who, after having been sworn, were distributed into ten dikasteries or tribunals of five hundred each; the remaining one thousand were used as a reserve to supply vacancies. The archon, instead of himself deciding, as formerly, was compelled to summon the sworn tribunal, and submit to them every act demanding a severer punishment than the nominal fine which alone he was permitted to impose. It was determined by lot which tribunal should decide the case, so that no one knew beforehand what dikastery would try any action. The archon presided, and submitted the question on which a decision was demanded, and the result of the examination previously made by himself; after which the plaintiff and defendant, as well

as the witnesses, were introduced. Both the political and civil disputes which had formerly been determined by the archon, were now turned over to the tribunals of the *Helias-tai*. Finally, all disputes among the subject cities, all complaints which the citizens of one city brought against those of another, and all prominent suits, especially cases of homicide, were decided by these tribunals at Athens.

Such tribunals had, indeed, existed before the time of Perikles; but to his efforts alone were due the systematic division of them into classes and their enlarged jurisdiction. Jurors' pay was also established, by which each juror could receive a compensation of three obols or half a drachma per day. Besides this, there was the "assembly-pay," or the daily remuneration which each citizen received as soon as he entered the assembly of the people. This pay, which from six thousand to eight thousand could receive at every session, was at first one obol, but it was subsequently tripled. It was also resolved that the city should remunerate and sustain the citizens who served as soldiers. The hoplites were allowed two obols each day, and an equal amount for food; the officers double this; and the horsemen three times as much. There is also mentioned the pay of the *boule*, each member of which received about a drachma per day.

The city could well afford these salaries, because, although the sum of the yearly revenue of the Athenians is not stated, we know that the tribute of the allies alone was at first four hundred and sixty talents a year, that later it reached the sum of six hundred, and finally amounted to one thousand talents (equal to six million drachmæ) or more. To appreciate the real value of this sum, we must bear in mind that, while the circulating gold and silver was much less in amount than to-day, the relative value of coin was at least six or eight times greater. Thus these six million drachmæ were equal to thirty-six or even forty-eight millions of modern drachmæ (\$6,120,000 to \$8,160,000). A conclusive proof of

the vast income of the Athenians is the fact that, after meeting all the expenses of the city and the construction of the many costly buildings which adorned it, they were able, during the time of Perikles, to lay aside within five years eight thousand talents, the relative value of which can not be considered less than three hundred millions of modern drachmæ (\$51,000,000).

These laws were enacted in order that even the poorest citizen might share in the administration of the government. This was in a measure absolutely necessary for the safety of the city. Its authority extended over nearly half of the Hellenic race, and controlled, it is supposed, from eight to ten millions of people; but the whole multitude did not equally share in the execution of the constitution and the laws. Originally, in ancient Hellas, a large part of the inhabitants were slaves. In fact, there were countries in which the slaves were several times more numerous than the free-men. In Attica, for instance, which had a population of five hundred thousand men, more than four hundred thousand were slaves. Even the free citizens were not all citizens of the same city. Many belonged to the various allies, who had little interest in the preservation of the greatness of Athens, and not a few were actually hostile to it.

Thus the supremacy of the state was really dependent on the Athenians alone, who could muster only about thirty thousand men fit for military duty. Now, many of this small number were occupied with their private affairs, and neglected the common interests. Hence the confederation of the empire, accomplished with much trouble, could not have been maintained without some device for concentrating their thoughts and energies on the preservation of their political influence; and this was the question which Perikles attempted to solve. The problem was most difficult—perhaps, indeed, impossible of solution. Though many of the acts of Perikles were wise and judicious, the paying of so many

salaries from the common treasury was ruinous in its results. For, although small in amount, they sufficed for the maintenance of the citizens. It was said that at Athens a family could live on five or six hundred drachmæ per annum; so that the pay of a cavalryman at two drachmæ per day was more than enough for a whole family. Various members of the same family could serve—one in the boule, another in the dikastery, and still others as soldiers, thus receiving ample wages. Hence, all the poor rushed to the public service, and the object of Perikles seemed to have succeeded; and that great diplomatist attempted to supply yet another need of the people from the public treasury.

Dramatic Poetry—Decline of Individual Energy.

The production of the best masterpieces of tragedy began soon after the expulsion of Xerxes from Hellas, succeeding the era of lyric poetry, just as the lyric had supplanted the epic of the heroic age. Æschylus, the creator of the tragedy, or at least the first poet through whom the drama became glorious, fought, as we have seen, both at Marathon and Salamis. Of his two famous successors, Sophokles was proclaimed victor over Æschylus about 470 B. C., and in 455 was represented the first tragedy of Euripides. Only a few of the works of these poets have descended to us, but these are sufficient to give us a complete idea of the loftiness of the ancient Hellenic drama. These dramatists were not the only ones then flourishing. The names (and unfortunately only the names) of many contemporaries have come down to us, who sometimes proved themselves even more successful in the contests. Philokles received the prize in a contest in which his opponent Sophokles was represented by his immortal "Œdipus Tyrannus." Euphorion, son of Æschylus, Xenokles, and Nikomachus were each victorious over Euripides. Besides these are mentioned Neophron, Ion, Agathon, and others.

At first admission to the theatre was free, but, in consequence of the enormous crowds, payment was rendered necessary. As the poor were unable to pay the price of admission, Perikles enacted a law under which the public paid for the ticket of every citizen. Later, this disbursement from the treasury was extended to other public feasts, so that finally sufficient money was set apart for the poor to enjoy all holidays. These innovations could not but result in fostering a spirit of indolence in the multitude, and in accustoming them to depend, not upon their own resources, but upon the treasury.

Thus gradually but surely were destroyed all the virtues which are produced by industry and by the ambition which the working man should have for ameliorating his condition. The poor, although supported by disbursements from the treasury, remained always poor, while the richer of the Athenians increased their property largely by the wonderful development of commerce. During the time of Solon seven talents was considered a large fortune, while now there were men like Nikias, Kallias, and Alkibiades, who acquired or inherited one hundred talents or more. The greatest inequality in condition was the result, and the poor became the impotent tools of the rich. As soon as the tributes of the allies began to accumulate at Athens, and the revenues of the public treasury were largely increased, the people, instead of serving as before in the military force, took especial care to draw their salaries and tickets for feasts, while their martial spirit and enterprise diminished, and the destruction of their empire rapidly approached. Thus, as we have said, the disbursements of Perikles were the prominent cause of the decline of Athens. But in the middle of the fifth century B. C. we are still far from this period of decline. Perikles enacted many wise and judicious laws, which tended to preserve for a time the power of the city.

Before the time of Perikles the Athenian citizens had

begun to settle the lands conquered by the city, taking lots from the former inhabitants of these countries. These land-owners outside of Attica were called "Klerouchi," and differed from the colonists in that the latter were gradually developing into free, independent cities, while the former were considered as forming an integral part of Attica. Perikles, however, multiplied these Klerouchi, and with this double object : first, to secure a means of living to the poorer citizens ; and, secondly, to use them as garrisons to suppress any revolt. Thus these Klerouchi rendered to the state great service in preserving the supremacy of the Athenians, and were not subject to the imputation of being supported by the public treasury.

Public Works.

The other great work of Perikles, the credit of which is due to him alone, was his attempt to enlarge the revenues of the poor by employing them upon many and magnificent public buildings. By his energy, and under the immediate supervision of Pheidias, there were erected at Athens most of the glorious masterpieces—the temples, market-places, theatres, shrines, gymnasia, fountains, and baths—the remnants of which still command the admiration of all the civilized world. It is true that most of these buildings were finished during the first years of the following period, but all were the immediate production of the brilliant epoch, called the age of Perikles, whose splendors we are now recording.

The new theatre, termed the Odeon, intended for the musical and scenic spectacles of the great feast of the Panathenæa, and the inimitable temple of Athene called the Parthenon, adorned by the most exquisite masterpieces of sculpture and statuary, were erected between 445 and 437 B. C. ; and the magnificent Propylæa, on the Acropolis, between 437 and 431. The reconstruction of the Erechtheium, or ancient temple of Athene Polias, which had been burned in the

invasion of Xerxes, was then also begun, as was also the construction of the great temple of Demeter at Eleusis, for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries, of the temple of Athene at Sunium, and that of Nemesis at Rhamnus.

Three statues of Athene, the work of the inspired hand of Pheidias, decorated the Acropolis: the first, forty-seven feet high, of ivory, in the Parthenon; a second of bronze, of the Lemnian Athene, so called from being dedicated by the Athenians in Lemnos, which Pausanias calls "the most worthy of admiration of the works of Pheidias";* and a third, the greatest of all, also of bronze, called the Athene Promachos, placed between the Propylæa and the Parthenon. This was so colossal, that it is asserted that the point of the spear and the crest of the helmet of Athene were visible to one sailing from the open sea toward the Peiræus.

Without the protection and energy of Perikles, it would have been difficult for these inimitable artists to produce their great works, which, according to the most moderate calculation, cost three thousand talents (about \$3,450,000). Perikles was the prime mover in causing the city to engage in plans involving such enormous expenses. The treasury was rich, and the wars against the Persians had ceased; so that he deemed it of great benefit to the city to use for its adornment at least the surplus money. And the fact that he of all the Athenians mainly induced the city to undertake this expenditure, is evident from the accusation made against him of spending the money Hellas had been obliged to contribute toward the war in gilding the city and ornamenting it with statues and temples that cost a thousand talents. (The Parthenon is said to have cost this sum.) The answer which, according to Plutarch, Perikles gave presents eloquently and graphically all the political and social results, for the success of which the construction of these various buildings was undertaken. He replied to the charge by

* τῶν ἔργων τοῦ Φειδίου θέας μάλιστα ἄξιον.

observing that "the Athenians were not obliged to give the allies any account of the sums they had received, since they kept the barbarians at a distance, and effectually protected the allies, who had furnished neither horses, ships, nor men, but contributed only money, which is no longer the property of the giver, but of the receiver, if the latter shall perform the conditions under which it is received ; that as the state was provided with all the necessaries of war, its superfluous wealth should be expended on such works as, when executed, would be eternal monuments of its glory, and which, during their execution, would diffuse a universal plenty ; for as so many kinds of labor and such a variety of instruments and materials were requisite to these undertakings, every art would be exerted, every hand employed, and almost the whole city would be in receipt of pay, and at the same time both adorned and supported by itself. . . . Thus, by the exercise of the different trades, plenty was diffused among persons of every rank and condition. Works of an astonishing magnitude and of inimitable beauty and perfection were accomplished, each architect striving to surpass the magnificence of the design by the elegance of the execution."

Perikles, therefore, undertook these public works especially in order to employ the idle hands and to give them the means of livelihood. It must be confessed that his design was well conceived, because, while he contributed to the adornment of the city, while he encouraged every art and industry, while he sustained the multitude and held it clustered about one centre, this measure had none of the vicious tendency of other disbursements from the treasury. It must not be forgotten, however, that the plan of Perikles could not have been carried out except through the surplus of the treasury, which accrued only through the supremacy of the Athenians, brought about by the great men who had preceded him.

The Periklean Age.

During this period, Perikles obtained great power at Athens, where he exercised almost monarchical authority. Previous to the year 457 B. C. he could not even be considered the leader of his political party, as Ephialtes was the more influential. Besides, as long as Kimon lived, until the year 449, his brilliant military glory darkened somewhat the political fame of his rival. Even after the death of Kimon, the aristocratic party possessed a general who, though not as fortunate as the victor at Eurymedon, yet, with great advantages and a character more like that of Perikles, became for some time a dangerous opponent. This new general of the aristocratic party, Thucydides, son of Melesias, must not be confounded with the famous historian. He was a statesman and an orator rather than a general, though able to serve in either capacity, as indeed were all who were prominent in public affairs. Thucydides reorganized and prepared his party for a struggle against Perikles, having persuaded his adherents, the "honorable and respectable" citizens, as we find them styled, to attend regularly the public assembly, "sitting together in a particular section, so as to be conspicuously parted from the demos"; to specify beforehand those that were to address them, and to sustain them by applause. He inspired them with such a spirit of obedience and order, that, though outnumbered by their opponents, they became a greater source of fear than before. Thucydides was himself an excellent orator, hardly inferior to Perikles.

But the latter finally triumphed, both by his gigantic intellectual ability, and by the many and various benefits which he inaugurated in behalf of the people. As soon as he felt that his influence was predominant, he vigorously undertook the carrying out of his political system. It was at this time that many of those ordinances were enacted which

are so closely linked with his name. Then were erected those buildings which Time, the destroyer of all things, revered for centuries, and which bear testimony not only to the genius of their founder, but also to the fact that by them Perikles succeeded in completely and fully applying his political system. Peace and prosperity prevailed at Athens during their erection, the power of Perikles seemed secure, while art, commerce, and industry received a splendid and powerful impetus.

Perikles seems to have held steadily in view a threefold object : to give the people ample employment ; to strongly fortify the city, that its ascendancy might be better maintained ; and to adorn and beautify it by every measure in his power, that he might thus render it worthy of its proud preëminence. Already the city was joined by two long walls to Phalerum and the Peiræus ; a third middle wall was built parallel with the one leading to the Peiræus, and distant from it only about five hundred and fifty feet, so that the union of the latter with the city became still more secure. About the same time the famous navy-yards were constructed at the Peiræus, upon which, according to Isokrates, an Athenian orator who flourished in the next century, were spent not less than a thousand talents.

While the city was thus strengthened, the Hekatompedon Parthenon, the Propylæa, the Odeon, and the other numerous works of art which adorned the citadel, the city, and all Attica, imparted to it a splendor surpassing that of any other Hellenic city, especially when we bear in mind that with this material eminence was linked a surpassing culture and intellectual growth. During these years Sophokles reached the summit of his glory ; Euripides was beginning his career ; the political eloquence of Perikles, and of Thucydides, son of Melesias, was at its height ; the astronomer Meton was calculating the more exact measurement of time ; Aristophanes and Thucydides were preparing their master-

pieces ; and Sokrates was beginning his arguments against the Sophists.

Yet all these facts do not of themselves suffice to show what Athens was at that period. The men thus far mentioned were all Athenians by race. The city, like an irresistible magnet, was drawing to herself from all Hellas every artisan, every philosopher, every historian, who looked toward her as the sacred hearth of the Muses, where alone could their works be accomplished, esteemed, and crowned. It was then that Herodotus of Halikarnassus hastened to Athens, and spent there a few years. It was before that people he so loved and so preëminently characterized that, having recited portions of his history in the great festival of the Panathenæa of 446 B. C., he was rewarded by the city in a manner in which even the most liberal monarchs have rarely rewarded the best intellectual productions : he received ten talents, equal to about 400,000 drachmæ (\$68,000 of our day).

At this period there came also to Athens Anaxagoras of Klazomenæ, Zeno of Elea, the chief of the Eleatic school of philosophers, and Protagoras of Abdera—all friends of Perikles, who discussed with them the highest questions of philosophy. There also appeared Hippodamus the Milesian, the renowned naturalist and still more famous architect, who superintended the construction of the citadel and laid out the Peiræus on a regular plan. The grateful Athenians gave the name of the artisan to the market-place of the Peiræus, by calling it the Hippodamian Agora. Thither came also Polygnotus the Thasian, who was invested with citizenship, in return for which favor he gratuitously painted the Theseum, the Pinakotheka or receptacle of pictures, and many other splendid decorations of the city. In addition to this, he instituted a school of painting, which became the foremost in Hellas, and produced many eminent masters, among whom was Dionysius of Kolophon.

Thus, if Athens did not rule all Hellas, she had without doubt become the intellectual center of the whole Hellenic nation, the stimulus of Hellenic feeling, and "the type of strong democratical patriotism combined with full liberty of individual taste and aspiration."

Availing himself of these advantages, Perikles, a little before the thirty years' truce, proposed a measure which at first appeared destined to realize the dream so often vainly pursued by the Hellenic nation during the first period of its glory—the dream of its complete union. At his suggestion a decree was passed, by which all Greeks, either in Europe or Asia, were invited to send to Athens representatives to consider : 1. The rebuilding of the shrines and temples which had been burned by the barbarians ; 2. The fulfillment of such vows as on that occasion the Greeks had offered to the gods ; 3. The safety of maritime commerce for all.

This was intended as a Panhellenic congress for Panhellenic purposes. But what was the probable object of Perikles? Did he intend by this congress to unite the Hellenic nation on the basis of an equality of rights, which alone could bring about the completion and strengthening of such an empire? His plans, whatever they might have been, failed through the mistrust of the Peloponnesians and of many other Greeks, who regarded the congress as a pretense to enslave the whole of the Hellenic people, and consequently sent no representatives to Athens. Thus the scheme of Perikles was frustrated.

However brilliant the city of Athens was daily becoming, however confessedly great was her material and intellectual vigor, there was in Hellas a strong autonomical sentiment, to which the supremacy of that city was in open opposition. On account of this, the states already subdued were irritated at the loss of their liberty, and those still free feared lest they might suffer a like fate. On the other hand, the sub-

ject cities were oppressed by the imposed tax, by the obligation of submitting most of their differences to the tribunals at Athens, and by the numberless extortions practiced by the Athenian generals, overseers, sailors, and even private citizens. Thus the great and splendid empire of the Athenians was founded on sand ; those beautiful and diversified flowers of poetry, of art, of rhetoric, of philosophy, were blooming upon the slopes of a volcano whose crater, bursting forth in the revolutions at Naxos, Thasos, Bœotia, Phokis, Lokris, Eubœa, and Megara, was destined after the thirty years' truce, and after the abandonment by the Athenians of every continental possession, to shake from its foundations their supremacy, and to demonstrate again that not even their sway over the seas was secure.

Causes and Extent of Athenian Supremacy.

In order to grant each due justice, let us add, in conclusion, that toward this pinnacle of glory which the Athenians reached about the middle of the fifth century B. C. four men contributed almost equal shares : Themistokles, who, having constructed the first fleet, prepared the material of the great edifice of the supremacy ; Aristides, who, by forming the first nautical alliance, laid its corner-stone ; Kimon, who, by his glorious achievements against the Persians and the revolutionists, completed the structure ; and finally, Perikles, who, by his various measures and ordinances, arranged and adorned it.

Perikles not only regulated and beautified the empire, but he also bequeathed to posterity a picture of the glory of Athens whose beauty and style is so lofty and the expression so grand, that the man may truly be called the Pheidias of oratory. It is in his immortal funeral oration, delivered the first year of the Peloponnesian war, and which Thucydides has preserved to us. The following extract may per-

haps give some idea of the man, and of the moral, political, and social state of the Athenians at that time :

"In short, I say the whole city is a school for Hellas, and in my opinion the same individual would among us prove himself qualified for the most various kinds of action. . . . That this is not mere vaunting language, but sober truth, the very power of the state, which we have won by such habits, is itself proof. For it is the only country at the present time that, when brought to the test, proves greater than its fame ; the only one that neither gives to the enemy who has attacked us any cause for indignation at being worsted by such opponents, nor to him who is subject to us room for finding fault, as not being ruled by men who are worthy of the empire. But we shall be admired both by present and future generations as having with striking proofs exhibited our power to the world, and as having no further need either of Homer to praise us, or of any one else who might charm for the moment by his verses, while the truth of the facts would prove false the idea formed by them. We have made every sea and land accessible to our daring, and have everywhere established records, whether of evil or of good. It was for such a country, then, that these men, nobly resolving not to have it taken from them, fell in battle ; and every one of their survivors may well be willing to suffer in its behalf."

Such was the city of Athens about the middle of the fifth century B. C. What were the actual bounds of her empire can not be definitely estimated. It certainly comprised Megaris, Bœotia, Phokis, Lokris, Eubœa, Ægina, all the Kyklades with the exception of Melos and Thera, the cities and islands on the southern coast of Thrace, those along the Hellespont, the Propontis, and the Thracian Gulf, many towns on the Euxine, the islands and nearly all the cities of the western coast of Asia Minor, many of those of Lykia, and also Naupaktus and the islands Kephallenia and Zakynthus

in the Ionian Sea. Fully one half of the Hellenic nation had joined itself to the empire of Athens. Perikles was now considering the project of summoning to Athens a common assembly of the Greeks, thus preparing for the national union of the states which heretofore had been not only independent, but too often at variance. Even Sparta had not now the strength to cope with Athens, nor was she able to retard her progress. The time would seem to have come in Hellenic history to combine the separate and conflicting elements under a uniform and representative government.

The Athenian empire was at the head, not only of the Hellenic nation, but also of all the then known world. The Persians on the east were humbled, the Carthaginians on the west had been routed, and Rome, not yet risen into prominence, was limited to middle Italy. The Hellenic nation, in the just consciousness of its own superiority, regarded and called the remaining nations "barbarous." This political supremacy was not indeed lasting; but, however short its duration, it was of sufficient length to produce monuments which have perpetuated through all succeeding ages the intellectual supremacy of the Hellenic name.

CHAPTER VIII.

PRELIMINARIES OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

THE empire of the Athenians was not destined to be completed by the union of the whole Hellenic nation. The first half of the fifth century witnessed its organization and growth; the latter half hands down to us the records of its decline.

This rapid development and disorganization did not arise from the causes which so quickly integrated and disintegrated the Asiatic nations. The Athenians did not become

masters of Hellenic cities because these cities, degenerated and weakened, were no longer able to preserve their independence. A proof of this may be found in the fact that these cities had not lost their power and spirit, but often rose against Athens, and finally succeeded in overcoming her. Again, the supremacy of the Athenians was not overthrown through listlessness and inactivity on their own part. They not only fought bravely to the last, though not always wisely, in behalf of their dominion, but, even after the fall of their empire, continued to manifest for a long time excellent political and military virtues. Hence not the slightest analogy exists between the causes of the rapid ascendancy and decline of Athens and of the Asiatic kingdoms. The empire of the Athenians was not formed by conquests, but mainly by the express coalition of many Hellenic cities for the purpose of resisting the invasions of the Persians. It could not be preserved, because it soon changed into a despotism. The Hellenic nation did not yet understand that a great empire without equality of rights can not long be maintained ; that one hundred and thirty thousand even of the most intelligent citizens can not permanently rule over many millions ; that one city can not for ever impose its will upon hundreds of others, especially when the latter are inspired with the desire for independence. On this account it does not follow, as has often been said, that the Hellenic nation was naturally incapable of forming a great empire. The truth is, that during that epoch it had not yet acquired the prerequisite experience.

It has been mentioned that in 456 B. C. the empire of the Athenians embraced, besides the naval states, the whole of eastern continental Hellas. In 451 Sparta herself was forced to accept, by a five years' treaty, this new state of affairs. After the first sacred war the inhabitants of Delphi continued to manage the affairs of the temple, but the Phokians disputed the right, and at intervals seized the control of the

sanctuary. This was displeasing to Sparta, because, while the Athenians ruled in Phokis, it was evident that they, through the Phokians, would also rule the sanctuary, whose moral influence was supreme throughout Hellas. Hence the Spartans sent an army to Delphi, banished those who had seized the temple, and granted its management to the natives of Delphi. As soon as they had retreated, the Athenians in turn marched against Delphi and restored the sanctuary to the Phokians.

Revolutionary Movements.

About the middle of the fifth century the dominion of the Athenians was constantly augmenting. But, at its very height, it received its first check in 447. The Athenians controlled the naval cities chiefly by their fleet, portions of which continually sailed the Hellenic seas. But their authority over the cities situated on the continent rested on a different basis. These, with the exception of Megara, where a garrison was kept, were managed by surrendering them to the control of the democratic faction, which was devoted to the Athenians, and by whom the oligarchical party was held in subjection, and the most formidable of its leaders were banished. These exiles, naturally expecting the assistance of Sparta, with that of some of the Bœotians and many fugitive Phokians, Lokrians, and Eubœans, suddenly seized Orchomenus, Chæroneia, and some smaller towns of Bœotia.

Tolmides, the Athenian general, contrary to the advice of Perikles, marched at once against them with a thousand Athenian hoplites and some allies. Attacked near Koroneia, the Athenians suffered a total defeat, in which the general himself and many hoplites fell, and not a few belonging to the first families of the city were captured. The Athenians, in order to effect their ransom, were compelled to evacuate Bœotia, the cities of which were seized by the oligarchs and converted from allies into foes, with the exception of

the Platæans, who remained as closely attached as ever to their ancient friends.

This occurrence stirred Phokis and Lokris to revolt, and the movement spread even into Eubœa. The Athenians sent against this island Perikles himself, with an ample force. Before he could effect its subjection he learned that the Megarians were in arms, and had banished the Athenian garrison from their city. Perikles hastened at once back to Attica, which not long after, at the end of the five years' truce, was invaded by Pleistoanax, king of Sparta. The Spartans and their Peloponnesian allies advanced no farther than Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, either because they had been bribed by Perikles, or, more probably, for the reason that their force was insufficient to accomplish important results. As soon as they had retired, Perikles returned to Eubœa, and effected its subjugation.

He, however, thought it inexpedient for the Athenians to continue the struggle to retake their possessions on the mainland, and deemed it the part of wisdom to abandon even those held in the Peloponnesus, resting content with the islands and distant coasts of Hellas. In the beginning of 445, by his express advice, the Athenians entered into a truce of thirty years with the Spartans and their allies. By virtue of this treaty the Athenians abandoned Nisæa, Pegæ, Trœzen, and Achaia. In addition to this they agreed that the Megarians should become the allies of Sparta. Perikles hoped by this sacrifice to secure the naval dominion of the Athenians, knowing well that upon the land his people were not the equals of the Peloponnesians in war.

Revolution of Samos.

Samos, Chios, and Lesbos were during this epoch the only cities which preserved the ancient rights of the confederation formed at Delos. They remained free, had their fortifications, ships, and military force, and, though they were

obliged to furnish assistance both by land and sea to Athens, they paid no tribute whatever.

Samos was the most powerful of these islands. About the sixth year of the thirty years' truce (440-439 B. C.), having engaged in a strife with the Milesians, it completely routed them. The latter as subjects of the Athenians sought their protection, and even some of the Samians, opposed to the oligarchical rulers, seconded the request. The Athenians asked both hostile parties to submit to them their differences and to abide by their decision. The Samians refused to comply, and an armament of forty ships was dispatched from Athens, which instituted at Samos a democratical government, left a garrison, and carried away to Lemnos fifty children and an equal number of men from the most prominent oligarchical families, to serve as hostages. Of these oligarchs, however, a number fled to the Asiatic continent, where they entered into negotiations with the satrap of Sardis to procure aid and restoration. Obtaining from him seven hundred mercenary troops, they passed by night to the island, seized the guards, sent them to the satrap, dissolved the democracy, liberated their hostages, and stirred up the people against the Athenians. In this movement Byzantium joined.

Immediately on the receipt of this grave intelligence, the Athenians sailed at once against Samos with sixty ships under the ten generals of the year, among whom were Perikles and the poet Sophokles. Sixteen of these ships were employed in summoning contingents from Chios and Lesbos, and in keeping watch for the arrival of the Phœnician fleet which was said to be coming to the aid of the Samians. Among those who went to Chios and Lesbos was Sophokles, then at the zenith of his glory through the splendid success of his "Antigone," one of the seven tragedies preserved to us out of the hundred or more said to have been created by him. According to the Chian poet Ion, who was

associated with Sophokles during this expedition, the famous tragedian was a most charming friend and companion, but not gifted with much practical wisdom.

Perikles with his squadron of forty-four ships met the Samian fleet of seventy ships off the island of Tragia, and routed it. Receiving a reënforcement of forty ships from Athens, and twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos, he disembarked at Samos, defeated the Samian land force, blockaded the harbor with a portion of his fleet, and, surrounding the city with its triple wall on the land, besieged it both by land and sea. Meanwhile the Samians sent Stesagoras with five ships to hasten the arrival of the Phœnician fleet, and the report that this was approaching became so general that Perikles felt obliged to take sixty out of his hundred and twenty-five triremes to meet the coming enemy. But the Phœnician fleet never came in sight, because the Persians dared not make an attack by reason of the truce, which forbade them to send a fleet westward of the Chelidonian promontory.

The Samians, seizing the opportunity offered by the weakening of the Attic fleet through the departure of Perikles, suddenly sallied out, destroyed the guard-ships, routed the rest, and, raising the siege, became for fourteen days the masters of the sea. The most noteworthy incident of this event is that Melissus, the general of the Samians, was also a prominent member of the Eleatic school, and wrote "Concerning Nature and Essence."* Thus, on one side the greatest dramatist of the century commanded the Athenians, and on the other one of the most renowned of philosophers led the Samians to victory; an event peculiarly characteristic of that epoch, in which the theoretical life was closely linked with the practical.

When Perikles returned from the Asiatic coast the Samians were again besieged, the Athenians having received

* *Περὶ φύσεως καὶ τοῦ ὕψους.*

an additional aid of sixty ships from home and thirty from Chios and Lesbos, making altogether nearly two hundred sail. The Samians, led by Melissus, continued the struggle for many months, but finally were defeated and compelled to demolish their wall, to give hostages, to surrender their war-vessels, and to pay by stated installments the expenses of the war, amounting, it is said, to one thousand talents. The Byzantines at the same time agreed to be subjects as before.

Funeral Oration of Perikles.

The revolution of Samos again showed how unstable was the foundation of the Athenian empire. The uprising was indeed subdued, and no other city took part in it except Byzantium, which appears to have yielded without any war as soon as the Samians were reduced to subjection. But, in order to accomplish this result, it was necessary to use two hundred triremes—not less than Kimon ten years before had needed to inflict a mortal wound on the great Persian king. These doubtless would not have sufficed if the Peloponnesians had given the Samians the aid which they solicited. But this the Peloponnesians not only refused to do, but, on the proposition of the Corinthians, declared that every confederacy had the right to punish its own recreant members. Thus they left the course of action free to the Athenians, and Perikles was able, on his return, to celebrate this new achievement by a splendid funeral oration.

The custom of delivering these orations was introduced shortly after the Persian wars,* and afforded an excellent opportunity for eulogizing the patriotism of the citizens, especially when the orator had great personal merit and power of eloquence. Perikles was twice chosen by the peo-

* This custom still prevails throughout Hellas. No man of note dies without the offering of this last tribute by his friends and relatives. Many men make the delivery of these funeral orations their profession.

ple to address them at public funerals. The oration pronounced after the reduction of Samos has not reached us. Of the second, delivered at the close of the first year of the Peloponnesian war, Thucydides has happily recorded a large part, describing also the funeral pomp—doubtless the same on all occasions. Three days before the funeral procession, the bones of the deceased warriors were placed in a tent, that each might have the opportunity of bringing to his own relative whatever offering he pleased. The remains were then laid in coffins of cypress, carried forth on carts, and deposited in the public vault, which was at the Kerameikus, the fairest suburb of the city. One coffin was used for the dead of each tribe, and an empty cart represented the “unknown”—i. e., those warriors whose remains were not found. The wives and female relatives followed the carts with loud wailings, and next in order a numerous concourse both of citizens and strangers.

In the obsequies of those who fell at Samos, after the coffins had been consigned to the grave, Perikles, standing on an elevated platform, pronounced the eulogy. This oration is said to have been brilliant and powerful. It appears that Perikles, in his exultation over the achievement, went beyond his usual moderation; for the Chian poet Ion says that he forgot himself so far as to say that Agamemnon needed ten years to conquer a barbarous city, while he in nine months had reduced to subjection the most powerful of all the Ionic communities. But so great was his personal influence, so brilliant the eloquence by which in narrating the heroic deeds of the departed he conferred honor upon them and the city, that his boastful statement was not disapproved. On the contrary, on descending from the bema, the wives, mothers, and daughters of the fallen decorated him, like a victorious athlete, with wreaths and garlands. One voice of disapproval only was heard, that of Elpinike, who approaching him said, “Are these actions, then, Perikles, worthy of crowns and gar-

lands, which have deprived us of many brave citizens, not in a war with the Phœnicians and Medes, such as my brother Kimon waged, but in destroying a city united to us both in blood and friendship?" According to Plutarch, Perikles only smiled, and answered softly with this line of Archilochus :

"Why lavish ointments on a head that is gray?"*

But the voice of Elpinike was the voice of truth. It was indeed unfortunate that the Hellenic power should have been wasted in civil combats ; it was unfortunate that no other bond of political union could have been found except that of force and oppression ; and most unfortunate of all, that every new triumph of Athens should only arouse the common indignation against her.

CHAPTER IX.

EVENTS BEFORE THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

The Decree against Megara.

THE destruction of the Samians did not even have the result of terrifying the other cities into submission, as shortly after the Lesbians secretly sought the assistance of Sparta to enable them to revolt. Their demand was not favorably heard, as the Peloponnesians, and especially the Spartans, were not disposed to violate the thirty years' truce. It is evident that Athens had the greatest possible interest in fostering this peaceful disposition of the Peloponnesians. But about this time a serious change took place in Athenian policy. While during the thirty years' truce they ob-

* Οὐκ ἂν μύροιςι γραῦς ἐοῦσ' ἠλείφεο.

tained peace at a great sacrifice, and while even now prudence demanded that they should avoid every cause of dispute, we suddenly see them inviting war of their own accord.

After the conquest of Samos, a decree was issued by Perikles, by which the Megarians were excluded, on penalty of death, from all ports within the empire of Athens and from the market of Attica. This barbarous decree virtually destroyed the Megarians, dooming them as it did to complete commercial stagnation. It was issued on account of the alleged facts that the Megarians had sheltered fugitive slaves from Athens, and had cultivated a tract of land partly sacred and partly in dispute between the two communities, and therefore by mutual understanding left in common without any permanent inclosure. In reality, the Athenians wished to punish Megara because no other revolution had brought upon Athens such irreparable mischief as the one in that city fourteen years before.

Grote says that the feeling prevalent between the two cities had been one of bitter enmity, and that it was undoubtedly *within the legitimate right of Athens to enforce this decree*. But since the Athenians had once surrendered Megara to the Peloponnesians, had they a right to avenge themselves in so relentless a manner on that city? It is true that Perikles maintained that there was nothing in the truce to prevent the issuing of such a decree, and that it was even less harsh than the systematic expulsion of foreigners by Sparta; but we must confess that his assumption savored of sophistry. That law existed in Sparta even during the heroic times, and was enacted in no spirit of antagonism to commerce, but simply to keep the Spartans fixed within their ancestral laws. Again, Sparta was not a commercial city, and the law could never have injured the commercial relations or interests of the Greeks. In no way does the decree against the Megarians seem to be justified; and assuredly it can not

not be regarded as the act of a statesman diligently avoiding every cause of strife with the Peloponnesian allies.

The Alliance with the Korkyræans.

About this period, and perhaps before the Megarian decree, other causes of dispute occurred. In 435 B. C. a war broke out between the Corinthians and their colonists the Korkyræans. A contest had arisen between the oligarchs and the people of their common colony Epidamnus (known afterward in the Roman times as Dyrrhachium). The oligarchs sought and obtained the assistance of the Korkyræans, while the people secured that of the Corinthians. The latter did not submit the affair to the Peloponnesian alliance, but undertook the struggle as their own. Many Peloponnesians readily joined arms with the Corinthians, and an expedition was speedily organized, consisting of Corinthians, Leukadians, Ambrakiots, Thebans, Megarians, Træzenians, and others. The Corinthians were, however, completely routed, because Korkyra was, next to Athens, the strongest naval power, having a fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes. Their defeat made them only the more bent on complete revenge against their enemy. For two whole years they were occupied in fitting out, in conjunction with their allies, a fleet of one hundred and fifty ships.

The Korkyræans knew well the preparations going on at Corinth, and, fearing lest they should not be able to withstand the attack, were compelled also to seek allies, and to this end sent ambassadors to Athens. These emissaries, on reaching the city, announced to the generals the object of their coming. The latter appointed a day on which the assembly of the people was to listen to their request. For, according to the political opinions of the ancients, it was not the executive power which had the right of declaring war and of making peace and alliances; but such affairs were

submitted to the assembly of the people. But as the object of the Korkyræans was previously known, the ambassadors of the Corinthians also appeared at the assembly of the people, to oppose their request.

Thucydides perhaps heard the speeches of the envoys on both sides, and those which he gives, though undoubtedly composed by himself, in all probability contain the principal facts that were mentioned. Under the thirty years' truce it was distinctly stipulated that "whichever of the Hellenic states should be in alliance with no other, should have permission to go to whichever side it pleased."* Since the Korkyræans were formerly neither allies of the Athenians nor of the Peloponnesians, they at first sight seemed justified in seeking, if they wished, the alliance of the Athenians. But other circumstances were to be taken into consideration. Korkyra was a colony of the Corinthians; and, though it may be true that most of the colonies had no political dependence on the metropolis, and that besides many Peloponnesian colonies had long before submitted to the Athenians, yet by right the metropolis could claim that it founded the colonies for the purpose of ruling them. It is therefore evident that, although the Korkyræans were not enrolled among the Peloponnesian allies, yet they were united by such ties as the Athenians, if they really wished to avoid every cause of dispute with the Peloponnesians, ought to have carefully considered, since the Corinthians had opposed the granting of aid by the Peloponnesians to the revolting Samians. Furthermore, war already existed between the Corinthians and Korkyræans. The Athenians, by accepting the request of the latter, necessarily engaged in war, not only with the Corinthians, but probably with all the Peloponnesian alliance, in which the Corinthians held a prominent

* Thucydides: *Τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων ἥτις μηδαμοὶ συμμαχεῖ ἐξεῖναι παρ' ὁποτέρους ἂν ἀρέσκηται ἐλθεῖν.*

position. As they justly remarked, "You would not only become auxiliaries to them, but also enemies to us, instead of being connected by treaty."*

Thucydides says that at the end of the first assembly there was a plurality of votes in favor of the Corinthians, but that this was changed on the following day. They did not indeed fully grant the request of the Korkyræans—that is, they made no alliance with them, under which both their friends and enemies would be the same, but only became their auxiliaries, to help each other against all who should attack either Korkyra or Athens or their allies; in other words, they entered into a defensive, not an aggressive, alliance. If the Athenians really believed that, by adopting this course, they could either avoid war with the Corinthians, or that such a war would not effect a dissolution of the treaty, we must confess that they were the least thoughtful and practical of men.

Thus the Athenians, about 433 B. C., sent to the assistance of the Korkyræans a small fleet of ten triremes, under Lakedæmonius, son of Kimon. They charged him not to engage in fight with the Corinthians, unless they were actually sailing against Korkyra or some Korkyræan possession, with a view to land; but in that case he was to do his utmost to prevent them.†

A great sea battle was fought between the Corinthians and Korkyræans on the coast of Epirus, nearly opposite the southern extremity of Korkyra, in which the Athenians, coming up to the Korkyræans whenever they were hard pressed, struck fear into the enemy without actually engaging in the fight, as the commanders were restrained by the terms of their commission. But soon the right wing of the

* Thucydides: Οὐ γὰρ τοῖσδε μόνον ἐπικουροὶ ἂν γένοισθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμῖν, ἐντὶ ἐνσπόνδων πολέμιοι.

† Thucydides: Μὴ ναυμαχεῖν Κορινθίοις, ἢν μὴ ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν πλέωσι, καὶ μέλλωσιν ἀποβαλεῖν, ἢ ἐς τῶν ἐκείνων τι χωρίον· οὕτω δὲ, κωλύειν κατὰ δύναμιν.

Korkyræans was utterly defeated, and the Athenians, seeing them hard pressed, gave them now more unequivocal assistance ; “for,” says Thucydides, “when the rout was certain and the Corinthians were lying close to them, every one without distinction set to work, and Corinthians and Athenians attacked each other.” Thus the pretext of that alliance did not prevent the clash between Athens and Corinth. The latter, compelled to cease the war against the Korkyræans, naturally changed their disposition toward the Athenians. They had lately dissuaded the Peloponnesians from an act of hostility against the Athenians, but they now openly sought to bring about a collision that would lead to a general war.

The Revolt of Potidæa.

Perdikkas, king of Macedonia, had been the friend and ally of the Athenians. But when the latter made an alliance with the other two princes of Macedonia, his brothers Philip and Derdas, with whom he was in dispute, he incited to insurrection the cities of the Athenian confederacy lying upon the Macedonian coast. Among these was Potidæa, which was a colony of the Corinthians, and still preserved certain relations with the metropolis. Perdikkas, availing himself of the hostile feelings of the Corinthians, not only sent ambassadors to Corinth in order to concert measures for provoking the revolt of Potidæa, but also to Sparta, hoping to call forth a declaration of war from the whole Peloponnesus.

On becoming aware of the dangers which awaited them, the Athenians ordered the Potidæans to demolish their wall toward the seaside, give hostages, and dismiss the Epidemiurgi, or annual magistrates, who came to them from Corinth. The Potidæans, after vainly striving to obtain from the Athenians a revocation of these measures, in conjunction with Corinth sent ambassadors to Sparta, “in order to

arrange a Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica, in the event of Potidæa being attacked by Athens." The Spartan authorities promised that, should the Athenians move against Potidæa, they would make an incursion into Attica ; whereupon the Potidæans rose *en masse*. The Athenians sent an army to the Macedonian coast, routed the Potidæans and their allies the Corinthians, and besieged Potidæa.

PART FIFTH.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

CHAPTER I.

COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES.

Deliberations at Sparta.

THE events last related occurred during the spring and summer of 432 B. C. The causes of dispute were multiplied, and the passions of the contending parties were more and more inflamed. The Megarians did not cease to object to the decree, and the Corinthians had now become to the highest degree angry and warlike. They maintained that the Athenians had violated the thirty years' truce by having fought against them, and, on mere suspicion that the Potidæans intended to revolt, had assailed the rights and privileges of that city. Besides, some other allies of the Peloponnesians made complaint of unjust treatment; many subjects of the Athenians, especially the Æginetans, were secretly complaining to Sparta of the persecution which they were suffering; and, most of all, the fear prevailed that the Athenians had in view the enslavement of all Hellas.

Thus the Lacedæmonians—although as indolent as ever, although always hesitating to undertake a great conflict,

although more readily promising than granting assistance—forced at last by the pressure of public opinion, deemed it of the most urgent necessity to do something on this occasion. In such serious emergencies, it was necessary that the Spartans themselves, apart from their allies, should decide whether any cause of war existed. If there were no cause, the affair was not even submitted to a vote of the allies. If war were decided upon, and the majority concurred in the opinion of Sparta, the confederacy was obliged to execute the order ; but if the majority decided otherwise, Sparta none the less carried out her decision, together with those of the allies who agreed with her. Every city, large or small, had an equal right of suffrage, but it is easily seen that Sparta exerted a controlling influence. The Corinthians, together with such other of the confederates as held that the Athenians had either violated the truce or otherwise wronged the Peloponnesians, submitted their complaints to the assembly of the citizens of Sparta. Even in the oligarchy of Sparta, such a question as this could have been decided only by the entire body of the citizens who, by reason of their age, regular attendance at the *syssitia*, and strict observance of the laws, had the right of voting. After the accusation had been formally presented, all strangers were excluded, and the assembly debated in secret.

The great historian of the Peloponnesian war furnishes an unusually full account of what occurred during this assembly, in which the fate of Hellas was to be decided. He does not indeed record all the speeches delivered ; but first, the argument of the Corinthians, necessarily the most important of all ; next, that of some Athenian envoys, who, happening to be at the same time in Sparta on other business, obtained permission from the magistrates to answer the accusers ; thirdly, the speech of King Archidamus “on the policy proper to be adopted by Sparta” ; and, finally, the pithy but most characteristic address of the ephor Sthenelai-

das, through the influence of which war was decreed. These speeches were composed by Thucydides himself, yet they faithfully depict the sentiments of the political parties which they represent. For this reason, not one of them is an answer to the preceding, but each represents the situation of affairs from the standpoint of the speaker.

After the war had been decided upon, the Lacedæmonians asked the god at Delphi whether it would be beneficial for them to proceed to war. He answered that if they should fight with all their might they would be victorious, and that he would help them whether he should be invoked or not. The vote for war was taken about the beginning of 431 B. C.

Responsibility for the War.

Thus was the Peloponnesian war initiated—the most bloody and cruel of all the wars that ever stained the earth. It divided the Hellenic nation for many a year into two opposing camps; it shook Hellas from its very foundations; it aroused the noblest and wildest of passions; and, with the material and moral exhaustion of the strength of the nation, it prepared the decline of ancient Hellenism. But who called forth the war? This is a question which, although already suggested, still forces upon us the necessity of again returning to it. It is a question which has been widely disputed, and some of the greatest modern historians express an opinion contrary to our view. Grote, for instance, maintains that the Athenians, by their decree against the Megarians and their alliance with the Korkyræans, did not violate the ordinances of the thirty years' truce. He holds that Athens was in the right; that the Peloponnesian confederates were manifestly the aggressors in the contest. We believe that the essential point to be considered is not to what degree the Athenians violated the ordinances of the truce, but whether by their acts they did not unwarrantably injure the Megarians, enter into a state of

war with the Corinthians, overturn the peaceful relations with the Peloponnesian allies, and above all justify the prevalent opinion that, not content with the advantages which the thirty years' truce offered, they intended to render all Hellas subservient. To demonstrate this, we will not bring forth the testimony of the comic poets, nor avail ourselves of the opinion offered by the historian Ephorus,* because the opinions of these persons can have no weight before the judgment of the great authority on the Peloponnesian war. Now Thucydides declares the Athenians the instigators of the war. At first he inadvertently hints at it, then mentions it in stronger terms, and finally declares it not only as his own opinion, but as that of all Hellas. "The truest reason," he says, "though least brought forward in words, I consider to have been that the Athenians, by becoming great and causing alarm to the Lacedæmonians, compelled them to proceed to hostilities." †

Again he says: "The Lacedæmonians decided by vote that the treaty had been broken, and that war should be declared, not so much because they were convinced by the arguments of the allies, as because they were afraid that the Athenians might attain to greater power, seeing that most of Hellas was already in their hands." ‡

Again: "In about fifty years [between the retreat of

* Ὁ δὲ Περικλῆς, εἰδὼς τὸν δῆμον ἐν μὲν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἔργοις θαυμάζοντα τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας διὰ τὰς καταπειγούσας χρείας, κατὰ δὲ τὴν εἰρήνην τοὺς αὐτοὺς συκοφαντοῦντα διὰ τὴν σχολὴν καὶ φόβον, ἔκρινε συμφέρειν αὐτῷ, τὴν πόλιν ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς μέγαν πόλεμον, ὅπως χρεῖαν ἔχουσα τῆς Περικλείους ἀρετῆς καὶ στρατηγίας μὴ προσδέχεται τὰς κατ' αὐτοῦ διαβολάς.

† Thucydides: Τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγοῦμαι, μεγάλους γιγνομένους, καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἀναγκάσαι εἰς τὸ πολεμεῖν.

‡ Ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰς σπονδὰς λελυθῆαι, καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι, οὐ τοσούτων τῶν ξυμμάχων πεισθέντες τοῖς λόγοις, ὅσον φοβούμετοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, μὴ ἐπὶ μείζονι δυνηθῶσιν, ὁρῶντες αὐτοῖς τὰ πολλὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑποχείρια ἤδη ὄντα.

Xerxes and the beginning of this war] the Athenians established their power on a firmer footing and advanced to a great height of prosperity. During this period the Lacedæmonians remained quiet, and made but little effort to hinder their progress. Even before this they were not sudden in proceeding to hostilities, unless they were compelled; and, to a certain extent, they were hindered by intestine wars [the revolt of the Helots]; so that the power of the Athenians was clearly rising to a dangerous height, and *they were encroaching on their confederacy*. Then they considered it no longer endurable, and were of opinion that they ought with the greatest resolution to attack their power, and overthrow it, if they could, by beginning this war.”*

Thucydides distinctly asserts that the Athenians gave cause for provocation by attacking the allies of the Lacedæmonians; and he remarks: “The good wishes of men were strongly in favor of the Lacedæmonians, especially as they gave out that they were the liberators of Hellas. And every individual, as well as state, put forth his strength to help them in whatever he could, both by word and deed. . . . So angry were the people generally with the Athenians—some from a wish to be released from their dominion, others from a fear of being brought under it.”†

Many other passages could be cited to prove that Thucydides, who was an eye-witness of the events, believed the

* . . . Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι αἰσθόμενοι, οὔτε ἐκώλυνον εἰ μὴ ἐπὶ βραχὺ, ἡσύχαζόν τε τὸ πλεόν τοῦ χρόνου, ὄντες μὲν καὶ προτοῦ μὴ ταχεῖς λέναι ἐς τοὺς πολέμους, εἰ μὴ ἀναγκάζοντο, τὸ δὲ τι καὶ πολέμοις οἰκείοις ἐξειργόμενοι· πρὶν δὴ ἡ δύναμις τῶν Ἀθηναίων σαφῶς ἤρετο, καὶ τῆς συμμαχίας αὐτῶν ἥκτορον το. Τότε δὲ οὐκέτι ἀνασχετὸν ἐποιοῦντο, ἀλλ’ ἐπιχειρητέα ἐδόκει εἶναι πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ καὶ καθαρετεῖᾳ ἡ ἰσχὺς, ἣν δύνανται, ἀραμένοις τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον.

† Ἡ δὲ εὐνοία παρὰ πολὺ ἐπρεῖ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μᾶλλον ἐς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ἄλλως τε καὶ προειπόντων ὅτι τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦσιν. Ἐρρωτό τε πᾶς καὶ ιδιώτης καὶ πόλις, εἴτι δύναιτο καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ξυνεπιλαμβάνειν αὐτοῖς. . . . Οὕτως ὀργῇ εἶχον οἱ πλείους τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, οἱ μὲν, τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπολυθῆναι βουλόμενοι, οἱ δὲ, μὴ ἀρχθῶσι φοβούμενοι.

Athenians the principal authors of the war. We therefore consider it altogether presumptuous to assert that "the Athenians did not attack the Peloponnesians ; the Athenians did nothing to invite the war ; the whole of Greece was deceived in thinking that the Athenians plotted against her liberty."

First Spartan Embassy.

The Lacedæmonians, however, although they voted to commence hostilities, did not immediately declare war. This course was taken partly to give the allies time for preparation, and partly to justify their course as far as possible. To this end they dispatched three embassies to Athens, on the acceptance of whose proposals depended, as they said, the preservation of peace. Through the first embassy they asked the Athenians to drive away the wrath of the gods ; in other words, they demanded the banishment of the Alkmæonidæ, who were considered sacrilegious. They demanded this especially for the purpose of driving from Athens Perikles, who was an Alkmæonid on the side of his mother ; for so long as *he* managed public affairs, they could never hope to come to terms with their opponents. The words of the great historian, and the request of the Lacedæmonians, demonstrate how preponderating the influence of Perikles had become in the city of the Athenians. But let no one think that he was sleeping on roses. He had many opponents and many enemies. Even among the multitude who were most strongly devoted to him, there were some who could not bear the thought of his great power. And although this enmity and ill feeling were not always seen in the assembly of the people, yet they often caused him much trouble, through the satirical songs and the comic poetry which at that period held the place of the public press ; so that while the city granted him splendid honors, and adorned his head with wreaths of olive, his enemies did not cease to scoff at him. His friends named him Olympian from the greatness of his

political and military acts ; but the comedians mocked his inimitable eloquence, giving some ridiculous explanation of the epithet. The most innocent of his acts were misrepresented and changed into crimes. All his associates were termed "Satyrs," i. e., men who spent their life in beastly dissipation ; and Perikles himself was called by the comedian Hermippus "King of the Satyrs." His intimate associates were termed "new Peisistratidæ," as if they were seeking to institute a new tyranny in the city.

These are only examples of the many missiles which envy and political interest directed against the leader of Athens. But they were not satisfied with these allegations. Still, not daring to attack openly, they attempted, about the year 432 B. C., a judicial prosecution against two men whom he particularly esteemed and honored, Anaxagoras and Pheidias, and against Aspasia, whom he loved above all earthly objects.

Prosecution of Aspasia and Anaxagoras.

Aspasia, daughter of Axiochus, was born at Miletus, and was distinguished for her beauty, education, ambition, and pride. That we may justly appreciate the character of one whose name does not usually recall ideas of modesty and virtue, but yet reflects in history some of the rays of the inimitable glory of Perikles, we must observe that, with the exception of Sparta, in ancient Hellas the women of respectable families, both married and single, passed a secluded and indoor life, in the female quarters, just as is the present custom of the women of the eastern nations. All their interests and rights were defined and managed by their male relatives. They received no education, and there was no pleasure in their society. It was not natural that the Greeks, the most cultivated of men, should for ever be deprived of that rich blessing in life which the grace, the sympathy, and the tenderness of woman alone can impart. Gradually there was formed a separate class of women called *hetærae* (liter-

ally, female companions), who passed a free life, were often excellently educated, and exercised great influence in the ancient community. The majority of these women certainly did lead lives not without blame, and thus the term *hetæra* quickly assumed the signification of paramour, in opposition to that of the lawful wife. It does not follow from this that all the *hetæraæ* were of this character, and that not one was able to reconcile her free life with modesty and true womanhood.

With reference to *Aspasia*, it must be admitted that from the very beginning the worst things were reported about her. But how is it possible to believe these vile accusations concerning a woman who, by undisputed testimony, was possessed not only of such physical beauty and grace, but also of such rare conversational and critical powers, that she was visited by the most distinguished of the Athenians of every class—among others, by *Sokrates*—several of whom brought their wives to listen to her? Or is it to be credited that the greatest and noblest in character of the political leaders of *Hellas* surrendered his heart and life to a woman who had cast off every sentiment of shame, and was sunk in indelible infamy? It is more natural to suppose that *Aspasia* became a victim to the generally bad reputation of the class of women to which she belonged, and afterward to the terrible false accusations which were pitilessly aimed at *Perikles*, and which did not respect the most sacred of his feelings.*

* One of the many errors in respect to Grecian history, as *Grote* remarks, arises from the practice of construing passages of comedy as if they were serious and literal facts.

Aspasia and *Theodote* appear to have been the only women of this class in *Hellas* who either inspired strong passion or exercised mental ascendancy. The visit of *Sokrates* with some of his friends to *Theodote*, his dialogue with her, and the description of her manner of living, are among the most curious remnants of Grecian antiquity, on a subject very imperfectly known to us. (*Xenophon*, "*Memorabilia*," iii, 11.)

Perikles, according to Athenian custom, had at first married one of his near relatives, by whom he had two sons, Xanthippus and Paralus. His marriage was not happy, and was afterward dissolved by mutual consent, as the Attic laws permitted great freedom in divorces. Perikles, after having given up his wife to another husband, with the consent of her male relatives, who were her lawful protectors, lived thereafter with Aspasia, by whom he had a son named after himself. He could not marry her, as marriage of a citizen with a foreigner was forbidden by Athenian law ; but he continued devotedly attached to her to the end of his life, finding in her that intellectual and social sympathy so rare in the family circles of ancient Hellas. At the house of Aspasia there gathered around Perikles the most noted men of Athens, such as Anaxagoras, Pheidias, Protagoras, and Zeno, who, laying aside the myths of the prevailing religion, boldly turned their investigations toward the beginning of the universe, and the laws which regulate and hold together the great world. Unfortunately, not only did the enemies of Perikles ridicule these philosophical researches, but Xanthippus, his unprincipled son, disgusted with his father for not furnishing him the means by which to indulge his wicked practices, contributed to the persecution, spreading the most extraordinary reports about what was said and done in the house. The comic poets enlarged these reports, and openly dragged on to the stage the names of Perikles and Aspasia, calling her the Omphale, the Deïaneira, or the Here of this great Herakles or Zeus of Athens. Finally, they were not satisfied with these theatrical aspersions, and both Aspasia and Anaxagoras were brought to trial on the charge of impiety.

The people of Athens and the Greeks in general were peculiarly devoted to their religion ; nor do we dare to blame them for this, as do many modern historians. It is not to be denied that their religion was in many respects puerile and

even immoral in tendency, and that, had they more seriously reflected upon the nature of divinity and the laws of the universe, they must have looked with scorn at the pitiable myths of their ancient polytheism. As this tendency toward reflection increased, there resulted a fearful combat between positive religion and philosophy, bringing on the moral anarchy by which the ancient nations were destroyed. In this combat philosophy can not claim to have been wholly right. History teaches that one of the strongest elements of national prosperity and greatness is religious belief, whatever it may be. The two greatest nations the world has ever seen, the Roman and the English, are positive witnesses of this truth. On the other hand, while philosophy has destroyed many religions, she has never created any. Ancient philosophy undermined the foundations of the existing belief, but it brought forth no other in its stead. So that in the struggle of philosophy against religion, we may be permitted to sympathize with the generous and daring spirits which, casting away the fetters of the positive dogmas, sought freely the truth ; but, considering at the same time that at those heights the human mind, left to its own weakness, can only wander, it is not just to condemn the more practical men who remained faithful to their ancestral traditions. Especially do we deem it unjust to condemn the people of Athens for their disapprobation of every innovation in religion. We blame the men who, availing themselves of the religious spirit of the people, used it as an aid to political aspirations and revengeful pursuits, while we can only reverence the sentiment itself ; and especially in the present accusation of impiety, we can well understand the excitement which arose at Athens, and the danger in which Aspasia and Anaxagoras were placed—a danger so great that Perikles is said to have advised Anaxagoras to depart from Athens to escape it.

Aspasia, against whom, in addition to the accusation of

impiety, was brought the more disgraceful charge that she received dissolute women at her house, was in imminent danger, until Perikles himself finally succeeded in saving her by pleading in her behalf. The haughty, distant, and imperturbable statesman, who never, even when himself traduced, forgot his dignity before the people of Athens, but always spoke proudly and boldly, in this particular case was so moved that he prayed and wept before the jurors, until he obtained the release of his friend.

Trial and Death of Pheidias.

About the same time, Pheidias was accused of stealing a part of the gold which was given him for the construction of the celebrated gold and ivory (chryselephantine) statue of Athene in the Parthenon. Pheidias had completed this masterpiece in 437 B. C., and had then gone to Olympia, where he constructed the last and greatest wonder of his art, the colossal statue of the Olympian Zeus. Having finished this work, he returned about 433 to his native land, hopeful that he might pass the remainder of his life in plenty and honor, when he suddenly found himself accused by the enemies of Perikles as a defaulter. That this accusation was groundless was easily proved; because the golden covering of Athene was so constructed that it could be taken away, and it was found to be of the original weight. But another accusation was immediately brought forward. In the battle with the Amazons which Pheidias wrought on the shield of Athene, there were discovered two faces which were evidently those of the artist himself and of Perikles. Pheidias was accused of impiety, was cast into prison as a malefactor, and died there of old age and sorrow even before the trial was ended. The enemies of Perikles, not even respecting his sorrow for the death of his friend, were so shameless as to report that Perikles himself had caused Pheidias to be poisoned, in order to prevent the adverse issue of the trial and

the damaging confessions which the accused was said to be about to make.

The conduct of the people of Athens on this occasion was the precursor of many and great political errors. Even if it were true that the two faces on the shield depicted the artist and his friend, this fact could not be deemed an attack against the dogmas of the positive religion sufficient to justify a serious accusation of impiety. But the people of Athens were fast becoming the tools, not merely of prominent political leaders, but even of obscure demagogues. It certainly can not be denied that, about the time of the opening of the Peloponnesian war, Perikles, although even then most powerful at Athens, had nevertheless many strong opponents; so that the Lacedæmonians, who in their first embassy sought his banishment by underhanded means, had good reason to hope that their demand would be sustained in the assembly by his enemies, who perhaps were in accord with them. But the people refused to comply with their demands, thus showing that they had not yet fully lost their ancient wisdom and good sense.

Further Negotiations.

Shortly afterward a second embassy came to Athens with fresh demands. The Athenians were required: 1. To raise the siege of Potidæa; 2. To reinstate Ægina in its autonomy; 3. To repeal the decree respecting the Megarians. These proposals were also rejected. The Athenians would not, at the demand of strangers, either retreat from Potidæa or free Ægina. Both cities were subject to them, and were thus recognized by the thirty years' truce. The Peloponnesian ambassadors then said that the abolition of the decree concerning the Megarians would be sufficient to preserve the peace. This decree, aimed at one of the allies of Sparta, struck a serious blow at international relations, and it should have been made the subject of a conference. On this ac-

count the Athenians made a mistake in entirely rejecting this request.

Then a third and final embassy came, which said : "The Lacedæmonians are desirous that there should be peace ; and there will be, if you will leave the Greeks autonomous." An assembly was called, and this last proposal hotly debated. Many advocated a declaration of war ; but others opposed this, saying that peace should be maintained, "being confident," says Thucydides, "that even in this excited state the Lacedæmonians would retreat, provided the decree was rescinded." But Perikles, who either desired war or deemed it inevitable, threw the weight of his irresistible eloquence into the opposite scale, by a speech which Dionysius of Halikarnassus ranks as one of the very best of all in the history of Thucydides. "The Athenians," says Thucydides, "thinking that Perikles advised the best and most honorable course, resolved to reply to the Lacedæmonians that they would do nothing in response to a command, but that they were ready to have their complaint settled by judicial decision, according to the treaty, on a fair and equal footing."

Thebes and Platæa.

The attempt to regulate matters by mutual concession proved futile. Hostilities, however, did not commence immediately after the departure of the envoys. There was no formal proclamation of war, though the truce could hardly be said to be still in force. It was foreseen from the very first that this war would be so terrible and bloody, that neither of the contestants seemed disposed to undertake the responsibility of opening hostilities. But at the height which passions had reached, the slightest spark was sufficient to kindle the fire, and this was ignited by the Thebans.

Deeming war inevitable, and wishing to anticipate the Platæans, who were allies of the Athenians, the Thebans came to an agreement with the oligarchs in Platæa ; and, on

a rainy night toward the close of March, 431 B. C., a body of more than three hundred hoplites entered the city,* and summoned by herald the Plataeans to return to the alliance of the Boeotians. But the latter, soon discovering, in spite of the darkness, that those who had come in were few, drove some away, killed others, and captured about one hundred and eighty, whom they afterward put to death, although the whole Theban army, which had come to Plataea, retreated only on condition (as they said) that the captives should be restored to them. The Plataeans denied that they had made such a promise. At any rate, they committed an inhuman and inconsiderate act. The far-seeing Perikles especially lamented its glaring impolicy. He knew that, with these captives, the Athenians could have forced the Thebans to many sacrifices. But from the very first it was foredoomed that the ferocity of the contending passions should find vent. The treaty was now virtually ended, and hostilities might be regarded as begun.

Strength of the Combatants.

The confederacy of the Athenians was composed of two elements, the free allies and the cities paying tribute. The free allies were the Chians, Lesbians, Korkyræans, Zakynthians, Kephallenians, and the Messenians in Naupaktus. These last, having for a long time opposed the Spartans in Ithome, finally surrendered about 455 B. C., on condition that they should be allowed to depart from the Peloponnesus. The Athenians, who had but lately become masters of Naupaktus, surrendered it to the fugitives, and they had since remained their faithful allies. The Akarnanians had recently joined themselves to the Athenians, because the latter had

* Plataea stood in Boeotia, immediately north of Kithæron, with the borders of Attica on one side and the Theban territory (from which it was separated by the river Asopus) on the other. The distance between Plataea and Thebes was about seventy stadia, or eight miles.

assisted them in regaining Argos in Amphilochia from the Ambrakiots. The Athenians hastened to forewarn and encourage their numerous allies, especially those situated around the Peloponnesus, because by the assistance of these latter they hoped eventually to conquer that peninsula.

Samos was perhaps the most important of the tributary cities. These cities contributed money and sailors, which the Athenians justly deemed one of the principal sources of their strength. But their greatest resource was the city of Athens itself, not only on account of the revenues of money and sailors which were here collected, but because the city contained powerful war forces, worthy of the metropolis of so great an empire. According to the report made by Perikles to the assembly of the people, the city alone could furnish 300 triremes, 1,200 horsemen, 1,600 bowmen, and 29,000 hoplites. In addition to these large military and naval forces, the surplus treasure on the Acropolis consisted of 6,000 talents, or about \$7,000,000 in American money. Besides, there were in the various temples in the Acropolis and the city many private and public votive offerings and sacred utensils, Median booty, and other valuables, amounting to not less than five hundred talents. The Athene of ivory and gold constructed by Pheidias contained a quantity of the latter metal not less than forty talents in weight, equal in value to more than four hundred talents of silver ; and the gold was attached in such a manner that it could easily be removed. Perikles, of course, did not think the use of these sacred effects probable ; but in the last extremity, and on condition of replacing them, they could easily be utilized. The Athenians also received a great annual revenue from the subject allies, amounting to six hundred talents (equal to about \$690,000), besides all other items, making up an aggregate sum of one thousand talents (about \$1,150,000).

Opposed to this great and powerful confederacy stood the no less great and powerful alliance of the Peloponnesians,

although composed of different elements. This alliance had no tributary cities. First of all, it included the whole of the Peloponnesus, except the Argeians and Achæans, both of whom were neutral at first, though the Achæan town of Pelene from the very beginning joined itself with the Peloponnesians. The latter had also, beyond the peninsula, many allies and sympathizers, such as the Megarians, Bœotians, Phokians, Opuntian Lokrians, Ambrakiots, Leukadians, and Anaktorians. This alliance had no common treasury, neither did it possess that governmental unity invaluable in war; it had few ships and no trained seamen, was wanting in "that superior development of directing intelligence," and its citizens were not imbued with the fervent and unanimous Athenian democratical sentiment. But, on the other hand, the Spartan supremacy on land was incontestable.

King Archidamus at once invaded Attica, at the head of sixty thousand men, or, according to some authorities, one hundred thousand hoplites, apparently two thirds of all the infantry of the allies. Against this enormous force the Athenians could present only about thirty thousand hoplites. Since the Peloponnesians could invade Attica without opposition, they never believed that the Athenians would offer resistance for more than one, two, or at most three years. Nevertheless, the Lacedæmonians determined to increase the naval force of themselves and their allies to an aggregate of five hundred triremes, trusting to the aid of the friendly Dorian cities on the Italian and Sicilian coasts. The Peloponnesians declared that they were fighting for the common liberty of the Greeks, and that for this reason they ought to have as allies all the tributary cities constituting the main body of the empire of the Athenians. Thus the Peloponnesians were possessed of a strength at least equal to that of the Athenians.

CHAPTER II.

FIRST TWO YEARS OF THE WAR.

As the contending parties were nearly equal in strength, the issue of the war clearly depended on the skillful use which either combatant might make of his resources. Had the Peloponnesians succeeded in moving to insurrection the subject cities, and in furnishing them with effective aid, the Athenians would have been compelled to make a speedy and humiliating peace. The Athenian troops avoided the Peloponnesians on land, while the latter avoided the Athenians on the sea. But the Athenians could and ought to have followed the advice which Demaratus had once given Xerxes: they could have seized upon some spot on the coast in either Laconia or Messenia, moved the Helots to insurrection by pillaging the land, and, by constantly threatening Sparta itself, deadened every energy of the chief city of their opponents.

It is most surprising that, for a long time, neither of the contending parties availed itself of its peculiar advantages. The Peloponnesians could assist most of the subject cities only by sea; and at sea they were either conquered by their enemies, or at least prevented from accomplishing their object. They may have thought that, by pillaging Attica, they could compel the Athenians to sue for peace. Why Perikles did not attempt from the very first what the general Demosthenes did some years after, by the occupation of Pylos, is indeed difficult of explanation. Experience had proved the weakness of the defensive system of Perikles, for it necessitated the lengthening of the war, and thus the insurrection of the subject countries became every day more threatening. For many years, therefore, about five hundred triremes and at least five hundred thousand hoplites, light-

armed soldiers, horsemen, and sailors, contended with all the ferocity of civil warfare around the Hellenic cities, then in the height of their glory.

Such was the Peloponnesian war, and such was the catholic* movement of Hellenism, concerning which the great historian wrote. What a difference between this movement and the one which occurred fifty years before, during the Persian invasion! Then the sacred object of national independence crowned the struggles of our forefathers, and made every pass a Thermopylæ, every battle a Plataea, and every naval engagement a Salamis. Within two years they rid themselves of every foreign danger, and gathered plentifully the fruits of the material and moral prosperity which the luxuriant tree of Hellenic harmony and prosperity ever produces. But now the frost of enmity was destined to wither all these fruits and prepare the loss of freedom. Yet Hellas, even during this civil and cruel war, could not at once cast off all its virtues and intelligence; for in that country the darkest days of winter never pass without the sun breaking through the clouds which conceal it, and gilding by its rays, at least for an instant, her plains and mountains. If the Athenians fought for supremacy, they also fought for national unity; if the Lacedæmonians proved finally despots more bitter than their opponents, yet for a long time they showed themselves heralds and champions of common liberty. Hence resulted that wonderful mixture of vices and virtues by which the Peloponnesian war was destined to become the most fearful of spectacles, and the most valuable lesson for all ages and nations.

Invasion of Attica.

In the beginning of June, 431 B. C., King Archidamus, having mustered on the isthmus the greatest force of infan-

* Κίνησις γὰρ αὕτη μεγίστη δὴ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐγένετο.

try that ancient Hellas ever produced, proceeded slowly from Megaris toward Attica. That good and noble man, hoping still for reconciliation, dispatched Melesippus as envoy to Athens with proposals of peace. The Athenians, however, through the strenuous efforts of Perikles, did not even permit the messenger to enter the city, but dismissed him without a hearing, ordering him to be beyond the borders on the same day, and sent guides with him for fear of his communicating with others. When on the frontier, Melesippus turned to his guides and said, "This day will be the beginning of many calamities to the Greeks."*

Archidamus now marched into Attica, entering by the road of Cēnoë (the Glyptokastro of to-day), the frontier Athenian fortress near Kithæron, on the borders of Attica and Bœotia. Here he again delayed a few days on pretext of preparing to lay siege to this spot, but really to give the Athenians time for repentance, and especially the estate-owners, who, seeing the threats made long ago now ready to be executed, might effect some change in the decision of the city. But, whatever may have been the sentiments of the land-owners, they, in obedience to the majority, had already begun to flock within the spacious walls of Athens, which, like Salamis forty-nine years before, now served as shelter for the houseless. The sheep and cattle were conveyed to Eubœa and the other adjoining islands.

Archidamus, after a seven days' delay near Cēnoë, learned that the Athenians were simply continuing the evacuation of their land; and, seeing that his army was impatient on account of the delay, he marched onward to Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, and pillaged the country. Having laid waste this plain, he turned to the eastward, with Mount Ægaleos on his right hand, and, after crossing Kekropeia, reached Acharnæ, the largest and most populous of all the demes in Attica.

* "Ἡ δὲ ἡμέρα τοῖς Ἕλλησι μεγάλων κακῶν ἔρξει.

Great disturbance prevailed in the mean time within the city of Athens. So long as the invading army was engaged in the Thriasian plain, the Athenians preserved to the last some slight hope that it would not penetrate into Attica proper, but would retreat, as Pleistoanax some years previously had done. But when they saw from their walls that the enemy was not jesting, but had undertaken the destruction of the estates, the orchards, and the harvests—when they actually beheld the Spartans so close to their city, carrying fire and sword over their wealthiest canton—they could not restrain their sorrow and anger. The land-owners could not endure the sight from afar of their burning buildings, and, while powerless to offer opposition, they were loud in their demonstrations against Perikles, who had advised this course, and became madly clamorous for arming and going forth to fight. This spontaneous outburst of discontent was intensified by the numerous political enemies of Perikles, prominent among whom was the demagogue Kleon, now rising into importance as an opposition leader. But, although we think that Perikles was in error in promoting the war, and also in the manner in which he carried it on, we can not but admire the perseverance and high-mindedness displayed by him in carrying out the plans which he thought indispensable for the preservation of the city. Firm as a rock, he met this tempest of unpopularity and righteous indignation. The enraged multitude filled the city with their outcry on the necessity of having an assembly to decide upon the dislodgment of the enemy. Perikles, calm, unmoved, and with his usual cold and distant manner, listened to all the declarations made against him. Knowing that according to the constitution no assembly could convene except by permission of the ten generals, of whom he was one, he did not yield to the wishes of the populace, fearing that, in this inflamed temper of the Athenian mind, they would decide on some ruinous course. So great was the

reverence which the people still preserved for the laws that, although restrained by no army whatever, although they alone had arms and were intoxicated with rage, yet they did not seek relief in violence, but respected the voice of their leader and yielded.

Perikles, however, in order to appease as much as possible the thirst of the citizens for immediate action, sent horsemen to restrain the attacks of the enemy's light troops and guard the buildings about the city. At the same time he fitted out a powerful fleet, which he dispatched for the purpose of pillaging the coasts of the Peloponnesus while the invaders were yet in Attica.

Archidamus, having laid waste the lands about Acharnæ and the demes between Mount Brilessus and Mount Parnes, departed toward the end of July for the Peloponnesus, having remained in Attica about forty days.

Athenian Operations.

The fleet of one hundred Athenian vessels, to which were added fifty of the Korkyræans and several others of the allies, sailed around the Chersonese, touching various ports at intervals, and repeating the work of the Peloponnesians in Attica, especially around the fertile coasts of Elis. These various operations occupied nearly three months, after which the fleet returned to Athens. Another division of thirty ships pillaged the Lokrian coast opposite Eubœa. The Athenians, knowing that the Æginetans were bitterly hostile, and not deeming it wise to allow them possession of an island so near to the Peloponnesus, drove them away from it, and had them transported with their families to that peninsula. The island was surrendered to Athenian proprietors, who were sent thither by lot.

Finally, about the end of September, Perikles himself, leading the largest Athenian force that had ever yet been seen together, penetrated into Megaris, where he was joined

by the ships which had returned from cruising about the Peloponnesus. A terrible pillage of the country ensued, during which "not merely their corn and fruits, but even the garden vegetables near the city, were rooted up and destroyed." Thus ended the first year of the war.

Funeral Oration—The Plague.

During the winter of that year Perikles delivered a funeral oration on the public burial of those who first died in the war, including that inimitable description of the political, social, and moral condition of Athens so eloquently portrayed in Thucydides. It is true that, at the moment he was speaking, the strength of the Athenians had as yet suffered no diminution; but the splendid spectacle depicted in his oratorical masterpiece was true of the epoch of twenty years before, when the armies of the city showed themselves victorious in Asia and Africa, rather than of the year in which the Athenians saw Attica itself trodden down by the enemy. We must also confess that there was something ominous in that picture of splendor, those bright colors and tones of cheerful confidence, which pervade the discourse of Perikles. It was indeed the funeral oration of the glory of the Athenians.

About the beginning of April, 430 B. C., the entire Peloponnesian force (two thirds from each confederate city as before) entered again into Attica, and began to pillage the lands about the city. They even carried the work of devastation to the more southerly districts of Attica, as far as the mines of Laurium. The land was deserted as before, the inhabitants having fled into the city, whence they again beheld with indignation the pillaging of their country.

But suddenly a more terrible evil came upon them. Long before this time a report had spread that a pestilence or epidemic sickness, believed to have started in Ethiopia, had smitten Egypt, Libya, and the countries of Asia under the

Persian dominion. Sixteen years previously, Rome and many parts of Italy had suffered a like visitation ; and more recently the disease had appeared in Lemnos, and in some other islands of the *Ægean*, but not with so much severity as to receive the attention of the whole Hellenic world. But in the spring of 430 it attacked both the *Peiræus* and Athens, where it found everything prepared for its terrific scourge. All the inhabitants of the country had shortly before sought refuge within the walls of the city. This vast multitude of people were either closely quartered in the houses of friends, or lived in small huts deprived of every comfort of life. Their state of moral depression, from the forced sacrifice of their properties in the country, made them all the more open to attack. The epidemic spread first in the *Peiræus*, later in the upper city, attacking all, without distinction of class, sex, or age. Thucydides was himself stricken, and he describes the disease with a conciseness which even modern therapeutic science has admired. It was, as it appears, an eruptive typhoid fever, similar to those which the sufferings of war usually cause in camps and cities. M. Littré believes that the disease is now extinct.*

The disease seized upon its victims suddenly, while in

* "The description given by Thucydides is so good that it evidently suffices to cause us to understand the nature of this ancient disease ; yet it is much to be regretted that physicians such as Hippokrates and Galen have written nothing concerning the great epidemics of which they were the spectators. Hippokrates was an eye-witness of this plague related by Thucydides, and has left us no description of it. Galen likewise saw the eruptive fever which smote the world under Marcus Aurelius, and which he terms the long plague. Excepting, however, a few words scattered in his voluminous works, he has left nothing on so important a medical event ; insomuch that, if we had not the account given by Thucydides, it would have been difficult for us to form an idea respecting the disease which Galen saw, and which is the same (as M. Hecker has endeavored to show) as the disease known under the appellation of the 'Plague of Athens.' It was an eruptive typhoid fever, different from the small-pox, and now extinct." (Introduction to the works of Hippokrates, vol. i, p. 122.)

perfect health ; and its first signs were an overheating of the head, and redness and inflammation of the eyes. Then the internal organs were attacked, the throat and the tongue assumed a bloody tinge, and the breath became unnatural and fetid. Next sneezing and hoarseness came on ; and in a short time the pain descended to the chest, with a violent cough. When it settled on the stomach, it caused vomiting, and discharges of bile succeeded, accompanied with great suffering. Externally the body was not very hot, but reddish, livid, and broken out in small pimples and sores. But the internal parts were heated to such a degree that the sufferers could not bear the slightest covering, and many in their agony threw themselves into cold water. Most sufferers succumbed to this intense heat on the seventh or ninth day, without any external change of the body. Others, having successfully withstood this first attack, died afterward from extreme diarrhœa and want of strength. A few finally survived, but in many cases either with the loss of some member of the body, or with the greater loss of memory, so that they could not even recognize their friends. It is also worthy of note that this year happened to be of all years the most free from other diseases.* This miasma spread to some populous islands, but did not attack the Peloponnesus.

* Grote well remarks that the causes of the Athenian epidemic as given by Diodorus (xii, 58)—unusual rains, watery quality of grain, absence of the Etesian winds, etc.—may perhaps be true of the revival of the epidemic in the fifth year of the war, but can hardly be so of its first appearance ; since Thucydides states that the year in other respects was unusually healthy, and the epidemic was evidently brought from foreign parts to the Peiræus. It may also be remarked that the Athenians, though their persons and movable property were crowded within the walls, had not driven in their sheep and cattle also, but had transported them over to Eubœa and the neighboring islands. Hence they escaped a serious aggravation of their epidemic ; for, in the accounts of the epidemics which desolated Rome under similar circumstances, we find the accumulation of great numbers of cattle, along with human beings, specified as a terrible addition to the calamity. (See Livy, iii, 66 ; Dionys. Hal., " Ant. Rom.," x, 53.)

Science did not remain idle. Hippokrates from Kos, who may be called the creator of the science of medicine, studied the disease, and later on assisted the Athenians by advising the clearing of the atmosphere by fire, coming to this conclusion by observing that smiths were very rarely attacked.

But in the beginning all assistance sought from priests and physicians proved futile, so that despair settled down upon the city. People came to the point of abandoning their sick friends and relatives. The laws of sepulture were not kept, and numerous unburied bodies were left lying here and there. Half-dead persons were in the streets and about all the fountains, and the very sanctuaries in which many were quartered were filled with the bodies of the dead. To this tragical sight of physical suffering was added the still greater horror of moral laxity. Since no one was certain that he would be living on the morrow, all hastened to gratify their tastes, and abandoned themselves to the greatest moral depravity. Neither fear of the gods nor of the laws of men deterred them; for they saw that death came alike to the pious and impious, and the latter did not expect to live long enough for trial and sentence.

For three years did this calamity desolate Athens. Her loss was incalculable. Out of the 1,200 horsemen, Thucydides tells us 300 died of the epidemic, besides 4,400 hoplites, and a number of the poorer population so great as to defy computation. In other words, the empire suffered by this epidemic its severest wound; it lost a fifth if not a fourth of its entire military force. We may also remark, with Grote, that amid all the melancholy accompaniments of the time there were no human sacrifices, such as those offered up at Carthage* during pestilence to appease the anger of the

* Carthaginenses, cum inter cetera mala etiam peste laborarent, cruentâ sacrorum religione, et scelere pro remedio, usi sunt: quippe homines ut victimas immolabant; pacem deorum sanguine eorum exposcentes, pro quorum vitâ Dii rogari maxime solent. (Justin, xviii, 6.)

gods ; there were no cruel persecutions against imaginary authors of the disease, such as those against the Untori (anointers of doors) in the plague of Milan in 1630.

The army of the Lacedæmonians, fearing lest it should be attacked by the disease, retreated precipitately from Attica. But while the Lacedæmonians were still in Attica, and during the early stage of the plague, Perikles had started with one hundred and fifty triremes and a large number of hoplites and horsemen to ravage the coasts of Peloponnesus. On his return he dispatched this force under other generals to Macedonia, in order to effect the capture of Potidæa. This fleet not only accomplished nothing of importance, but communicated the distemper to the soldiers at Potidæa, who had before been free from it. A great loss of life was the result, so that the armament returned in a pitiable condition to Athens, where the state of affairs was equally desperate.

Last Days of Perikles.

The Peloponnesians, availing themselves of the sufferings of their enemies, now sought every opportunity to inflict upon them greater losses than before. Death, sickness, and loss of property wellnigh crushed the spirit of that long-suffering people ; and in their dispirited condition they sent ambassadors of peace to Sparta. The Athenians no doubt felt that they would have fought to the end against their enemies, but not against destiny. The Spartans turned a deaf ear to these propositions, and a general uprising both of the rich and poor took place at Athens against Perikles, as the foremost cause of these evils. Then shone forth in all its brilliancy the majestic character of that indomitable man. Calling an assembly of the people, he addressed them like a king rather than a citizen, as the father of his country rather than as its servant.

Thucydides has preserved the arguments and the haughty

style of this speech ; but he could not reproduce the tones, the proud and resolute bearing of the orator, and the impression which it made on the audience. The irresistible logic and the earnest and eloquent appeal of Perikles to the patriotism of his audience must have deeply affected the assembled people. Though mowed down by the pitiless disease, they were none the less persuaded by the words of Perikles, and decided to follow up the war persistently.

But no power of eloquence can long master the force of facts ; and shortly after the Athenians, oppressed by their misfortunes, again attacked Perikles. His political opponents, Kleon, Simmias, and Lakratidas, availing themselves of the popular feeling, entered a suit against him, on the ground of mismanagement of the public funds, and brought about his condemnation and a verdict of a fine, variously stated by different authors at fifteen, fifty, and eighty talents.

While as citizen and statesman he calmly submitted to this terrible trial, his physical nature now succumbed to the most frightful sufferings. The pestilence, which spared no one, carried away many of his best friends and many of his relatives, including his sister and his sons Xanthippus and Paralus. He who had so many times insisted upon courage and fortitude in his fellow citizens, and had shown himself worthy of his words, when he saw his dear son Paralus dead, and had drawn near in order to place a wreath on that beloved head, could not restrain himself, and, for the first time in his life, wept bitterly.

The people, who saw how much inferior were his successors, again created him general in September of 430 B. C., and trusted him with the supreme management of all affairs. But that long and glorious life, which had passed its sixtieth year entirely devoted to the service of his country, was already approaching its end. He lived about one year longer, but appears to have accomplished little during this time. He died

in the autumn of 429 B. C., of slow fever, which gradually wasted away his power. The disease and his many mental sufferings overcame his reason itself. But even through this darkness the soul-power of the man shone at intervals. It is said that during his last moments, while the best of citizens and of friends were sitting around his bed, conversing on his extraordinary virtue and the great authority he had enjoyed, and enumerating his various exploits and the number of his victories, supposing that he did not know what they said, he suddenly interrupted them by remarking : "I am surprised that you mention and extol those acts of mine which, being partly works of fortune, were achieved even by other generals ; while you take no notice of the greatest and most honorable part of my career—that no Athenian, through my acts, has ever put on mourning."*

The state of public affairs soon showed the want of Perikles, and the Athenians openly expressed their regret for his loss. In his mild, dispassionate behavior, his unblemished integrity, and irreproachable conduct during his whole administration, he stands without a parallel in Hellenic history.

The political career of Perikles was contemporaneous with the last days of the glory of Athens and its first signs of decline. Various and antagonistic opinions prevail respecting the character and deeds of the man. Athens and all Hellas certainly owed much to his genius, but at the same time he was not blameless for the misfortunes which befell her later. Though the constitution of Perikles may be censured in several respects, nevertheless his name will ever recall the most glorious epoch of ancient Hellenic history. Perikles may be regarded as the prototype of the perfect public man of Athens. Themistokles was perhaps a greater politician ; Kimon, a greater general ; Demosthenes, a greater orator ; but Perikles alone was at once a statesman, general, and orator. Combining these advantages, he was before the

* Plutarch, "Perikles."

public for forty years, during fifteen of which he ruled the city. The career of the other eminent men of Athens, from Miltiades to Phokion, was in some way or other suddenly ended.

Be it remembered, also, that Perikles did not retain his exalted position by favoring the multitude or acting the part of a demagogue, but by imposing obedience upon them, the more admirable since his power was linked with the truest liberty. He did not create a new constitution, like Solon ; nor a new city, like Themistokles ; nor a new supremacy, like Kimon. But he accomplished things far greater and more admirable. He regulated and maintained the constitution in its supremacy, and adorned the city with those masterpieces, sufficient in themselves to render the Hellenic name immortal.

CHAPTER III.

PYLOS AND SPHAKTERIA.

Savage Character of the War.

IN January, 429 B. C., the Athenians became masters of Potidæa. The Peloponnesians laid siege to Plataea in March of that year, and forced it to surrender in the spring of 427. In the mean while Lesbos revolted from the Athenians, but, although a Peloponnesian fleet came to its assistance, it was finally subdued. In Korkyra, also, the aristocrats, hoping by the assistance of the Peloponnesians to overcome the democrats, their opponents, attacked the latter, and for some time seemed to have succeeded in their revolutionary movement. But, finally, a strong Attic fleet came up, and they were completely routed in 425.

At first sight, therefore, the Athenians seemed trium-

phant. But their affairs were not so flourishing as might appear. The recapture of Potidæa indeed balanced the loss of Platæa ; but the repeated revolutions of Lesbos and Korkyra demonstrated anew the impending dangers, which if multiplied could scarcely be overcome. In the fourth year of the war, out of the revenue of six thousand talents, five thousand had been spent, and to meet the expenses of the siege of Mitylene the Athenians were compelled to raise a new tax of two hundred talents. They dispatched a division of their fleet to the coast of Asia, to plunder for the sake of procuring money.

While the Peloponnesians were without doubt stronger by land, they did not remain idle on the sea. They not only sent assistance over to Lesbos and Korkyra, but even dared to wage a naval battle against Phormio, the most renowned Athenian commander of those times. It is true that on these occasions the Peloponnesians were not successful, but in suffering defeat they were under constant drill, and by means of this drill they might finally become victors, even on that element where the Athenians had hitherto deemed themselves unconquerable.

But the greatest misfortune was, that from the beginning the war had assumed a savage and revengeful character. The Platæans did not hesitate to put to death the hundred and eighty captured Thebans. The Peloponnesians, again becoming masters of that city, put to death all her greatest leaders, two hundred Platæans and twenty-five Athenians, made slaves of the women, and surrendered the city to the ferocity of the Thebans, who razed it to the ground and rented out the land. The Athenians recaptured Mitylene, and decided to kill all the men and sell as slaves all the women and children. On the following day they rescinded this cruel resolution, which would have raised against them throughout Hellas the most deadly exasperation, and decided to inflict punishment only on those who were the first cause of

the uprising ; yet the men thus slaughtered were more than one thousand in number. The Athenians, not satisfied with the expulsion of the Æginetans, sailed in 424 B. C. to Thyrea, and, having sacked and plundered this new asylum of those unfortunate people, conveyed them back to Athens and killed them all.

Thus the war was daily becoming more murderous. Besides those who fell in battle, all captives were usually put to death. Taking into consideration the fact that the ancient Hellenic communities were composed of only a few thousand citizens, we can more readily estimate their loss. But this loss, however great it may be regarded, was insignificant compared with the terrible anarchy and degradation which the nation suffered. In every city there were two political parties, the aristocrats and the democrats—the former favored by the Lacedæmonians, the latter by the Athenians. These two factions lost to a great degree their civil character, and assumed the aspect of contesting armies. Hence two kinds of civil war resulted in Hellas : one general, between the Athenians and their allies and the Spartans and their allies ; another, or rather numberless others, between the aristocrats and democrats. The law-abiding community, the growth of so many centuries, had almost lost its former peaceful character, and Hellas ran the risk of returning to a more lawless and unsettled state than that which prevailed during the heroic age. Law no longer existed ; authority became vested in the strong and villainous ; private contracts were openly violated, and family ties were disregarded. As wickedness was sustained in its lawless career by reasoning, so words themselves lost their usual meaning, and the oratorical art strove by every sophistry to represent the just as unjust, and the unjust as just. Such circumstances arise under similar conditions in all nations. Thucydides, whose historic and prophetic genius knew how to judge the present and discern the future, says that “such things are likely to

occur so long as human nature shall be the same as it is now."* Let us bear in mind the tragical scenes which occurred in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries A. D. on account of religious disputes in England, Holland, France, and Spain ; and going back to more ancient times, we find that the Carthaginians and the Jews, not satisfied with plunder, confiscation, and slaughter, increased the sufferings of their victims by impalement, mutilation, and other like tortures.

Seizure of Pylos.

In 425 B. C. an event occurred which was the preparation for a cessation of hostilities. Early in the spring of that year the Peloponnesians, under King Agis, son of Archidamus, penetrated into Attica, as was their custom. We say, as was their custom, because almost from the very beginning of the war they annually repeated this incursion. In the sixth year of the war numerous earthquakes were felt at Athens, in Eubœa, and in Bœotia, and especially near Orchomenus, which deterred the Lacedæmonians from invading Attica. In the seventh year the incursion did not last long—hardly fifteen days—partly because it took place very early in the season, so that the army, on account of the corn not being ripe, was deprived of food ; partly because unusually severe weather set in ; and partly because the Lacedæmonians, and Agis the king, received information which compelled them to hasten their return.

About the time of the invasion of the Lacedæmonians, forty ships had sailed from the Peiræus, under command of Eurymedon and Scphokles, to the assistance of the adherents of the Athenians in Sicily. This naval division was also ordered, on passing Korkyra, to assist the democrats there, who during that epoch had not yet entirely overcome their opponents. These were the chief purposes for which this

* Γινόμενα, καὶ ἀεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾖ.

naval division was sent forth, but the following unexpected event occurred during the expedition :

There was then at Athens a military man, Demosthenes, confessedly the most competent general of the Athenians at that time, and a man of the highest genius. Demosthenes had in the previous year eminently distinguished himself in western Hellas. Hence his influence at Athens was great. This general now conceived the daring plan, doubtless in unison with the Messenians in Naupaktus, of seizing upon some spot in Messenia, and thence, in concert with the Messenians and other slaves of Sparta, to fight the Lacedæmonians in their own territory, and thus paralyze all their foreign projects. This great undertaking, destined to bring about such serious results, and which it is strange, as we have before remarked, that neither Perikles nor any one else at Athens had thought of until the seventh year, did not even then obtain any great attention in that city. No special army was appointed for this work, but Demosthenes was permitted to join the expedition, and to employ the fleet in any descent which he might think expedient on the coast of Peloponnesus. When the fleet reached the southwestern coast of Laconia, opposite Pylos, Demosthenes proposed to the two generals that they should plant his little fort on this ground, and then proceed on their voyage. They refused to carry out this proposition, when, fortunately, a storm arose, which compelled them to seek refuge in Pylos—the modern bay of Navarino.* This harbor, formed almost in the shape of a crescent, is fronted and protected by the island of Sphakteria or Sphagia, “untrodden and full of woods.” This islet stretches in a line with the harbor, and close outside of it, forming two narrow entrances, the one on the north and the

* Who of the modern Greeks is not familiar with this harbor, where, on the 8th of October, 1827, the fleets of England, France, and Russia, having routed the united Turco-Egyptian force, sanctified by the blood of the best nations the autonomy of modern Hellas?

other on the south. Both entrances have in the course of time suffered some material change.* The opposite Peloponnesian coast, which in the Homeric years was so splendid by reason of the then flourishing Pylos, was now uninhabited and barren, owing to the tyranny of the Lacedæmonians, who had driven away the inhabitants and eradicated every trace of industry and agriculture.

Demosthenes took advantage of the storm that drove the fleet into this harbor to renew his proposition, but the generals again opposed him, saying that the Peloponnesus had many desert capes, which he could occupy if he wished to expend the money of the city. It seemed very improbable that Demosthenes would be able to maintain his ground on Spartan territory, against the overwhelming superiority of the Lacedæmonian land force. The storm, however, continued for several days, and the soldiers, becoming weary of forced idleness, were seized with a spontaneous impulse to erect for themselves a fortification. Thus a small fort was temporarily raised at a short distance from the northern or narrowest of the two channels. The ground selected was most suitable, both on account of its naturally fortified appearance, and because there was a spring of good water in the center of the promontory. The work was complete in six days, and then Eurymedon, leaving Demosthenes with five ships, sailed for Korkyra.

This fortification, completed with so much negligence and ill feeling, was destined from the very first to secure the means of safety to the Athenians. We have seen that King Agis hastened to return home with all the Peloponnesian

* To-day the southern entrance has a width of nearly three quarters of a mile, and a depth of water varying from five to thirty-three fathoms; while, according to Thucydides, its width in his time was so small that but eight or nine triremes could enter in a parallel line. The width of the northern entrance is now about four hundred and twenty-five feet, and the depth of water inconsiderable; but formerly, according to Thucydides, two triremes could enter thereby, which presupposes a much deeper channel.

army, as soon as he was informed of the daring occupation of Pylos ; at the same time, the fleet of the Peloponnesians, which had been sent to Korkyra to sustain the aristocrats, was ordered to report as soon as possible at Pylos. Thus both the Athenians and their allies were immediately relieved of their enemies. But, on the other hand, the situation of Demosthenes assumed a desperate aspect, because, with five triremes and a few volunteer Messenians, he saw from his little fort forty-three ships of the enemy entering the harbor, and the coast lined with warriors ready to punish the insolence of those who had dared to desecrate their sacred soil. Demosthenes, however, lost none of his courage, but with becoming spirit and wisdom prepared for defense. He sent two of his five ships to Eurymedon, entreating immediate succor ; at the same time he directed his attention to the plan of assault, expected from the sea, because it appears that he had safely fortified the front toward the continent and harbor.

The ephors immediately dispatched four hundred and twenty Spartans to the island of Sphakteria to prevent the Athenian fleet, which was hourly expected, from assisting the garrison ashore. They now rushed daringly upon the coast, above which the little fort rose, defended by sixty Athenian hoplites and a few bowmen, whom they expected to overcome with ease. The coast, however, was covered with rugged cliffs, and there was but one very narrow passage by which the ships could approach. Now, since only a few could make a simultaneous attack, while Demosthenes could mass all his force at this very point, the struggle became less unequal than might at first be imagined. The Peloponnesian ships strove to effect a landing, but were fiercely repelled by the Athenians. In vain did squadron after squadron advance to the assault ; in vain did the gallant Brasidas indignantly call to his men not to be chary of ship-timber, and suffer the enemy to build a fort in their own country. He called

upon them to shatter their ships upon the rocks if necessary, but, in any case, to effect a landing. Following up his words with deeds, he rushed on; but the moment he set foot on land, he was wounded by the Athenian defenders, and fell back fainting on the vessel. His shield rolled overboard into the sea, and was captured by his enemies, who deemed it one of the most glorious trophies of their daring deed. The Peloponnesians rushed madly onward to avenge the fall of their gallant officer, but fell back before the victorious bravery of Demosthenes and his little band.

After two days of unsuccessful attacks, the Peloponnesians ceased fighting, and on the third day sent to Asine in the Messenian Gulf for timber to construct battering machines. But in the mean time the Athenian fleet, under command of Eurymedon, returned from Zakynthus. On its departure from Pylos it had been reënforced by four Chian ships and some of the guard-ships at Naupaktus, so that now it mustered fifty sail. The Athenians at first proposed to fight on the open sea; but seeing that the enemy did not come to meet them, they entered the harbor by both channels, vanquished the Peloponnesians, and drove them back to the shore with serious injury. The Lacedæmonians, realizing that their fellow citizens in Sphakteria were thus at the mercy of the Athenians, strove again and again to sally forth. A terrible engagement ensued within the harbor, in which the Athenians were finally victorious. When the news reached Sparta, the emergency was deemed so grave, since many of the hoplites in Sphakteria belonged to the first families in the city, that the ephors came in person to the spot. Seeing that there was no hope left for the prisoners, the magistrates sought an armistice in order to allow time to send ambassadors to Athens and treat for peace.

Eurymedon and Demosthenes accepted the proposition, and agreed upon an armistice on terms most unsatisfactory to the Lacedæmonians. All the triremes, not only in the

harbor, but in all the remaining ports of Laconia, numbering sixty, were surrendered to the Athenians, to hold until the envoys should return from Athens. The Athenians, in return, promised to send to the Spartans in the island a stipulated quantity of provisions.

Athenian Demagogues.

We may well imagine what a stir there was at Athens when the ship which brought the news and the envoys of the Lacedæmonians reached the Peiræus. "The sudden arrival of such prodigious intelligence," remarks a historian, "the astounding presence of Lacedæmonian envoys, bearing the olive-branch and in an attitude of humiliation, must have produced in the susceptible public of Athens emotions of the utmost intensity; an elation and confidence such as had probably never been felt since the reconquest of Samos."

Fortune had not accustomed the Athenians to such prosperous events. The burning of the splendid edifices of Attica, the plague which had mowed down the inhabitants, the humiliation which they had suffered by submitting proposals of peace to which the Spartans gave no heed, the destruction of their most ancient and faithful allies the Platæans, the expenditure of the reserved fund, the revolt of Lesbos, their strongest ally—all these events were calculated to render the citizens anxious concerning the issue of this terrific combat; when suddenly, as if by miracle, or rather by the wisdom and daring of one man, they saw the haughty Spartans, the greatest power in Hellas, humbled at their feet. A more favorable circumstance could not have offered by which they might be honorably delivered from so many evils, and, without further sacrifices, enabled to recover their former prosperity. And yet the Athenians did not improve the opportunity. To understand the folly of their conduct, it is necessary to explain the gradual change which had taken place in the internal affairs of the city.

During the last years of Perikles the influence of the best and wisest citizens diminished, and the people prevailed in the assembly. The people, while Perikles lived, were more or less managed by him ; but after his death they were governed by the so-called demagogues—men of low descent, but who possessed ability in speaking, and address and zeal in manipulation of the various machines by which the multitude is flattered and deceived. The demagogues would often in the public assembly carry resolutions which the generals, and others of like rank and position, were obliged against their will to execute. Hence ill feeling resulted between the political and military men of the city, sustained by mutual passions and individual interests, and particularly by the envy of the demagogues for the military glory of the generals, and by the contempt of the latter for men who, far from danger and every serious responsibility, claimed to direct by speeches and intrigues the welfare of the community. The antagonism therefore of the assembly and the executive became exceedingly strong at Athens. Some of the generals indeed appeared still at intervals in the assembly. If the famous Phormio, the victory-crowned Demosthenes, and many other military men are no longer mentioned as addressing the people, the good and brave Nikias continued to unite both duties, now counseling in behalf of the city, and now endangering himself on the field of battle. But how small was the influence of the generals in the assembly, the following may show.

Nikias, son of Nikeratus, was then the richest man at Athens. His possessions were enormous, and he employed a thousand men in the silver-mines at Laurium. He was also well versed in political science, a brave general, and an excellent citizen ; so that, take him all in all, he appeared well fitted to rule his country. Yet he attained only a small political influence. This was due in part to his extreme scrupulousness as to giving offense or making personal ene-

mies. He had not the bravery to sustain his opinions—the courage to overcome his opponents—the ambition to increase his ranks, to cheer those around him, to rally men to his side, and, finally, to render his party victorious. But it can not be denied that the bad element of the assembly, and the still worse management of it, had much to do with neutralizing his energy. Nikias always said what he deemed best, but his words were seldom heeded. He ever fulfilled his duty toward his country, offering his life as a sacrifice, but rather passively than energetically; not shouldering responsibilities like Themistokles, Kimon, and Perikles, but accepting the tasks imposed upon him, which he often regarded as ruinous.

The most prominent demagogues of that time were Eukrates the rope-seller, Lysikles the sheep-seller, Hyperbolus the lantern-maker, and the notorious Kleon the tanner, son of Kleænetus, the most influential of all. Thucydides describes him as the most violent of citizens, ever preferring war to peace, because in time of peace his evil doings would be more apparent.* Aristophanes, who then flourished, with inimitable talent and a courage still more wonderful, stigmatized the destroyers of the constitution of Athens, particularly the ignoble Kleon, emptying his quiver of its bitterest arrows. Having called him “a brawler,” he adds that he frightened his opponents by the violence of his accusations, the loudness of his voice, the impudence of his gestures; and that he shamefully prostituted to dishonest uses the influence which he attained, threatening men with accusations, and then receiving money to withdraw them; a robber of the public treasury, following with persecution every virtuous and noble deed, and by the basest and most ignoble flattery securing

* I confess that nothing in Grote’s “History of Greece” astonishes me so much as his attempt to represent Kleon under colors that would befit a Themistokles or Kimon, rather than the most consummate villain that ancient Hellas ever produced. His arguments are eloquent and worthy of himself, but they are certainly illusory and misleading.

the good will of the people. Recalling the estimable character of Aristophanes, the noble patriotism which shines through all his deeds, and, above all, contrasting his words with the best known acts of Kleon, we can not but accept the accuracy of his statements, which are sustained by the general estimate of Thucydides.

The proposals which the ambassadors submitted to the assembly were very simple: "Restore to us the men in Sphakteria, and in return accept peace and the alliance of Sparta." These proposals were not very honorable for the Lacedæmonians, who, to save a few of their fellow citizens, were willing to sacrifice the principal object for which they undertook the struggle, entirely forgetting their allies, whom they now abandoned to their fate, having in the stipulations proposed nothing in their behalf. Since Sparta now relinquished all those claims for which the war was declared, it may reasonably be said that Athens would have emerged triumphant from the contest. The wisest thing, therefore, that the Athenians could have done, was to accept immediately the propositions of the ambassadors.

But Kleon came forward, and reminded his countrymen that, having the men in Sphakteria, now was the time for Athens to recover what she had lost during the dishonorable truce of thirty years. He insisted that the Lacedæmonians should restore to the city Nisæa, Pegæ, Trœzen, and Achaia, in exchange for the soldiers blocked up in Sphakteria; after which a treaty might be concluded for so long a time as both sides might wish.

This decree, though adopted by the assembly, was evidently unwise. The Athenians had surrendered these possessions to the Peloponnesians long before the present war, by the thirty years' truce. How, then, after so many misfortunes in war, could they claim countries which twenty years before, in the very height of their power, they were persuaded that it was not possible for them to maintain? Be-

cause one ray of prosperity shone on them, were they at once to prefer claims which justified the accusations of their intended spread of dominion, in consequence of which the Peloponnesian war was declared? Finally, the Athenians sought from the Spartans impossible things, because the aforesaid cities belonged not to them, but to their allies. Thus the answer of the assembly was a virtual rejection of peace.

The Lacedæmonians, observing that on such a basis negotiation was impossible, and hoping that they might perhaps attain the desired end if they should discuss the question, not before the multitude excited by Kleon, but before a few prominent citizens, proposed to the assembly to appoint commissioners who might consider with them freely and deliberately suitable terms for a pacification. Upon that, Kleon violently attacked them. He knew from the first, he said, that they came with dishonest purposes, but now the thing was clear; they were unwilling to treat before the people, but wished to meet a few chosen individuals. If they had any honest and fair proposition to make, he called upon them to proclaim it openly to all. The Lacedæmonians remained silent, "abashed by the speaker and intimidated by the temper of the assembly." Their mission was terminated, and they were reconveyed in the trireme to Pylos.

Capture of Sphakteria.

The generals of the Athenians now refused to surrender the vessels to the Peloponnesians, alleging that they had violated the treaty by a fraudulent attempt to surprise the rock of Pylos. But, though by this violent act the Peloponnesians were for the present deprived of a naval force, the success of the Athenians was not so sure as at first appeared. The men in Sphakteria appear to have economized their provisions issued during the armistice; and bold Helots, encouraged by generous rewards, together with emancipation,

succeeded at intervals, even now, in landing provisions upon the island. On the other hand, the Athenians suffered from want of corn and water; watches were with difficulty maintained. They were also afraid lest winter should overtake them, and, instead of the expected trophies and booty, there arrived at Athens news of distress and pressing appeals for aid.

These tidings caused much disturbance among the Athenians at home. They regretted that they had not accepted the treaty. Kleon was the person most of all discomposed, as he saw that the people were displeased with him for misleading them. He at first declared that the informants from the camp had misrepresented the state of affairs. The latter replied that, if their accuracy were mistrusted, commissioners might be sent to verify it. The assembly at once chose Kleon and Theogenes for this duty. This, of course, did not suit the purpose of the former, who well knew that the facts were precisely as represented. He accordingly altered his tone at once. "If," said he, "ye really believe the report, do not send commissioners, nor delay and waste your opportunity, but sail at once against the men." Here, with his usual shamelessness, he attempted to take the part of a prosecutor instead of a culprit, and, alluding to Nikias, who was general at that time, tauntingly remarked that "it was easy, if their generals were *men*, to sail with a force and capture the soldiers in the island. If he had himself been an officer, he would have done so."

These remarks excited strong indignation against Kleon. "And why then," was shouted on all sides, "do not you immediately set sail, if you suppose the matter so easy?" Nikias and his fellow generals also asserted that they were ready to grant any force which the orator might choose to ask.

Kleon, supposing that Nikias was merely pretending to give up the command to him, was ready to accept it. But

as soon as he saw that that general really wished to transfer it, he tried to retreat from his position, saying: "It is *your* duty to sail, not mine; *you* are the general, and not myself." Nikias, however, again urged him, formally renouncing the command of the forces against Sphakteria, and calling upon the Athenians to attest to it. They, as the multitude is ever wont to do,* the more Kleon tried to evade the duty, pressed Nikias the louder to give up the command to him, and called upon Kleon to sail. At last, seeing that there was no possibility of escape, and making a virtue of necessity, he came boldly forth, and said: "Do not think that I am afraid of the Lacedæmonians. I shall sail, taking with me no hoplites from the regular Athenian muster-roll, but only the Lemnian and Imbrian soldiers that are here, together with some peltasts from Œnos in Thrace, and four hundred bowmen. With this force, in addition to the soldiers at Pylos, I engage in the space of twenty days either to bring the Lacedæmonians in Sphakteria as prisoners, or to kill them on the spot."

The Athenians were filled with laughter at this boast, but the prudent men were pleased, reflecting that they should gain one of two advantages: either to get rid of Kleon, which they rather hoped, or, if deceived in their opinion, to get the Lacedæmonians into their hands. The vote was accordingly passed for the immediate departure of Kleon. The latter caused Demosthenes to be named as his colleague in command, and information was also dispatched to Pylos that Kleon was coming with the desired reinforcements.

The capture of the men was not so difficult as was supposed. With the reinforcements success was certain. The Athenians could obtain provisions and water from the coasts of the Peloponnesus and from the adjacent islands. Demosthenes had prepared everything necessary for the assault,

* Thucydides, iv, 28.

and as soon as he had received the assistance brought by Kleon he pushed the work eagerly. Sphakteria had recently become more open to assault, in consequence of an accidental conflagration of the wood which covered the island.

The Lacedæmonians resisted bravely for an entire day, but, after many had fallen, the remainder, surrounded on all sides, were asked by the Athenians to surrender. Most of them, incapable of further resistance, immediately signified compliance by dropping their shields and waving their hands above their heads. They were accordingly made prisoners, and were carried to Athens within the twenty days which Kleon had specified. The captives amounted to 292, the survivors of the original total of 420. Of these, 120 were Spartans, and had remained in the island seventy-two days.

Kleon, as may be supposed, now improved his opportunity. Since Demosthenes kept silent, and Kleon continued his boasting, the honor of the achievement was granted to this demagogue, who hence became all-powerful; he imagined himself a great general, and continued to urge the people to war. In vain did the Lacedæmonians submit repeated proposals of peace. The Athenians, animated by Kleon, were full of ardor for the prosecution of the war, and turned a deaf ear to them. For some time the Athenians were prosperous; they occupied and fortified the peninsula of Methone; deprived the Megarians of their harbor; became masters of Kythera, situated on the southern coast of Laconia; and with the coöperation of the Messenians continued to plunder the coasts and threaten a new Messenian war.

CHAPTER IV.

DEFEAT OF THE ATHENIANS.

Brasidas.

WE have already mentioned the name of Brasidas in connection with the hostilities at Pylos. This young Spartan had often distinguished himself during the war. In bravery, in adventurous valor, and in the exercise of arms and military tactics, he stood second to none in Hellas. Brasidas possessed the true military genius, which Sparta neither produced nor had any desire to produce. Her affairs were managed by an oligarchical association, which as a body could sometimes plan and execute great things; but no citizen was allowed any individual supremacy, because it would have become dangerous to the power of the rest. Thus, while the policy of Sparta was wholly selfish, Brasidas showed himself honest and sincere toward the allies, caring for their interests no less than for those of his own country, and as far as possible striving to harmonize their plans and purposes. Brasidas was in all respects a Panhellenic, while the idea of Hellenism or of Hellenic nationality never prevailed at Sparta. In a word, Brasidas appeared rather a production of all Hellas than of the city to which he belonged by birth and education. If there was a city to which by genius and eloquence he would seem to be allied, that city was Athens and not Sparta.

How, then, from the education which the Spartan constitution fostered, and from that system which humbled every great thought and undertaking, was produced the greatest military mind of that epoch? Just as Athens, which gave birth to Aristides, Kimon, and Perikles, now brought forth Kleon, the most depraved of the Greeks of that epoch. There are principles and sentiments which ennoble the most

depraved of constitutions, just as there are principles and sentiments which debase the noblest of constitutions. Athens, on account of her many-membered confederacy, was regarded as the tyrant of Hellas ; hence she produced the most faithful servant of tyranny, the bloodthirsty and depraved Kleon. Sparta, again, on account of the Peloponnesian war, was regarded as, and became to some extent, the bulwark of Hellenic liberty ; hence from her came the noblest defender of that liberty. But Sparta none the less always behaved as a stepmother toward her foreign-spirited child. Had she not come to the above-mentioned distress, she would perhaps never have allowed him the completion of his great plans.

About the beginning of 424 B. C. Brasidas did for Sparta what Demosthenes had done for the Athenians. Just as Demosthenes had understood that the severest blow which he could inflict on Sparta was to occupy the coasts of Laconia, so Brasidas understood that the most effective method of assailing the Athenians was to arouse the allies to revolution, and by all means to aid the uprising. But since, from lack of a sufficient naval force, he could not work on the islands, he resolved to carry the war to the allied cities of the Athenians situated on the coast of Macedonia ; especially since Perdikkas, king of Macedonia, the inhabitants of Chalkidike, and some other districts subject to the Athenians, had sought the assistance of Sparta, and had asked Brasidas to lead the undertaking. Sparta permitted his departure, but so little did she appear disposed to assist him, that she granted him only seven hundred Helots. In addition to these, however, he succeeded, through the money sent from Chalkidike, in enrolling about one thousand men from the Peloponnesus. With this small force of seventeen hundred hoplites, Brasidas resolved to undertake this adventurous and important expedition.

He started in the spring of 424, and reached Macedonia through eastern Hellas and Thessaly. He effected the

march with great daring and wisdom, and on his way he also saved Megara, which was in extreme danger from the Athenians. Reaching Macedonia and uniting forces with Perdikkas, Brasidas detached from the Athenians many cities, promising them liberty from the tyranny they suffered, and their association in the Peloponnesian alliance on equal terms. He made good these promises by great military experience and perfectly honest dealings. In December he became master of Amphipolis, perhaps the most important of all the foreign possessions of Athens. The historian Thucydides, to whom was intrusted the defense of that important town, was at Thasos when Brasidas surprised it. He hastened to the assistance of the threatened city, but did not arrive in time to prevent its capture. Dr. Thirlwall says it does not appear that human prudence and activity could have accomplished anything more under the same circumstances; yet his unavoidable failure proved the occasion of a sentence under which he spent twenty years of his life in exile, where he composed his history.* The opportunities which an exile enjoyed of personally consult-

* "In my judgment," says Grote, "not only the accusation against Thucydides was called for on the fairest *presumptive* grounds, but the positive verdict of guilty against him was fully merited. . . . When I consider the immense value of Amphipolis to Athens, combined with the conduct whereby it was lost, I can not think that there was a single Athenian, or a single Greek, who would deem the penalty of banishment too severe."

It is painful to find a historian like Grote assuming to justify the conduct of the Athenians, and especially the active part supposed to have been taken by the demagogue Kleon, in connection with the severe and unmerited penalty imposed upon Thucydides. While it is true that mankind has every reason to rejoice at his exile, because otherwise he would perhaps never have undertaken his great work, yet, as a matter of *justice*, nothing can be said in mitigation of the conduct of the Athenians on this occasion. Led by the demagogue Kleon, they endeavored to wipe out their own sins and vindicate their lamentable incapacity through the sufferings of an innocent man. But Grote, in trying to justify the villainous acts of Kleon, has often been misled both in his assumptions and conclusions.

ing neutrals and enemies, contributed much to form that "impartial, comprehensive, Panhellenic spirit, which reigns generally throughout his immortal work."

Armistice.

The revolution of the allied cities in Macedonia astonished the Athenians, who almost at the same time sustained other misfortunes. Following the advice of Kleon, instead of directing their main efforts to the endangered Chalkidike, they decided, about the middle of 424, to recover Bœotia itself, in conjunction as usual with some malcontents in the Bœotian towns, who desired to break down and democratize the oligarchical governments. The undertaking, however, was not merely unsuccessful, but attended with a ruinous defeat. A force of seven thousand hoplites, several hundred horsemen, and twenty-five thousand light-armed, under command of Hippokrates, took possession of Delium, a spot strongly situated, overhanging the sea, about five miles from Tanagra, and very near the Attic confines. But while the Athenians were still occupied in raising their fortifications, they were suddenly startled by the sound of the Bœotian pæan, and found themselves attacked by an army of seven thousand hoplites, one thousand horse, and five hundred pel-tasts. The Athenians suffered a complete defeat, and were driven away with great loss.

Such was the change of affairs which took place in 424 B. C. During the preceding year they could have ended the war in a manner most advantageous to them. They did not choose to do so, and were now constantly defeated. Worse still, the seeds of revolt spread among the allied cities. The best citizens, among whom Nikias was a leader, finally persuaded the people that it was necessary to come to terms of peace, while affairs were yet undecided. For, although the Athenians had suffered the terrific defeat near Delium, and had lost Amphipolis and other cities of Macedonia, they were

still masters of Pylos, of Kythera, of Methone, of Nisæa, and of the Spartans captured in Sphakteria ; so that there was now an equality of advantages and of losses. Besides, the Lacedæmonians were ever ready to lay aside the sword in order to regain their men. Again, the oligarchy in Sparta envied Brasidas, and did not look with pleasure on his splendid achievements. Lately they had refused to send him any assistance whatever. The opportunity, therefore, was advantageous for the conclusion of peace ; while if the war continued and Sparta became desperate, and extended a hand of assistance to the struggle of Brasidas, or spread revolt in the adjacent islands also, the whole structure of the empire of the Athenians might be endangered, and the city be compelled to accept most disgraceful conditions of peace. Such were the arguments by which Nikias* and his party finally gained the ascendancy over Kleon, and in the beginning of 423 B. C. persuaded the Athenians to enter into an armistice of one year, within which they hoped to be able to put an end to the destructive war by a lasting peace.

Renewal of Hostilities.

Unfortunately, the armistice could not be carried out in Chalkidike. The cities there continued in their rebellion against the Athenians. Brasidas could not be prevailed upon to leave them unprotected in the struggle which they had undertaken, relying on his promises of assistance. The warlike party at Athens, taking advantage of this, succeeded in frustrating any definite conditions of peace. On the other hand, the Lacedæmonians, seeing that the war was continued,

* In face of the incidents thus far narrated, the reader can hardly agree with Grote, who believes that Nikias was wrong in seeking to obtain peace, cost what it might, and that the views of Kleon, who continued his opposition to the propositions of peace, by insisting on terms more favorable than could be obtained, were "much sounder and more judicious than those of his rival Nikias."

sent an ample force to Brasidas. This army did not succeed in reaching him, because the king of Macedonia, Perdikkas, had in the mean time become angered with Brasidas, and persuaded the Thessalians to oppose the Lacedæmonians in their passage.

The year of the armistice passed, and Kleon renewed his expostulations against the incompetency of the generals who had the control of affairs in Chalkidike, and urged the necessity of sending thither a competent general with a sufficient force. When he spoke of a *competent general*, he intended himself, because after the success at Pylos he had the folly to imagine himself an experienced military man. But, worst of all, the Athenians decided to forward a new force, and intrusted its command to Kleon. He therefore, in August, 422 B. C., started from the Peiræus, with twelve hundred hoplites, three hundred horsemen, a considerable number of allies, and thirty triremes. Reaching Chalkidike, he engaged in battle against Brasidas in Amphipolis, suffered a disgraceful defeat, and was killed while fleeing. Brasidas also ended his short but glorious career in this battle, dying the death of a hero. The way in which his memory was honored was the best evidence of the deep impression that he had made on the Hellenic world. All the allies attended his funeral in arms, and interred him at the public expense, in front of the market-place of Amphipolis. Thucydides tells us that the Amphipolitans made offerings to him as to a hero, honored him with games and annual sacrifices, proclaimed him the founder and preserver of the city, and did everything in their power to obliterate the memory of the Athenians who were the original founders of Amphipolis.

While it may be true, as Grote says, that "Thucydides seems to take pleasure in setting forth the gallant exploits of Brasidas, . . . not less than the dark side of Kleon," yet it can not be denied that no military man in Hellas before the time of Brasidas ever obtained his well-earned ascendancy

and admiration. Not only Plato—who “might well select him as the most suitable historical counterpart to the heroic Achilles” *—not only the allies, not only Thucydides, but the whole Hellenic world, take pleasure in setting forth his gallant exploits, and in representing him as the combination “of every sort of practical excellence.”

Peace of Nikias.

Thus disappeared the two foremost champions of the war—its good spirit, Brasidas, and its evil, Kleon. The party of Nikias finally prevailed at Athens, and that general soon after arranged a conference with King Pleistoanax of Sparta, who was also anxious for peace. Discussions continued during the whole autumn and winter after the battle of Amphipolis, without any actual hostilities on either side. Finally, at the beginning of the spring of 421 B. C., a peace of fifty years was agreed upon. The principal conditions of this peace, known in history as the “peace of Nikias,” were as follows:

1. The Lacedæmonians and their allies were to restore Amphipolis and all the prisoners to the Athenians. They were further to relinquish to the Athenians Argilus, Stageirus, Acanthus, Skolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. But, with the exception of Amphipolis, these cities were to remain independent, paying to the Athenians only the usual tribute of the time of Aristеides.

2. The Athenians should restore to the Lacedæmonians Koryphasium, Kythera, Methone, Pteleum, and Atalante, with all the captives in their hands from Sparta or her allies.

3. Respecting Skione, Torone, Sermylus, or any other town in the possession of Athens, the Athenians should have the right to adopt such measures as they pleased.

4. The Lacedæmonians and their allies should restore Panaktum to the Athenians.

* Plato, “Symposium,” c. xxxvi.

When these terms were submitted at Sparta to the consideration of the allied cities, the majority accepted them. The Bœotians, Megarians, and Corinthians, however, summarily refused their consent.

The Peloponnesian war was now considered to be at an end, precisely ten years from its beginning. Both the combatants came out from it terribly maimed. Sparta not only did not attain her object—the emancipation of the Hellenic cities from the tyranny of the Athenians—but even officially recognized this tyranny, by consenting that the Athenians should adopt such measures as they chose toward the allied cities. Besides, Sparta obtained an ill repute throughout Hellas, because she had abandoned the Greeks in Chalkidike, who had at her instigation revolted, and because she had also sacrificed the interests of her principal allies. She had so humbled herself solely to free the men captured in Sphakteria, thus losing her prestige of never yielding to the personal interests of her citizens, ever considering these as subservient to the best interest of the city.

Athens, on the other hand, preserved intact her supremacy, for which she undertook the struggle. This, however, was gained at the cost of Attica ravaged, a multitude of citizens slain, the exhaustion of the treasury, and the increase of the common hatred toward them on account of the savage massacres to which they had often resorted.

But, after all, was this peace based on any secure foundation? The Lacedæmonians hastened to restore to the Athenians their prisoners, but could not persuade the cities in Chalkidike which had revolted to submit anew to the Athenians; nor did they undertake to force them to this, but contented themselves with recalling their troops. Thus the conditions of peace could not be carried out. The Athenians, therefore, refused to restore Pylos or the prisoners taken at Sphakteria. Again, the strongest of the allies of Sparta did not recognize the treaty; and since the

Bœotians were masters of Panaktum, which they refused to deliver to the Athenians, this condition also remained unfulfilled. Thus the Spartans, seeing that by the cessation of the war they attained nothing but the bitter opposition of the allies, decided by a new sacrifice at least to recover their men. They concluded with the Athenians an offensive and defensive alliance, and the latter finally restored the prisoners.

The Lacedæmonians, though daily promising to fulfill this new alliance by compelling, in conjunction with the Athenians, the allies to abide by the fifty years' truce, did not keep their promise; wherefore the Athenians did not fulfill their engagements, and especially did not give up Pylos. But what the Lacedæmonians most of all desired, after the recovery of their men, was the departure of the Athenians from Pylos. Hence they endeavored to persuade the Bœotians to restore to the Athenians the prisoners, and also Penaktum. The Bœotians pretended to accept the proposition, with the understanding, however, that a defensive and offensive alliance should be entered into between them and the Lacedæmonians, hoping thereby to neutralize the alliance between the latter and the Athenians. The Lacedæmonians could accept this only by violating their agreement with the latter; but so great was their desire to secure Pylos that they yielded to the demand of the Bœotians, hoping that this alliance, secretly entered into, would not become known at Athens.

Thus an alliance was concluded with the Bœotians, who, however, not wishing again to surrender Panaktum to the Athenians as a fortification, hastened to demolish it. When the Spartan ambassadors came to Bœotia to take the Athenian prisoners, they were astonished to find that the Bœotians, instead of keeping their promise to hand over Panaktum, had razed it to the ground. Nevertheless, they went to Athens and said, "Here are the prisoners from Bœotia,

and here is also Panaktum," and asked in return for the surrender of Pylos. The Athenians, however, learned then, probably for the first time, of the separate alliance which the Lacedæmonians had concluded with the Bœotians, and that no fortification was to be delivered to them, but merely the bare ground. They naturally regarded this as a defiance; and were the more enraged, since they were conscious of having really served the best interests of the Lacedæmonians by delivering the prisoners. Hence the assembly of the people was not disposed to accept the proposition of the ambassadors. They were strengthened in their purpose by one who now for the first time appears in the political arena, who was destined later to play an important part in the fortunes of his country, and whose character was perhaps the most eccentric of all that appear in Hellenic history. This man was Alkibiades.

CHAPTER V.

ALKIBIADES.

ALKIBIADES was descended from the illustrious race of the *Æakidæ*, which claimed Eurysakes, son of Ajax, as its founder. He was also related both on his father's and mother's side to the best families of Athens. His grandfather, Alkibiades, being a friend of Kleisthenes, played an important part in the political changes brought about during the end of the preceding century. His father, Kleinias, fought bravely in the battle of Artemisium, and lost his life at Koroneia, where the Bœotians won the day. His mother was Deino-mache, daughter of Megakles. Hence Alkibiades was a descendant of the *Alkmæonidæ* and a relative of Perikles. Later, by his marriage with Hipparete, daughter of the

distinguished Hipponikus, who was slain at the battle of Delium, Alkibiades added to his already large property the handsome dowry of ten talents.

Nature, as if jealous of fortune, endowed him with the most wonderful advantages, both natural and intellectual. His finished beauty of person, which retained its charm through the several stages of childhood, youth, and manhood, caused him to be much admired even by women of generally reserved habits.* Unfortunately, he often abused the advantages with which he was endowed by nature. His athletic body was wonderfully supple. He was by the ancients compared to the chameleon, because he could adapt his mode of living to the many vicissitudes of his life and the wonderful changes of his fortune. At Sparta, he showed himself poor and seriously disposed; in Ionia, amorous, fond of pleasure, and indolent; in Thessaly, fond of horses; and, having lived with the satrap Tissaphernes, he surpassed in splendor the Persian munificence. Within this most beautiful form were enfolded traces of the rarest intellect and moral virtues. Sokrates bore witness to the young man's virtue and ingenuity. Fearing lest the pride of riches and high rank should corrupt him, he used his best endeavors in instructing him, and took care that so hopeful a plant should not lose its fruit and perish in the very flower.†

From his earliest youth Alkibiades gave striking evidence of his courage. In 432 B. C., when hardly twenty, he received a severe wound through his daring bravery; his life was saved only by the strenuous efforts of Sokrates, who himself served with him as hoplite. Eight years later he again distinguished himself at Delium, and then had occasion to repay the debt by protecting Sokrates against the Bœotians. His mind, full of various devices, and his discernment and

* Ἀλκιβιάδης δ' αὖθις διὰ μὲν τὸ κάλλος ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν γυναικῶν θηρώμενος, etc. (Xenophon, "Memorabilia," i, 2, 24.)

† Plutarch.

eloquence, recalled in many respects the great Themistokles. Concerning his eloquence the ancients are at variance. Theophrastus—who did not hear him, because he flourished near the end of the following century, and whom Plutarch describes as a curious searcher into antiquity, and more versed in history than the other philosophers—says of Alkibiades that he was the most competent of all to discover and understand the necessary arguments; but in the midst of his speech he often hesitated, not hitting upon the word he wanted, and stopped until it occurred to him. Eupolis, the comic poet, who was contemporaneous with Alkibiades, calls him

“The best to speak, the weakest to harangue”—*

meaning that he was most eloquent in conversation, but not before the assembly of the people. If we were to judge Alkibiades from his speeches in the history of Thucydides, we should not perhaps accept the opinion of Demosthenes, who called him “most powerful in speaking”; but we must necessarily suppose him able to sustain his arguments before the popular assemblies.

Above all, he had the good fortune to possess teachers and guides such as no other man who became prominent in the city had. To limit ourselves to the greatest, he had Prodikus, whose wonderful allegory of the choice of Herakles is mentioned in the “Memorabilia” of Xenophon, and who undertook to teach him the noblest elements of virtue; Sokrates, the wisest, most moral, and most positive of philosophers, who with paternal solicitude busied himself in imparting to him the safest teachings of his practical wisdom and experience; and Perikles, the Olympian Perikles, who undertook to teach him the loftiest political and theoretical lessons.

But all these advantages both of nature and fortune ended

* λαλεῖν ἄριστος, ἀδυνάτατος λέγειν.

only in forming a most audacious violator of the laws, and an impious traitor to his country. As the many and great streams incessantly flowing into the Euxine do not succeed in sweetening the waters of that basin, so his many moral teachers did not succeed in beautifying the temperament and soul of Alkibiades. Thucydides repeatedly stigmatizes him because he indulged his inclinations on too large a scale, which afterward mainly caused the destruction of the state. No other Athenian trampled so shamelessly upon the laws of his country. Entering once into the house of a teacher, he struck him because he did not have the works of Homer with him ; he also whipped one of his political opponents in the theatre ; and also Hipponikus, who later became his father-in-law, not in anger or for any dispute, but because in a wanton frolic he had made a wager with his friends that he would do it. Hipparete made a prudent and affectionate wife ; but at last, no longer able to endure his infidelity, she commenced proceedings for a divorce. Alkibiades prevented her from taking the benefit of the law, by seizing her forcibly before all the magistrates, and carrying her through the populous market-place to his own house. His reported acts of violence are without number. Who does not know how he acted even toward his own country ? After driving her to a renewal of war, after instigating the foolish expedition against Sicily, when he was summoned to give an account of his conduct before a tribunal, instead of obeying, he deserted to the Spartans and instructed them how to inflict serious wounds upon the Athenians.

Whence arose the depravity of that nature, which had in itself not a few good qualities ? His passions were many and violent, and the strongest of all was his fondness for dispute and rule. But these were common to most of the Greeks ; and we may add that ambition and love of power are usually the mainsprings of great deeds. His early education was neglected, because his father died when he was

but five years old ; but was the youth of Kimon and of Themistokles more carefully watched? It has been said that Alkibiades entered a political career earlier than was expedient. This appears to have been the opinion of Thucydides as well as of Plato, who adds that he would have become another Perikles if he had engaged in public affairs at a proper age. But Alkibiades was thirty-one or thirty-two years old, while in England public men have distinguished themselves at twenty, and at twenty-five have virtually ruled the nation.

The truth is, that Alkibiades became what he was from the foul atmosphere in which he was brought up. The moral laxity which the Peloponnesian war brought about caused such a confusion of ideas, that it is not strange that ambition considered everything lawful that would lead to ultimate success, treason not even excepted. The unrestrained multitude which ruled the city almost surrendered itself to the leather-seller Kleon; so it was easily drawn to the dashing Alkibiades, the more since he undoubtedly had good qualities, and also military ability, which then appeared to be confined to the best families. For this reason Alkibiades rose superior to all plebeian demagogues, and the people became his blind worshipers, applauding all his daring wickednesses, calling them sallies of youth and good-humored frolics, and encouraging rather than suppressing his lawlessness. Such was the indulgence of the city toward him, that even after openly betraying her, after becoming the main cause of her greatest misfortunes, as soon as he wished to return she opened her arms to welcome him. Aristophanes well expresses the conflicting sentiments of the people toward him: "They love, they hate, but can not live without him." But the following precept by the same poet well depicts the change which had come over the constitution of Athens: "Nurse not a lion's whelp within your walls; but if you choose to keep him, you must submit yourself to his be-

havior." It is related by Plutarch that when Timon, famed for his misanthropy, saw Alkibiades conducted home with great honor from the place of assembly, after having gained his point, he did not shun him as he did other men, but went up to him, and, shaking him by the hand, thus addressed him: "Go on, my brave boy, and prosper; for your prosperity will bring on the ruin of all this crowd."

Such was the man who first appears in the political arena at the time when the ambassadors of the Lacedæmonians came to Athens to ask Pylos in return for the site of Panaktum and the Athenian prisoners.

Alliance with the Argeians.

Alkibiades had at first shown himself friendly to the Spartans; but as they had despised his youth, and had manifested greater consideration toward Nikias and his party, Alkibiades became enraged, and took upon himself to oppose them for deceit and violation of the terms of the treaty. While opposing the Lacedæmonians, he at the same time secretly communicated with the Argeians, to induce them to send ambassadors to Athens with the power of concluding peace.

Argos had remained neutral during the first period of the war, and, having thereby recovered from the exhaustion of its resources, hastened now to take advantage of the anomalous state of affairs in Hellas, and especially in the Peloponnesus, to regain its power. To this end it had secretly entered into various negotiations, and had concluded peace with the Mantineians and Eleians. Hence, Argos gladly heard of the unexpected chance held out to them of alliance with Athens—"a former friend, a democracy like their own, an imperial state at sea, yet not interfering with their own primacy in the Peloponnesus." They accordingly immediately dispatched to Athens the required embassy, which was in fact a joint embassy—Argeian, Eleian, and Mantineian.

The Lacedæmonians, hearing what was transpiring, hastened to send new ambassadors to Athens, with full power to put an end to all differences. Common opinion, however, was against them, not because a renewal of the war was desired, but because the Lacedæmonians seemed indisposed to make any strenuous efforts for the discontinuance of the war. When, therefore, the new ambassadors declared that they had come invested with autocratic power, Alkibiades began seriously to fear lest the Spartans might obtain peace, which did not at all please him, because, being eminently a man of action, by war alone could he satisfy his ambition.

Wishing to guard against a defeat of his plans, he resorted to a singular manœuvre. He went privately to the envoys, and accosted them as a friend of Sparta, and anxious that their proposition should succeed. He assured them, however, that if they proclaimed themselves to have come with full power of settlement, the people would ask of them many impossibilities ; but if they would say that they had simply come to submit propositions and debate the same, they would obtain much more favorable conditions, especially since he himself would do all in his power to assist them.

The ambassadors fell into the snare ; for when, the next day, Alkibiades asked them in a courteous manner, before the assembly, what their commission was, they answered that they did not come as plenipotentiaries.* Alkibiades, at this, immediately began to rave and storm, calling them faithless and prevaricating, and saying that they were come neither to do nor to say anything honorable. "Yesterday," he continued, "they declared one thing to the council, and to-day make a different statement to the assembly. How can we make peace with a government having such representatives?" The ambassadors were thunderstruck, and the Athenians, naturally strengthened in their former feeling against the Lacedæmonians, dismissed them immediately,

* Plutarch.

and, in spite of the persistent efforts of Nikias, concluded, in 420 B. C., an alliance with the Argeians and their allies.

By such a dastardly stroke did Alkibiades inaugurate his political career. This alliance between the Athenians and the Argeians meant hostilities for many years, as well as various internal disputes for Argos, which finally ended, in 416 B. C., very disastrously to that community.

During this same year (416) the Melians, who up to that period had remained neutral, were invited by the Athenians to surrender, and to become a subject ally of Athens. The Melians refused to give up the independence of a city which had stood for seven hundred years; but after a protracted siege they were compelled to surrender to the mercy of their cruel opponents, who put to death all the men of military age, sold the women and children as slaves, and subsequently sent out five hundred Athenian colonists to form a new community. They had acted in like manner, five years previously, toward the inhabitants of Skione in Chalkidike, who surrendered to them after a long-continued blockade. The Athenians put to death the male population of military age, sold the women and children into slavery, and gave the territory to the Platæans to occupy.

While externally the city of Athens showed herself so savage toward the Greeks in general, internally her constitution was daily growing more vicious. It is known what a source of benefit to the city was the law of ostracism. But now it was flagrantly abused, and ended in a sort of parody of the ancient preventive law. The political antipathy between Alkibiades and Nikias having reached a point of great violence, it was deemed best to decide which of the two ought to leave the city. Suddenly the leaders of the contending parties changed their opinion, preferring to let the political dissension proceed, and caused the law to fall upon the demagogue Hyperbolus, the proposer of the vote, whom everybody disliked, and who was a constant subject of ridi-

cule for the comic writers. Plutarch says: "He was unconcerned at the worst things they could say of him; and being regardless of honor, he was also insensible to shame." Thucydides also remarks that he was a base fellow, who was ostracized not from fear of his influence or rank, but for his villainy and for being a disgrace to the city. At any rate, it was recognized by every one that this act was a gross abuse of ostracism. "Even if we grant," says Grote, "that Hyperbolus fully deserved the censure which Thucydides bestows, no one could treat his presence as dangerous to the commonwealth; nor was the ostracism introduced to meet low dishonesty or wickedness." Hence this sentence caused its extinction, and no more use was afterward made of it.

Expedition against Sicily.

In the mean time, the peace between Sparta and Athens, although many immediate hostilities had occurred, was not considered broken off until 416 B. C., when, owing to the events in Sicily, it was deemed to be positively at an end.

After the defeat of the Carthaginians, the city of Syracuse continued to rule over the Hellenic cities in Sicily. The Gelonian dynasty continued in power until about 466 B. C., when, on the expulsion of the tyrant Thrasybulus, the Syracusans established a democratical government in their city, and decided to introduce the same in all the Hellenic cities of Sicily. They flourished greatly under their new constitution, and about the middle of the century they ruled by their powerful navy the seas about Sicily and Italy, reduced many of the Sicilian townships, humbled Agrigentum, the second city of the island, and now began to indulge in schemes for extending their ascendancy throughout the island. With this end in view they fought against the people of Leontini. The latter, being the settlers of Naxos in Sicily, founded by the Athenians, sent to Athens in 427 B. C. to entreat aid as "allies and Ionians"; and the Athenians then began to

mingle in Sicilian affairs. But in 424 the Syracusan Hermokrates, who in political experience, eloquence, and bravery was the equal of the best of the Athenians, and who was above all mercenary motives, prevailed upon the Hellenic cities in Sicily to accept peace. After eight years, hostilities again broke out between the Egestæans and the Selinuntines, the latter of whom in 415 sought the assistance of the Syracusans and the former of the Athenians.

The Athenians had sent certain naval squadrons to Sicily at the beginning of the war ; but now, when a request for aid came, the question was not one of a small expedition. Alkibiades inflamed the popular feeling to an irresistible degree, and proposed that a sufficient force should be sent to capture Syracuse, to seize all Sicily, and to rule over the entire west. Nikias and the wisest of the Athenians deemed it most imprudent that the city should be deprived of the best portion of her citizens and ships, while, owing to the relations toward the Peloponnesians, and especially the Spartans, the dissolution of the fifty years' truce seemed near at hand. But who could resist Alkibiades, who saw in this undertaking the realization of his brightest hopes? Thus, while Nikias was dissuading the people from the siege of Syracuse, Alkibiades was dreaming of Carthage and of Libya ; and after these were gained, he had planned to grasp Italy and the Peloponnesus, regarding Sicily as little more than a magazine for provisions and warlike stores.* Nikias, who on account of the magnitude of the occasion was more than usually moved, represented, by repeated and earnest arguments, both the difficulties of the work and the ruinous results that a failure might occasion, seeing "that those who hate us will quickly make an attack upon us." It was in vain that he prophesied ; in vain the wisest of the Athenians, and especially the philosopher Sokrates, expressed the same opinion, as did also the astronomer Meton. Alkibiades inspired the

* Plutarch.

people with hopes of great things, painted in vivid colors the splendor of the expedition, and enforced his arguments with plausible falsehoods ; so that he finally persuaded the multitude, "who," says Thucydides, "neither knew anything of the size of the island nor of the number of the Greeks and barbarians who inhabited it." Yet, while they were so ignorant of these matters, many of them sat whole days in the assembly, drawing in the dust the figure of the island, and plans of Libya and Carthage ! Was it possible for Athens to avoid the precipice from which later she was cast ? The expedition against Sicily can only be compared in its folly to the Russian expedition of Napoleon, which took place while he was carrying the load of the Anglo-Spanish war, and was himself separated by Germany from the land against which he was marching. The plan of the Athenians may be deemed still more irrational. It was intended for an expedition across the sea, which, on account of the state of navigation then, was as distant from Athens as America from England before the invention of steam.

The expedition having been decided upon in April, 415 B. C., great preparations were made, and about the middle of summer the most complete and splendid fleet that ever Hellenic city prepared sailed from the Peiræus. The fleet made straight for Korkyra, where the contingents of the maritime allies were assembled. The armament was found to comprise 134 triremes, carrying 5,100 hoplites, among whom were 1,500 native Athenians and 1,300 serving as light troops. The expedition was under command of Alkibiades, Lacharus, and Nikias, who gave new proof of his wonderful patriotism and magnanimity by undertaking a work which he so much opposed. The fleet weighed anchor with great pomp and parade, and the Athenians placed trophies even more splendid than those previously erected at Eurymedon and Kyprus, as if the citizens felt that they would never again see so complete an equipment, and wished to salute

their forces in an unprecedented manner. Crossing the Ionic Gulf from Korkyra, the fleet reached Rhegium in Italy, and after some delay there proceeded to Katana in Sicily. Here an order was received from Athens recalling Alkibiades to the city, to clear himself of a serious charge.

Flight of Alkibiades.

Alkibiades had carried his points in the assembly of the people in spite of Nikias and the best of the citizens ; but it must not therefore be supposed that he was omnipotent. On the contrary, he had many opponents, who envied his greatness and influence, and were the more dangerous since they had on their side all the better class of citizens, who regarded his policy and career as destructive. Now, before the fleet had sailed, it was suddenly found that all the Hermæ * had, in one night, been mutilated and disfigured by unknown hands. It is difficult to describe the intensity of mingled dismay, terror, and wrath which filled the public mind on the morning after this nocturnal sacrilege. Plutarch says that this circumstance alarmed even those who had long despised things of that nature. "If we could imagine," says Grote, "the excitement of a Spanish or Italian town on finding that all the images of the Virgin had been defaced during the same night, we should have a parallel, though a very inadequate parallel, to what was now felt at Athens, where religious associations and persons were far more intimately allied with all civil acts and with all the proceedings of everyday life—where, too, the god and his efficiency were more forcibly localized, as well as identified with the presence and keeping of the statue."

Did the enemies of Alkibiades commit this act? The

* The Hermæ were four-cornered posts ending in a bust of Hermes or some other divinity, and stood on the various thoroughfares as well as before the temples and houses of the city. They were held in great veneration both as sacred ornaments and guardian gods.

affair was involved in mystery, and they took advantage of this circumstance to fasten the sacrilege upon him, by recalling his many violent irreligious acts; charging further that he was plotting to change the constitution. Alkibiades at once defended himself against these serious accusations, and offered to submit to trial before joining the expedition; but this would not serve the interests of his enemies, who knew well that the citizens who were to sail would have obtained his acquittal. To obviate this inconvenience, they urged his immediate departure, alleging that it was extremely absurd for a general who was invested with a discretionary power and a very important command, when the troops were collected and the allies all ready to sail, to lose time. "In the name of the gods," said they, "let him sail; and when the war is concluded, let him be accountable to the laws, which will still be the same."*

As soon as Alkibiades had set sail,† his enemies, of whom the demagogues Androkles and Thessalus, son of Kimon, were the most prominent, continued the accusation, and an act was passed that he should be called back to Athens to defend himself.‡ Alkibiades did not obey, but fled to Argos,

* Plutarch.

† The second year of the eighty-first Olympiad, and seventeenth of the Peloponnesian war.

‡ It is truly astonishing to read the account given of this mutilation of the Hermæ by Wachsmuth ("Hellenische Alterthumskunde") and many others, who in the most unmeasured language denounce the Athenian people for their conduct on this occasion. The views of Grote are extremely correct, and reveal a deep appreciation of the religious sentiment of the Athenians. "Those," he says, "who are disposed to imagine that the violent feelings and proceedings incited at Athens by the mutilation of the Hermæ were the consequence of her democratical government, may be reminded of an analogous event of modern times. . . . In the year 1766, at Abbeville in France, two young gentlemen of good family (the Chevalier d'Etallonde and Chevalier de la Barre) were tried, convicted, and condemned for having injured a wooden crucifix which stood on the bridge of that town: in aggravation of this

and thence to Sparta. Here, with utter shamelessness, this infamous traitor urged the sending of aid to Syracuse against the Athenians, and the renewal of the war in Hellas in a manner most destructive to them. On being told that the republic had condemned him to death in his absence, he is said to have exclaimed, "I shall show them that I am alive." He fully redeemed his word.*

Destruction of the Athenians in Sicily.

In the mean while, Lamachus lost his life in battle, and Nikias continued alone the war in Sicily, with characteristic carefulness. At first he met with some success, having besieged Syracuse and put it in extreme peril. In the following year assistance came to the Syracusans, in the shape of three thousand Spartan warriors under command of Gylippus, a man no less experienced than Nikias, and much more energetic and skillful; and affairs changed their aspect. In the beginning of 413 B. C. the Athenians sent to the aid of Nikias seventy triremes and five thousand hoplites, among whom were twelve hundred Athenian citizens of the best class, all under the command of Demosthenes; but again the attack against Syracuse failed. The fleet of the Athenians was destroyed in four unfortunate naval engagements,

offense, they were charged with having sung indecent songs. The evidence to prove these points was exceedingly doubtful; nevertheless both were condemned to have their tongues cut out by the roots, to have their right hands cut off at the church gate, then to be tied to a post in the market-place with an iron chain, and burnt by a slow fire. This sentence, after having been submitted by way of appeal to the Parliament of Paris and by them confirmed, was actually executed upon the Chevalier de la Barre (d'Etallonde having escaped) in July, 1766; with this mitigation, that he was allowed to be decapitated before he was burnt—but at the same time with this aggravation, that he was put to the torture, ordinary and extraordinary, to compel him to disclose his accomplices." (Voltaire, "Relation de la Mort du Chevalier de la Barre.")

* Plutarch.

and the land army was compelled to retreat into the interior of the island, where it was partly destroyed and partly captured in September, 413. Among the prisoners were the two generals, whose lives Gylippus made every effort to save, so that they might adorn by their presence his triumphant return to Sparta ; but the Syracusans condemned them to death. The good and brave Hermokrates for a long time vehemently opposed this decision, but to no purpose ; and finally, seeing all his efforts abortive, he furnished the unfortunate men with the means of destroying themselves. The remaining prisoners, to the number of about seven thousand, fared still worse. They were confined in the quarries, where usually only malefactors worked ; and there, suffering from the heat of the day, the chills of the night, hunger, thirst, and countless other torments, these unhappy men perished. At the expiration of seventy days the survivors were sold as slaves, with the exception of the Athenians and the few Greeks from Sicily and Italy who had joined them. It is not known what became of these, but a very small number of the Athenians succeeded in returning home.

Thus Athens lost her two best generals, many thousand hoplites, among whom were about three thousand native Athenians, more than two hundred triremes, and all the treasure accumulated since the peace of Nikias, amounting to three thousand talents ; but most unfortunate of all was the loss of her prestige of being unconquerable at sea. To use the language of Thucydides, "They were altogether vanquished at all points, and, having suffered largely in every respect, they were destroyed (as the saying is) with utter destruction, army and navy and all." Indeed, never was anything more tragical and heart-rending than the picture painted by Thucydides. The terrible losses of the French in Russia in 1812 called forth many harrowing reports. The sufferings of Andersonville have been described in a masterly way by many a historian. But not one of these can equal

the description of the Hellenic artist ; and whosoever may have read Thiers, the most prominent of modern historians on the greatest disaster of modern times, will be forced to acknowledge the intellectual supremacy of the great Athenian.

Alliance of Sparta with the Great King.

In the mean while the war became general, and hostilities were resumed in Hellas. King Agis again entered Attica with a Peloponnesian force, and, by advice of Alkibiades, fortified Dekeleia (413 B. C.), and left there a garrison which for nine whole years—that is, to the end of the war—continued to ravage Attica, carrying off myriads of slaves, cutting off the land communication of the Athenians with Eubœa, and keeping the city of Athens practically in a state of continued siege. And yet, while the Athenians saw Dekeleia fortified and occupied, while they saw all Hellas preparing to fall upon them, instead of recalling Nikias, they sent to Sicily, to the astonishment of the world, the naval and land army under Demosthenes, thus depriving themselves of their still remaining means of defense. But they were destined to be severely chastised for their repeated acts of folly.

In October reports began to reach Athens of the destruction of the forces in Sicily. At first the people refused to credit the ominous news, but they were finally compelled to believe it. Some fugitives found their way home, and corroborated the information ; confirmatory reports poured in from Sparta and from other sources ; and, finally, they heard from all sides that Sparta and all the cities subject to the Athenians were preparing to avail themselves of the disaster in order to hasten the destruction of the city.

The Peloponnesians, not satisfied with the garrison which harassed the Athenians at Dekeleia, were preparing a fleet of one hundred triremes, having no hesitation, after the events in Sicily, in fighting the Athenians at sea. Many prominent allies of the city of Athens—Eubœa, Lesbos, Chios, Erythræ

—entered into negotiations with Sparta, declaring themselves ready to revolt as soon as the Peloponnesian fleet should appear in the Ægean Sea. Above all, Darius II, son of Artaxerxes I, who had ruled over Persia since 423 B. C., deeming the opportunity favorable to again subdue the Greeks in Asia Minor, sent ambassadors to Sparta, offering to take part in the existing struggle. From the very first of the war, the Lacedæmonians did not hesitate to seek the assistance of Artaxerxes; but the negotiations were not consummated on account of the death of that monarch and the peace of Nikias, which was soon after made. But now they hastened to accept the proposition of Darius, and in 412 B. C. concluded two treaties with his representative Tissaphernes, the satrap of Ionia and Karia, by which they recognized the Persian supremacy over the Hellenic cities in Asia, and Tissaphernes bound himself to contribute the pay of all the crews of the Peloponnesian fleet.

These treaties show conclusively what Sparta understood to be "Hellenic liberty," for which she pompously declared that she fought. They show the anti-Hellenic character of the Lacedæmonians, and the short-sighted policy of that state, since, owing to the desperate condition of the Athenians, the Lacedæmonians had no need of this sacrifice in order to overcome them. But perhaps the Spartans may have feared that the king would offer money on the same conditions to the Athenians, in case they refused to accept his proposition; but it is incredible that the Athenians should accept such treaties; and, again, the possible treason of an opponent can not justify a counter-treason. Therefore, these treaties were base, and entailed new disasters on the Athenians, whose misfortunes were constantly increasing on account of the daily expected naval force of the Spartans from Sicily, and through the watchful wickedness of Alkibiades, who, having gone to Asia, instigated revolution among the allies. The first to revolt were the Chians and the Erythræans.

They were soon followed by the Klazomenians, and not long after the Teians, the Milesians, and the Rhodians united with the Peloponnesians.

CHAPTER VI.

CHANGES IN THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION.

Recuperation.

IN the beginning of 412 B. C. the city of Athens had thus lost the best part of her force, and was deprived of almost all her territory. With her subjects in revolt, and the remainder of Hellas ready to make an attack, she seemed without hope of safety. Nevertheless, she continued to fight against all obstacles for eight years, and often emerged from the contest victorious. How did she ward off for so long a time this extreme danger, and how amid so many difficulties did she accomplish what she had not done before her misfortune? Many believe that the form of a government, whether monarchical, constitutional, or democratical, has no influence whatever on the fortunes of a nation. Nevertheless, each of these forms may reach such a degree of degradation as to retard the success of every worthy object. Something of this kind had been in progress in the democratic constitution of Athens from the middle of the fifth century B. C. to the present time. Ever since the plebeians began to rule in the assembly, the constitution had been surrendered to the thoughtlessness and ignorance of the many, and its overthrow became inevitable.

Having without reason decided upon the Peloponnesian war, whereby Attica was destroyed and her citizens were ruined; having rejected without cause the offers of the

Spartans for peace after their disaster in Sphacteria, and consequently sustained the disasters near Delium and in Chalkidike; having finally decided foolishly upon the ruinous Sicilian expedition, where everything was "utterly destroyed"—yet the people of Athens had not yet deviated entirely from the path of reason, had not yet become utterly debased, so as to be unconscious of their sins and unable to organize the means of atoning for them. The depth of their misfortunes opened their eyes; they saw the rocks against which they were dashing, and, after their first burst of grief and anger, began gradually to look their situation in the face. Under the peril of the moment, the energy of despair revived in their bosoms. "They resolved to get together, as speedily as they could, both ships and money; to keep watch over their allies, especially Eubœa; and to defend themselves to the last." A board was formed of ten elderly men, under the title of Probuli, distinguished for wisdom and experience. They had the exclusive right of trying every proposition before it was submitted to the assembly; and hence the latter could not debate on any subject which had not previously been decided by the Probuli. With a degree of unanimity and promptitude rarely seen in an Athenian assembly, the right to determine and provide for all things necessary for the common safety was allotted to the council. They abridged the expenses of their religious ceremonies, contests, and public holidays, and immediate steps were taken for the construction of a new fleet. Cape Sunium was fortified in order to protect their numerous transport-vessels in the passage from Eubœa to the Peiræus; all their outside garrisons, except that at Pylos, were recalled; an amnesty in behalf of those accused of complicity in the mutilation of the Hermæ was issued, and all condemned through it were reinstated in their political rights, excepting those who had openly joined themselves to the enemy.

Owing to the occupation of Attica by the enemy, and the

intended or already declared revolution of the allies, the public revenues were much impoverished, and besides were collected with great difficulty. Hence it was unanimously decided to adopt an unusual economical measure. During the first year of the Peloponnesian war the proposition of Perikles was agreed to, that from the then existing surplus of six thousand talents one thousand should be set apart to be used in case a fleet of the enemy should actually threaten the Peiræus. A decree of death was passed against any one who should offer to use the money for any other purpose, and in fact the Athenians did not touch this treasure for twenty years. Now, although the Peiræus was not actually threatened, affairs had nevertheless reached such a point, that the assembly with one accord annulled the penalty of death for this offense, and voted to have the money spent for the present exigencies.

These wise regulations produced results which astonished Hellas, because she thought that Athens could not rise from the abyss into which she had fallen. During the year 412 B. C. one hundred and twenty-eight triremes were sent at intervals to Asia Minor ; Lesbos, which had attempted to revolt, was recovered ; and the hostile party in Miletus was conquered. But the government of the Probuli, which was established about the end of 413 B. C., does not appear to have been renewed in 412 ; not only because the institution was unusual and not in accordance with the existing constitution, but because the people, who in the height of their difficulties were ready to act wisely, as soon as they saw matters arranged did not wish to continue under this self-imposed yoke. However, the city was able for the present to maintain its stand ; but it was not possible to continue this course for a long time, especially for want of money. The last of the thousand talents had been spent, and the new tax was collected with difficulty ; while the Peloponnesians, under their treaty with Tissaphernes, had at their disposal the inexhaustible treasury

of the great king. Therefore the most prominent and wealthiest of the Athenians began to think seriously on the necessity of putting an end to this disastrous war, and of effecting some definite change in the constitution. The commanders and officers of the fleet, the principal station of which was then at Samos, especially favored these measures. These men not only risked their lives, but, owing to the bad management of the scanty public funds, contributed most of the money from their own resources, and, in fact, bore all the brunt of the war. But these plans could not have been entertained had not Alkibiades effected his own return.

Recall of Alkibiades.

This man, whose practical genius was incontestable, was destined, through the manifold wickedness of his character, to lose the confidence of all the political interests which he served by turns. King Agis despised him for having alienated the affections of his wife. Availing himself of the just suspicion entertained by the other Spartans of the treachery of the man, which was peculiarly strengthened after the defeat in Miletus, he succeeded in having an order issued to the admiral of the Lacedæmonians stationed in Asia Minor to put Alkibiades to death. Informed in time, the latter escaped to Tissaphernes, and represented both the Lacedæmonians and their king Agis in a false light to him. He advised Tissaphernes not to assist them effectually, alleging that the complete humiliation of the Athenians would not serve the interests of the Persian empire, which ought rather to preserve the equilibrium and constant struggle between the two prominent cities of Hellas.* Tissaphernes readily followed his counsels, and it was evident to all the world that he held Alkibiades in the greatest admiration and esteem. At the same time he promised the chiefs of the Athenian fleet that he would entirely estrange Tissaphernes from the alliance

* Plutarch.

with the Spartans—not to recommend himself to the people, whom he could not trust, but to oblige the nobility, if they would but exert their superiority, repress the insolence of the commonalty, and obtain his recall to Athens.

The admirals and officers at Samos were disposed, from their own convictions, to accept these propositions. They not only earnestly desired the overthrow of this unbridled democracy, but deemed it indispensable that Sparta should be deprived of the alliance of Tissaphernes. Therefore, in the beginning of 411 B. C., they sent Peisander and other ambassadors to Athens, to effect the intended change. The people, seeing that there was no other hope of safety, much against their will granted the request by voting that Peisander, with ten other citizens, should at once sail to arrange matters with Alkibiades and Tissaphernes. But when Peisander returned to the fleet, he did not find things as he had expected. Alkibiades could not prevail upon Tissaphernes as easily as he thought. The latter deemed it more advantageous to continue the alliance with the Peloponnesians, and offered to the Athenian ambassadors propositions which they could not accept. Immediately after the rupture of the negotiations, Tissaphernes concluded a third treaty with the Spartans, which was calculated to destroy the hopes of the Athenians altogether, so far as Persian aid was concerned.

Peisander and his associates nevertheless decided, without regard to Alkibiades, to effect the change in the constitution. This was accomplished at Athens in March, 411 B. C. Perhaps the misfortunes of the Athenians brought about the desired end, because the Spartans had recently taken from them Abydos and Lampsakus, and, worst of all, the cities in Eubœa had revolted. Unfortunately, this political change was not accomplished moderately and calmly, as the officers of the fleet at Samos wished. Both the senate of five hundred and the assembly of the people were dissolved. In place of the former, an oligarchy called the government of

the Four Hundred was installed with sovereign authority in the senate-house. The people chose only five men, called Proëdri (Presidents), who in turn selected ninety-five others. Thus one hundred were appointed, and each of these last chose three others; and thus the Four Hundred were elected. Surrounded by a squad of spear-bearers, they undertook the government of the city, and, entirely disregarding the advice of the five thousand citizens whom they were to convene "whenever they might think fit," they sent heralds of peace to the Spartans, and in fact managed affairs as they thought best.

When the news reached the fleet at Samos, the officers of the army, led by two brave, ambitious, and trustworthy men, Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, refused to recognize this change, recalled Alkibiades, and sent word to the people in the capital demanding the abolition of the Four Hundred, the restoration of the ancient senate of five hundred, the abolition of every kind of political remuneration, and the formation of a real assembly composed of all the citizens who could provide their own panoply, the number of whom was estimated at about five thousand. Above all, they asked that all negotiations with the Peloponnesians should cease.

The oligarchs had, in the mean time, divided and engaged in civil strife. The enemy availed themselves of this, and became masters of the greatest part of Eubœa, from which the Athenians were accustomed to get a large share of their provisions. Besides, many of the oligarchs whom Peisander had appointed over the allied cities deserted to the Lacedæmonians, with whom their power seemed more secure than with the Athenians. Owing to these misfortunes, and to the consciousness of being unjustly deprived of so many political rights, the citizens, about the end of June, gladly overthrew this monstrous structure of the oligarchs, regulated the constitution after the wise demands of the army, and voted the recall of Alkibiades.

Thucydides, speaking of these measures and regulations, says that then particularly did the Athenians act wisely. No unusual measures whatever were taken against the oligarchs. A few, to be sure, were condemned; but how was it possible that Peisander and those of his associates who had deserted to the enemy should escape punishment? The only death to be seriously lamented was that of the old and well-known Antiphon, who would not save his life by flight, but bravely defended himself, finally suffering the extreme penalty. But what are these few condemnations compared with the terrific slaughters to which triumphant parties often resorted during these years in various other Hellenic cities, and especially in Korkyra?

Not only did the new constitution show itself moderate, but it also brought with it a change in the conduct of the war. Owing to the harmony between the city and the army, the recall of Alkibiades, and especially the just confidence placed in the two young leaders, Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus, the fleet of the Athenians was repeatedly victorious. Thus, in July, 411 B. C., it routed the Peloponnesians at Kynossema, near Sestos, and in September at Abydos.

CHAPTER VII.

ATHENIAN SUCCESSES AND MADNESS.

Xenophon's "Hellenika."

THE former of these two battles is the last noteworthy event recorded by Thucydides, and the latter is the first mentioned in the "Hellenika" of Xenophon. Thucydides, after his expulsion, busied himself principally in Thrace, for about twenty years, in the composition of his immortal work.

He returned to Athens after the war, but it is not known when he died.

Xenophon, also an Athenian, was born in 445 B. C., and was one of the most prominent pupils of Sokrates. He is the Greek who, with the exception of Solon, more than any other united the practical with the theoretical life; for he was a great general and a most versatile writer. But his history, the "Hellenika," which contains in seven books the continuation of the work of Thucydides up to the battle of Mantinea in 362 B. C., certainly can not, either as to the purpose in view or the manner of execution, be compared to the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides.

Herodotus related the struggle between Hellas and the East, the rise of Hellenism in that contest, and the supremacy of the Athenians. He fulfilled his purpose with conscientiousness and impartiality. Thucydides narrated the struggle between the Athenians and Sparta, between aristocracy and democracy, between the Ionic and the Doric tribes. He delineated the various political, social, and individual passions of this struggle, with an art worthy of Sophokles and Shakespeare. Xenophon intended to relate the supremacy of Sparta, and to show the greatness of the Spartan constitution, which the unbridled freedom of the people of Athens had forced him, like many other Greeks of that epoch, to prefer; the more so, since Sparta then reached her highest glory. This choice, however, was erroneous, not as regards the just condemnation of the *ochlocratia*, or the undue power of the masses, but as regards the preference given to the Spartan oligarchy. Whatever was glorious in ancient Hellas in form of government, was produced by the democracy of the Athenians up to the middle of the fifth century. To Athens is due all the greatness and grace of ancient Hellenism, while the Spartan oligarchy not only brought forth political virtues of a lower type, was not only entirely sterile in eloquence, science, and art, but showed herself inferior to the Athenians

even in the exercise of her supremacy. The prevailing idea of Xenophon's work being thus erroneous, it is substantially untrustworthy, and, even in its exposition of the most dramatic and most noteworthy events, it is dry and meager; so that one is often led to believe that the author was ambitious to imitate the brevity of expression taught by the constitution which he so much admired. And yet it is a great good fortune that the "Hellenika" were preserved, for want of other contemporaneous history, and for the practical experience of the author.

Progress of the War.

The Athenians were for some time prosperous. In April, 410 B. C., they gained near Kyzikus a most glorious victory, in which the military genius of Alkibiades shone more than ever before. All the ships of the Peloponnesians were either captured or destroyed, and the Lacedæmonian admiral, Mindarus, fell fighting bravely. The letter of Hippokrates, the secretary of the admiral, to the magistrates at Sparta, vividly portrayed the greatness of the calamity: "Our advantages are lost; Mindarus is slain; the soldiers are starving; we are in straits as to what to do."*

The impression which this misfortune made at Sparta was so great, that the ephors unhesitatingly submitted to the Athenians propositions of peace, which the best of the citizens were in favor of accepting. But this class no longer wielded any influence. The amendments to the constitution agreed upon during June, 411, were again changed so that all the people, even the poorest, had a share in the public affairs. Hence the *ochlos* or mob once more carried matters to the higher council. New demagogues sprang up, the most prominent of whom was Kleophon, who was actuated by the

* Xenophon, "Hellenika," i, 1, 23: "Ἔρρει τὰ καλὰ · Μίνδαρος ἀπέσσυται · πεινῶντι τῶνδρες · ἀπορίομεν τί χρὴ δρῆν." See also Plutarch, "Alkibiades," c. 28.

same principles as Kleon, and who finally persuaded the people to reject the propositions of peace.

The war therefore continued, and fortune did not at first abandon the Athenians. About 410, Alkibiades, having occupied Chrysopolis (the modern Skutari), became master of the Bosphorus, and the Lacedæmonians were also driven from Thasos ; but in the following year the Athenians lost both Pylos and Nisæa. In 408, however, Alkibiades recovered Chalkedon and Byzantium.

Encouraged by these repeated successes, Alkibiades resolved in 407 to appear finally even at Athens, whither he had not yet returned, although his banishment had been revoked years before. "When he landed, the multitude that came out to meet him," says Plutarch, "did not vouchsafe so much as to look upon the other generals, but, crowding up to him, hailed him with shouts of joy, conducted him on the way, and such as could approach him crowned him with garlands ; while those that could not come up so close viewed him at a distance, and the old men pointed him out to the young." He was given the absolute command of their forces both by sea and land, and one hundred triremes and fifteen hundred hoplites for the continuation of the struggle. But the city was not destined to be saved by the man who had formerly betrayed her. Destiny seldom leaves political wickedness unpunished.

Lysander.

Up to that time Sparta had shown no excellent leader except Gylippus, who, however, does not appear to have been employed in the contest in Asia Minor. Perhaps if Gylippus had achieved in the East what he had in Sicily, his prestige would have become greater than would have suited the oligarchy of his country. But during December, 408 B. C., or January, 407, Lysander, a new admiral of the Lacedæmonians, arrived on the coast of Asia Minor. He was born of poor

parents, and is even said to have been of that class called Mothakes, being enabled only by the aid of richer men to keep up his contribution to the public mess, and his place in the constant drill and discipline. His family, however, although poor, belonged to the Herakleidæ, and was one of the most respected in Sparta. Lysander had received excellent advantages from nature. He proved himself not only a most capable commander, and adapted for every political emergency, but especially fit for the formation and direction of political parties. He was never actuated by desire for material emolument, but was contented in the poverty in which he was born ; which trait is the more to be admired, since he received more opportunities than any other Greek to enrich himself. Unfortunately, he deemed every method lawful for the accomplishment of plans which might either serve his own private ambition or further the interests of his country. To this end he made use of every evil practice—slaughter, murder, deceit, and perjury. His recklessness in falsehood and perjury is illustrated by various current sayings ascribed to him ; such as, that children were to be taken in by means of dice, men by means of oaths. Neither shall we err as to his character in stating that it was directly opposite to that of Brasidas. Brasidas used his genius for the service of Sparta, and the force of Sparta for the interests of a common Hellenism ; wherefore we have characterized him as a Panhellenic man. Lysander, on the other hand, employed the strength of the Hellenic nation for the service of the individual interest of Sparta. In this respect he was a genuine child of Sparta ; but afterward he strove to subject her power to the service of his own designs. His ambition was the more unusual, since it was joined with a strange abstinence in diet. No one conformed more readily to the Spartan discipline than he. There is nothing more dangerous than the love of power, especially under the peculiar temperament of Lysander. The mercenary and pleasure-seeking

man, however great he may become, has always some propensity in common with the masses, whereby the force of his energy is materially diminished ; but invulnerable natures, such as that of Lysander, since they surround their genius with some superhuman peculiarity, become much more dangerous than the former. For this reason, Lysander, though not of greater genius than Alkibiades, was stronger among both Greeks and Asiatics. His influence was only counteracted by the oligarchy of his country, which, after availing herself of his services during the difficulties of the last two years, finally paralyzed his power.

Such was the man against whom the Athenians and Alkibiades had now to contend—a man wholly different from all the Spartan admirals thus far met. At the same time another terrible opponent arose, Cyrus the Younger, son of Darius II, and satrap of Asia Minor. Intending to grasp the sovereignty from his brother Artaxerxes II, he did not use the vacillating policy of Tissaphernes ; but, knowing that he had need of Greek soldiers for the accomplishment of his object, he thought it imperative to sustain the Spartans with all his might. Lysander happened to be at Sardis, and strengthened this disposition of Cyrus by a cunning artifice ; for when Cyrus, after drinking his health, asked what he could do to please him, Lysander replied, “I beg you would add an obolus to the seamen’s pay, so that, instead of three oboli a day, they may have four.” Cyrus, judging him by former admirals who were so often bribed, expected that he would ask for some private favor. Admiring the spirit of the man, Cyrus increased the pay as asked ; and many of the Athenian sailors, who received only three oboli, deserted to the enemy, while those who remained became indolent and mutinous, and gave their officers continual trouble.

This was a source of extreme difficulty to Alkibiades. His fleet was larger than that of Lysander, but the latter,

who well knew that the Athenians would be reached by Persian gold, carefully avoided risking battle. Alkibiades saw this, and, wishing to levy money on the hostile coast, and at the same time consult with Thrasybulus, who had gone to Phokæa, he decided to intrust the fleet for a short time to his pilot Antiochus, whom he commanded under no circumstances whatever to sail against the fleet of the enemy. But Antiochus, contrary to the order, fought a battle near Ephesus in the spring of 407, was defeated, lost fifteen ships, and was slain in the battle.

Flight of Alkibiades.

This defeat, though small in itself, became the cause of important events. The whole conduct of Alkibiades furnished so much ground of mistrust, that even his best justified acts, as soon as they brought the least misfortune, were naturally misunderstood. Such is the fate of traitors. The Athenians, as long as they saw him prospering, forgot everything and surrendered to him the force of the city; but as soon as they heard of this defeat, and learned that Alkibiades had left the fleet, they at once took the command from him, and chose ten generals, among whom were Konon and Thrasyllus. Alkibiades did not return to Athens, but retreated to the Chersonese, where he had recently constructed some fortifications for his own safety.

These events took place about the end of 407 B. C., and about the same period the command of Lysander was terminated, and Kallikratidas was sent in his stead.

Kallikratidas.

Kallikratidas differed so much in character from Lysander, that it seems as if destiny played with the fortunes of this great war, and with those of the Hellenic nation, by repeatedly surrendering it to dispositions entirely antagonistic. While Lysander invoked in every way the interven-

tion of the Persians in Hellenic affairs, that he might thus subdue Athens, and on its ruins raise the Spartan despotism in Hellas, Kallikratidas disliked every relation with the barbarians, was impatient with the existing civil war, and yearned for the restoration of peace. Kallikratidas was, like Brasidas, a Panhellenic man, and pursued faithfully the object for which Sparta declared war. Both sought the restoration of liberty and equal rights. Lysander, like many other adherents of the Spartan constitution, demanded that their city should be rewarded for the struggles she had undergone for twenty or more years, by succeeding to the supremacy of the Athenians.

Kallikratidas was at first successful, though he was basely accused by Lysander. The leaders of the fleet, succumbing to the plots of this crafty man, at first acted against his successor, but were shortly after compelled to acknowledge his virtues. Kallikratidas, however, found himself obliged to go to Sardis, and solicit from Cyrus the pay of his soldiers. Cyrus, eager to manifest in every way his partiality for the former admiral, delayed receiving him until Kallikratidas could bear it no longer, and returned to Ephesus without an interview. At the same time he lamented bitterly that the Greeks should be compelled to go to foreigners for money, and swore that, should he ever return home, he would exert all his power to reconcile the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians. Having written to Sparta for money, and obtained sufficient provisions from the Milesians and Chians, he became master of Methymna, on the northern coast of Lesbos—a town not only strongly attached to the Athenians, but also defended by an Athenian garrison.

Here he gave evidence of his Panhellenic sentiments. When the allies demanded that the Methymnian and Athenian prisoners should be sold as slaves, he peremptorily refused compliance, saying that never while he commanded would he allow any free Greek to be reduced to slavery.

How different from the savage slaughter that all the other commanders committed during the war ! “ No one who has not familiarized himself with the details of Grecian warfare,” says Grote, “ can feel the full grandeur and sublimity of his proceeding—which stands, so far as I know, unparalleled in Grecian history. It is not merely that the prisoners were spared and set free : as to that point, analogous cases may be found, though not very frequent. It is, that this particular act of generosity was performed in the name and for the recommendation of Panhellenic brotherhood and Panhellenic independence of the foreigner ; a comprehensive principle, announced by Kallikratidas on previous occasions as well as on this, but now carried into practice under emphatic circumstances, and coupled with an explicit declaration of his resolution to abide by it in all future cases.”

After the capture of Methymna, Kallikratidas, having pursued the Athenian commander Konon, who had approached Methymna in order to attempt its relief, as far as Mitylene, compelled him to fight within the harbor, captured thirty of his seventy vessels, and closed the port against him. When Diomedon, another admiral of the Athenians, came to his rescue with twelve ships, Kallikratidas routed him also, and captured ten of his vessels.

The Athenians, learning the perilous condition of Konon, made every effort to rescue him. We are informed that within thirty days a new fleet of one hundred and thirty triremes was fitted out and sent from the Peiræus. So inexhaustible were the resources of that wonderful city ! This new fleet joined the ships of the Samians and the other allies, making the combined force consist of one hundred and fifty triremes. In July, 406 B. C., it was drawn up against the enemy near the Arginusæ islands, between Lesbos and Asia Minor. Kallikratidas was advised by his pilot, the Megarian Hermon, to retire for the present without fighting, inasmuch as the Athenian fleet had the advantage of

thirty triremes over him in number. He replied that flight was disgraceful, and that Sparta would be no worse off even if he should perish.* A great naval battle took place, in which the Athenians gained a splendid victory, since, as it appears, they were well commanded, eight of the ten generals being present. The Athenians lost twenty-five ships; the Lacedæmonians lost nine of their ten ships, and more than sixty of those of their allies. Kallikratidas fell in the battle. Thus perished the hero whose sentiments were so worthy of a Spartan, and who, in justice, magnanimity, and valor, was equal to the best of the Greeks.†

The Athenians had again by their energy succeeded in overcoming adverse fortune. But had they the wisdom to take advantage of this new victory? It is said that the Spartans submitted fresh propositions of peace, which were again rejected, mostly through the efforts of the demagogue Kolophon. But another mistake much more serious was committed, which ended in the most disgraceful proceeding in all history.

Death of the Generals.

The Athenian generals held a council after the battle, to decide whether they should avail themselves of the victory to hasten to the rescue of Konon, who was still closely besieged by Eteonikus, or should delay their departure in order to collect the dead who were floating about in the sea, and to rescue those fallen overboard, who were trying to save themselves by means of chance spars or empty casks. They decided upon the former course, but at the same time left with Thrasybulus and Theramenes forty-six triremes, to collect the dead and save the shipwrecked. A violent storm arose, which baffled their efforts, and in fact rendered all such intervention totally impracticable. Now, since the

* Ἡ Σπάρτη οὐδὲν μὴ κάκιον οἰκίεται ἐμοῦ ἀποθανόντος, φεῦγειν δ' αἰσχρόν.

† Plutarch.

number of those who thus perished was considerable, Archedemus, Kleigenes, Kleophon, and other demagogues, actuated by their usual envy of military men, incited much hard feeling against the generals for having neglected a sacred duty, and summoned them to prove their innocence. Two out of the eight, foreseeing the danger awaiting them, did not return ; but the other six, among whom was Perikles, son of Perikles and Aspasia, hastened to obey. On reaching the city they were charged with violation of their duty, not only by the above-named demagogues, but by the pilot Theramenes, a man of considerable political and military ability, and who deemed all things lawful to satiate his grasping ambition. Theramenes, on seeing the opposite party about to succeed, abandoned his own, and joined the other. The generals maintained that, "if any one was to blame for not picking up the drowning men, it was Theramenes himself, to whom they had expressly confided the performance of this duty. Nevertheless, they (the generals) made no charge against him, well knowing that the storm had rendered the execution of the task absolutely impossible." The defense of the generals was listened to with favor, and seemed likely to prevail with the majority. But the demagogues, with infernal ingenuity, called for a new trial, alleging that it was now dark, so that no vote could be taken, the show of hands being indistinguishable. In the mean time they stirred up the feelings of the people and the relatives of the dead to such a storm of sorrow and anger, that, maddened for revenge, they clamored for the blood of the commanders.

When the senate met for the purpose of determining in what manner the generals should be judged, the senator Kalixenus, at the instigation of Theramenes, proposed the following resolution : "Whereas both the accusation and the defense of the generals have been heard in the former assembly, the Athenian people do hereby enact that they shall vote on the subject by tribes. For each tribe two urns shall

be placed, and the herald of each shall proclaim, 'All citizens who think the generals guilty for not having rescued the warriors who had conquered in the battle, shall drop their pebbles into the foremost urn ; all who think otherwise, into the hindmost.' Should the generals be pronounced guilty, they shall be delivered to the Eleven and punished with death, and their property shall be confiscated, the tenth part being set apart for the goddess Athene."

This was heard by a large portion of the assembly with well-merited indignation. Its enormity consisted, as Grote says, in breaking through the established constitutional maxims and judicial practices of the Athenian democracy. It deprived the accused generals of all fair trial, alleging, with a mere faint pretense of truth which was little better than utter falsehood, that their defense as well as their accusation had been heard in the preceding assembly. Now there has been no people, ancient or modern, in whose view the formalities of judicial trial were more sacred and indispensable than in that of the Athenians—formalities which included ample notice beforehand to the accused party, with a measured and sufficient space of time for him to make his defense before the dikasts, while those dikasts were men who had been sworn beforehand as a body, yet selected by lot for each occasion as individuals. From all these privileges the generals were now to be debarred, and their lives, honors, and fortunes submitted to a vote of the unsworn public assembly, without hearing or defense. Nor was this all. Xenophon tells us that one single vote was to be taken in condemnation or absolution of the eight generals collectively.*

In vain did a large portion of the assembly oppose the measures of the mob ; in vain did the officers of the senate refuse to accede to the mad demands. Finally, they were forced to yield when the mob, in the frenzy of their excitement, intimated that unless their opponents would cease offer-

* Grote, vol. vii, chap. lxiv.

ing resistance, they should themselves share the fate of the generals. The brave old philosopher Sokrates protested to the last against such an unlawful and unheard-of proceeding. But the voice of the philosopher and the demands of justice alike availed nothing for the unfortunate generals. They were all *murdered* in the usual manner by being compelled to drink hemlock, and their property was confiscated.

It is useless to depict the madness and injustice of this act. Instead of expressing thanks first to the gods and then to the generals for their glorious victory, the people, as if seized by frenzy, condemned them to death, and thus in the midst of threatening danger deprived themselves of their most able leaders. As the scorpion when surrounded by a circle of flame, which gradually closes in upon it, will not endeavor to save its life by fighting to the last, but turns upon its own body its fatal sting; so the democracy of Athens, as if crazed by the gathering of disasters, cast away its last chance for freedom and prosperity, by inflicting upon itself this wound, alike terrible and unforeseen. The act is the more to be deplored, since, even if the generals had neglected the saving of the shipwrecked, the importance of this neglect vanishes before the great interests of common safety. But they had not neglected this duty, and its execution was only prevented by reason of the storm.

In vain did the people, repenting their folly soon after, bring to trial those who had deceived them. The evil was done, and brought on its inevitable and ruinous results. Never was a political sin punished with such swiftness and severity as that of the Athenians.

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CHAPTER VIII.

FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.

Ægospotami.

THE Chians and the other allies of Sparta, immediately after the disaster at the Arginusæ, gathered in council at Ephesus, and decided, in conjunction with Cyrus, to seek from the ephors the immediate renomination of Lysander as admiral. This election of a commander for a second time was contrary to custom. Nevertheless, the ephors substantially accepted the request by appointing Arakus as admiral, and Lysander as his secretary, but invested with all the real powers of command.

Lysander reached Ephesus about the beginning of 405 B. C., and immediately aroused everywhere the courage of the adherents of Sparta. He hastened to visit Cyrus at Sardis, and the latter furnished him with abundant means. Having thus equipped new triremes, he availed himself of the inactivity of the new generals whom Athens had sent to dominate by his navy not only the coasts of Asia Minor, but the very entrances of the Peiræus. He soon afterward appeared with all his fleet at the Hellespont, and proceeded to attack the neighboring town of Lampsakus, which he carried by storm.

The generals of the Athenians awoke at last from their lethargy, and entered the strait with their powerful fleet of one hundred and eighty ships. But on learning that Lysander had already become master of Lampsakus, they sailed toward the European side of the strait, reached a certain spot called *Ægospotami*, or Goat's River, right opposite Lampsakus, separated by a breadth of strait of about one mile and three quarters, and summoned Lysander to battle.

The only advantage of the place was its proximity to Lampsakus. It was without a safe harbor, good anchorage, houses, or provisions. Thus the great army was compelled to furnish itself with all necessaries from Sestos, about one mile and three quarters distant by land, and still farther by sea. Now, anciently there existed in the armies no organized commissariat, but each sailor or soldier attended to his own wants; and hence it followed that for a long time the ships were left unguarded. The choice of that place by the Athenians was an unpardonable mistake.

The admiral of the Lacedæmonians, who was anchored at Lampsakus in a good harbor, and had behind him a city overflowing with provisions, and an infantry ready to aid him, could not fail to turn such a mistake to his advantage. Early next morning the Athenians sailed across the strait and found him ranged in perfect order of battle, with the land force so disposed ashore as to lend assistance, but with strict orders to await attack and not to move forward. Not daring to attack him, thus securely posted, and not having succeeded during the day in drawing him out of the harbor, they were compelled in the evening to return to Ægospotami. This was repeated for four successive days, the Athenians becoming each day more confident in their own superior strength, and more full of contempt for the apparent inactivity of their opponents. In vain did Alkibiades—who, as we have mentioned, lived in a castle of his own in the Chersonese, and who witnessed the scene—tell the generals that it was disastrous to have stationed their ships near a dangerous and naked shore, and that it was their duty to sail to the port of Sestos, where they would be as safe as Lysander at Lampsakus, and could fight whenever they wished. The generals refused to listen to him, and dismissed him with the insulting taunt that they were now in command, not he. They continued daily inviting their adversaries to battle, whom they now considered as “a dastardly set of

men, who durst not quit their station."* Indeed, so ruinous a contempt did the generals feel for Lysander, that after their return to Ægospotami they allowed their crews to be scattered here and there on the coast.

Finally, on the fifth day, Lysander, who as usual sent in the wake of the retiring Athenians some swift ships to watch their movements, ordered the officers, as soon as the Athenians landed, to make known the fact by raising a bright shield. The moment he beheld the signal he at once pushed forward with the utmost speed against the enemy. All the triremes were caught at their moorings ashore, some entirely deserted, others with one, or at most only two, of the three tiers of rowers which formed their complement. We are told that the men, not in the least expecting a surprise, were scattered here and there, some in the market-place, some in the fields; some were asleep in their tents, and some preparing their dinner. Lysander thus became, not only without the loss of a single ship, but almost of a single man, master of one hundred and seventy triremes. The division of Konon alone, composed of twelve vessels, succeeded in escaping to Kyprus. Lysander took the captured vessels and prisoners back to Lampsakus, accompanied with the flutes and songs of triumph. He killed all the Athenian captives, amounting to three or four thousand men—showing by this act how he differed from the good and noble Kallikratidas. This complete destruction of the fleet put Athens at the mercy of the victor.

Lysander next began the conquest of the rest of the Attic empire, ordering all the Athenians and philo-Athenians whom he found to repair to Athens on pain of death. His design was, that the crowds he drove into the city should soon occasion a famine, and so prevent the trouble of a long siege, which must have been necessary if provisions had been

* Plutarch.

plentiful.* Thus all the allied cities fell under his power, and he forthwith abolished in these the democratic and other forms of government, and set up the oligarchical form, composed of a Lacedæmonian governor called harmost, assisted by ten archons, whom he invested with full power of life and death. The only city which offered resistance was Samos, and for the present Lysander put off its subjection. With the exception of this island, all the Athenian empire, once so great and glorious, had now crumbled to ruins.

Capture of Athens.

At length, in November, 405 B. C., Lysander entered the Saronic Gulf with a powerful fleet of two hundred triremes, and in conjunction with Kings Agis and Pausanias, who led the entire land force of Sparta, vigorously began the siege of Athens. Surrounded on all sides, the Athenians could not hope either for military aid from without or for supplies to sustain the large crowds whom Lysander had forced into the city. Delay in surrender, therefore, seemed impossible. Nevertheless, the city resisted for many months, displaying a spirit worthy of her past greatness and success. But when the citizens began to die of hunger, they submitted propositions for an honorable peace, stipulating that they should become allies of the Lacedæmonians and keep their walls and the Peiræus. The Spartans rejected these proposals, and demanded the destruction of the long walls. Then the Athenians, though suffering the most excruciating torments, decided to continue the defense. But the distress within the walls became more and more aggravated; hunger increased daily; and finally many of the oligarchs decided upon unconditional surrender to the Lacedæmonians, hoping to rule through them.

Under these circumstances, Theramenes, who had been

* Plutarch.

the cause of the death of the generals, offered to go as envoy to Lysander and Sparta, in order to ascertain the real intention of the ephors in regard to Athens. His true object, however, was to bring matters to such a pass that the city would be obliged to surrender at discretion. His offer was accepted, and he passed more than three months in the camp of Lysander. On his return he alleged that he was forcibly kept by Lysander, and that the latter had finally declared that all negotiations should be made through the ephors, who alone had the power to grant peace. Though all hope had now fled, the pride and desperate resolution of Athens still enabled her citizens to bear up. Numbers died of starvation before any offer to surrender was made. But finally the unbearable sufferings of the city strengthened the growing desire for peace. The men who stood out most boldly for prolonged resistance were put to death. Among these was Kleophon, who, though arguing that they should not surrender, fulfilled none of his military duties. The advice of Theramenes was eagerly accepted, and an embassy was dispatched to Sparta, with instructions to conclude peace upon any terms.

An assembly of the Peloponnesians and their allies, and especially the Corinthians and Thebans, recommended that no treaty should be made with the hated enemy. They demanded that the name of Athens should be for ever eradicated, and its inhabitants sold into slavery. The Lacedæmonians resolutely declared that they would never consent to enslave or annihilate a Hellenic city which had rendered such great services to Hellas at the time of the most direful dangers from the Persians. Peace was finally granted, on terms which, although most burdensome, were immediately accepted by the despairing Athenians. The city was surrendered on the 16th day of the Attic month Munychion (about the beginning of April), 404 B. C.—almost exactly twenty-seven years after that surprise of Platæa by the Thebans

which opened the Peloponnesian war. The Athenians were compelled to destroy their long walls and the fortifications of the Peiræus ; to surrender all their ships except twelve ; to evacuate all their foreign possessions, and confine themselves to their own territory ; to recall all their exiles ; to become allies of Sparta, following her leadership both by sea and land, and recognizing the same enemies and friends. Worst of all, the ancestral government was abolished, and in its stead an oligarchy of thirty was established. The walls were destroyed with great festivity, the men working under the sound of flutes played by the women. The allies especially showed much alacrity in the work, considering this as the first dawn of Hellenic liberty. Lysander, after assisting at the solemn ceremony of the beginning of the work of demolition, returned to Samos, which he subdued within a short time.

Such was the end of the Peloponnesian war. Was it possible that this war should not have taken place ? If the Athenians had sustained their supremacy on the basis of equal rights, the war might indeed have been avoided, or at least would not have assumed such a general and disastrous character. Supposing even that the Peloponnesians had finally undertaken it, they would have been deprived of the principal auxiliary by which the struggle was made national, and through which chiefly they were victorious, since they declared themselves to be fighting for the liberty of Hellas. The despotism of the Athenians made the contest unavoidable, as Thucydides himself regarded it. But what rendered it still more so was the change which came over the constitution of the Athenians from the middle of the fifth century. However faulty their supremacy, perhaps the war might not have taken place, or at least would have ended much earlier, if the *ochlos* or mob, which was then powerful at Athens, had not incessantly renewed their demand for its continuance. Had the wiser citizens, who managed the affairs of

the city when she triumphed over the Persians and founded the first great Hellenic empire, still continued in the ascendant, they would certainly have rescinded the unjust decree against the Megarians rather than undertake the terrible struggle. Even if they had undertaken it, they would have availed themselves of the misfortunes of their opponents at Sphacteria to reestablish peace; they would have accepted the just considerations offered after the victory at Kyzikus; in a word, they would partly if not wholly have saved the supremacy of their country. The faulty constitution of Athens caused, and for twenty-seven years sustained, the Peloponnesian war. In other words, the Greeks of that epoch had not yet learned the salutary principles upon which the unity of a nation can be safely based, as well as the expedient management of its affairs. On this account the first serious attempt at establishing a great Hellenic empire proved abortive.

But this was not the only result of the Peloponnesian war. That long and stubborn contest inflicted on the material and moral state of the nation wounds from which it has never recovered. The inhabitants of many Hellenic cities were either nearly or totally obliterated; and the city of Athens, the real capital of the nation, lost not only her supremacy, but the best and the largest part of her citizens, as well as her walls and ship-yards, her splendid estates, her fleet, and her treasures. Worst of all, the unrestrained audacity of the *ochlos* resulted in a terrific lawlessness. The oligarchs, sustained by a Spartan garrison, committed outrageous crimes, and hence stirred up that moral anarchy always resulting from political insubordination, and which more than any other cause destroys a constitution.

If the conquered suffered such evils, was the fortune of the conquerors better? Those cities which, relying on the promises of Sparta, united with the latter, fell under a severer yoke than they had formerly borne. Syracuse suf-

ferred such a decline of her power and glory, that from 410 to 405 B. C. she saw the Carthaginians repeatedly invading Sicily and ravaging its most flourishing cities, and the ferocious tyrant Dionysius ruling over her. The real allies of the Lacedæmonians, after having undergone so many sacrifices, finally obtained no advantage whatever, not even the moral advantage of seeing the liberty and autonomy of the Hellenic cities secured. Sparta alone was triumphant, and was already proclaimed the hegemon of entire Hellas. But she possessed only an appearance of strength, and gained only a short-lived supremacy.

PART SIXTH.

HEGEMONY OF SPARTA.

CHAPTER I.

STATE OF HELLAS AFTER THE WAR

Spartan Oppression.

LYSANDER, having by the overthrow of Samos entirely ended the war, returned in triumph to Sparta, bringing with him all the triremes that he had found in the Peiræus, except the twelve which he left to the Athenians, as well as the ships that he had captured at Ægospotami and elsewhere, and four hundred and seventy talents remaining from the treasures given him by Cyrus for the continuation of the contest. Never either before or after him did a Greek receive such a splendid ovation from his country and so many honors from entire Hellas. The cities not only voted to him golden crowns, but established altars and composed pæans and hymns in his praise, as to a god. The Ephesians placed his statue in the temple of Artemis, and the Samians named their principal holiday "Lysandria." Many contemporaneous poets, such as Antilochus and Nikeratus, extolled his fame, and the Hellenic world vied in the honors bestowed upon him.

But if no other Greek ever attained to such power in Hellas, no other Hellenic city ever acquired the power of Sparta during that epoch. The promise of liberty for Hel-

las, the promises for which the Peloponnesian war was declared, the promises which we saw at intervals repeated through Brasidas and Kallikratidas, and which the allies when they were destroying the long walls and ship-yards of the Athenians regarded as still certain—these were dissolved like a dream, and Sparta openly assumed the supremacy of all Hellas—a supremacy much stronger and more oppressive than that of the Athenians. The supremacy of the latter was established to defend the Hellenes against the Persians, and it finally compelled the barbarians to recognize the autonomy not only of the islands, but of all the Hellenic cities throughout Asia Minor. The first act of the hegemony of Sparta was to relegate to the Persian rule nearly all the Hellenic cities on the coasts of Ionia, Æolis, and the Hellespont. The Lacedæmonians appear to have retained Abydos only. The states subject to Spartan rule were compelled to submit to an oligarchical form of government, composed of ten of the worst followers of Lysander, over whom presided a Lacedæmonian dignitary termed *harmost*. At Athens the thirty tyrants were left in power; in other places a Lacedæmonian garrison was maintained; and all paid a heavier tribute than the one levied by Athens, amounting from the outset to one thousand talents per annum. If now to the naval strength thus acquired we add the territorial domain possessed by Sparta, we may easily understand how much more powerful was the Spartan supremacy than the Attic.

Thus, after the subjection of Athens, Sparta imposed her law and will upon Hellas, and appeared to have fulfilled the dream so often indulged of establishing one Hellenic empire. But the Spartan supremacy was itself of short duration. How could it have been otherwise, characterized as it was by all the errors of the Attic dominion, and much more oppressive? The allies, and especially the Thebans and the Corinthians, were discontented from the very first;

because, having asked for a portion of the booty obtained by the common struggle, they were wantonly insulted. Again, the oligarchy of Sparta itself could not long endure the authority which Lysander acquired throughout Hellas. Hence a faction arose there which sought only a pretext to break forth openly. This was soon found, since many cities were cruelly tyrannized over, and others had causes of displeasure.

Cruelties of the Thirty.

We have seen that after the capture of Athens Lysander surrendered that city to the discretion of thirty men. These were appointed especially for the purpose of drawing up new laws and a new constitution ; but instead they forcibly assumed the government, known as that of "the Thirty," appointing as many new magistrates and officers as they pleased, and also a new senate composed of persons of assured oligarchical character and of their warmest adherents. Thus the senate was simply plastic in the hands of the Thirty. Every trace of a popular assembly and of heliastic courts disappeared.

The tyranny exercised by the Thirty was more or less repeated in other cities. The crimes which they committed are unfortunately to be met with in all such civil revolutions, and were renewed almost to the letter during the great French reign of terror. First, they punished those who, by their disgraceful conduct during the democracy, were really worthy of death. Later, however, they attempted to put to death all the prominent men of the democratic party ; and since they foresaw that such multiplied cases of execution and spoliation would inevitably create an opposition, they sent to Sparta for a guard, promising that they would themselves assume its keeping. This guard occupied the Acropolis, and the Thirty now commenced a pitiless slaughter of the democrats, confiscating the property of those who succeeded in saving their lives by flight, as did Thrasybu-

lus and others. They also issued decrees of banishment, as in the case of Alkibiades. Nor was their vengeance sated with all this, but they now laid hands upon the prominent men of every party, not even excepting the oligarchs themselves; for they killed the brother of Nikias, and also his son, who had succeeded not only to the large fortune of his father, but to his known dissatisfaction with the democratic government. However, all of the Thirty were not of one opinion respecting these murders. Theramenes believed that the death of the most obnoxious democrats ought to suffice, because the shedding of more blood became dangerous by causing disturbances, increasing the number of their enemies, and estranging friends and others. But Kritias, the most violent among them, thought differently. He belonged to one of the best families of the city, was wealthy, and possessed an excellent education and intelligence. Madened by his reckless spirit, he came to the conclusion that murder, robbery, and every other crime were the lawful aids of a political career. Thus slaughter, confiscation, and banishment continued. Theramenes finally grew alarmed at the growing indignation of the people, and proposed that all Athenians who could serve the city in a military way should take part in the formation of the government, or in other words should be constituted citizens. Kritias consented that a catalogue should be drawn up of three thousand men to be invested with the political franchise, chosen as much as possible from their own friends and companions. To these *exemption from death* was granted, except by a vote of the senate, while the lives of all the other Athenians depended on the will of the Thirty. In that political paroxysm in which the question was one of life or death, the only thing considered was how one could save his life, or at least could ward off death as long as possible.

The list of the three thousand having been completed, Kritias and his party disarmed all Athenian citizens. Be-

lieving now that they could do just as they pleased, they killed many on account of personal enmity, and not a few on account of their money. Above all, Kritias, seeing that Theramenes continued to oppose these violent measures, decided to get rid of him also. But the senate was well disposed toward Theramenes. Kritias, therefore, on his own authority, struck his name from the list of the three thousand, and had him condemned to death by the Thirty. Theramenes died bravely, and it is said that after he had swallowed the draught of hemlock there remained a drop at the bottom of the cup, which he poured out on the floor,* saying, "Let this be for the gentle Kritias," thus setting forth the fate which his violent antagonist deserved. But the whole political career of Theramenes was unprincipled, and for his vacillation he was called "Kothornos," a name given to a kind of shoe fitting either foot, and worn by both men and women.

Overthrow of the Thirty.

Such was the tyranny of the Thirty from April to December, 404 B. C. During this time about fifteen hundred victims were sacrificed at Athens. But now clouds began to gather on the horizon. It has been seen that several Athenians had saved their lives by flight. These fugitives, the most prominent of whom was Thrasybulus, found refuge both at Thebes and Megara. These cities were dissatisfied with the haughty and unjust constitution of Lysander and of Sparta, and disobeyed the decree which required the fugitives to be at once surrendered to the Thirty, under a penalty of five talents. Thrasybulus and his party, availing themselves of the protection which they obtained in these neighboring cit-

* This was done according to the playful convivial practice called the *kottabus*, which was supposed to furnish an omen by the sound of wine-drops thrown into a metallic vessel, and after which the person who had just drunk handed the goblet to the guest whose turn came next.

ies, and especially at Thebes, suddenly seized Phyle, a frontier fortress in the mountains north of Attica, lying on the direct road between Athens and Thebes. Thrasybulus had at first only seventy men, and hence the tyrants did not at once employ active measures to oppose him. But this small body was reënforced by fresh accessions of exiles, and in the spring of 403 B. C. routed the army sent against them, and became masters of the Peiræus. Kritias, at the head of a large army, attacked Thrasybulus vigorously, but he was slain, and his army dispersed. As soon as Kritias fell, the Thirty lost all their courage. On the following day they came humbled and dejected into the senate, which was thinly attended. The body of the three thousand was also in discord and mutiny. A great meeting was held by them, and it was determined to depose the Thirty and to constitute a fresh oligarchy of Ten, one from each tribe. The deposed tyrants retired to Eleusis, as they no longer deemed themselves safe at Athens.

Hostilities continued against those in the Peiræus even after the election of the new board of Ten. The Thirty in Eleusis also did not cease to hope for the recovery of their power. Now, since Thrasybulus was daily increasing his forces, both the Ten and the Thirty sent ambassadors to Sparta, seeking aid. The Spartans not only lent the oligarchs one hundred talents, but at the same time resolved to besiege Athens by land and sea; and to this end they dispatched Lysander with an army, and his brother Libys with a fleet. The destruction of the Athenians at the Peiræus seemed inevitable. But the incapability of Sparta for the exercise of her supremacy was now conclusively proved. The Bœotians and Corinthians refused to join the army, alleging that the Athenians had abided by the treaty. In Sparta itself a faction arose. The oligarchy of that city, fearing the daily increasing influence of Lysander, and not wishing that he should acquire new honors and glory by a

social duties and rights. He examined the moral and political phenomena comprising (as he was fond of saying) "all the good and evil which has befallen you and your home." He continued to discuss *human** affairs, investigating such questions as these: What is piety? What is impiety? What is honorable or base? What is the just and the unjust? What is wisdom, madness, courage, or cowardice? What is a city? What is the character befitting a citizen? What is the character essential for the exercise of authority? "Men who knew these matters," says Xenophon, "he accounted good and honorable; men who were ignorant of them he assimilated to slaves." He reached by his wonderful dialectic art the most moral and the wisest conclusions, and continued throughout his life to hold inviolably to the principles which he taught, by being self-abstaining. His physical constitution was, to an extraordinary degree, healthy, robust, and enduring. We are told that "he went barefoot in all seasons of the year, even during the winter campaign at Potidæa, under the severe frosts of Thrace; and the same homely clothing sufficed to him for winter as well as for summer."

Sokrates not only served bravely as a hoplite, but also risked his life in behalf of law and justice during the trial of the generals for the events at Arginusæ, and in his opposition to the execrable tyranny of the Thirty. What, therefore, moved the wrath of the restored democracy against him? It was charged that he did not respect the gods of the city; yet it is certain that he always fulfilled his religious duties. He was accused of introducing new gods. It is true that he declared himself prompted and controlled by some divine voice which he called his *dæmon*; but this

* Sokrates sought to confine the studies of his hearers to *human* matters as distinguished from *divine*. Within the pale of human things came all knowledge excepting astronomy and physics, which belonged to things *divine*.

dæmon, which was only the inspiration of his genius, could not seriously be regarded as a new divinity. He was accused of corrupting the youth, and as evidence his enemies mentioned two of his worst pupils, Alkibiades and Kritias ; but no teacher was ever condemned for not making all his pupils good and virtuous citizens. The envy of the Sophists (who, instead of condemning like Sokrates the passions of their hearers, flattered them), and the common belief that Sokrates was not the friend of absolute democracy, contributed to his conviction. But perhaps the principal reason was, that the dialectic and searching system of Sokrates, though limited by him to human questions only, was finally applied by his hearers to higher questions concerning the creation of the universe, and tended to undermine the foundations of the prevailing religion. The misfortune of ancient society was, that the popular religion was never to be the subject of any philosophical debate ; either philosophy must be left to destroy the religion, or society, striving for the conservation of the latter, must limit as much as possible free philosophical research. Hence we see the most intelligent and most liberal of the Hellenic tribes continually persecuting, for religious reasons, the prominent philosophers.

The condemnation of Sokrates took place in 399 B. C. The old philosopher died bravely and undisturbed, retracting not one of his principles ; and he has been justly regarded in all centuries as one of the greatest martyrs of truth.

CHAPTER II.

CYRUS AND THE TEN THOUSAND.

The Expedition of Cyrus the Younger.

EIGHTEEN months had hardly elapsed (from April, 404, to September, 403 B. C.) since Sparta had triumphantly imposed her hegemony upon all Hellas, when already this supremacy had received two severe blows. The Corinthians and the Thebans, the most powerful of her allies, had refused to obey Lysander ; and the greatest of their captured cities, Athens, was freed from the oligarchical system which Lysander had imposed. After the restoration of democracy, it is true, Athens remained under the control of Sparta ; but it was evident that her allegiance was wavering, and that the domination of the Lacedæmonians could with difficulty be maintained in this new state of affairs. But not long after Sparta received a third wound. Her greatest advantage was that she had no opponent capable of uniting all the dissatisfied. About this time, however, she entered into hostile relations with the Persians, and the latter, availing themselves of the daily increasing indignation of the Greeks, finally caused her overthrow.

In 404 B. C. Darius II, king of Persia, died. His wife Parysatis, a bold, capable, and intriguing woman, greatly preferred Cyrus to his elder brother Artaxerxes. It has already been related that Cyrus—who was appointed during the last years of the Peloponnesian war satrap of the western coasts of Asia Minor—by his faithful adherence to the Spartans, contributed much to their success. Darius died without complying with the request of Parysatis that he should declare in favor of Cyrus as his successor. Accordingly, Artaxerxes II, surnamed Mnemon, was proclaimed king. But

Cyrus, who seems to have calculated from the first upon succeeding to the Persian crown at the death of his father, did not now abandon his claim. He rested it on the principle, often followed by the Persians, that the son born during the actual reign of the father was preferred to the one born prior to that event. Moreover, he was the favorite son of Queen Parysatis, and especially trusted in the assistance of his ancient allies the Lacedæmonians. To insure success, he concealed his ambitious projects till after he had gathered a sufficient force in his satrapy.

His schemes, though carefully formed, did not escape the penetration of Alkibiades, who shortly after the catastrophe at Ægospotami had sought shelter in the satrapy of Pharnabazus in Phrygia, thinking himself no longer safe from Lacedæmonian persecution in his fort on the Thracian Chersonese. Alkibiades communicated his suspicions to Pharnabazus, and even wished to hasten to Artaxerxes at Susa, in order to gain favor by revealing the projects of Cyrus to him, and thus becoming the instrument of defeating them. But he had not the opportunity to do so. The restless character, enterprise, capacity, and daring of Alkibiades never ceased to alarm his enemies, and Sparta finally demanded from Pharnabazus that he should be put to death. The Persian satrap, though united to him by the ties of hospitality, yet did not dare to offend the Lacedæmonians; and he dispatched his brother Magæus with a band of ruffians to assassinate Alkibiades in the Phrygian village where he was residing. These men, afraid to enter his house, surrounded it and set it on fire. Alkibiades, wrapping his robe about his left hand to serve as a shield, and taking his sword in his right, sallied through the fire and rushed upon his assailants. At sight of him, says Plutarch, the barbarians dispersed, not one of them daring to wait for him, or to encounter him hand to hand; but, standing at a distance, they pierced him with their darts and arrows. Timandra, a female companion with whom he

lived, wrapped the body in her own robes, and buried it as decently and honorably as her circumstances would allow. Alkibiades died in a manner worthy of his life. Having been guilty of so many treasons throughout his career, he was finally murdered by the treachery of his last friend and protector.

In the mean time Cyrus continued his preparations. Klearchus, a Lacedæmonian harmost at Byzantium, presented himself to him as an exile, and contributed much to the speedy collection of an army. The restoration of peace in Hellas left idle many daring men who had acquired military tastes and habits; hence competent recruits for a well-paid service like that of Cyrus were now unusually abundant. The anomalous condition of many cities in Asia furnished both Cyrus and Klearchus a sufficient pretext for collecting and maintaining troops. Hence, at the beginning of 401 B. C., having brought together all his garrisons at Sardis, he started with the object, as understood by every one except himself and Klearchus, of conquering and rooting out the Pisidian marauders. He marched to Ikonion and Tarsus, and thence to Issus, where he was joined by a fleet of thirty-five Lacedæmonian triremes, bringing a reënforcement of seven hundred hoplites, under the command of the Lacedæmonian Cheirisophus, said to have been dispatched by the Spartan ephors, who finally decided to aid Cyrus in his undertaking, hoping in case of his success to gain many advantages. This Hellenic fleet, together with an Egyptian fleet of twenty-five triremes, prevented the satraps of Kilikia and Syria from offering any resistance to the expedition of Cyrus.

Cyrus was allowed to traverse all the immense space from Ionia to the heart of Asia, and to pass through many defensible positions, without having yet struck a blow. He finally reached the Euphrates, and, after crossing that river, came to a plain called Kunaxa, where Artaxerxes awaited him. The king, learning what was going on, had prepared an army

which is said to have exceeded a hundred myriads (one million) in number. To oppose this immense multitude Cyrus had 10,400 hoplites and 2,500 peltasts—in all, 12,900 Greeks, from Laconia, Arcadia, Athens, and Thessaly—and about 100,000 Asiatics. A battle was fought in September, 401 B. C., at Kunaxa, in which Cyrus was killed, and his Asiatic troops were routed. The Greeks alone were victorious in the position in which they were drawn up, and then, rejecting the demand of the king to surrender their arms, they decided to return home, thus preserving their arms and their honor. This is the memorable retreat of the Ten Thousand which the historian Xenophon, who took part in it, described in his work, “The Anabasis of Cyrus.”

Retreat of the Ten Thousand.

The Greeks did not return by the way they came, but marched through Mesopotamia, Media, and Armenia, toward the southern coasts of the Euxine, hoping thence to reach Thrace. The Persians, not daring to fight them, pretended to be willing to facilitate their march, until, having drawn Klearchus and four other generals to their camp, they beheaded them after a short imprisonment. They hoped that the army, thus deprived of its commanders, would despair and surrender, or at least disperse. But they did not know of what noble elements the Hellenic army was composed. The soldiers were astounded, but only for a moment. They soon after assembled, and chose other generals, among whom was Xenophon, who until then had followed the army as a simple volunteer. He now assumed the real command, although the Spartan Cheirisophus was nominal leader. Xenophon succeeded by wonderful patience, and by military tactics adapted to the circumstances and countries, in leading the Greeks in the course of four months to Trapezus, in the midst of a bitter winter, through wild, uninhabited, and snow-covered countries, among hostile nations, and threat-

ened by constant plots and treasons of the agents of the Persian government, without a geographical chart, without machines for the construction of bridges—in a word, without any aid such as modern armies have. The deep religious sentiment by which the Hellenic army was inspired is especially worthy of notice. That sentiment was one of its strongest supports amid trying circumstances. From Trapezus it became necessary to march through Bithynia before reaching Thrace, where the Greeks finally arrived only after the lapse of four more months. During this march from the coasts of Asia Minor to Kunaxa, and from Kunaxa to Trapezus, and from Trapezus to Thrace, this army lost one half of its original force.

Xenophon, three years after his return to Hellas, was again in military service under the Lacedæmonian king Agesilaus, in the expedition which the latter undertook against the Persians. But during the two years after this latter event, Athens became a party to the war against Sparta, and, since Xenophon continued to serve as commander of the Cyreians in the army of Agesilaus, the Athenians passed upon him sentence of banishment. Having thus become an exile, he established himself on an estate not far from Olympia in the Peloponnesus, which he either bought or received from the Spartans as a present. In this place, as well as in Corinth, where he afterward lived, and where in 355 B. C. he died at the age of ninety-two, he composed most of his writings. But his name was immortalized by his command in the retreat of the Ten Thousand—a march ever wonderful in the history of the military art. A small number of men, in the depths of Asia, surrounded by hostile myriads, with no hope of assistance and suddenly deprived of their commanders, nevertheless succeed, though for nearly eight months constantly marching and fighting, in returning home with their arms in their hands. What an astonishing sight! What is the retreat of the French from Russia, which finally

ended in their utter ruin, compared to this Hellenic achievement? or what was wanting to that nation which had such soldiers, in order to have the material rule of the world, over which for so long a time it had held intellectual supremacy? Ah! what was wanting? What they lacked was thus expressed by Aristotle: "The race of the Hellenes is free and well governed, and *capable of ruling over all, if only under one government.*" In other words, there was lacking political union, without which the most wonderful advantages in the political life of a nation become abortive. This political union the ancient Hellenes did not cease to pursue, but they were destined never to accomplish it during the first period of their history, either under the supremacy of the Athenians, of Sparta, or of the Thebans.

CHAPTER III.

EARLY DECLINE OF THE SPARTAN RULE.

Causes of Weakness.

THE supremacy of Sparta, as we have seen, began to decline shortly after its establishment, through the disaffection of the Corinthians, Megarians, and Thebans, and by the abolition of the oligarchy at Athens. Soon after, by reason of the assistance given to Cyrus, she drew upon herself another dangerous enemy. But these were not the only causes of her decline. About 400 B. C. this hegemony preserved its power complete. All the islands and many coasts on the Ægean paid tribute to it, and were occupied by its garrisons. During this time Sparta imposed her will as absolute mistress on the Eleians. The latter in the Peloponnesian war had often acted against her interests, and to

punish them she sent an embassy requiring the Eleians to make good the unpaid arrears of the quota assessed upon them for the cost of the war against Athens; and further, to relinquish their authority over their dependent townships, or Pericœki, leaving the latter autonomous. The Eleians refused to obey, alleging that their dependent cities were held by the right of conquest. Upon this King Agis ruthlessly ravaged their land (a productive country under flourishing cultivation), and compelled them to destroy their walls, surrender their war-vessels, and give up every claim of rule over adjacent cities.

Sparta, availing herself of this triumph, forced the remainder of her ancient enemies, the Messenians, who, by the protection formerly granted by the Athenians, had sought refuge at Naupaktus and Kephallenia, to depart from the neighborhood of the Peloponnesus, and to take shelter, some in Sicily, others at Kyrene.

But while externally Sparta seemed all-powerful, she was internally preyed upon by an evil destined to destroy that once powerful frame. Her extended sway was antagonistic to her ancient constitution. Compare the state of the city during the beginning of the Peloponnesian war with that at its end. During the former epoch Sparta had not one tribute-paying subject, no common treasury, nor any regular revenue from her citizens; while during the second not only did Lysander surrender to her a great amount of gold and silver, but she regularly collected a heavy tribute from the subject states. During the year 432 B. C. she was slow in her resolutions, and especially averse to any remote expedition. In 404 and thereafter she became aggressive, and eager not only to subdue neighboring powers, but also to undertake wars with distant enemies, with a view to territorial aggrandizement. Up to 432 she preserved her ancestral customs, diligently avoiding every association, not only with foreigners, but also with other Greeks. But at the end of the war

her foreign relations reached such a magnitude that they formed the principal business of her magistrates. Hence the gathering of strangers at Sparta and the emigration of Spartans to other countries became constant and inevitable, and the Lycurgan legislation was neglected. This change necessarily produced various evils. It brought into the management of affairs men whose love of command was foreign to the ancient constitution, limited to a few the exercise of political rights, engendered violent animosities in the pursuit of office, and corrupted the basis of Spartan power, the Lycurgan obedience.

Intrigues of Lysander.

Lysander, the most competent and powerful man brought out by the hegemony of Sparta, had recently lost much of his influence through the ephors and kings, but he did not lay aside his aspirations and pretensions. From all parts of Hellas voices were heard urging him to assume the highest office in his country; while at Samos pæans were sung in his honor, poets were writing his encomiums, and the Sophist Kleon of Halikarnassus wrote a discourse proving that Lysander had well earned the regal dignity, that genius ought to prevail over legitimate descent, and that the crown ought to be offered to the most worthy among the Herakleids. Lysander therefore began seriously to foster the idea of breaking the succession of the two regal families, and opening for himself a door to reach the crown. He endeavored to obtain from Delphi, Dodona, and Zeus Ammon in Libya, oracles favorable to his plans. But none of these oracles could be induced to render a decision repealing the established law of succession to the Spartan throne. Finding his schemes thus thwarted, he was compelled to resort to stratagem.

At the end of the Peloponnesian war the two kings of Sparta were Agis, son of Archidamus (426-399), and Pau-

sanias, son of Pleistoanax (408-394). Agis died about a year after his expedition against Elis, leaving by his wife Timæa a son, Leotychides, but about whose legitimacy many doubts existed. Advantage was taken of these doubts by Agesilaus, the younger brother of Agis, who was powerfully seconded by Lysander. The latter made the mistake of supposing Agesilaus to be of a disposition particularly gentle and manageable. They planned to exclude Leotychides and give the throne to Agesilaus. Lysander now believed that, since through him Agesilaus had become king, he himself must sooner or later reach the crown.

Agesilaus II.

Agesilaus was then at the mature age of forty. Having nothing to expect but a private station, he had trained himself strictly in Spartan diet and obedience. He was simple in his manners and kind to his fellow citizens. "Agesilaus," says Plutarch, "was singular in this, that before he came to govern he had learned to obey." He was short of stature, feeble, and lame. These defects caused Lysander to suppose that, in case he should succeed in settling the crown upon him, he himself might eventually rule in his stead and thus satiate his inordinate ambition. But he was grievously disappointed. As soon as Agesilaus became king, he proved himself one of the strongest men of ancient Hellas—an excellent general, strictly and inflexibly just, rigidly respecting "money transactions." Agesilaus certainly had faults, but even these served to display more prominently the noble nature of the man. "In his conduct with respect to the other citizens," says Plutarch, "he behaved better as an enemy than as a friend. If he was severe toward his enemies, he was not unjustly so; his friends he countenanced even in their unjust pursuits. If his enemies performed anything extraordinary, he was not ashamed to take honorable notice of it; his friends he could not correct when they

did amiss. There is still extant a short letter of his to Hydrieus the Karian, which is a proof of what we have said : 'If Nikias is innocent, acquit him ; if he is not innocent, acquit him on my account ; at any rate, be sure to acquit him.'"

But what is especially to be admired in Agesilaus is his Panhellenic spirit, which he displayed so eminently during the first part of his reign. This characteristic is the more surprising, since the education of Sparta was little calculated to produce or to foster such a spirit. Let us not forget that Simonides is said to have called that famed city the "man-subduing" Sparta, because it was the chief tendency of her discipline not only to make the citizens obedient and submissive to the laws, but also to crush out every vestige of Panhellenic sentiment. In fine, Agesilaus possessed all the advantages of Lysander, with none of his vices ; all the eminent qualities of Kallikratidas, while he was at the same time a far greater general than either of the two. The war in which Sparta was now engaged opened for him a broad and splendid career. In this Lysander doubtless hoped to become all-powerful, but failed. Before we enter upon this, however, we must take note of an internal revolution which placed Sparta in extreme peril.

Conspiracy of Kinadon.

A year had not yet passed since Agesilaus II began to rule, when an informer came before the ephors, communicating the secret that a terrible plot was preparing against the constitution, organized by a citizen named Kinadon.

Kinadon was a young man of resolute character, but not one of that select number called "Equals" or "Peers." He exercised his political rights through the liberality of a rich man, and, on account of his great military skill, strength, and courage, was enrolled among the Spartan militia ; but he was excluded from the honors and distinctions of the state,

which were reserved for the peers. Kinadon, therefore, like all Spartans who had imbibed from the Lycurgan discipline that sense of personal character and that contempt of privilege which its theory as well as its practice suggested, deemed his natural rights denied him, and plotted to destroy that body by a rising of the inferior classes. After the ephors had by due examination ascertained the truth of the information, they arrested Kinadon, put him to the torture, and forced from his lips the names of his accomplices, among whom was the soothsayer Tisamenus. They asked Kinadon, among other questions, what was his purpose in setting on foot the conspiracy; to which he gave the Laconic answer, "I wanted to be inferior to no man at Sparta."* His punishment was not long deferred. He was manacled, with a clog round his neck to which his hands were made fast, and in this condition was led about the city, with men lashing and goading him during his progress. His accomplices were treated in like manner, and at length all were executed.†

Thus was Sparta freed from this danger. But if the oligarchy succeeded in defeating their opponents, Sparta could not escape the consequences of her own sins, and especially of the neglect of the Lycurgan laws and of her entanglement with the Persians.

CHAPTER IV.

THE WAR AGAINST THE PERSIANS.

Thimbron and Derkyllidas.

AFTER the battle of Kunaxa, Artaxerxes, wishing to reward Tissaphernes for the services which the latter had rendered him during the expedition of Cyrus, gave him the

* Μηδενὸς ἥττωι εἶναι ἐν Λακεδαιμονί.

† Xenophon, "Hellenika," iii, 3, 11.

countries over which Cyrus had formerly ruled ; and this satrap now decided to punish the Hellenic cities in Asia Minor for the assistance given to Cyrus. These cities sent to Sparta, as the great imperial power of Hellas, to entreat her protection against the impending danger, and the Spartan ephors at once dispatched to them Thimbron (400 B. C.), with a force of two thousand Neodamodes (or Helots who had been enfranchised) and four thousand Peloponnesian heavy-armed, accompanied by three hundred Athenian horsemen.

Sparta undertook this war, not so much for the liberty of the Greeks in Asia, as because she had broken the peace by lending aid to Cyrus, and was afraid lest Tissaphernes, after securing his power in Asia, might attack the islands and coasts under the hegemony of Sparta. Moreover, the fame of the ten thousand Greeks had become diffused throughout Hellas, inspiring signal contempt for the military efficiency of Persia, and hopes for the overthrow of the Persian despotism.

The Cyreians also had joined Thimbron, so that the army was considerably reënforced by a strong body of veteran warriors. But that commander achieved nothing worthy of so large an army. Derkyllidas was dispatched in the winter of 399-398 to supersede him, and on his return to Sparta Thimbron was fined and banished. Derkyllidas was a man of so great cunning and resources as to have acquired the surname of Sisyphus,* after the reputed king of Corinth. He had been harmost at Abydos during the naval command of Ly-sander, who condemned him, on the complaint of Pharnabazus, "to stand in public with his shield on his arm—which seems to have been considered as a disgrace to the best of the Lacedæmonians; for it is a punishment for disorder."† Hav-

* Homer says in the Iliad concerning Sisyphus: 'Ο κέρδιστος γένετ' ἀνδρῶν.

† Τὴν ἀσπίδα ἔχων, ὃ δοκεῖ κηλὶς εἶναι τοῖς σπουδαίοις Λακεδαιμονίων· ἀτα-

ing never forgiven Pharnabazus for thus dishonoring him, he availed himself of a strife between that satrap and Tissaphernes to make a truce with the latter, and conduct his army, eight thousand strong, into the territory of the former, known as *Æolis*. Within a few days, in the spring of 398, he became master of Larissa and eight other cities, which he declared "autonomous and free from the rule of Pharnabazus."

The ephors were so much pleased with these achievements that they prolonged the command of Derkyllidas for another year. Now, since the temporary truce with Tissaphernes had ended, and the Hellenic cities had sent envoys to Sparta entreating protection against that satrap, Derkyllidas was directed by the ephors to march into Karia and attack Tissaphernes. Hereupon Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes united their forces, fully determined to drive their common enemy from Asia. These satraps at the head of their combined army came suddenly face to face with Derkyllidas on the plain of the *Mæander*. He was marching in disorder, not expecting the enemy; so that, had they fallen upon him, they would have gained an easy victory. But Tissaphernes was afraid of the Cyreians, whose daring deeds he well remembered; and, deceived also by the stratagem by which Derkyllidas concealed the confusion of his army, he avoided battle, and sent forward heralds to demand a conference. The conference ended in nothing. Derkyllidas demanded the complete autonomy of the Hellenic cities in Asia Minor, while the two satraps insisted that the Lacedæmonian army should be withdrawn from Asia, and the Lacedæmonian harmosts from all Græco-Asiatic cities. An armistice was, however, concluded, to allow time for conference with the authorities at Sparta.

ξίας γὰρ ζηλώμα ἐστίν. It was a stain (κηλίς) probably because an officer of rank always had his shield carried for him by an attendant, except in the actual encounter of battle.

Agesilaus in Asia.

When this news reached Sparta, Agesilaus, by the advice of Lysander, declared himself ready to undertake the war against the Persians, on condition that they would give him thirty Spartan peers for his officers and councilors, a select body of two thousand newly enfranchised Helots, and six thousand of the allies. All this was readily decreed, and Lysander, who was the leader of the thirty Spartans who constituted a sort of council of officers, hoped by his preëstablished influence over Agesilaus to have his own way in everything, and, in fact, the real command, although without the name.

The expedition of Agesilaus, though apparently a continuation of the expeditions of Thimbron and Derkyllidas, assumed a different aspect by reason of the rank and character of the man. Sparta had undertaken the war ostensibly in order to free the Hellenic cities in Asia Minor from Persian despotism; but Agesilaus conceived a much greater project—the complete abolition of the Persian empire. Hence he may be considered the real precursor of Philip and Alexander. Everything seemed to inspire him with that lofty plan. The kings of Sparta, whenever they had command of the forces of Hellas, always considered themselves to have inherited the scepter of Agamemnon and Orestes; and Agesilaus especially likened his expedition to a new Trojan war—an effort of united Hellas to punish those constant Asiatic enemies of the Hellenic name. For this reason he was desirous of sailing from Aulis in Bœotia to Asia, as did formerly the heroes against Troy. His ambition, as well as the sleepless longing for power of Lysander, contributed to this aspect of affairs, as did also the common belief which prevailed after the return of the Ten Thousand that the Persian empire was unable to oppose the Hellenic battalions, provided they were commanded by a competent general.

It is true that the aggressive policy of Sparta was ill suited to produce that harmony in Hellas indispensable to success in so great a work ; and this dissension was manifest from the very first, when the Athenians, Corinthians, and Thebans refused to take part in the undertaking. Sparta also received, shortly before the departure of the king, other serious news. The Athenian admiral Konon, who had escaped with nine triremes from the defeat of *Ægospotami*, had remained for the last seven years under the protection of *Evagoras*, prince of *Salamis* in *Kyprus*. But that active Athenian did not cease even then to benefit his country. Sustained by *Pharnabazus* and *Evagoras*, as well as by the Greek physician *Ktesias*, who seems to have had considerable influence with Queen *Parysatis*, orders and funds were obtained to equip in *Phœnicia* and *Kilikia* a numerous fleet under the command of Konon. At the same time, taking as many triremes as he had found ready (about forty in number), he sailed along the southern coast of *Asia Minor* from *Kilikia* to *Kaunus*, making preparations for the war.

Agessilaus, hoping by his exploits in *Asia* to check the growth of the hostile elements, hastened to *Ephesus* early in 396. He reached *Asia* while the truce was still in existence. On being asked by *Tissaphernes* why he had come, he repeated the answer of *Derkyllidas*, "To free the Greeks in *Asia*." *Tissaphernes* proposed that the armistice should be prolonged to enable him to submit the affair to the Persian court, adding that he hoped for a successful termination. Thereupon a new armistice of three months was concluded.

While the army remained idle in *Ephesus*, *Lysander* began his intrigues, and, as *Plutarch* affirms, his power and interest appeared in a very obnoxious light. The respect which the Asiatic Greeks entertained for him was great, as was also the belief that he had granted the crown to *Agessi-*

laus, whose character no one yet knew; and they all came to regard the victor of *Ægospotami* as the real leader of the undertaking. Hence numerous ancient followers of his hastened to *Ephesus* to welcome him and submit various requests. "The gates of that minister," says *Plutarch*, "were continually crowded, and all applications were made to him; as if *Agésilau*s were simply a private citizen, and *Lysander* were the king. This enraged the thirty councilors whom their president never consulted, so that they appeared rather as his ministers than as councilors to the king. It also enraged *Agésilau*s himself, who suddenly revealed a royal power of command which no one had ever suspected in the 'lame king,' and began systematically to reject the petitions of all who appeared to apply to him through the influence of that minister. He also opposed the counsels of *Lysander*, and pursued measures different from those for which he was most earnest. *Lysander*, seeing all his hopes frustrated, was forced to acknowledge to his friends that they must pay their court to the king, and to those who had greater influence with him than himself. Unable to bear the humiliation into which he had fallen, he begged the king that he might be sent on some mission, promising to serve faithfully in whatever duty he might be employed. *Agésilau*s appointed him his lieutenant in the *Hellespont*, where he rendered the king a great service by persuading *Spithridates*, a Persian, in the province of *Pharnabazus*, to come over to the Greeks, with a considerable treasure and two hundred horse."

In the mean time *Tissaphernes*, thinking his strength sufficiently increased by additional reinforcements received since the conclusion of the armistice, demanded the immediate departure of *Agésilau*s from *Asia*, threatening attack if such departure were delayed. The king, for an answer, ordered the army to march to the south and cross the *Mæander*, ostensibly to attack *Tissaphernes* in *Karia*, where he usually resided. Having put the enemy on this false scent,

he suddenly turned short and entered Phrygia, captured many cities, collected abundant provisions, and made himself master of immense treasures. On this occasion he displayed his great consideration for his friends. While he himself was indifferent to money, he was not the less anxious to enrich his friends, and would sometimes connive at unwarrantable modes of acquisition for their benefit. Many times, however, he also showed his philanthropy, commanding his troops not to ill-treat the captives—"For these," he said, "are the *men* whom you fight with"; and then, pointing to the rich spoils, he added, "These are the things you fight for."

Agesilaus passed the winter of 396-395 at Ephesus, during which time he busied himself in the training of his army and in the formation of an excellent cavalry force, which he understood would be absolutely necessary to oppose that of the Persians.

When the season called him into the field, Agesilaus declared that Sardis was his object. But Tissaphernes, construing this proclamation as a feint (because he had been imposed upon before), concluded that the real march would be directed against Karia, and accordingly disposed his cavalry in the plain of the Mæander, while he concentrated his infantry on the south, almost within the limits of Karia itself. But Plutarch quaintly remarks: "In this (his proclamation) he did not deceive Tissaphernes. That general deceived himself." The king marched straight to Sardis, and, finding that place destitute of defenders, plundered the country without any obstacle for three days. On the fourth day the cavalry of Tissaphernes made its appearance. A battle was fought, during which Agesilaus, by a masterly union of his cavalry and infantry, put the enemy to flight, many of whom were drowned in the river Paktolus. Their camp was also taken with a valuable booty. The great king (Artaxerxes), learning that Tissaphernes had shown himself so in-

capable, sent down an order for his deposition and death. Tithraustes, the bearer of this order, seized him by stratagem while he was in the bath, and caused him to be beheaded.

Tithraustes played his part much better than his predecessor. He endeavored by a lavish expenditure of money to foster the constantly increasing displeasure of the Greeks in Hellas against Sparta; and at the same time he informed Agesilaus that the faithless Tissaphernes was the cause of the war; that he was punished by his master; that the king was ready to recognize the autonomy of the Hellenic cities in Asia, on payment only of the tribute which from the earliest times they had rendered; and that consequently he called upon Agesilaus to evacuate Asia. Agesilaus answered that his country was the sole arbitress of peace. In the interim he was prevailed upon by Tithraustes to conclude an armistice of six months, and to move out of his satrapy into that of Pharnabazus, receiving from Tithraustes thirty talents to defray the expenses of his march. This, among other things, showed the exhausted condition of the Persian empire, when its generals and governors acted toward each other as enemies and not as servants of the same political interests.

During the autumn of 395 Agesilaus entered Phrygia, which was subject to Pharnabazus, and in a short time captured the whole army of that satrap, with very rich booty. Agesilaus finally yielded to the entreaties of Pharnabazus, quitted his satrapy, and encamped near the temple of Artemis at Astyra, in the plain of Thebe. He occupied himself with enlarging his army, and laying his plans to penetrate into Asia during the coming autumn. Among his many thousand soldiers, as Plutarch says, there was scarce one who had a worse or a harder bed than he. He was so fortified against heat and cold that none was so well prepared as himself for all changes of weather or climate. The Greeks

in Asia never saw a more agreeable spectacle than when the Persian governors and generals, who had been inordinately elated with power and rolling in riches and luxury, humbly submitted and paid their court to a man in a coarse cloak, and, upon one brief word, conformed to his wishes. Many thought this line of Timotheus applicable on this subject: "Mars is the god; and Hellas reveres no GOLD."

His plans were now all laid for penetrating farther into the interior, when suddenly he was urgently recalled by Sparta. A dangerous revolution had broken out in Hellas.

CHAPTER V.

THE BÆOTIAN AND CORINTHIAN WARS.

General Revolt from Spartan Rule.

TITHRAUSTES had no sooner concluded the armistice of six months than he sent the Rhodian Timokrates with fifty talents into Hellas, to still further inflame the existing ill feelings toward Sparta, and if possible excite a war against her. Timokrates did not find many difficulties in the execution of his mission, because, as has been often stated, the haughty and aggressive conduct of Sparta had long since excited indignation in many quarters. Corinth and Thebes had not fought against the supremacy of Athens in order finally to succumb to the Spartan rule. Argos was content in its neutrality, but was always dissatisfied with the Spartan dominion. Athens, at first oppressed, not long after recovered her ancient constitution, and refused to obey blindly the demands of the new hegemony. She even hoped for some amelioration of her fortunes from the reported activity of Konon, who in the mean while had succeeded in causing the

Rhodians to revolt against Sparta. The Thebans, above all, offered themselves as ready to join any alliance against her, and gave cause for hostilities by persuading the Opuntian Lokrians to take possession of a certain strip of land in dispute between the Phokians and Lokrians, but now held by the former. The Phokians in return invaded Lokris, and at the same time sought the assistance of Sparta against the Thebans, from the fact that the latter were prevailed upon by the Lokrians to invade Phokis.

Thus a new war began in Hellas in 395 B. C., known as the Bœotian war. The Spartans joyfully embraced this opportunity of making war upon the Thebans, having been, as Xenophon says, long angry with them on several different grounds. They thought that the present was an excellent time for "putting down their insolence"; and to this end they at once dispatched Lysander to the aid of the Phokians. The Thebans sought the assistance of the Athenians, and the latter, forgetting their ancient antipathy toward that people, and remembering only the aid received from them during the time of Thrasybulus, voted unanimously to grant the request. This, and the extravagant confidence of Lysander in himself, saved Thebes.

Lysander, with an army composed of Herakleots, Phokians, and others, committed the mistake of not awaiting the arrival of Pausanias, king of Sparta, who was coming to his aid with the Peloponnesian forces, but at once resolved to act alone against Haliartus. He was not only repulsed, but, still worse for Sparta, was himself slain. His army was disbanded before the arrival of Pausanias, who now did not dare to attack the Thebans, with whom the Athenians had joined themselves. He merely solicited a burial truce, after which he returned to Sparta. On his arrival there he was accused of "unmanly conduct," and sentenced to death, but succeeded in making good his escape to Tegea in Arkadia. His son Agesipolis was invested with the scepter in his place.

The death of Lysander and the retreat of Pausanias from Bœotia greatly encouraged all the enemies of Sparta. An alliance was concluded against the Lacedæmonians by Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos ; and the formation in Corinth of a common congress was decided upon. The war, therefore, which had begun as a Bœotian war, now received the appellation of a Corinthian war, by which it was known until its end in the peace of Antalkidas. The Eubœans, the Akarnanians, the Ozolian Lokrians, Ambrakia and Leukas, and the Chalkidians of Thrace, at once joined the alliance. But the Thebans were the prime movers in this uprising against Sparta ; and now, abandoning for the first time the rank of a secondary power, which up to that time they had held, they began to prepare that splendid hegemony which we shall shortly see accomplished by Epaminondas and Pelopidas. But these men are not yet mentioned, and at this time Ismenias appears as the soul of the city, and of all the anti-Spartan feeling. He was a rich Theban, who eight years before had warmly sympathized with Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles. He was honored by his political opponents, when they put him to death fourteen years later, with the title, "a projector of both great and evil plans" * —the same combination of epithets which, though they do not appear in consonance with each other, has been often applied to powerful opponents, as it was by Clarendon to Oliver Cromwell. Ismenias, at the head of a body of Bœotians and Argeians, abolished the hegemony of Sparta in the regions north of Bœotia, expelled the Lacedæmonian harmosts from Pharsalus, Herakleia, and Phokis, and also caused many Thessalians, and the neighboring Malians, Ænians, and Athamanes, to join the new alliance.

Recall of Agesilaus.

These important events took place during the winter of

* Μεγαλοπράγμων ἄμα καὶ κακοπράγμων.

395-394 B. C. The allies assembled in the spring of the following year at Corinth, and decided upon the mustering of a powerful army, in order to entirely deprive Sparta of her hegemony. Sparta, deeming herself gravely threatened, sent an order to Agesilaus to hasten without delay to her assistance. But even before his return a great battle was fought near Corinth in July, 394. Aristodemus, guardian of the youthful king Agesipolis, son of Pausanias, at the head of 13,500 Lacedæmonian hoplites, 600 horsemen, and 700 slingers and bowmen, drew himself up against 24,000 Athenian, Argeian, Bæotian, and Corinthian hoplites, and 1,550 horsemen. The Lacedæmonians were finally victorious, and secured their ascendancy in the Peloponnesus ; but the victory was not sufficiently decisive to enable them to undertake any forward movement beyond the isthmus.

This battle was fought about the same time that Agesilaus received his orders of recall, and was forced to abandon his flourishing prospects for the overthrow of the Persian empire. Agesilaus, on learning the reason of his recall, deemed it his duty, though regretfully, to obey. Assuring the Hellenic cities that as soon as matters were arranged in Hellas he should come back to Asia without delay, and leaving four thousand men for their protection, he hastened home with the remainder of his army, by the same road that Xerxes had taken a century before on his march against Hellas. He met no obstacles on the way except in Thessaly. But he succeeded in routing the forces of the Thessalians, crossed the strait of Thermopylæ, joined the Phokians and Orchomenians, and reached the neighborhood of Koroneia.

Battle of Koroneia.

The allies, on becoming aware of his approach, left a sufficient force for the protection of the camp in Corinth, and hastened to occupy the heights about Mount Helikon. Here in the plain of Koroneia, which Agesilaus entered from

the river Kephissus, was fought during August, 394, "the most furious battle in our time,"* says Xenophon, who was certainly able to judge, for he himself fought in it on the side of Agesilaus, with whom he had returned from Asia.

Both armies advanced slowly and in silence, and when about a furlong apart the Thebans first raised their war-shout and made a desperate charge. The center of the Lacedæmonians, comprising the Cyreians with Xenophon himself, and the Asiatic allies, rushed forward with equal alacrity to meet them. The Argeians "fled without even crossing spear," and found safety on the high ground of Mount Helikon. The allies in the center also succumbed, so that the friends of Agesilaus were already on the point of crowning him as victor, when suddenly it was reported that the Thebans had completely beaten back the Orchomenians, and had reached the baggage in the rear of the army. Agesilaus immediately wheeled around, at the head of his phalanx, to attack them, about the same time that the Thebans, seeing their allies fleeing, prepared to fight their way out in close order, and rejoin them on Helikon. But Agesilaus now came up, and a terrific battle took place between his hoplites and the Thebans. Pushing their shields against each other, they grappled in the fiercest contests of bodily strength. No shout was heard, nor was there complete silence; only an ominous, ghastly murmur arose from the death-teeming field. No fiercer or more desperate conflict was ever fought in Hellas. Agesilaus himself, lame and weak in body, but possessing that unconquerable moral strength which is stronger than any material force, fought most heroically at the head of his chosen band. He received many wounds from the numberless Theban missiles that were directed against him; he was pushed and trampled down, and only snatched from the jaws of death by the heroic devotion of his faithful body-guard, fifty in number, most of whom were mowed down beneath

* Οἷα οὐκ ἔλλη τῶν γ' ἐφ' ἡμῶν.

the mighty Theban spear. The Thebans at last succeeded in cutting through the solid Lacedæmonian lines, and, having given a dead comrade for every inch of ground they had gained, with broken shields and spears joined the Argeians and the remaining allies on the heights of Mount Helikon, while the Lacedæmonians remained masters of the field.

The king had his wounds dressed, but, although much weakened by loss of blood and fatigue, he would not retire to his tent until he had given his final orders. Raised on men's shoulders, he was carried through all his battalions, giving directions for the night-watch, since it was already late. But meanwhile he was informed that a part of the enemy had taken refuge in the temple of the Itonian Athena. Tortured though he was by his severe wounds, Agesilaus did not lose his usual lofty bearing, but commanded his soldiers to respect the sanctity of the spot, and leave the fugitives free to go whithersoever they wished. He next had himself borne to the field of battle. The sight was terrible. The earth was red from the blood of the slain and the wounded ; friends and enemies were lying side by side. Shields were shattered to pieces, spears broken, daggers without sheaths, some on the ground and others stuck into the bodies, while many were still firmly clinched in the grip of death. Now if, added to this hideous spectacle, we think of the king carried over the field by his soldiers, severely wounded, but still caring for the rest, order, and security of his army, we have a complete and tragic picture of one of the most deadly combats of our ancestral history.

Agesilaus, however, on account of his wounds, could not take advantage of his hard-earned victory. Having on the next day erected a trophy and granted to the Thebans permission to bury their dead, he proceeded to Delphi, offered to Apollo the tithe of the booty obtained in Asia, amounting to one hundred talents, and then returned to Sparta, where he met with a grateful and honorable reception.

Thus two great battles were fought in Hellas about the middle of 394 B. C.—one near Corinth, and the other at Koroneia; and, though the Lacedæmonians conquered in both, the results of these victories were “totally barren.” They were compelled to return home, leaving inner Hellas under control of their opponents. Even the narrative of Xenophon, deeply colored as it is both by his sympathies and his antipathies, indicates, as Grote remarks, that the predominant impression carried off by every one from the field of Koroneia was that of the tremendous force and obstinacy of the Theban hoplites. In fact, it must be acknowledged that the honor of the day was rather on the side of the Thebans, who broke through the most strenuous opposition and joined themselves to their allies.

About the beginning of August of the same year, in the interim between the two battles, a third battle was fought near the coasts of Asia Minor, in which the Lacedæmonians were totally defeated.

Abolition of the Naval Supremacy of Sparta.

As soon as the naval preparations of Konon were completed, he met with many difficulties on account of the jealousy and avarice of the Persian commanders, and their reluctance to serve under a Greek. Hence Konon had been unable to make efficient use of his fleet; and in the mean time Agesilaus, while still in Asia, took measures for the construction of many triremes, and appointed Peisander, the brother of his wife, as admiral.

Finally Konon himself went into the interior, communicated personally with Artaxerxes, and succeeded in obtaining Pharnabazus, “the bravest and most straightforward” of the Persian satraps, to act jointly as commander of the fleet. Konon sailed with ninety-two triremes to Knidus, where Peisander, with the fleet of Sparta and her allies, sallied out from the harbor to meet him, and both parties prepared for

battle. Xenophon, speaking of the young Spartan admiral, says that he was ambitious and resolute, but inexperienced in the management of affairs.* His Asiatic allies left him as soon as the battle began, and, though he fought bravely, he was finally completely defeated, and received his death-wound in the struggle.

This memorable victory achieved by Konon, whom eleven years ago we saw making his escape with difficulty to Kypus, was followed by the most important results; above all, by the complete abolition of the naval supremacy of the Lacedæmonians. Pharnabazus and Konon next sailed with their victorious fleet from island to island, drove away the Lacedæmonian harmosts, and abolished the Spartan rule. We are told that Pharnabazus and Konon found themselves everywhere received as liberators, and welcomed with presents of hospitality. "They pledged themselves not to introduce any foreign force or governor, nor to fortify any separate citadel, but to guarantee to each city its own genuine autonomy." Hence all the islands revolted against the Lacedæmonians, with the single exception of Abydos, which Derkyllidas, who was harmost in the town at the time of the battle of Knidus, succeeded in preserving to the allegiance of Sparta.

As soon as spring arrived, Pharnabazus and Konon directed their movements to various islands among the Kyklades. They occupied Kythera, plundered the coasts of Laconia and Messenia, and then sailed up the Saronic gulf to the isthmus of Corinth. Here they found the confederates, Corinthian, Boeotian, Athenian, and others, carrying on the Corinthian war. The presence of a Persian satrap and of a Persian fleet as masters of the Peloponnesian sea and the Saronic gulf was indeed a most lamentable event, and entirely unexpected after the victory at Salamis, the achieve-

* Φιλότιμον μὲν καὶ ἐρρωμένον τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀπειρότερον δὲ τοῦ παρασκευάζεσθαι ὡς δεῖ.

ments at the Eurymedon and at Kyprus, and the Kimonian treaty. But the unfortunate position in which the Hellenic world was placed, of not being able to harmonize liberty and union, was destined to bring upon her still greater misfortunes.

The Rebuilding of the Long Walls.

Pharnabazus, before sailing home, promised to the confederates the assistance of the great king, and left with them a large amount of money. Konon represented to him that the only way to inflict a mortal wound upon the Lacedæmonians was to aid him in rebuilding the long walls at Athens. Pharnabazus, who hated the Lacedæmonians with all the fervency of an Asiatic, eagerly consented, and not only left the fleet at the disposal of Konon, but also gave him a large amount of money with which to carry out his plans. Konon, in 393 B. C., sailed to the Peiræus, and was fortunate in restoring the work of Themistokles, Kimon, and Perikles, and seeing rise once more the walls which in 404 were so triumphantly destroyed by the bitter enemies of the city. Strange indeed it was to behold the Bæotians and the other neighbors, who had taken part with flute and dance in the destruction of the walls, now with equal manifestation of joy assisting in rebuilding them. So complete was the change of sentiment which had come over Hellas within a few years. Only the two long walls were reconstructed which united the Peiræus with the city of Athens. The third or Phaleric wall (a single wall stretching from Athens to Phalerum) was not restored, as it was not necessary to the security either of the city or of the port. In commemoration of his great naval victory, Konon also dedicated a golden wreath in the Acropolis, and caused the erection of a temple in honor of the Knidian Aphrodite, who was worshiped by the people of Knidus with peculiar devotion. The Athenians not only inscribed on a pillar a public resolution immortalizing the deeds of Konon, but also erected a statue in his honor.

At this period the city of Athens seemed to have regained her former appearance. In 403 she had through Thrasybulus recovered her old constitution, and now, through Konon, she had rebuilt her long walls. Constitutions and fortresses, however, do not form the strength of states, but rather the moral force of the citizens. That force had weakened at Athens since the middle of the preceding century, when the execution of the laws became lax. The power of Athens gradually but surely withered, both on account of the undue freedom of social habits and of the incessant uprisings and continuous wars. A proof may be found in the fact that in the battles of Corinth and Koroneia the Athenian hoplites did not exhibit their former courage and endurance, and the honor in both these hard-fought contests was mainly due to the Thebans. Thus the city of Athens was able to restore her constitution and walls, but, since she no longer possessed the moral elements by which she had flourished, she was not destined to regain her former hegemony.

But if Athens was not to rise again to her ancient glory and power, the reconstruction of her walls in the face of her preceding misfortunes was a circumstance such as to astound Sparta. The naval supremacy of the latter was overthrown by the defeat at Knidus ; and by the alliance of Konon with the Persians the former could keep a fleet which not only drove the Spartans from the coasts of the *Ægean* and Asia, but fairly ruled the Peloponnesus itself. True, the Spartans were victorious at Corinth and Koroneia ; but these victories proved insufficient to discourage their enemies, who shortly after inflicted upon them the memorable defeat at Knidus.

Iphikrates.

In the mean time a desultory warfare was carried on, during the ensuing winter and spring, between the garrisons in Corinth and Sikyon. It was now that the Athenian Iphikrates, who was destined to become one of the most noted

generals of antiquity, began his career in the former place. Up to that epoch the best part of the Athenian force was composed of native hoplites, who, through constant drill from their childhood, were skillful in the performance of their military duties. But on account of the change in the life, customs, and opinions of the people, those important duties began to be neglected. The young men passed their time in the company of female flute-players and dancers, and the old in playing at dice and gaming. In fine, the people now occupied themselves more with festivals and illicit pleasures than with the preservation of honor and the welfare of the city.

Since the citizens either avoided military duty, or, even if they served, had no longer the ancient drill, obedience, courage, and ambition, the city was forced to employ, besides the hoplites, many mercenaries; and, in fact, ever since the beginning of the present war, the latter formed the best part of the military force. Iphikrates had his mercenary troops under the strictest discipline, and had introduced many improvements both in their armor and in their clothing. These mercenaries were called peltasts. The *pelta*, whence they derived their name, was a small, light shield, which was first carried by the Thracians, and later was adopted by all the Greeks. These soldiers, though armed more heavily than the light-armed troops, were not at first very useful, because the pelta could not oppose the heavy Hellenic shield. But if the pelta was too light, the Hellenic shield was too heavy to be easily managed.

The genius of Iphikrates obviated these difficulties. He lengthened by one half both the light javelin and the short sword, and also devised a species of shoes, known afterward by the name Iphikratides,* which were easily adjusted and were very light. Thus he rendered his peltasts much more effective than formerly for hand-to-hand contests. The new

* Ἰφικρατίδας ὑποδήσεις.

shoes also materially increased their speed, and they accordingly became on many occasions more effective than the hoplites themselves. If the hoplites maintained their superiority in the open field, the peltasts of Iphikrates were stronger either in suddenly attacking or surrounding an enemy, or in completing the defeat, especially on uneven ground. Iphikrates had already many times routed the allies of the Lacedæmonians, but had not as yet fought against the Lacedæmonians themselves, who on this account scoffed at their allies, saying, "Our friends fear these peltasts as children fear hobgoblins." But they were soon to be severely chastised for this mockery.

Destruction of a Spartan Battalion.

Agesilaus had again assumed command of the army in the Corinthian war, and during April and May, 392, had occupied many cities, and surrounded Corinth in such a way as to cut off communication with Bœotia. The allies were so much alarmed at this new success, that both the Athenians and the Bœotians sent envoys to ask peace. But Agesilaus, breathing immeasurable scorn and hate, especially against the Thebans, sought in every way to humiliate them; and as their envoys approached, he affected not to notice them. Thus haughty, and pleased at the abasement of his opponents, Agesilaus sat in a round pavilion, on the banks of the lake adjoining the Heræum, "with his eyes fixed on the long train of captives brought out under the guard of armed Lacedæmonian hoplites," proudly eying the assembled multitude, when suddenly a messenger appeared on a reeking horse. To the many inquiries he returned no answer, but galloped straight to Agesilaus, before whom he alighted, and with downcast looks delivered his communication. The king immediately started from his seat, seized his spear, and commanded the herald to summon the generals and officers. As they rushed forth, he ordered them to

march without a moment's delay, and that all the battalions that had not dined should snatch a hasty lunch and follow him rapidly. He had not gone far when other horsemen came who confirmed the tidings of disaster. Upon this he ordered a halt, and, heavy at heart, led the army back.

Serious indeed was the news which cut short the triumphant thoughts of Agesilaus. The peltasts of Iphikrates had routed and completely annihilated a Lacedæmonian battalion. This was the greatest loss which his country had sustained for a long time; and, besides being deprived of a number of brave men, there was the additional mortification of having their heavy-armed soldiers beaten by the light-armed, and Lacedæmonians by mercenaries.*

The Amyklæan hoplites had started from Lechæum to return home for the celebration of their great festival, the Hyakinthia. The road from Lechæum to Sikyon lay near the walls of Corinth, and accordingly the polemarch at Lechæum decided to accompany them with his division of six hundred hoplites, and with a *mora* of cavalry (number unknown), until they should be out of danger from the enemy at Corinth. Having accompanied them for fifteen or twenty stadia, he turned back with his division of hoplites to Lechæum; still leaving, however, the cavalry, with orders to its officer to accompany the Amyklæans as much farther as they might choose, and afterward to follow him on the return march.

The polemarch, who was afraid lest the Amyklæans might be attacked from Corinth in their march, never imagined that his division of six hundred Lacedæmonian hoplites was in any danger. Iphikrates allowed the whole body to pass by undisturbed; but when he saw from the walls of Corinth the six hundred hoplites returning without horse or light-armed troops, he conceived the project of attacking them with his peltasts. There were then in Corinth many Athenian hoplites commanded by Kallias, and it was most natural that

* Plutarch.

hoplites should be opposed with hoplites. But Iphikrates was emulous of accomplishing this desperate feat with his peltasts. Kallias arrayed his forces in order of battle not far from the gates, while Iphikrates began his attack on the Lacedæmonian flanks and rear. Approaching within a javelin-throw, he poured upon them a shower of darts and arrows which did deadly execution, especially on the right, since that side was unprotected by the shield. The polemarch directed his phalanx to move forward, but the peltasts still pressed him vigorously. Upon this the polemarch commanded a halt, sent the younger soldiers * to drive off the assailants, and ordered the wounded to be carried forward to Lechæum. But even the young soldiers, encumbered as they were by their heavy shields, could not come up with their nimble enemies. After an unavailing pursuit they sought to regain their ranks, when the attack of the peltasts was resumed, so that some were slain before they could get back. Again did the polemarch give orders to march forward, but the peltasts once more compelled him to halt. Again he dispatched the younger soldiers † (this time all those between eighteen and thirty-three years of age, whereas on the former occasion it had been those between eighteen and twenty-eight) to drive away the enemy. The result was the same as before. Thus was fought this strange battle, in which many of the Lacedæmonians were killed or wounded, while the peltasts became every moment more confident and vigorous. The Laconian cavalry had in the mean time come up, but afforded no relief to the distressed division ; in fact it did not dare to advance farther than the young hoplites had done. Finally, after great loss and exhaustion, the polemarch reached a height of land, distant about a quarter of a mile from the sea and about two miles from Lechæum. Here Iphikrates still continued to harass the hoplites, and Kallias was rapidly approaching to engage them hand to hand, when the Lace-

* τὰ δέκα ἀφ' ἡβης.

† τὰ πεντεκαίδεκα ἀφ' ἡβης.

dæmonians, enfeebled and despairing, fled in disorder, some to Lechæum and others to the nearest coast, where a few boats had put out from the town to rescue them. But the peltasts still pursued and attacked them, so that out of the full muster of six hundred a very small proportion survived to reënter Lechæum.

This was the misfortune the various details of which were reported to the king by the escaped horsemen, and which brought about such a complete change in the exultant thoughts of Agesilaus that morning. The allies of course said nothing more about peace. The Spartans on that occasion displayed their ancestral spirit; for, according to Xenophon, the fathers, brothers, and sons of the slain warriors walked about publicly with cheerful and triumphant countenances, like victorious athletes. But it is certain that they accomplished nothing in Corinth. Agesilaus returned home, and Iphikrates regained most of the disputed districts in Bœotia.

CHAPTER VI.

THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS.

Negotiations.

SPARTA, which had lost her hegemony on the sea, and had been driven from inner Hellas, now began to fear lest she might not be able to hold even her supremacy over the Peloponnesus. Persuaded that she could not by her own forces regain her great influence, at least while the opponents had for ally the king of Persia—and since the continuation of the war was of no benefit to the oligarchy of Sparta, enhancing as it did Agesilaus's power and glory—she decided in 392 B. C. (the same year that the disaster at Corinth took

place) to detach by all possible means the king of Persia from his alliance with the Athenians, Thebans, and her other enemies, and gain him over to her own interests. To this end she sent to Asia the Spartan Antalkidas, a most crafty man, but who had little need of artifice to accomplish his undertaking; for he offered to surrender all the Greeks in Asia to the great king. Sparta had done this formerly in much more prosperous circumstances, so that she had not the least scruple of conscience now, when she was herself endangered, in again sacrificing those unfortunate Greeks. This sacrifice sufficed to detach the king from the league of her opponents, but was not enough to make him her ally. The king of Persia well remembered that the first act of Sparta's hegemony was the expedition against Asia, and it was not likely that he would now be a party to the restoration of a state of affairs capable of bringing new and similar dangers against his dominion. Sparta was well aware of this, and accordingly instructed Antalkidas to offer, not the restoration of her own hegemony, but that the cities of Hellas, both great and small, should remain free. This proposition was advantageous both to the interests of Sparta and of the great king. It was advantageous to the king, because the absolute freedom of every Hellenic city meant the absence of political union, and consequently the weakness of all Hellas. It was advantageous to Sparta, because when Hellas returned to the condition in which she was before the Persian wars—i. e., the Athenians being limited only to Attica, the Thebans to Thebes, and so on—the Lacedæmonians would still be the most powerful Hellenic people, ruling over Laconia and Messenia (countries which they had held from the earliest times), comprising two fifths of the Peloponnesus. But it is evident that this second proposition necessarily brought on a third, that of mutual alliance to secure the fulfillment of its conditions. It was not likely that the Athenians, the Thebans, the Corinthians, and the other great cities of Hellas, would

willingly accept these terms. The Athenians, for instance, already hoped for the recovery, if not of their former supremacy, at least of a part of it; the Thebans laid claim to the supremacy of Bœotia; and the others had similar aspirations. It was necessary that they should be forced to abandon these ambitious projects; but experience had shown that Sparta could not force her will upon Hellas, and she was therefore obliged to ask the king to act jointly with her in this present emergency.

These were the disgraceful propositions of Antalkidas—propositions extremely favorable to the king of Persia. He at once assumed the supremacy of all the Greeks in Asia, and saw Hellas sanctioning the destructive pledge of never again being united in one nation. The worst feature of the matter was that this pledge was given to him; he was recognized as the guardian of Hellenic affairs. But so great was the aversion of King Artaxerxes toward the Spartans, that five full years passed before he was persuaded to accept these propositions. Antalkidas on coming to Asia no longer found Tithraustes satrap of Ionia, but Tiribazus, who entertained no ill feelings toward the Spartans. But Pharnabazus, satrap of a neighboring province, still remembered what he had suffered. Ambassadors also came from the Athenians, Corinthians, and Argeians, together with the Athenian Konon, who strengthened the anti-Spartan dispositions of Pharnabazus. Artaxerxes had not much confidence in the Lacedæmonians, and Tiribazus, though disposed to assist them, could not yet prevail upon the Persian court to show any favor to Antalkidas. Subsequent events evince the great laxity which then existed in the Persian court. While the court opposed Antalkidas, Tiribazus secretly assisted him with money to reënforce the Spartan fleet. At the same time he struck a serious blow at the Athenians by arresting Konon, on the pretense that he was acting contrary to the interests of the king. The removal of an officer of so much

ability—the only man who possessed the confidence of Pharnabazus—was the most fatal of all impediments to the naval renovation of Athens. Konon is said to have been put to death in prison by the Persians, while others assert that he died of sickness in Kyprus, whither he had found means to escape.

In the mean time Tiribazus had occasion to go to the Persian court, and Struthas, a warm friend of the Athenians, was sent down to Ionia as his temporary substitute. He completely defeated the Lacedæmonian army which sallied forth from Ephesus against him, and Thimbron, the commander of the Lacedæmonian forces in Asia, was among the first to fall in the battle. The Athenians also still held their sway over the sea, under their admiral Thrasybulus ; but he was shortly afterward murdered in his tent at Aspendus in Pamphylia, whither he had gone to levy contributions for his forces. The dominion of the Athenians on the coasts adjacent to the Bosporus and the Hellespont was, however, maintained by Iphikrates, whom the Athenians sent as successor to the brave and lofty-minded Thrasybulus.

Decree of Artaxerxes.

In 388 Antalkidas was again sent by the Lacedæmonians to Asia Minor, apparently as an admiral, but really to resume negotiations with the Persians. He went with Tiribazus to Susa, and finally prevailed upon the great king “to please sanction the humiliation and servitude of the Greeks.” To avoid all possible obstacles to the execution of this decree, the king was further induced to invite the satrap Pharnabazus up to the court, and to honor him with his daughter in marriage ; appointing to the satrapy of Daskyleium Ariobarzanes, a personal friend and guest of Antalkidas.

In the spring of 387 Antalkidas and Tiribazus returned to the coast of Asia Minor, bringing not only the royal decree, but also abundant money, with which Antalkidas at

once equipped a fleet, so powerful that the Athenians could not cope against it for want of resources. Antalkidas, knowing that as soon as the Athenians should yield no one would dare to oppose the royal edict, made an exception in behalf of them only, by presenting them with the islands Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros. The Argeians also yearned for peace, because they suffered many devastations through the repeated incursions of the Lacedæmonians into their territory. Thus everything seemed favorable to the success of Sparta at the time when Tiribazus summoned to Sardis the envoys of all the cities to listen to the propositions of peace as expressed in the royal edict.

Tiribazus produced the original edict, and, having first publicly exhibited the royal seal, read aloud as follows : "King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the Hellenic cities in Asia should belong to him, as well as the islands Klazomenæ and Kyprus. He thinks it just also that all the other Hellenic cities, both small and great, should be free, except Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, which are to belong to Athens, as they did originally. Whosoever refuses to accept this peace, him I shall fight, assisted by those who are of the same mind, by land as well as by sea, with ships and with money."

Instructions were given to the ambassadors to communicate this decree to their respective cities, and to meet again at Sparta for its acceptance or rejection. When the time of meeting arrived, though many cities were angry with the Lacedæmonians for their treacherous policy, all were forced to submit. The Thebans alone were inclined not to recognize the royal edict ; but seeing that Agesilaus was ready to march against them with a powerful army, with which they were unable to contend single-handed, they hastened to acknowledge the independence of the Bæotian cities.

Owing to the deplorable state of the Persian empire, Artaxerxes drew no advantage from this circumstance, as Cy-

rus, Darius, or Xerxes himself would have done ; for it must be acknowledged that, had such an opportunity presented itself to any of these despots, the subjection of Hellas would inevitably have followed. Artaxerxes limited himself to securing his supremacy over the unfortunate Greeks in Asia, and left the Lacedæmonians free to arrange matters in Hellas as they best could. The Lacedæmonians again, on account of the isolated character of the cities, succeeded in a few years, if not in recovering their former supremacy, at least in securing a tyrannical rule. But the rest of the Hellenic world was never deceived in its judgment concerning this affair. Owing to this decree, a great portion of the Hellenic nation was surrendered to the foreigner ; by this decree, Hellas wrote with her own hand her political condemnation, declaring that she would henceforth never unite in one kingdom ; finally, by this decree, which the Greeks were compelled to write out upon stone columns in their common sanctuaries, the disgrace and decrepitude of Hellas were publicly made known.

Worst of all was the fate of the surrendered Greeks in Asia. The satraps hastened to enforce their authority over them ; they erected citadels in the principal cities, and established garrisons ; they destroyed many cities, making slaves of the inhabitants, and forcing into their harems the most comely maidens. Chios, Samos, Rhodes, and other islands adjacent to the Asiatic coast, were exposed to the will of their powerful neighbors. They were not individually a match for the combined forces of Asia, and there was no fleet in Hellas to assist them. Only Evagoras the Kyprian fought bravely against the Persian supremacy, but even he was at last compelled to succumb, though he was allowed to retain possession of Salamis, with the title of king. This occurred in 385 B. C., and in 374 both he and his valiant son Pnytagoras were assassinated. Nikokles, son of Evagoras, reigned at Salamis after him ; and it is to him that the Athe-

nian orator Isokrates wrote the well-known letter "How to Rule,"* and another "Of Advice."

While the Greeks in Asia and those adjacent to the coast were thus abandoned to the despotism of the emissaries of the great king, the cities in Hellas suffered much from the Lacedæmonians. They broke up the Corinthian alliance, forced Corinth to become their own ally, and again compelled Argos to remain neutral. They sought in every way to prevent the supremacy of the Thebans in Bœotia, and to this end they organized oligarchical forms of government in all the Bœotian towns, and over many they placed Lacedæmonian garrisons and governors. They rebuilt the city of Plataea, and collected there the remnant of its unfortunate inhabitants, not in order to grant them autonomy, but to use them as tools for their own tyranny and interests. By instituting a Lacedæmonian guard and governor there, they both separated Athens from Thebes, and also increased the hostile bulwarks with which they surrounded this latter city. The Lacedæmonians, not content with the isolation of these places, sought their destruction, as in the case of Mantinea. This city had been formed by the union of five hamlets. The Spartans, seizing upon some pretext of its having furnished corn in time of war to the hostile Argeians, and plainly manifested its disaffected feeling toward Sparta, besieged it, and, after accomplishing its overthrow, compelled all who had formerly moved to Mantinea to return to their respective cities. Thenceforward Mantinea remained only a simple hamlet. The two years following the peace of Antalkidas were spent in the exercise of this despotic rule in Hellas, and in the third was undertaken a much greater and more disastrous work.

The Olynthian Confederacy.

During the Peloponnesian war Perdikkas II, king of

* *Περὶ τοῦ βασιλεύειν ἢ περὶ βασιλείας.*

Macedonia, anxious to divert the attention of the Athenians from the coasts of his country, eagerly assisted the Hellenic cities of Chalkidike in their wars against the Athenians, and advised them to fortify Olynthus and make that city "their headquarters." The peninsula of Chalkidike ends in three extremities or points, which run out into the Ægean—Pallene (now Kassandra), Akte (Hagion-Oros), and Sithonia (Longus). At the head of the Toronaic Gulf, which lies between Sithonia and Pallene, was situated Olynthus, surrounded by an extensive and fertile plain.

The advice of King Perdikkas brought very good results. Olynthus, availing herself of the strifes which arose in Macedonia after the death of that king, and also of the existing war in Hellas, succeeded in establishing a strong confederacy, in which not only many Hellenic cities on the coast were included, but also many Macedonian cities and districts. During the present year (387 B. C.), when Amyntas II ruled in Macedonia, the Olynthians extended their union so as to comprehend all the larger towns in this region—including even Pella, the capital of Macedonia, and the most considerable city of the country.

The Olynthian confederacy, concerning which, unfortunately, we do not possess much accurate information, is one of the most noted institutions in Hellenic history. We find here established, to some extent, the principle of political union on the basis of equality. Olynthus was the capital of the confederacy, but was not a mistress, like Athens and Sparta, exercising its sway over the smaller cities. This shows what an extent and power this coalition might have acquired, if an evil spirit had not called forth the interference of the Lacedæmonians before the union had time to strengthen itself. When we consider that this confederacy, renewed and strengthened, was able by its very position to render futile the attempts of Philip against Hellas, made a few years later, and when we see the strongest city in Hellas

furiously hastening the destruction of that great bulwark of Hellenic liberty, we are forced to believe that there is a fate which drags nations to an inevitable doom.

It has been stated that most of the cities in Chalkidike eagerly united with the Olynthians. But there were a few which preferred their individual autonomy, and said, "We wish to make use of our ancestral laws and be free citizens."* Akanthus and Apollonia were next to Olynthus the largest cities, and they acted in this spirit. They could not be prevailed upon to sacrifice a part of their ancient laws for the common good of the confederacy; and, deeming the narrow privileges of a citizen more precious than the larger and more important rights of the union, they sought in 382 the intervention of Sparta. At the same time Amyntas II sent envoys to solicit aid against Olynthus. Seeing his kingdom daily becoming weaker, and running the risk of being consolidated into the powerful Olynthian confederacy, and driven almost to despair by the enterprise of the Olynthians, he did not hesitate to ask for Spartan intervention, although he must have known that no Spartan blood was ever spilt for the cause of Hellenic liberty, unless the independence of Sparta was immediately threatened. Sparta hastened to send to Chalkidike the general Eudamidas, assigning to him two thousand hoplites; while his brother Phœbidas was left behind to collect a second army and hasten to Macedonia. The instructions given to these generals were very simple: "We demand of you the abolition of the Olynthian confederacy."

Occupation of Thebes.

This expedition, in itself so uncalled for, was destined to produce other and more serious consequences. While Phœbidas was marching through Bœotia on his way to Chalkidike, he was urged by Leontiades, one of the polemarchs of

* Βουλόμεθα τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι καὶ αὐτοπολιταὶ εἶναι.

Thebes, and a friend of Sparta, to seize the castle called the Kadmeia, drive the party of Ismenias, his democratic colleague, out of the city, and put the administration into the hands of the nobility, subject to the oversight of the Lacedæmonians.

Phœbidas, though having no such orders, was nevertheless persuaded that this would be a great and useful work for his country; and he accordingly occupied the Kadmeia with the connivance of Leontiades, who proceeded without delay to Sparta, to make known the fact that "order reigned at Thebes." The Spartans at first pretended to be displeased at the violation of the treaty; but a few days later, on the proposition of Agesilaus, they officially recognized the act of Phœbidas and sentenced Ismenias to death. Thus Sparta, by becoming the mistress of Thebes in 382, gave a fresh proof of her slight reverence for Hellenic autonomy; for, though by more recent writers it is said that she took the command of the army from Phœbidas, and imposed upon him a fine of ten thousand drachmæ,* yet no such thing is mentioned by Xenophon. Even if this is true, it does not lessen the atrocity of the high-handed violence, but, on the contrary, heightens it; for in that case, while punishing the actor, they authorized the action.

Sparta hastened to send another army of ten thousand men to Macedonia, under command of Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus. Teleutias was a brave and competent officer; nevertheless, the conquest of Olynthus was found no easy matter. The Olynthians met the Spartans with the greatest courage and dexterity, fighting like brave men for their homes and autonomy. They finally succeeded in completely routing the Lacedæmonians, and Teleutias was himself slain. But the Lacedæmonians, who were then in the fullness of their power over Hellas (notwithstanding the independence of the cities guaranteed by the peace of Antalki-

* Plutarch.

das), dispatched a still greater army, under command of their king Agesipolis. Much success was obtained, but the extreme heat of the summer presently brought upon the king a fever, which proved fatal within a week. Polybiades, who succeeded him in the command (379), compelled the Olynthians to seek peace, to dissolve their confederacy, and to enroll themselves in that of the Spartans. The remaining cities of the now shattered league were received as allies of Sparta, while those which formerly belonged to Macedonia passed again under the dominion of Amyntas.

CHAPTER VII.

LIBERATION OF THEBES.

Condition of the Hellenic World.

THUS was destroyed the wisest institution that the Hellenes established during the first period of their history, and the strongest bulwark of Hellas in the north. While Sparta was accomplishing this, she at the same time compelled the Phliasians to surrender at discretion to Agesilaus, who named a council of one hundred, "vested with absolute powers of life and death over all citizens, and authorized to frame a constitution for the future government of the city." Thus, in 379 B. C., Sparta seemed to have accomplished by the peace of Antalkidas what she had not effected by her own achievements during the Peloponnesian war. On this account many historians extend her supremacy up to this period, asserting that "the empire of the Lacedæmonians on land had reached a pitch never before paralleled."* But, strictly speaking, she had not only officially abandoned her

* Grote, vol. ix, chap. lxxvii, p. 288.

supremacy by the peace of Antalkidas, but had in fact never regained that power which she had obtained by the capture of Athens and completed by the triumphs of Agesilaus in Asia. In 379 all the Greeks in Asia were writhing under the despotic rule of the great king, and the islands adjacent to the coast gradually fell under the sway of the eastern monarch. Many islands near Hellas, such as Naxos, Tenos, Andros, Siphnos, Seriphos, and others, joined the new confederacy which Athens organized about this time.

Availing herself of her daily increasing commerce, the restoration of her walls, the nautical dexterity of her inhabitants, and, above all, of the feeling of discontent against the ascendancy of Sparta, which was now widely spread, Athens sent envoys to the principal islands and maritime cities in the *Ægean*, inviting all of them to an alliance on equal and honorable terms. Thus, if Athens never recovered the formidable power which was lost at the close of the Peloponnesian war, yet she was at sea always stronger than Sparta, to which only a few islands rendered obedience. Sparta ruled only continental Hellas, if the term may be used. But Argos, Attica, and much of Thessaly escaped her supremacy; and in fact, so strong was the indignation against her which existed all over Hellas and among her allies, that it was evident that the smallest spark would be sufficient to burn to ashes that insecure edifice.

While a large portion of Hellenism was kept under the rule of the barbarians, another under that of the Macedonians, and a third groaned under the tyrannical supremacy of the Lacedæmonians; while hither Hellenism was enslaved, scattered, humiliated—western Hellenism, once so powerful and so glorious, now suffered in the extreme at the hands of Dionysius the Elder. This tyrant subjugated and destroyed many Hellenic cities in Sicily and Italy, and at the same time was forced to humiliate himself before the Carthaginians, to whom he allotted a considerable part of Sicily. It

was also reported that he had entered into negotiations with the king of Persia for a joint attack upon Hellas, and its division between them. He was thus the ally of Sparta, which was regarded by all as the betrayer of the interests of Hellenism. The affairs of Sparta, however, were conducted by Agesilaus, who was confessedly not only one of the greatest generals of ancient Hellas, but one of her most Panhellenic men. But alas for the statesman condemned to serve a political system innately faulty and breeding pestilence from its very foundations! However high-minded he may be, it is impossible that he should not succumb to the influence of the atmosphere which he breathes. Thus we see Agesilaus, who had begun his career as a Panhellenist, destined to pass the greater part of his remaining life fighting against Greeks, and inviting upon himself and his country the curses and execrations of the Hellenic world.

Never did the indignation of Hellenism burst forth so generally as during these years. This sentiment was spread by two citizens of that city which, after having ceased to occupy politically the first rank in Hellas, still kept abreast of all through her eloquence. These two citizens were Lysias and Isokrates. Lysias delivered an oration at Olympia during the 99th Olympiad (384 B. C.), three years after the peace of Antalkidas, of which unfortunately only a fragment is preserved by Dionysius of Halikarnassus. In this he forcibly demonstrated the dangers to which Hellas was exposed from the king of Persia and the tyrant of Syracuse. Recognizing the Spartans as the rulers of Hellas, he wonders how they can endure to see their country the center of a flaming circle fast closing in upon her, and urges them to march against those enemies before they, uniting their forces, shall lay violent hands not only on Hellas, but on the very autonomy of Sparta.

To understand fully the impression which this Olympiac oration of Lysias produced, we must bear in mind that the

festival of 384 was the first that had taken place since the peace of Antalkidas. Consequently, a large throng of Greeks were present who, on account of the Bæotian and Corinthian wars, had not been able to attend the two former festivals (392 and 388). There were besides present many a *theoria*, or company of state ambassadors of the Greeks in Asia, who had been surrendered by Sparta to the Persians, as well as many Italian and Sicilian Greeks, who suffered severely under the tyranny of Dionysius. In a word, not only was the attendance much larger than on former occasions, but the feelings of the audience were intensely excited on account of the slavery into which they had fallen, the disgrace which the Hellenic name had suffered, and the danger threatening the autonomy of the remaining portion of the nation. But, worst of all, there was present a legation sent by Dionysius himself, under the management of his brother Thearides, which was perhaps the most magnificent that ever came to Olympia. Its members were clothed with rich vestments, and lodged in a tent of extraordinary splendor, decorated with gold and purple. Dionysius also sent some excellent rhapsodists to recite poems composed by himself; for that tyrant had an ambition even to compose poems, and believed fully in the great glory which they would bring. But the very magnificence of this legation was calculated to arouse the indignation of the multitude, who knew that all this pomp was the result of the plunder of many Hellenic cities. The indignation was still more inflamed by the speech of Lysias, who in eloquent words held up before them the picture of "the sacred plain of Olympia insulted by the spectacle of wealth extorted from Grecian sufferers." The multitude, unable to control their feelings, scoffed at the poems of the tyrant, and even assailed his tent.

This demonstration, though in itself so significant, made no impression on the Lacedæmonians, who shortly after declared the foolish war against the Olynthians and committed

the atrocious assault upon the rights of the Thebans. Hence the common indignation against them continued, and was again manifested during the next celebration (380). Isokrates then delivered his famous panegyric oration, and spoke out more plainly than Lysias. He denounced the Lacedæmonians as traitors to the general security and liberty of Hellas, and as seconding foreign potentates as well as Grecian despots merely to satisfy their disgusting covetousness. "No wonder," he exclaimed, "that the free and autonomous Hellenic world is daily drawn into a narrower space, when the presiding city, Sparta, assists Artaxerxes, Amyntas, and Dionysius to mutilate and absorb it, and herself makes unjust aggressions against Thebes, Olynthus, Phlius, and Mantinea."

These sentiments of universal disapprobation were destined to inflict upon Sparta a mortal wound. After the destruction of the Olynthians and the Phliasians, her power seemed unconquerable. But within a few months she suffered an insult at the hands of the Thebans destined to be followed by a long train of misfortunes which should dash her from her triumphant height to extreme humiliation. How just indeed was the hate entertained among all the Greeks toward the Lacedæmonians is evidenced from the very words of Xenophon, who was alike conspicuous for his philo-Laconian sentiments and for his dislike of Thebes; for he openly charges the Lacedæmonians "with having entered into the citadel, with the deliberate purpose that Thebes should be enslaved to Sparta, in order that they themselves might rule despotically." But the hour of retribution had already come.

Thebes.

For three years Thebes suffered greatly from the tyranny of Leontiades and his oligarchical followers, who were upheld by the Spartan garrison in the Kadmeia. The tyrants not only oppressed their fellow citizens at home, but even sought by the most nefarious means to assassinate the three

or four hundred who had fled to Athens at the first seizure of their leader Ismenias. They sent hired assassins to Athens to take them off by private murder; but all escaped excepting Androkleides, chief of the band, and successor of the deceased Ismenias. The tyrants next asked the Athenians "not to harbor or encourage exiles, but to drive them out as persons declared by the confederates to be common enemies." Letters to the same effect were sent to the Athenians from Sparta. But the Athenians, says Plutarch, in gratitude to the city of Thebes for the generous spirit which had been shown by the Thebans twenty-four years before to Thrasybulus and the other Athenian refugees during the domination of the Thirty, would not suffer the least injury to be done to the exiles.

The latter, who from the first had determined upon the liberation of their country, seeing themselves exposed to imminent dangers, hastened the execution of their plans. They had many sympathizers at Thebes, and were in constant communication with them. Of all the auxiliaries, the most effective was Phyllidas, who so successfully concealed from the tyrants his true sentiments, that he was not only deemed worthy of their confidence, but was sent to Athens on official business. While there he entered into secret conference with the fugitives, and especially with Mellon, and immediate measures were adopted for the overthrow of the tyrants.

Accordingly, in December, 379, the fugitives Pelopidas and Mellon, together with five of their companions, disguised in the dress of peasants, entered the town at different points in open daylight. They were forthwith conducted by those that were concerned in the affair to the appointed rendezvous, the house of Charon, where they remained concealed all the ensuing day. In the evening, through the assistance of their confederates, they killed the two polemarchs, Archias and Philippus, while they were feasting at the house of Phyl-

lidas. They also killed Leontiades at his own house, freed the prisoners, and proclaimed liberty. Epaminondas also—who now for the first time comes before us—heartily engaged in the promotion of the undertaking. Soon after the other fugitives arrived from Athens, as did also a body of Athenian volunteers, together with two generals who were privy to the plot. Thus Pelopidas and his party were considerably strengthened.

The whole city was now in terror and confusion; houses were filled with lights, and the streets with men running to and fro. Pelopidas was elected governor of Bœotia, together with Mellon and Charon. He immediately blocked up and attacked the citadel, hastening to drive out the Lacedæmonians and recover the Kadmeia before succor could arrive from Sparta.* The siege was vigorously pushed, and finally, when “undisturbed egress from Thebes, with the honors of war, was guaranteed to the garrison by oath, the Kadmeia was surrendered” (January, 378 B. C.).

This daring act, which was called by the Greeks sister to that of Thrasybulus, shook to its foundations the whole Hellenic world. But the change of affairs which followed upon this action rendered it still more glorious. For the war, says Plutarch, which humbled the pride of the Spartans, and deprived them of their empire, took its rise from that night when Pelopidas, without taking town or castle, but being only one out of twelve† who entered a private house, loosened and broke to pieces the chains of the Spartan government.

The murder of Leontiades and his friends, perpetrated during the night while in their homes and at the banquet, arouses in a modern reader a feeling of repugnance, especially when we consider that it was accomplished by men belonging to the highest class of society. But such were the customs and political opinions of the Hellenes, that all ap-

* Plutarch.

† The number is variously estimated from seven to twelve.

proved that splendid revenge in return for the occupation of the Kadmeia and the death of Ismenias, and all admired the personal daring of the few men who with one blow overthrew a government heretofore deemed impregnable. That we may fully understand the fact that the most prominent and richest men in Hellas did not hesitate to incur such danger, let us not forget that, from the Homeric Odysseus and Achilles to Aratus and Philopœmen, the rich Greek did not cease to contend in the *palæstra*, endeavoring to surpass the poor not only in money, but in valor and bodily strength.

Although it was winter, Sparta hastened to send an army against the Thebans. Agesilaus declined to lead it, on the ground that he was above sixty years of age, and therefore no longer liable to compulsory foreign service ; but this was not his real reason. Xenophon says that he was afraid to appear again (as he had lately done in the case of the Phliasians) in arms against Greeks in order to uphold tyranny. It may therefore be conjectured that the king had begun to tire of the vain and incessant warfare to which fortune had condemned him. Accordingly, Kleombrotus, the other king of Sparta, took the command. He entered Bœotia, remained a few days, and then returned to the Peloponnesus without accomplishing anything.

The expedition, however, brought on some serious consequences. While Kleombrotus was passing through the outskirts of Attica, he sent to Athens three Lacedæmonian envoys to demand satisfaction "for the part taken by the two Athenian generals and the Athenian volunteers in concerting and aiding the enterprise of Pelopidas and his comrades." The Athenians were still so anxious to avoid giving offense to Sparta, that they forthwith killed one of the two generals, while the other escaped, and a sentence of banishment was passed against him. But while this sentence indicates the dread the Athenians still had of the Lacedæmonians, the harmost Sphodrias (a man of courage and am-

bition, but governed rather by sanguine hopes than good sense and prudence*), whom Kleombrotus had left at Thespiæ to prosecute the war against Thebes, was persuaded that it would be a much greater and more glorious performance if, without any directions from his superior, he could, in the midst of peace, seize upon the Peiræus, and deprive the Athenians of the empire of the sea by a sudden attack on land. This violent attempt failed; and, since the Spartans did not punish Sphodrias, the Athenians entered into alliance with the Thebans, and prepared for war.

It was about this time that the Athenians, assisted by their generals Chabrias, Timotheus, Konon, and Kallistratus, began vigorously to increase their dominion at sea. But, however great the eagerness and the zeal displayed by the Athenians in the prosecution of their object, they now occupied only a secondary place in Hellenic history. The new hegemony, which was far from reaching the glory of the former, was a few years afterward again lost through the tyranny and selfishness of Athens. Wavering indeed and inconstant was also the policy of Athens on this occasion, now allying herself with the Thebans, now abandoning them, and again openly siding with the Spartans. The freedom of Hellas from Spartan despotism is due to Thebes, and to Thebes only. The virtues of this city gilded the clouds which began to collect over the setting sun of the first Hellenism, and to this city we must now turn our attention.

* Plutarch.

